Benson v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM DECISION denying 50 Motion for Summary Judgment ; granting 53 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 11/01/2011. (tls)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

MICHAEL T. BENSON,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. 2:10-CV-275 TS

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiff brings this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).1
Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s decision to terminate Janice K. Benson’s Waiver of Premium
benefit. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

1

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.
1

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael T. Benson is the named beneficiary of a group life insurance policy
provided to his late wife, Janice K. Benson (“Ms. Benson”), by her employer, Zions
Bancorporation (“Zions”). Ms. Benson was an active employee of Zions from 1990 to December
1998. Ms. Benson became disabled in 1998 and she qualified for disability benefits under a
group plan sponsored by Zions and insured by UNUM Insurance Company.
At the time she became disabled, Ms. Benson’s group life insurance benefits were insured
by Beneficial Life Insurance Company (“Beneficial”). The Group Life Insurance Policy (the
“Policy”) provided for a Waiver of Premium benefit if the claimant is “totally disabled.” So long
as the claimant continued to meet the definition of total disability in the Policy, his or her life
insurance coverage would continue at no cost. It was determined that Ms. Benson qualified for
the Waiver of Premium benefit and each year after she first qualified, Beneficial sent forms to
her and her treating physicians to update information on her condition.
In 2007, Defendant Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company (“Hartford” or
“Defendant”) acquired certain life insurance policies from Beneficial, including Ms. Benson’s
policy. Hartford became the claims administrator responsible for determining claims under the
Group Life Insurance Policy.
On October 30, 2008, Hartford contacted Ms. Benson and informed her that in order to
continue the Waiver of Premium benefit, she would have to provide information to demonstrate
that she continued to be totally disabled under the terms of the Policy. Ms. Benson provided
certain documentation to Hartford in response to its inquiry.

2

Specifically, Ms. Benson provided an “Attending Physician’s Statement of Functionality”
completed by her treating physician, Dr. Abdulla, on December 10, 2008.2 Dr. Abdulla noted
that he first began seeing Ms. Benson in September 2008, and that she had chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (“COPD”) and had undergone a lobectomy, a surgical removal of a portion of
the lung. Dr. Abdulla also noted that Ms. Benson had shortness of breath and wheezing. Dr.
Abdulla did not complete the portion of the form discussing functional capabilities.3
Ms. Benson also submitted a Personal Profile Evaluation.4 In that Evaluation, Ms.
Benson stated that she was unable to work due to her chronic pain and related medication use,
depression, and nerve damage. Ms. Benson stated that she spent 12 to 15 hours per day in bed.
As part of its evaluation of Ms. Benson, Hartford sent a functional capacity letter, dated
January 9, 2009, to Dr. Abdulla. That letter asked Dr. Abdulla to answer the following question:
“Do you feel that Janice Benson is currently mentally and physically capable of performing Parttime work that is: Chose One” followed by categories or work ranging from sedentary to very
heavy.5 Dr. Abdulla checked the box marked “Medium,” which indicated that he believed Ms.
Benson was able to perform part-time work involving the exertion of “20 to 50 pounds of force

2

Rec. at 129-30.

3

Id. at 130.

4

Id. at 125-28.

5

Id. at 118.
3

occasionally and/or 10 to 25 pounds of force frequently and/or greater than negligible up to 10
pounds of force to move objects.”6
On February 20, 2009, Hartford informed Ms. Benson that she no longer met the
definition of disabled and, therefore, was no longer eligible for the Waiver of Premium benefit.7
Hartford based its decision on the Attending Physician’s Statement of Functionality completed
by Dr. Abdulla on December 10, 2008; the functional capacity letter completed by Dr. Abdulla;
and a telephone call with Ms. Benson on February 11, 2009. In addition to terminating the
Waiver of Premium benefit, Hartford informed Ms. Benson that she could convert the Group
Life Insurance Policy to an Individual Insurance Policy at her own expense.8
On March 4, 2009, Ms. Benson spoke with a representative from Hartford. Ms. Benson
explained that she could not return to work and that her doctor had made an error.9 Ms. Benson
was informed of her appeal rights and was told that she would need to appeal the decision.10 In
addition, Ms. Benson was “advised she would need to convert her policy during the appeal
process to keep her benefit.”11

6

Id.

