Castaldo v. Horne

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court Remands Plaintiff's state law claims to the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brooke C. Wells on 6/22/2017. (las)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION
KARA LYNN CASTALDO,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:15-cv-149-BCW

OWEN HORNE,
Magistrate Judge Brooke Wells
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Horne’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. 1 Plaintiff has opposed the motion 2 and Defendant replied. 3 This Court has
jurisdiction of this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) as both parties have consented to have this
case heard by the assigned Magistrate Judge. 4
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts three causes of action against Officer Horne: (1) illegal
expansion of a traffic stop, (2) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) excessive force and unreasonable seizure under Article I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution. 5 Plaintiff is seeking no less than $100,000 in damages. Officer Horne is seeking
summary judgment on all causes of action based on qualified immunity because Plaintiff did not
suffer a constitutional violation and Officer Horne did not violate clearly established law.

1

Docket No. 20.

2

Docket No. 23.

3

Docket No. 24.

4

Docket No. 8.

5

Docket No. 2.

BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of July 18, 2015, Plaintiff was driving home from work 6 when
she was pulled over by Defendant Horne. There is a dash-cam video that depicts the events that
occurred that night, starting when Defendant Horne began following Plaintiff’s vehicle. 7
Defendant Horne pulled Plaintiff over because she had a brake light that was not functioning.
Plaintiff pulled over right after Defendant put his overhead lights on. Plaintiff did not fully roll
her window down. 8 Defendant requested that Plaintiff roll her window down, and Plaintiff
replied that it was rolled down. Because Plaintiff did not roll the window down any further,
Defendant requested that Plaintiff exit the vehicle. Plaintiff did not exit the vehicle.
Defendant then orders Plaintiff to exit the vehicle and explains that he would like to
conduct the rest of the stop outside the vehicle. Plaintiff holds her papers sticking out of the
window (her hand does not come past the rolled up window). Defendant did not take the papers.
Defendant opens Plaintiff’s vehicle door and explains that she can either exit the vehicle or go to
jail for refusing to follow his orders. Plaintiff remained in her vehicle. Defendant orders Plaintiff
out of the vehicle a number of times, and Plaintiff remained in the vehicle. Finally, Defendant
reached into the vehicle, released Plaintiff’s seatbelt, and started to pull Plaintiff out of the
vehicle. As Defendant grabbed Plaintiff’s left arm to pull her from the vehicle Plaintiff grabbed
the steering wheel with her right arm. After a minor struggle, Defendant was able to remove
Plaintiff from the vehicle.
6

Plaintiff worked as a bartender at the Barrelhouse bar on 24th Street in Ogden.

7

The Court will “view[ ] the facts in the light depicted by the video[recording],” and will not “adopt a party’s
version of the facts where ‘there is clear contrary video evidence.’” Valencia v. De Luca, 612 F. App’x 512, 514
(10th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 546 (2015), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 997 (2016).
8

Although the parties disagree on exactly how far the window was rolled down, the dash-cam video shows that
the window was rolled down less than a third of the way and may be even less than that.

2

Once outside the vehicle, Defendant placed Plaintiff’s wrists behind her back. He
handcuffed Plaintiff behind her back and double locked the handcuffs. Plaintiff was searched
incident to arrest and placed into the backseat of the patrol car. Thereafter, Defendant conducted
an inventory or search of Plaintiff’s vehicle 9 and Plaintiff’s vehicle was towed for a hold.
Plaintiff was transported to Weber County jail and booked. Plaintiff was cited for a lamp
violation (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6A-1604) and interference with arresting officer (Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-305).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In general, summary judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 10 Under this
standard, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but that
party must set forth specific facts as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of
proof in order to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” 11 “However, summary judgement
decisions involving a qualified immunity defense are subject to a somewhat different analysis on
review than are other summary judgment rulings.” 12
“When a claim of qualified immunity is raised in a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s actions violated a specific statutory or
constitutional right, and ‘the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated
9

Under Utah law, Plaintiff claims this was an illegal search of her vehicle and Defendant claims this was a legal
inventory taken prior to towing the vehicle. As discussed later in this decision, the Court does not reach Plaintiff’s
state law claims.
10

Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc., 111 F.3d
794, 797 (10th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 935 (1997)).
11

Id. (quoting Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1993)).

