Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission et al
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 22 Motion for Joinder. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner on 04/16/2012. (asp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:09cv1089
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION; R.
BRUCE JOHNSON, Commissioner and
Chair of the Utah State Tax Commission;
and the STATE OF UTAH;
District Judge Tena Campbell
Defendants.
Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner
This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner by District Judge Tena
Campbell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).1 Before the court is Utah State Tax
Commission, et al.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to join parties.2 The court has carefully
reviewed the motion and memorandum submitted by Defendants. Union Pacific Railroad
Company (“Plaintiff”) did not file a responsive memorandum. Pursuant to civil rule 7-1(f) of the
United States District Court for the District of Utah Rules of Practice, the court elects to
determine the motion on the basis of the written memorandum and finds that oral argument
would not be helpful or necessary. See DUCivR 7-1(f).
1
See docket no. 21.
2
See docket no. 22.
Pursuant to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, rule 20,
Defendants seek to join the following entities as defendants: Beaver County, Box Elder County,
Cache County, Carbon County, Davis County, Emery County, Grand County, Iron County, Juab
County, Millard County, Morgan County, Salt Lake County, Summit County, Tooele County,
Utah County, Wasatch County, Washington County, and Weber County (collectively,
“Counties”). Defendants argue that because the Counties have collected the disputed property
taxes Plaintiff seeks to enjoin, complete relief cannot occur without their participation.
Courts utilize a three-step inquiry in determining whether a party is necessary and/or
indispensable under rule 19. See Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 997 (10th
Cir. 2001). Accordingly, this court must determine: (1) whether the Counties are necessary
parties; and (2) if so, whether joinder of the Counties is feasible; or (3) if not, whether the
Counties are indispensable. See id. The court will now address each of the above factors.
First, rule 19(a)(1) provides that a party is necessary if:
(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among
existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the
interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A)-(B). The relief sought by Plaintiff would require a reduction of its
2007 property tax assessment and a refund of money collected by the Counties. While the State
of Utah apportions the value and assesses the taxes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-201(1)(a) &
2
59-2-801, the actual amounts owed are collected by the Counties. See id. § 59-2-1330(1)
(requiring that the property tax is to be paid directly to county assessor or treasurer).
Furthermore, under Utah law, any refunds must be paid by the taxing entity that received the
money. See id. § 59-2-1330(2)-(7) (providing the procedure for tax refunds). As such, the court
would not be able to “accord complete relief” among Plaintiff and Defendants if the Counties are
not added as parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). Absence of the Counties would also “impair or
impede the [Counties’] ability to protect the interest” in the subject matter of this lawsuit. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). Thus, because the Counties collected the taxes at issue here and would
be ultimately responsible for refunding amounts to Plaintiff, if required, this court concludes that
the Counties are necessary parties to this lawsuit.
Second, joinder of a necessary party is feasible if the party is “subject to service of
process” and their “joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 19(a)(1). The Counties are subject to service of process, see Fed R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), Utah R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(G), and this case arises under federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Accordingly, the court concludes that joinder of the Counties is feasible as they are subject to
service of process and the court will not be divested of subject-matter jurisdiction if they are
joined.
Because the court has determined that the Counties are necessary parties and that their
joinder is feasible, the court does not need to reach the indispensability issue or permissive
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joinder under rule 20. Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. The
Counties shall be joined as defendants in this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
PAUL M. WARNER
United States Magistrate Judge
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