Stradling et al v. Sun American Mortgage et al
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM DECISION denying 22 Motion for Relief from Judgment ; denying 26 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 06/24/2011. (asp)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
GREG STRADLING and FAY
STRADLING,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT
TO FED.R.CIV.P. 60(B) AND
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
TO AMEND
vs.
SUN AMERICAN MORTGAGE
COMPANY, et al.,
Case No. 2:09-CV-1026 TS
Defendants.
The Court has before it Plaintiffs Greg Stradling and Fay Stradling’s (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)1 and Motion to
Amend Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).2 Having considered the parties’ respective
arguments, the Court will deny the Motions.
1
Docket No. 22.
2
Docket No. 26.
1
I. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs move the Court for relief from its March 28, 2011 Order (the “Order”)3
dismissing their cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As
a threshold matter, the Court notes that “[r]elief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and may only
be granted in exceptional circumstances.”4 Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), a court may relieve a
party from a judgment or order for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,= or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively
is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.5
On the first pages of both their Motion and supporting memorandum, Plaintiffs note that
they seek relief under subparts (2) through (6) of Rule 60(b). In the arguments that follow,
however, Plaintiffs largely fail to explain how the identified subparts relate to their various
arguments made in support of their Motion. The only exception is found in the final section of
Plaintiffs’ supporting memorandum, which includes a summary of consent orders signed by
Defendants U.S. Bank and MERS approximately two weeks after this Court's dismissal Order,
and argues that this new information requires relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2). In the
3
Docket No. 20.
4
Bud Broos Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., Inc., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th
Cir. 1990).
5
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
2
remainder of Plaintiffs’ Motion, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should grant their requested relief
because the Order: (1) denied them fundamental fairness; (2) dismissed their cause of action with
prejudice, foreclosing any opportunity to amend their claims; (3) misrepresented their motion for
joinder as a motion to amend; and (4) refused to apply the law applicable to this case.6
A.
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Plaintiffs argue that the consent orders filed in conjunction with their Motion mandate
relief under Rule 60(b)(2). To qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(2), the moving party must
show:
(1) the evidence was newly discovered since the trial; (2) the moving party was
diligent in discovering the new evidence; (3) the newly discovered evidence [was]
not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the newly discovered evidence is
material; and (5) that a new trial with the newly discovered evidence would
probably produce a different result.7
The Tenth Circuit has explained that while this standard was announced in the context of a party
seeking relief from the result of trial, the required showing under Rule 60(b)(2) remains the same
for those seeking relief from an order dismissing the case.8
Applying this standard to the instant action, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate how this newly discovered evidence is material or how this evidence would produce
a different result. Although the consent orders were signed by two of the Defendants in the
present action, the subject matter of the consent orders has no impact on the authority of MERS
6
Docket No. 22.
7
Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 F.3d 658, 670 (10th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original).
8
Id. (“Of course, in this case the Plaintiffs sought relief from an order dismissing the case,
not from the result of a trial—but the required showing under Rule 60(b)(2) remains the same.”).
3
to act as a beneficiary under Utah law, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Truth-in-Lending Act,
Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend, or Plaintiffs’ request to join a necessary party. The
consent orders are simply not relevant to the present action and, therefore, fail to provide an
adequate ground for the requested relief.
B.
REMAINING CONTENTIONS
Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments fail to demonstrate why they are entitled to relief under
Rule 60(b). Plaintiffs’ first contention is that they were denied fundamental fairness because the
Court’s Order dismissed their complaint without fully and fairly adjudicating the contentions
therein. While the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint necessarily disposed of Plaintiffs’
cause of action prior to a full trial, the Court’s dismissal was pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6),
which allows a court to dismiss an action that fails to plead a plausible claim for relief. As
demonstrated by the Court in its Order, Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law and, therefore,
merited dismissal.
Plaintiffs next contend that their claims should have been dismissed without prejudice
and that this Court abused its discretion in denying them leave to amend their complaint. While
leave to amend should be freely given, the Court need not allow amendment when doing so
would be futile.9 Plaintiffs requested leave to amend to add additional parties, but did not seek
leave to change their causes of action. The Court found that allowing Plaintiffs to bring
9
Docket No. 20, at 5 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) and Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434
F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006)).
4
insufficient claims against additional parties would be futile. On reconsideration, the Court finds
no error in this conclusion.
Plaintiffs assert that the Court erroneously treated their motion to join Aurora Loan
Services as a necessary party as a motion for leave to amend. This assertion is simply false. The
Court evaluated whether Aurora Loan services was a necessary party under Fed.R.Civ.P.
19(a)(1)(B) and concluded that Aurora Loan was not a necessary party and, therefore, Plaintiffs’
motion failed.
Plaintiffs lastly contend that the Court refused to apply the law applicable to this case.
Plaintiffs contention here seems to be that the Court erred in refusing to adopt their assertion that
the promissory note signed in conjunction with the deed of trust when they purchased their
property is no longer valid because the two instruments have been “split”—rendering the note
and the deed of trust a nullity. This position, however, has been repeatedly considered, and
rejected, by this Court10 and Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate why this line of precedent should be
disregarded.
Because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate why they are entitled to relief under Rule
60(b), the Court will deny the Motion.
II. MOTION TO AMEND
Plaintiffs also filed a separate motion seeking leave to amend their Complaint. As
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate why they should be relieved from this Court’s Order
10
See Docket No. 20, at 6-7.
5
dismissing their case, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend likewise fails. The Court will deny the
Motion.
III. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b) (Docket No. 22) is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(a)(2) (Docket No. 26) is DENIED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case forthwith.
DATED June 24, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________________
TED STEWART
United States District Judge
6
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