7

Id. at 113-15.

8

Id. at 114.

9

Id. at 26.

10

Id.

11

Id.
4

Ms. Benson appealed Hartford’s decision to terminate her Waiver of Premium benefit.12
As part of her appeal, Ms. Benson submitted a new Personal Profile Evaluation on March 31,
2009.13 In the Evaluation, Ms. Benson again stated that she could not work due to her chronic
pain, medications, and depression. Ms. Benson further stated that she stayed in bed 12 to 15
hours per day.
Dr. Abdulla also submitted an amended “Attending Physician’s Statement of
Functionality.”14 On the functional capabilities portion of the form, Dr. Abdulla noted that the
restrictions included on the form were not applicable as Ms. Benson was on disability and social
security.
On April 30, 2009, Hartford sent Dr. Abdulla a letter requesting treatment notes and other
information in relation to Ms. Benson’s appeal. In addition, the letter asked Dr. Abdulla the
following: “Do you feel that Ms. Benson has been prevented from performing any work,
including part-time sedentary level work, since February 6, 2009? If yes, please advise us of any
restrictions or limitations that have been placed on her activities that would preclude part-time
sedentary level work.”15 Dr. Abdulla responded, stating: “Yes; COPD; LUL lobectomy; chronic
pain.”16

12

Id. at 103.

13

Id. at 107-10.

14

Id. at 104-05; see also Docket No. 51, Ex. A.

15

Rec. at 96.

16

Id. at 85.
5

On May 7, 2009, Hartford referred Ms. Benson’s file to University Disability Consortium
for an independent medical record review.17 Hartford also indicated to Ms. Benson that it was
“requesting a telephonic consultation with Dr. Abdulla.”18
University Disability Consortium assigned the review of Ms. Benson’s file to Dr. Ruffell,
a Board Certified Psychiatrist, and Dr. Chekiri, who is Board Certified in Family Medicine.
Dr. Ruffell completed a psychiatric review for Ms. Benson.19 Dr. Ruffell examined
various medical records and also spoke with Ms. Benson’s treating physician, Dr. Abdulla. In
speaking with Dr. Abdulla, he opined that Ms. Benson’s mental/emotional diagnosis was “at
worst, mild depression.”20 When asked if Ms. Benson’s symptoms were of such severity that
they would interfere with her occupational capacity if she were motivated to function in a work
setting, Dr. Abdulla stated “No.”21 Dr. Abdulla further stated that he would not have any
objection should Ms. Benson want to return to work despite all of her current mental/emotional
problems.22 Based on her review of the records and her discussion with Dr. Abdulla, Dr. Ruffell
found support for the finding that Ms. Benson had mild symptoms of depression and anxiety. Dr.
Ruffell further stated that “there is not support in the information available to me to conclude that

17

Id. at 79.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 45-49.

20

Id. at 47.

21

Id.

22

Id.
6

these symptoms are of such severity that they would be likely to impair [Ms. Benson’s]
occupational capacity were she motivated to function in the workplace despite them.”23
Dr. Chekiri completed a medical record review of Ms. Benson.24 Dr. Chekiri reviewed
Ms. Benson’s medical records dating from January 2008 to March 2009. In addition, Dr. Chekiri
spoke with Dr. Abdulla who “opined that [Ms. Benson] could perform part-time sedentary work,
but that 40-hour per week sedentary work would likely cause excessive exertion given her
pulmonary status.”25 Dr. Chekiri agreed that Ms. Benson would be restricted to part-time
sedentary work because of the severity of her lung disease.26 Dr. Chekiri opined that Ms. Benson
“should be able to perform part-time sedentary work,” with certain restrictions.27
On May 19, 2009, Hartford informed Ms. Benson that it was denying her appeal and
upholding the termination of Ms. Benson’s Waiver of Premium benefit.28 In making this
determination, Hartford reviewed: Ms. Benson’s appeal letter, received on April 21, 2009; Dr.
Abdulla’s Attending Physician’s Statement, dated April 16, 2009; Ms. Benson’s Personal Profile
Evaluation, completed on March 31, 2009; notes submitted by Dr. Abdulla on April 30, 2009;

23

Id. at 48.

