Spinden, Tina Stanford the Estate of et al v. Colvin
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJs determination that Spinden be denied Social Security benefits be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead on 9/16/2015. (las)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION
Estate of TINA S. SPINDEN,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 1:14-cv-00132-DBP
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead
Defendant.
The parties consented to this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt.
13.) Plaintiff Tina Spinden (“Spinden”) appeals the decision of the Acting Commissioner of
Social Security (Commissioner) denying her claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and
supplemental security income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the Act),
42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., 1381 et seq. Having considered the parties’ briefs, the administrative
record, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s
decision.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case involves Spinden’s May 2009 applications for disability insurance benefits
(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act
(the Act) (Administrative Record (Tr.) at 277–88). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1381-1383c.
Spinden alleged that she became disabled on October 24, 2008 (Tr. 35–36, 42, 386). An
administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing and issued an April 29, 2011 decision
(Tr. 124–35). The Appeals Council vacated that decision and ordered the ALJ to obtain and
consider additional evidence and consider additional issues (Tr. 141–43). The ALJ then
rendered a de novo decision on May 6, 2013, finding that Spinden was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act prior to August 5, 2009, but became disabled within the meaning of the Act
on August 5, 2009 (Tr. 12–25). The Appeals Council denied Spinden’s request for review
(Tr. 1–4, 7), making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.981, 416.1481, 422.210(a). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT LAW
a.
Definition of disability under the Act
The Act states that an individual “shall be determined to be under a disability only if [her]
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to
do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The inability to perform such work must last, or be
expected to last, at least 12 consecutive months. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214–15
(2002).
b.
Process for determining disability under the Act
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, Social Security regulations set forth a
five-step sequential evaluation process. That process requires the adjudicator to consider
whether a disability claimant: (1) engaged in substantial gainful activity during the alleged period
of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had a condition that met or medically equaled the
severity of a listed impairment; (4) could return to [her] past relevant work; and, if not, (5) could
perform other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a
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decision regarding the claimant’s disability can be reached at any step in the sequential
evaluation process, further evaluation is unnecessary. Id.
c.
Standard of review
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether substantial
evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Court may neither reweigh the
evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Id. Where the evidence as a whole
can support either the agency’s decision or an award of benefits, the court must affirm the
agency’s decision. Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Spinden raises two objections to the ALJ’s decision. First, Spinden argues
that the ALJ did not properly consider and weigh the opinion of Mark Corgiat, Ph.D., who
conducted a consultative psychological examination in September 2009 (Tr. 517–21). Second,
Spinden argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the credibility of her hearing testimony that
she could not work due to mental symptoms.
a.
Dr. Corgiat’s report is not inconsistent with the ALJ’s decision.
An ALJ must consider the opinions of acceptable medical sources, such as psychologists.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Medical opinions are statements from acceptable
medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments,
including her symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what she can still do despite her
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impairment(s), and her physical or mental restrictions. Id. at §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2).
If the ALJ’s findings conflict with the opinion of an acceptable medical source, he must explain
why the opinion was not adopted. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7.
Here, after examining Spinden, Dr. Corgiat assessed that Spinden suffered from anxiety
disorder and major depressive disorder (Tr. 520). He explained that Spinden did not have
agoraphobia, but “simply has significant anxiety whenever she is confronted with any novel or
unpredictable situation” (Tr. 517–19). Based on Spinden’s reports, he noted that she had been
largely dysfunctional for several years, had received treatment for depression and anxiety, and
was currently experiencing significant symptoms related to those conditions (Tr. 521). Of note,
he did not opine that Spinden could not or should not work (Tr. 517–21).
The ALJ discussed Dr. Corgiat’s opinion in his decision (Tr. 19). The ALJ did not
express a particular weight he had assigned to Dr. Corgiat’s opinion. The ALJ did, however, state
that he had determined that “the medical record does not contain any opinions from treating or
examining physicians indicating that [Spinden] was disabled or that she had limitations greater
than those determined in this decision prior to August 5, 2009” (Tr. 22); the date on which the
ALJ found Spinden to be disabled (Tr. 25).
The Court is convinced that the ALJ adequately considered and addressed Dr. Corgiat’s
opinion and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that his decision was
consistent with Dr. Corgiat’s opinion through August 5, 2009. For example, the ALJ apparently
accepted Dr. Corgiat’s assessment that Spinden’s generalized anxiety disorder and depression
were significant conditions when he found them to be severe impairments at step two of the
Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation (Tr. 15). Among other limitations, the ALJ
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found that Spinden’s decreased attention and concentration would limit her to simple, routine
work; occasional job contact with coworkers and supervisors; and, “due to some minor difficulty
adapting to changes, she requires a slightly longer than average time to adjust to changes in
routine” (Tr. 16). Based on the evidence of record, the ALJ could reasonably conclude that
these limitations were consistent with Dr. Corgiat’s findings (Tr. 517–21).
Although Dr. Corgiat did state that Spinden had been “largely dysfunctional for several
years,” the Court finds no basis in the administrative record or relevant law that such a statement
should be interpreted as “disabled” or “unable to work.” Such an interpretation is not justified by
the record here. Two state agency psychologists considered Spinden’s medical records, including
Dr. Corgiat’s examination report, and assessed mental functional limitations largely consistent
with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding (Tr. 16, 22, 531-44, 553–55, 582). And, as
the ALJ noted, Spinden testified that although she had significant depression- and anxiety-related
symptoms, being busy and doing constructive things might decrease those symptoms; that she
never had any problems getting along with coworkers; that she helped take care of her disabled
mother and daughter; and that she had no problem using public transportation (Tr. 17–18, 48–49,
62, 89–92, 100–01).
In short, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ’s decision demonstrates
that he adequately considered and addressed Dr. Corgiat’s opinion.
b.
The ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility
An ALJ considers a variety of factors when evaluating a claimant’s testimony about her
pain and other symptoms, including mental symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c).
An ALJ may consider the consistency of an individual’s statements, both internally and with
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other information in the case record. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5. If a claimant
performs significant work, an ALJ may find that work indicates the claimant was “able to do
more work than [she] actually did,” even though the work performed was not substantial gainful
activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571, 416.971. If an ALJ’s credibility findings are supported by
substantial evidence, those findings merit particular deference. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395
F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the
finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial
evidence.” (quotation and citation omitted)).
Although Spinden alleged that her depression and anxiety were disabling, she also
testified that her medications helped alleviate her symptoms. (Tr. 52–53) Spinden further
testified that: she helped take care of her disabled mother and disabled adult daughter (Tr. 82,
89–92; 106, see also Tr. 518); she could take public transportation without difficulty (Tr. 62);
that she could care for herself and help clean the living area she shared with her mother and
daughter (Tr. 89–92); and she never had problems getting along with coworkers (Tr. 59).
Further, as discussed above, Spinden admitted that it was possible for her to consistently work
five days a week, eight hours per day, depending on her degree of depression and anxiety, and
that doing something constructive might actually decrease her symptoms from those conditions
(Tr. 100–01). It was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Spinden’s other statements and her
ability to perform activities requiring significant responsibility and contact with others
contradicted her allegations of disabling depression and anxiety. Accordingly, this Court agrees
with the Commissioner that the ALJ’s credibility findings are supported by substantial evidence
and should not be disturbed.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from harmful
legal error. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s determination that Spinden
be denied Social Security benefits be AFFIRMED.
Dated this 16th day of September, 2015.
_________________________________
DUSTIN B. PEAD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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