12

Id. (citing Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995)).

3

were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.’” 13 Then “[t]he trial court decides as
a matter of law whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, state a claim for violation of a clearly
established constitutional right.” 14 “‘Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established,
there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains.’” 15 Thus, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to show the defendants violated a constitutional or
statutory right, or that the asserted violation was clearly established under the law, the defendant
is entitled to qualified immunity.” 16
ANALYSIS
“The principles of qualified immunity shield an officer from personal liability when an
officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.” 17 “If the law [does]
not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment
based on qualified immunity is appropriate.” 18
A two prong analysis has been established to determine whether Defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity. “A court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . or
shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 19 The court must also “decide whether

13

Id. (quoting Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)).

14

Id. (citing Romero, 45 F.3d at 1475).

15

Id. (quoting Albright, 51 F.3d at 1535).

16

Id.

17

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009).

18

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2001).

19

Person, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).

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the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” 20
The Tenth Circuit has stated that qualified immunity will “protect all but the plainly
incompetent, or those who knowingly violate the law.” 21
A. Defendant did Not Illegally Expand the Stop
Defendant Horne testified that when Plaintiff initially failed to obey his command to roll
down her window, he “was unable to see the vehicle and maintain a tactical advantage.” 22 He
further testified that he felt Plaintiff posed an immediate threat:
[Plaintiff] could have had weapons, guns, a vehicle bomb. I had no idea. All I
know is that she’s not behaving normally. It was an extreme, unusual
circumstance and therefore it was an unknown threat. It could have been very
serious to me.
The Supreme Court acknowledged such officer safety concerns in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 23 as they “specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he
approaches a person seated in an automobile.” 24 The Pennsylvania Court went on to note “we
have expressly declined to accept the argument that traffic violations necessarily involve less
danger to officers than other types of confrontations.” 25 In carefully weighing these safety
considerations, the Supreme Court found:
Against this important interest we are asked to weigh the intrusion into the
driver's personal liberty occasioned not by the initial stop of the vehicle,
20

Id.

21

Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 101 F. App’x 795, 799 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gross v. Pirtle, 245 F.3d
1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2001)).
22

Docket no. 20-2, Transcript (Tr.) p. 50, ln. 5-6.

23

434 U.S. 106 (1977)

24

Id. at 110 (“According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occur when a police officer
approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings—A Tactical Evaluation, 54
J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963)”).
25

Id. at 110.

5

which was admittedly justified, but by the order to get out of the car. We think
this additional intrusion can only be described as de minimis. The driver is
being asked to expose to view very little more of his person than is already
exposed. The police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be
briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting
in the driver's seat of his car or standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence
of the police on the latter choice not a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person,” but it hardly rises to the level of a “‘petty indignity.’” Terry v.
Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 17, 88 S.Ct. at 1877. What is at most a mere
inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for
the officer's safety. 26
Accordingly, this Court finds that Defendant Horne was acting lawfully and did not
violate any constitutional right when he asked Plaintiff to exit her vehicle.
B. Defendant did Not Use Excessive Force in Removing Plaintiff from Her Vehicle
This Court also must determine whether Defendant Horne violated a constitutional right
when he physically removed Plaintiff from her vehicle. “There is no doubt that Graham v.
Connor 27 clearly establishes the general proposition that use of force is contrary to the Fourth
Amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness.” 28 However, “that
right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” 29
The Supreme Court held in Graham, “that claims of excessive force in the context of
arrests or investigatory stops should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective

26

Id. at 111 (footnote omitted).

27

490 U.S. 386 (1989).

28

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-202.

29

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

6

reasonableness standard,’ not under substantive due process principles.” 30 “Because ‘police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation,’ . . . the reasonableness of the officer’s belief as to the appropriate level of force should
be judged from that on-scene perspective.” 31
Graham requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case,” including the following factors “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 32 However, the qualified immunity
inquiry goes a step further by “acknowledge[ing] reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal
constraints on particular police conduct.” 33
In the case at bar, Defendant physically removed Plaintiff from her vehicle when she
refused to exit the vehicle after Defendant ordered her out of the vehicle a number of times. In
removing Plaintiff from the vehicle, Plaintiff resisted by holding on to the steering wheel
creating a struggle for Defendant Horne to remove her. Plaintiff claims that Defendant used
unlawful excessive force when he removed her from the vehicle.
Although the severity of the initial crime of having a brake light out is relatively minor, it
was Plaintiff’s refusal to follow the officer’s orders that escalated the stop to Defendant ordering
Plaintiff out of the car. By refusing the officer’s order to roll her window down further, and then

30

Saucier, 533 U.S. 204 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 388, 394).