24

Id. at 39-44.

25

Id. at 41.

26

Id. at 42.

27

Id. at 43.

28

Id. at 54-58.
7

progress notes submitted by Dr. Abdulla; and the reviews completed by University Disability
Consortium.29
From this evidence, Hartford determined that Ms. Benson was “not physically precluded
from performing at least a part-time sedentary level occupation, and . . . ha[d] no psychological
conditions that preclude[d her] from any work.”30 As a result, Hartford determined that Ms.
Benson no longer met the Policy definition of “Totally Disabled” and was no longer entitled to
the Waiver of Premium benefit.31
Ms. Benson passed away on August 27, 2009. On September 29, 2009, Hartford wrote to
Plaintiff in response to a claim he filed as the beneficiary of the life insurance benefit under the
Plan.32 Hartford explained that Ms. Benson’s claim had been terminated.33
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must first determine the appropriate standard of review in this matter. Plaintiff
argues that the Court should apply a de novo review while Defendant argues that an arbitrary and
capricious standard should be used.
A denial of benefits under an ERISA plan “is to be reviewed under a de novo standard
unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine

29

Id. at 54.

30

Id. at 58.

31

Id.

32

Id. at 38. Plaintiff’s claim is not included in the record.

33

Id.
8

eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”34 If, however, “the plan given an
administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe its terms,
we employ a deferential standard of review, asking only whether the denial of benefits was
arbitrary and capricious.”35
In making this determination the Court must look to the language of the plan to determine
whether it gives the administrator discretionary authority. In doing so, “it is essential to focus
precisely on what decision is at issue, because a plan may grant the administrator discretion to
make some decisions but not others.”36 The Tenth Circuit has “been comparatively liberal in
construing language to trigger the more deferential standard of review under ERISA.”37 The
court has stated that “the mere requirement to submit satisfactory or adequate proof of eligibility
does not confer discretion upon an administrator.”38 “On the other hand, when . . . a plan states
that the grant or denial of a particular benefit is to be determined by proof satisfactory to the
administrator, courts have said that deferential review is proper.”39
In Nance, the Tenth Circuit “distinguished plan terms that require submission of
‘satisfactory proof’ from those that require submission of ‘proof satisfactory to [plan

34

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).

35

Holcomb v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 578 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
36

Nance v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 294 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002).

37

Id. at 1268.

38

Id. at 1267.

39

Id. at 1268.
9

administrator ].’”40 The court “held that language requiring proof ‘satisfactory to [plan
administrator] suffices to convey discretion to a plan administrator.’ On the other hand,
requiring satisfactory proof alone, without specifying who must be satisfied, does not vest a plan
administrator with discretion.”41
The court in Nance found that plan language requiring that proof of disability be
satisfactory to the plan administrator was sufficient to convey discretion to the plan administrator
and, thus, warranted the more differential standard of review.42 Following Nance, this Court has
held that language requiring approval of the plan administrator was sufficient to confer
discretion.43
The Group Life Insurance Policy provides that Defendant’s role is to “administer
coverage and determine premiums payable under this policy.”44 The Waiver of Premium
provision, the provision at issue in this matter, requires proof of total disability be “properly
submitted to and approved by the Company.”45 The continuation of insurance under the Waiver
of Premium provision becomes effective “as of the first Premium Due Date on or next following

40

Ray v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 214 F.3d 482, 485-86 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Nance, 294 F.3d at 1267-68).
41

Id. (quoting Nance, 294 F.3d at 1268).

42

Nance, 294 F.3d at 1268.

43

Lunt v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 1964515, at *6 (D. Utah July 2, 2007); Streeter v.
Metropolitan Life Ins., 2006 WL 2944876, at *1 & n.14 (D. Utah Oct. 13, 2006).
44

Rec. at 6.

