Warner v. Patterson et al

Filing 95

MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 83 Motion for Summary Judgment ; Plaintiff is awarded nominal damages in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00) for the violation of his equal protection rights and one hundred dollars ($ 100.00) for the violation of his First Amendment rights ; denying Plaintiffs requests for compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees ; Plaintiff may request costs, including the full amount of any payments made toward the filing fee assessed in this case, by filing a proper motion within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. Signed by Judge Tena Campbell on 09/13/2012. (asp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

DANNY LEE WARNER, JR.,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:08-CV-519 TC
TOM PATTERSON et al.,
District Judge Tena Campbell
Defendants.

Plaintiff Danny Lee Warner, Jr., currently confined at the Florence Correctional Center in
Arizona, filed this pro se civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while confined at the Utah
State Prison. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2012). Plaintiff was allowed to proceed in forma
pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. On October 27, 2011, the Court issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order partially granting and partially denying Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment (Doc. no. 81). Before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on all
remaining claims.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff is an adherent of the Odhvegr religion, also known as Odinism or Asatru.
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserted numerous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) based on alleged interference with his right to freely exercise his religion
while confined at the Utah State Prison. Plaintiff also asserted an equal protection claim based

on the denial of certain religious accommodations that are allegedly provided to inmates of other
faiths.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order of October 27, 2011, the court granted summary
judgment for Defendants on all claims except: (1) Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim based on denial of
fast-boxes for observance of the Winter Nights period, (Doc. no. 81 at 27); (2) Plaintiff’s equal
protection claim based on the denial of fast-boxes (Doc. 81 at 35); and (3) Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim based on the blanket ban imposed on publications from National Vanguard
Press (Doc. 81 at 39-40). Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment on each of these claims.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants in their official capacities.
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory, punitive and nominal damages, attorney fees, and costs against
each of the remaining Defendants in their individual capacities.
II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants concede that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief on his remaining claims;
however, they assert that this relief should only be granted against the two defendants who were
ultimately responsible for the violations. Defendants further concede that Plaintiff is entitled to
nominal damages on his constitutional claims, but they contend that all other damages are barred
under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) based on the lack of any accompanying
physical injury. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) (West 2012). Finally, Defendants assert that
Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are moot because he is no longer incarcerated in Utah.
The court will address each of these arguments in turn.

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A. Declaratory Relief
Defendants concede that declaratory relief is appropriate on each of the remaining claims
but contend Plaintiff has not shown that each of the remaining defendants were directly
responsible for the violations. Defendants assert that the only defendants who can be held
responsible are Clint Friel, who authorized the blanket ban on National Vanguard Press
publications, and Jeff Koehler, who made the decision to deny fast-boxes to Plaintiff for the
entire Winter Nights period. Although Plaintiff does not dispute that Friel and Koehler were
ultimately responsible, he asserts that each of the other remaining defendants were also directly
involved on some level. Because the other defendants were not in a position to make policy and
were only acting under the direction of others, the court concludes that declaratory relief is only
appropriate against Friel and Koehler, who were ultimately responsible for the violations.1
B. Damages
Defendants concede that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of nominal damages in the
amount of one dollar for the violation of his First Amendment rights resulting from the National
Vanguard Press ban, and one dollar for the equal protection violation stemming from the denial
of fast-boxes. 2 However, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot recover any other damages
because he cannot show a physical injury as required under the PLRA.

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The court also sees little point in untangling exactly who did what and why given that
declaratory relief is intended merely to put officials on notice so as to prevent future violations.
Declaratory judgment against the junior defendants would not significantly promote this end.
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Both sides agree that monetary damages are not available under RLUIPA in accordance
with the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1662 (2011).
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The PLRA provides, in pertinent part, that “no Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury . . . without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) (West 2012). The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this provision to prohibit an
award of compensatory damages absent a finding of actual physical injury. Searles v. Van
Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 881 (10th Cir. 2001). An award of nominal damages, however, is
mandatory upon a finding of a constitutional violation. Id. at 879. Regarding punitive damages,
the Searles Court noted that the PLRA does not prohibit an award of punitive damages where
appropriate, id. at 880, and that “as a general rule, punitive damages may be recovered for
constitutional violations without a showing of compensable injury.” Id. at 881. “The legal
standard for punitive damages in cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is well established. Punitive
damages are available only for conduct which is ‘shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent,
or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’”
Id. at 879 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983)).
Plaintiff argues that although he cannot show any physical injury, as required under the
PLRA, he is still entitled to compensatory damages based on what he describes as a grave
“spiritual injury.” Plaintiff asserts that the impact of Defendants’ actions on Plaintiff’s spiritual
well-being was far more significant than a mere mental or emotional injury. Even accepting
Plaintiff’s characterization of his injuries, however, the court does not see any valid legal
distinction between the “spiritual injury” asserted by Plaintiff and the “mental” and “emotional”
injuries which are expressly addressed in the PLRA. Moreover, although Plaintiff vaguely
asserts that punitive damages are warranted, he has not specifically alleged that Defendants were
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motivated by evil motive or intent, or acted with reckless or callous indifference. Nor has
Plaintiff presented any specific facts to support such a conclusion. Thus, the court concludes that
Plaintiff is entitled to only nominal damages on each of his remaining claims.
C. Injunctive Relief
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are moot because Plaintiff
is no longer incarcerated in Utah. Plaintiff, however, contends that injunctive relief remains
necessary given the facts that he has time on his Utah sentence left to serve and that he is likely
to be returned to Utah at some point in the future.3 Plaintiff further asserts that although
Defendants have acknowledged the past violations they have not shown that they revised their
policies to prevent similar violations in the future. While it does appear that Plaintiff is likely to
be returned to the custody of the Utah Department of Corrections at some point, there is little
reason to believe that the violations proven here are likely to be repeated. In fact, the record
shows that the ban on National Vanguard Press publications was never a formal written policy
but resulted from a misinterpretation of otherwise valid prison policies, and that the error has
long since been corrected. Regarding the provision of fast-boxes, Defendants have clearly
acknowledged that Asatru adherents are entitled to receive fast-boxes for the entire Winter
Nights period, subject to the advance request policy, and that Asatru adherents will be
accommodated the same as adherents of any other religion in this regard. Thus, the court

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According to court records Plaintiff recently plead guilty in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Arizona to one count of Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition under
18 U.S.C. §§ 924(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and was sentenced to sixty-three months imprisonment in
federal custody.
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concludes that Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are moot.

DECLARATION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, THE COURT HEREBY DECLARES that:
(1) Defendant Clint Friel violated Plaintiff’s right to freely exercise his religion under the
First Amendment and RLUIPA by imposing a blanket ban on publications from National
Vanguard Press; and,
(2) Defendant Jeff Koehler violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and RLUIPA by denying Plaintiff fast-boxes for the entire Winter
Nights period.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. no. 55) is GRANTED;
(2) Plaintiff is awarded nominal damages in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00)
for the violation of his equal protection rights and one hundred dollars ($100.00) for the violation
of his First Amendment rights;
(3) Plaintiff’s requests for compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and
attorney fees4 are DENIED; and,
(4) Plaintiff may request costs, including the full amount of any payments made toward

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The Court notes that Plaintiff has represented himself throughout this litigation and,
therefore, is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. However, the Court wishes to commend
Plaintiff for the zealous defense of his rights and for the exemplary manner in which he has
litigated his claims here.
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the filing fee assessed in this case, by filing a proper motion within thirty (30) days from the date
of this order.
DATED this 13th day of September, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________
TENA CAMPBELL
United States District Judge

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