31

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).

32

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

33

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.

7

refusing to exit the vehicle, Plaintiff elevated Defendant Horne’s level of concern for his safety
due to her perceived abnormal behavior. Based on her continued refusal to obey Defendant
Horne’s orders to exit the vehicle, he made the decision to physically remove Plaintiff. From the
dash-cam video, it appears that any struggle in removing Plaintiff was caused by Plaintiff’s own
resistance from grabbing the steering wheel. Once Plaintiff was freed from the vehicle,
Defendant was not forceful with Plaintiff when walking her to his car or while handcuffing her.
Under Utah law, a person is guilty of class B misdemeanor if she:
[H]as knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention
of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: (2) the
arrested person’s refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: (a)
necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and (b) made by a peace officer
involved in the arrest or detention. 34
Here, Defendant was seeking to effect a detention of Plaintiff for her taillight violation,
when Plaintiff refused to obey Defendant’s lawful order to exit the vehicle. “[I]n Utah there is
no right to physically resist either an arrest or an order of the police, irrespective of the legality
of the arrest or order, so long as the officers are within the scope of their authority.” 35 By
interfering with Defendant’s detention of her by refusing to exit her vehicle, Plaintiff gave
Defendant cause of her arrest under the interference statute.
Under the first factor of Graham, the severity of Plaintiff’s crimes “weigh[s] against the
use of anything more than minimal force” because the charge underlying her arrest is a
misdemeanor. 36 Here, because Plaintiff refused to exit the vehicle as ordered, Defendant opened

34

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (emphasis added).

35

State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ¶ 33, 57 P.3d 1052, 1061 (citations omitted).

36

Davis v. Clifford, 825 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2016).

8

her door and attempted to lift or pull Plaintiff out of the car, but because Plaintiff was holding on
to the steering wheel it necessitated more effort by Defendant. Once Plaintiff was removed from
the car, Defendant walked her to his car and handcuffed her. Contrary to the cases cited by
Plaintiff, the force used by Defendant was not excessive. Defendant did not break Plaintiff’s
window, he did not rip her out of a broken window, he did not pull her out of the car by her hair,
and he did not pepper spray her or taser her. And once Plaintiff was out of the car, Defendant
did not throw Plaintiff on the ground and did not physically assault her in anyway. At most,
Defendant pulled on Plaintiff “using pressure points, and twisting [her] wrist and arm.” 37 This is
“no greater force than the force [the court] considered reasonable in Mecham v. Frazier, [ ]
which involved the use of pepper spray to the face and the physical removal of a resistant trafficstop suspect.” 38 The amount of force used in this case was “minimal in comparison with more
drastic techniques, such as the use of pepper spray, tasers, or batons. . . .” 39 This factor weighs in
Defendant’s favor.
The second factor considered is whether Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the safety
of officers or others. As stated earlier, Defendant testified that he was concerned for his safety
when Plaintiff acted abnormally and refused to follow his orders to further roll down her window
and then exit the vehicle. Defendant further testified that he believed he may still have been in
danger when he went to remove Plaintiff from the vehicle “Well, I’m placing somebody under
arrest. As soon as I touched her, she began to actively resist. She could have assaulted me. She

37

Valencia, 612 F. App'x at 519.

38

Id. (citations and footnote omitted).

39

Id.