45

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
10

the date of the Employee’s proof of Total disability is approved by the Company.”46 The Policy
goes on to state that “[p]roper proof of Total Disability must be submitted to the Company” and
“[u]pon receipt and approval of proper proof of Total Disability, the Company will acknowledge
in writing the Employee’s Total Disability.”47
Considering the language of the Group Life Insurance Policy, the Court finds that it
sufficiently conveys discretion to Defendant, at least as to the Waiver of Premium provision.
Therefore, an arbitrary and capricious standard is appropriate here.
In applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the decision will be
upheld so long as it is predicated on a reasoned basis. In fact, there is no
requirement that the basis relied upon be the only logical one or even the
superlative one. Accordingly, [the Court’s] review inquires whether the
administrator’s decision resides somewhere on a continuum of
reasonableness—even if on the low end.
A lack of substantial evidence often indicates an arbitrary and capricious
decision. Substantial evidence is of the sort that a reasonable mind could accept
as sufficient to support a conclusion. Substantial evidence means more than a
scintilla, of course, yet less than a preponderance. The substantiality of the
evidence is evaluated against the backdrop of the administrative record as a
whole.48
The parties agree that Defendant operates under the same conflict at issue in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company v. Glenn.49 The existence of a dual-role conflict does not alter the

46

Id. (emphasis added).

47

Id. at 10 (emphasis added).

48

Adamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 455 F.3d 1209, 1212 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
49

554 U.S. 105 (2008).
11

standard or review, but is a “factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.”50
Thus, the Court will consider Defendant’s conflict of interest in making its determination of this
matter.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges Hartford’s decision in terminating Ms. Benson’s Waiver of Premium
benefit on the following grounds:
[Hartford] ignored statements from [Ms. Benson], Dr. Abdulla and Dr. Chekiri
documenting her disability, failed to collect any medical records for [Ms. Benson],
failed to review any information from UNUM’s disability file, failed to take into
account [Ms. Benson’s] disabled status with SSDI and UNUM, failed to inform
[Ms. Benson] at the end of her appeal period of her right to obtain continued
insurance coverage under the policy by paying the premium for coverage herself,
and failed to give Zions an opportunity to allow [Ms. Benson] to continue her
coverage for up to 12 months following her loss of eligibility for the waiver of
premium.51
Plaintiff also argues that University Disability Consortium reviewers were financially dependent
on Hartford and were not provided adequate documentation to provide a full and fair review of
Ms. Benson’s claim.
The Court will discuss each of these arguments in turn.
A.

TOTAL DISABILITY
Plaintiff fist argues that the record establishes that Ms. Benson continued to be disabled

when Hartford terminated her Waiver of Premium benefit, until her death in August 2009.
Plaintiff further argues that Defendant had to determine that Ms. Benson was capable of

50

Id. at 115 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

51

Docket No. 51, at 19-20.
12

performing full time, rather than part time, work in order to terminate the Waiver of Premium
Benefit.
The Group Life Insurance Policy provides for a Wavier of Premium benefit if an
employee is totally disabled. Under the Policy, “‘Totally Disabled’ and ‘Total Disability’ mean
that the Employee is unable due to bodily injury or sickness to engage for remuneration or profit
in any and every occupation or business for which he or she is or becomes reasonably suited by
education, training, or experience.”52 “Employee” is defined as a person “who works full-time
for the Policyowner.”53
Plaintiff argues that by using the term “Employee” in determining total disability,
Defendant was required to determine that Ms. Benson was capable of performing full-time work
before terminating her Waiver of Premium benefit. Since no physician involved in the treatment
or review of Ms. Benson’s claim opined that she could work full-time, Plaintiff argues that
Defendant had no basis to terminate her Waiver of Premium benefit.
Defendant argues, however, that in order for Ms. Benson to receive a Waiver of Premium
benefit, she had to be totally disabled. Defendant argues that the definition of totally disabled
under the Group Life Insurance Policy does not require full-time work. Rather, under the
language of the Policy, a person is not totally disabled if he or she is capable of performing work
“for remuneration or profit in any and every occupation or business for which he or she is or
becomes reasonably suited by education, training, or experience.” Defendant argues that the use

52

Rec. at 8.

