Mountainland Supply v. Ram Constructors et al
Filing
54
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDERgranting 44 Motion for Attorney Fees: the court grants Mountainland Supply $56,401.02 in attorney fees and $64,116.81 in accrued interest. Signed by Judge Dale A. Kimball on 8/17/11 (alt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for the
use and benefit of MOUNTAINLAND
SUPPLY COMPANY, LLC, ,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER GRANTING
ATTORNEY FEES AND
ACCRUED INTEREST
RAM CONSTRUCTORS, INC., and
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Case No. 2:09CV915DAK
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Defendants.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees. The parties have
fully briefed the motion. The court concludes that a hearing would not significantly aid in its
determination of the motion. Therefore, based on the motions, memoranda, and other materials
submitted by the parties, the court enters the following Order.
In this court’s June 8, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order, the court recognized that
attorney fees are recoverable in Miller Act cases in which the contract between the parties’
provides for attorney fees. In this case, the open account agreement provides for interest on
outstanding balances and the payment of attorney fees incurred in collecting outstanding
balances. Because the court held that Mountainland was entitled to the payment of interest on
the outstanding balance and attorney fees, it requested that Mountainland submit updated
calculations of each and provide supporting documentation.
Mountainland timely filed its updated information and supporting documentation.
Defendants oppose Mountainland’s requested fees based on several of the factors used by courts
in assessing the reasonableness of fee requests.
Attorney fees awarded pursuant to a contract should not be given scrutiny to the same
degree as fees awarded in a statutory context, but should be awarded consistent with the
contractual purpose of giving the parties the benefit of their bargain. See United States ex rel.
C.J.C., Inc. v. Western States Mech. Contractors, Inc., 834 F.2d 1533, 1548 (10th Cir. 1987).
“Where attorney’s fees are provided by contract, a trial court does not possess the same degree of
equitable discretion to deny such fees as it has when applying a statute providing for a
discretionary award.” Id. However, a court “may nevertheless, reduce the contractual attorney’s
fees claimed if it finds such an award ‘would be inequitable and unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Oil Screw Triton, VI, 712 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1983) (quoting in
part Cable Marine, Inc. v. M/V Trust Me II, 632 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. Unit B 1980)).
“In considering whether a fee is unreasonable or excessive,” a trial court may consider
“the familiar factors from the federal cases awarding fees in a statutory context.” Id. “The
district court may choose to use these factors, not to compute a reasonable fee, but to assist in
determining if the fees claimed are unreasonable or inequitable. In addition, it remains important
for the district court to provide a ‘concise but clear explanation’ of its reasons for any
adjustments to the fee award.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiff seeks attorney fees of $56,401.02. Plaintiff has submitted the hourly
time records and billing rates of the legal work performed in this case. Defendants, however,
object to the requested fees based on the following specific factors: (1) the time and labor
required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the question; (3) the skill required to perform legal
services properly; (4) the customary fee; (5) the amount involved and the results obtained; and
(6) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys.
Defendants argue that the 260.25 hours expended by Mountainland’s seven attorneys and
five paralegals is unreasonable and inefficient. Given the extensive factual and legal issues that
were contested and considering the results obtained, the court is hesitant to second guess the
reasonableness of the time expended. The case was document intensive and the parties were
required to brief novel legal theories. Specifically, Defendants question the amount of hours that
were worked on the motion for summary judgment, but the case was ultimately won with that
motion for summary judgment. And, Defendants unduly discount the number of issues that were
raised in the briefing. Furthermore, while many attorneys and paralegals worked on the case, the
billing records do not demonstrate any significant duplication of work. The majority of the work
was performed by four attorneys and one paralegal. The court does not find the time spent to be
unreasonable.
Defendants also take issue with Jaussi & Christiansen billing in one hour increments,
but the documentation demonstrates that they did not bill in one hour increments. Defendants
also question the use of two firms. The use of two firms is not uncommon and does not provide
a basis for assuming that there were inefficiencies. The attorneys appear to have worked
together.
Defendants further ask the court to consider the customary fee for similar work in the
community. Defendants do not claim that there is a customary fee for Miller Act cases, but they
request the court to consider this factor in light of the total hours and fees billed by
Mountainland. In considering the customary fee for a Miller Act case, the court believes that
most cases would be document intensive and involve fact issues with respect to the parties
ongoing relationships. In this case, the parties and the court had to consider whether several
other projects should be used as offsets. Each Miller Act case will turn on a different set of facts.
In this case, Defendants raised extensive factual and legal issues. This factor, therefore, does not
support a reduction in Mountainland’s fee award.
Finally, Defendants argue that the experience and ability of the attorneys involved in this
case did not result in increased efficiencies. Again, the court will not second guess the amount of
work that was required to successfully bring a motion for summary judgment in this case. The
court has reviewed the billing records and does not find the type of inefficiencies that it would
typically lead the court to reduce the requested fees.
In conclusion, the court has reviewed the attorney fees materials submitted by
Mountainland and finds the hourly rates to be reasonable for the market and the time spent to be
reasonable given the issues involved in this case. Therefore, the court awards Mountainland
$56,401.02 in attorney fees. The amount of accrued interest has not been opposed. Accordingly,
the court grants Mountainland $64,116,81 in interest.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasoning, the court grants Mountainland $56,401.02 in attorney fees
and $64,116.81 in accrued interest.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2011.
________________________________
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
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