9

could have had a weapon.” 40 Based on Defendant’s testimony he believed based on her behavior
that she may have been a danger to him. In hindsight we know that there is no evidence of a
weapon in the vehicle and Defendant was likely in no danger at the point he removed Plaintiff
from the vehicle. However, “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene” 41
Defendant perceived a threat to his safety at that time. That said, viewing the lack of evidence of
an actual threat in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that this factor
weighs in the favor of Plaintiff.
Finally, the third Graham factor considered is whether Plaintiff actively resisted or
attempted to evade arrest. In considering this factor in Mecham v. Frazier, the Tenth Circuit
found the officer used objectively reasonable force in pepper spraying and pulling a driver out of
the car and placing her on the ground when driver continued to exercise control over the car and
refused to get off the phone and get out of the car. 42 In Simpson v. Kansas, the Tenth Circuit
found that a driver’s refusal to comply with an officer’s instructions satisfied this factor. 43
Here, before removing Plaintiff from her vehicle Defendant had ordered Plaintiff to exit
her vehicle no less than seven times. Defendant also warned Plaintiff that if she did not exit the
vehicle she would be going to jail. Plaintiff refused to exit the vehicle, and continued to exercise
control over the vehicle by remaining in the driver’s seat with the keys. Further, in the process
of removing Plaintiff from vehicle she grabbed on to the steering wheel creating more of a

40

Docket no. 20-2 (Tr. P. 65, ln.15-17).

41

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).

42

500 F.3d 1200, 1204-1205 (10th Cir. 2007).

43

593 F. App’x 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2014).

10

struggle for Defendant to pull her out of the car. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of
Defendant.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that under the Graham factors and considering
the totality of the circumstances Defendant did not use excessive force. Plaintiff refused to roll
down her window elevating officer safety concerns, then Plaintiff further refused to exit the
vehicle after being ordered to do so several times and after she was told that she would be going
to jail if she failed to exit the vehicle, and Plaintiff then resisted arrest when Defendant went to
remove her from the vehicle. Even if Defendant was mistaken about the proper use of force
when there was a minimal threat to his safety, given the totality of the circumstances presented
here Defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable. Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity and Plaintiff’s claims for illegal expansion of a traffic stop and use of excessive force
under the U.S. Constitution shall be DISMISSED.
C. Remand of Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
In addition to the federal claims decided above, Plaintiff has also alleged violations under
the Utah Constitution. Given that this Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, it must
determine whether it will retain jurisdiction over the state law claims. The “district court has
discretion to try state claims in the absence of any triable federal claims; however, that discretion
should be exercised in those cases in which, given the nature and the extent of the pretrial
proceedings, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness would be served by retaining
jurisdiction.” 44 The Tenth Circuit has clarified that “if federal claims are dismissed before trial,
leaving issues of state law, the federal court should . . . generally decline to exercise pendant
44

Thatcher Enterprises v. Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990).

11

jurisdiction in such instances because ‘notions of comity and federalism demand that a state
court try its own lawsuits, absent compelling reasons to the contrary.’” 45
Also, the Supreme Court has held:
Where, as here, all federal-law claims in the action have been eliminated and
only pendant state-law claims remain, the district court has a powerful reason
to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction. A wide discretion to
remand rather than to dismiss will enable district courts to deal with
appropriate cases involving pendant claims . . . [and] a remand generally will
be preferable to dismissal when the statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s
state-law claims has expired before the federal court has determined that it
should relinquish jurisdiction. Even when the applicable statute of limitations
has not expired, a remand may [be preferred] . . . in light of the increased
expense and time involved in enforcing state law that dismissal would entail. 46
This Court finds no compelling reason to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims. The original trial date has been vacated and there is currently no trial date or deadlines
pending before this Court. The issues in the case have been narrowed to only the state law
issues. The incident took place in, and the parties are from, Weber County, Utah. Further, the
remaining claims involve important issues of state law that would be best decided by a state
court. All of these factors weigh in favor of remanding to state court rather than this Court
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Finally, it appears that the statute of
limitations for Plaintiff’s state law claims will soon expire, 47 so, rather than dismissing Plaintiff’s
state law claims, this Court will remand this case to the Second District Court for Weber County.

45

Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1229 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir.
1995)).
46

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).

47

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-304(1) (two year limitation on actions “against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or
other officer for liability incurred during the performance of the officer’s official duties …”).

12

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement. Further, this Court REMANDS Plaintiff’s state
law claims to the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah. Upon remand of Plaintiff’s
state law claims, this action shall be closed.
DATED this 22 June 2017.

Brooke C. Wells
United States Magistrate Judge

13