53

Id. at 7.
13

of “Employee” in determining total disability does not alter this fact in that the Policy uses the
term “Employee” to describe Zion employees who are eligible for benefits.
The Court must reject Plaintiff’s argument. There is nothing in the Policy to suggest that
Defendant was required to determine that Ms. Benson was able to perform full-time work before
terminating the Waiver of Premium benefit. Rather, the definition of total disability is limited to
those who are unable “to engage for remuneration or profit in any and every occupation or
business for which he or she is or becomes reasonably suited by education, training, or
experience.” Nothing in this definition requires a finding that the individual is able to perform
full-time work. While the use of the word “Employee” lends credence to Plaintiff’s argument,
the Court agrees with Defendant that the term, in this context, is meant to denote an employee of
Zion who is eligible for benefits and is more akin to “insured.” Therefore, the Court finds that
Defendant did not need to determine that Ms. Benson was able to perform full-time work before
terminating the Waiver of Premium benefit. As the language of the Policy states, Defendant
need only determine that Ms. Benson could “engage for remuneration or profit in any and every
occupation or business for which he or she is or becomes reasonably suited by education,
training, or experience.”
Substantial evidence in the record supports Hartford’s finding that Ms. Benson could
engage in part-time sedentary work. The reviews of both Dr. Chekiri and Dr. Ruffell provide
evidence that Ms. Benson was not “totally disabled” as required by the policy. Even Ms.
Benson’s own doctor, Dr. Abdulla, provided evidence, though contradictory, that supports a
finding that Ms. Benson was no longer totally disabled and, thus, no longer entitled to the Waiver

14

of Premium benefit. There is certainly evidence supporting Plaintiff’s claim that Ms. Benson
continued to be totally disabled up to the time of her death. As stated, however, “there is no
requirement that the basis relied upon be the only logical one or even the superlative one.”54
Rather, the decision need only be supported by substantial evidence, which it is here.
B.

FAILURE TO GATHER INFORMATION
Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to gather medical records and other information

necessary to comply with its fiduciary and claims-processing responsibilities under ERISA.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to collect any medical records for Ms. Benson,
did not request any information from UNUM, and made no attempt to request information from
the Social Security Administration regarding Ms. Benson’s eligibility for benefits under that
program.
Plaintiff’s argument that Hartford failed to request medical records is contradicted by the
record. Hartford requested Dr. Abdulla “provide any treatment notes for the period of January 1,
2008 to the present.”55 The record indicates that Ms. Benson was only receiving treatment
through Dr. Abdulla56 and that Dr. Abdulla first began treating Ms. Benson in 2008.57 Dr.

54

Adamson, 455 F.3d at 1212.

55

Rec. at 96.

56

Id. at 29.

57

Id. at 129.
15

Abdulla did, in fact, provide Hartford with treatment records.58 Hartford reviewed these records
and provided them to University Disability Consortium for review.
The Court finds Hartford’s actions to be appropriate as the documents requested and
received were tailored to the question before Hartford: whether Ms. Benson continued to be
totally disabled. While Plaintiff faults Defendant for not seeking more records, the records
Hartford sought were those most relevant to its determination. Hartford specifically sought and
received records from Ms. Benson’s only treating physician during the relevant time period.
Plaintiff also argues that Hartford should have sought records from UNUM, the
administrator of the Zion Long Term Disability Plan, and the Social Security Administration,
from which Ms. Benson was receiving benefits. However, whether Ms. Benson continued to be
“totally disabled” under the Policy and whether Ms. Benson was entitled to long term disability
and/or social security benefits are different issues.59 Therefore, there is no requirement that
Hartford seek out records from either UNUM or the Social Security Administration.
C.

