Stewart v. Stoller et al

Filing 225

MEMORANDUM DECISION and Order Denying Motion for Recusal(Docket No. 209)-denying 209 Motion for Recusal filed by Plaintiff Sophia Stewart. Signed by Magistrate Judge Evelyn J. Furse on 12/6/12. (jmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
SOPHIA STEWART,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RECUSAL (Docket No. 209)

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:07-cv-00552-CW-EJF
MICHAEL T. STOLLER, et al.,
District Judge Clark Waddoups
Defendants.
Magistrate Judge Evelyn J. Furse

Plaintiff Sophia Stewart moved this Court for “Recusal of Judge Clark Waddoups and
Magistrate Judge Evelyn Furse for Bias and Prejudice and Extraprejudicial.”1 (Docket No. 209.)
Because Ms. Stewart proceeds pro se the Court liberally construes her filings. Casanova v.
Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1125 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C.
sections 144 and 455 alleging, among other things, that Judge Waddoups and Magistrate Judge
Furse must recuse themselves because of bias and prejudice.2 (See Docket No. 209.) The Court
denies Plaintiff’s Motion because she fails to provide any facts that can form a valid basis for her
Motion.
DISCUSSION
28 U.S.C. sections 144 and 455 govern disqualification of judges. Section 455 “place[s]
the obligation to identify the existence of [bias or prejudice] upon the judge himself.” Liteky v.

1

This case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. section
636(b)(1)(B). (See Docket No. 191.)
2

A judge whose recusal is sought under 28 U.S.C. section 144 or 455 need not transfer
the matter to another judge, but may decide the motion herself. Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co., LLC
v. AT & T Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (D. Utah 2005) (citations omitted).
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United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). Section 144 “places a substantial burden on the
moving party to demonstrate that the judge is not impartial.” In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266,
1269 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). No justification exists for recusal under either section
144 or section 455.
A. Legal Standards
1. Standard under Section 455
Section 455 requires a judge to disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) (West 2012). A judge must
also disqualify himself “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. §
455(b)(1) (West 2012).
The standard for disqualification under section 455 is objective. In re McCarthey, 368
F.3d at 1269. Under this standard
disqualification is appropriate only where the reasonable person, were he to know all the
circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality. There must be a
reasonable factual basis to question the judge’s impartiality. The scope of inquiry is
limited to outward manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Section
455 does not require recusal based only on assumptions about a judge’s beliefs that are
not substantiated by the facts of record.
Id. at 1269-70 (citations omitted).
2. Standard under Section 144
A party who seeks to disqualify a judge under section 144 must file a “timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 144 (West 2012).
The affidavit must be timely and “state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists.” Id. “Under § 144, the affidavits filed in support of recusal are strictly
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construed against the affiant and there is a substantial burden on the moving party to demonstrate
that the judge is not impartial.” United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted). An affidavit “is insufficient if it merely states conclusions, rumors, beliefs
and opinions; it must state with required particularity the identifying facts of time, place,
persons, occasion, and circumstances.” Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1992)
(quotations and citations omitted).
Section 144 imposes upon the party who seeks disqualification the burden to
“demonstrate that the judge is not impartial, not a burden on the judge to prove that he is
impartial.” In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d at 1269 (citation omitted).
B. Disqualification Is Not Justified
Plaintiff seeks disqualification based almost entirely on conclusory allegations of bias
and prejudice. Plaintiff alleges the following facts as evidence of bias or prejudice as against
Judge Waddoups: vacation of trial dates, termination of Defendant Dean Webb from the case,
and failure to enter default judgments sought by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges the following facts as
evidence of bias or prejudice as against Magistrate Judge Furse: failure to enter default
judgments sought by Plaintiff. These facts simply represent judicial rulings with which Plaintiff
does not agree. However, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or
partiality recusal motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 541 (citation omitted); see also Green, 969 F.2d at
919 (“[A]dverse rulings against a litigant cannot in themselves form the appropriate grounds for
disqualification.”) (citation omitted). To the extent Ms. Stewart’s claim goes to the delay
between her motions for default and ruling on those motions, the length of time that elapsed
between filing and ruling (the longest being from September 14, 2012 to December 4, 2012) is

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well within the discretion of the Court to manage its calendar and, as a matter of law, could not
constitute a due process violation under the circumstances of this case.
Even reading Plaintiff’s filing liberally, as this Court must, Casanova, 595 F.3d at 1125,
Plaintiff cites no facts to question the impartiality of Judge Waddoups or Magistrate Judge Furse.
Accordingly, there exists no basis for disqualification under section 455 or section 144. The
Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal
(Docket No. 209).
SO ORDERED this 6th day of December, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

________________________________
Evelyn J. Furse
United States Magistrate Judge

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