CONTINUED LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
Plaintiff argues that Hartford failed to give Ms. Benson or Zions an opportunity to

continue Ms. Benson’s life insurance coverage after the Waiver of Premium benefit was
terminated. Plaintiff’s argument consists of three parts. First, Plaintiff argues that Hartford did
not make clear whether the right to convert was mutually exclusive of Ms. Benson’s right to
appeal or whether the right to convert would be renewed if, after an appeal, Hartford maintained

58

Id. at 88-92.

59

See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 833 (2003).
16

its denial. Second, Plaintiff argues that Hartford failed to inform Ms. Benson of her right to
convert when Hartford informed Ms. Benson of its decision to uphold the denial of benefits.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Hartford had an obligation to notify Zions that Zions could continue
Ms. Benson’s coverage.
Plaintiff’s first argument is contradicted by the language of the Policy and other
information in the record. The Policy provides for the ability to convert the Policy to an
individual life insurance policy in certain circumstances.60 The Policy states:
If an insured becomes entitled pursuant to the above provisions to have an
individual policy of life insurance issued to him or her without evidence of
insurability, such right shall terminate (1) 31 days after the termination of the
coverage relating to such Insured under this policy, or (2) if later, 15 days after
such Insured receives written notice of his or her right to convert. This provision
does continue any insurance beyond the termination date of any coverage
provided by this policy.61
Ms. Benson’s Waiver of Premium benefit was terminated on February 20, 2009.62 The
letter informing Ms. Benson of the termination contained the following language: “We will,
however, allow you 31 days from the date of this letter to convert your Group Life Insurance
benefit amount of $108,000.00 to an Individual Life insurance Policy at your own expense.”63
The letter then provided a telephone number to call should Ms. Benson have any questions.64

60

Rec. at 15-16.

61

Id. at 16.

62

Id. at 113-15.

63

Id. at 114.

64

Id.
17

Ms. Benson did contact Hartford and was advised that she would need to convert her policy
during the appeal process to keep her benefit.65
As stated, Plaintiff argues that Hartford did not make clear whether the right to convert
was mutually exclusive of Ms. Benson’s right to appeal or whether the right to convert would be
renewed if, after an appeal, Hartford maintained its denial. As set forth above, the Policy
language makes clear that the right to convert is based on the date of termination of the benefit
and is not altered by an appeal. Further, any confusion created by Hartford’s letter was clarified
during the conversation Ms. Benson had on March 4, 2009. Therefore, the Court must reject this
argument.
Plaintiff next argues that Hartford failed to inform Ms. Benson of her right to convert
when Hartford informed Ms. Benson of its decision to uphold the denial of benefits. As set forth
above, however, Ms. Benson’s conversion right terminated 31 days after Hartford made its
decision to terminate coverage, not after the appeal was determined. Therefore, the appeal
determination letter correctly did not reference any right to convert.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Hartford failed to inform Zions of its right to convert. This
argument relies on a provision of the Policy that allows Zions the right to continue an employee’s
coverage. Because this is a right of Zions, there is nothing impermissible about failing to include
this information in the letter to Ms. Benson. Further, Plaintiff has provided nothing showing that
Hartford was required to inform Zion of its decision to terminate benefits. As a result, this
argument fails.

65

Id. at 26.
18

D.

UNIVERSITY DISABILITY CONSORTIUM
Plaintiff’s final argument is that University Disability Consortium reviewers were

financially dependent on Hartford and were not provided adequate documentation to provide a
full and fair review of Ms. Benson’s claim
As set forth above, the Court finds that Hartford gathered and provided to Dr. Chekiri and
Dr. Ruffell all records it had received from Plaintiff’s only treating physician during the relevant
time period. Further, Plaintiff has provided nothing to suggest that Dr. Chekiri and Dr. Ruffell
were somehow biased in the determination that Ms. Benson was not totally disabled. Therefore,
the Court will deny Plaintiff’s claim on this ground.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 50) is DENIED.
It is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 53) is
GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against
Plaintiff and close this case forthwith. The hearing set for November 17, 2011, is STRICKEN.
DATED November 1, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

_____________________________________
TED STEWART
United States District Judge
19