Isaacson v. Astrue
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM DECISION denying 16 Motion to Supplement Record ; affirming the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba on 07/11/2011. (asp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
CHRIS ISAACSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:10-cv-581-SA
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Defendant.
Before the Court is an action filed by Plaintiff, Chris
Isaacson, asking the Court to reverse the final agency decision
denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
1381-1383f.
See 42 U.S.C. §§
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that
Plaintiff was capable of performing work as a clean-up worker,
janitor, and laundry worker - work that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s
decision by arguing that it is not supported by substantial
evidence and that it is based on significant legal errors.
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine
whether the factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied.
See
Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
“Substantial
evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’” Doyal v. Barnhart,
331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), and
“requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance,”
Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084.
The Commissioner’s findings, “if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”
U.S.C. § 405(g).
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The Court may neither reweigh the evidence nor
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
See Lax, 489
F.3d at 1084.
Having carefully reviewed and considered the ALJ’s decision,
the record, and the parties’ pleadings, the Court affirms the
ALJ’s decision.
The Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is
not legally erroneous and is supported by substantial evidence.
BACKGROUND
On January 23, 2008, Plaintiff applied for Supplemental
Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f (Doc. 7, the certified copy of the
transcript of the entire record of the administrative proceedings
relating to Chris Isaacson (hereafter “Tr. __”) 11).
Plaintiff
initially alleged a disability onset date of August 10, 2007,
which he later amended to January 23, 2008 (Tr. 11).
After his
application was denied initially on June 19, 2008 (Tr. 64), and
upon reconsideration on January 2, 2009 (Tr. 71), Plaintiff
requested a hearing before an ALJ (Tr. 74).
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The ALJ hearing was
held on June 8, 2009 (Tr. 22-58).
The ALJ issued a decision
finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the
Act from January 23, 2008, through August 21, 2009, the date of
the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 12-21).
the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 7).
Plaintiff requested review of
In a May 25, 2010 letter, the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 1-4),
making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision for
purposes of judicial review.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
After receiving the Appeals Council’s May 25, 2010 letter,
Plaintiff submitted a complaint to this Court on June 25, 2010,
which was ultimately filed on July 14, 2010, and the case was
assigned to United States District Judge Tena Campbell (Docs. 13).
On July 28, 2010, the parties consented to United States
Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
and the case was reassigned to United States Magistrate Judge
Samuel Alba (Doc. 5).
Plaintiff filed his brief on October 30, 2010 (Doc. 11).1
The Commissioner filed his brief on December 10, 2010 (Doc. 14).
Plaintiff filed his reply brief on January 4, 2011 (Doc. 15).
On January 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement
the record (Doc. 16).
On January 27, 2011, the Commissioner
filed his response to that motion (Doc. 18).
Plaintiff filed an amended brief on November 13, 2010 (Doc.
12); however, because that amended brief was untimely and filed
without leave of the Court, that brief was stricken (Doc. 13).
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ANALYSIS
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s motion to supplement
the record.
The Court then analyzes each of Plaintiff’s
arguments challenging the ALJ’s decision denying him SSI
benefits.
I.
Motion to Supplement the Record
Plaintiff seeks to supplement the administrative record with
a Social Security Administration Abbreviated DIB Review Sheet,
showing that he was awarded disability benefits as a child.
The
Court denies this motion because the Commissioner has not moved
for a sentence six remand and the Plaintiff has not met the
standard for a sentence six remand.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), courts have jurisdiction to review
a Social Security Agency (“the agency”) decision denying
disability benefits.
Section 405(g) provides the sole basis of
courts’ - including this court’s - jurisdiction over those
matters.
On appeal, the evidence is limited to the transcript of the
record prepared and certified by the agency.
405(g).
See 42 U.S.C. §
Based on this certified record, and pursuant to sentence
four of Section 405(g), a court may affirm, reverse, or modify
the agency’s decision.
See id.
The court may consider
additional evidence only in limited circumstances.
Sentence six
of this section provides that, if there is “new evidence which is
material and that there is good cause for the failure to
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incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding,”
the court may remand the case to the agency for consideration of
this new evidence upon the Commissioner’s motion.
Id.
In
ordering a sentence six remand, the court does not address the
merits of the agency’s decision itself.
Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991).
See Melkonyan v.
After the sentence six remand
occurs, the agency assesses the new evidence, makes findings of
fact, and issues a decision that is then subject to the court’s
review.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In assessing whether new
evidence is material, a district court should determine if the
agency’s decision “might reasonably be different if that evidence
were presented.”
Cagle v. Califano, 638 F.2d 219, 221 (10th Cir.
1981).
Plaintiff, not the Commissioner, has requested that the
record be supplemented.
Further, a motion for a sentence six
remand has not been filed; nevertheless, even were Plaintiff to
file such a motion, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed
to show that the DIB Review Sheet is “material” evidence in that
it might reasonably change the agency’s decision.
When a child who was entitled to SSI disability benefits
attains eighteen years of age, the agency must redetermine
whether he is disabled under the adult standards.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(H)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § 416.987.
See 42 U.S.C.
The agency must not
apply any presumption of continuing disability; instead, the
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agency must determine whether the claimant meets the adult
standard of disability.
See id.
In this case, Plaintiff’s DIB Review Sheet shows that he
received child benefits in 1994; however, the DIB Review Sheet is
merely evidence of the agency’s prior decision regarding
eligibility for child benefits.
The DIB Review Sheet is not
relevant evidence in the ALJ’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s
eligibility for benefits as an adult.
As set forth in Section II
below, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff did not meet the adult standard of
disability, including the adult listing for mental retardation.
Plaintiff’s assertion that IQ remains constant throughout
life as an argument for supplementing the record with the DIB
Review Sheet is unpersuasive.
As discussed in more detail in
Section II below, besides a low IQ score, a claimant must also
meet Listing 12.05's other criteria, including showing deficits
in adaptive functioning, to meet the requirements of the listing
for mental retardation.
The new document does not support that
Plaintiff met the requisite deficits in adaptive functioning.
Another argument Plaintiff makes for supplementing the
administrative record with the DIB Review Sheet is that because
he met the child listing for mental retardation, he must meet the
adult listing for mental retardation, see Doc. 11, at 9-10;
however, as set forth by the Commissioner in his response to
Plaintiff’s motion, the document Plaintiff seeks to add to the
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record shows that, in fact, Plaintiff was not found disabled on
the basis that he met the listing for mental retardation, but
instead was found disabled as a child under less-stringent
“individualized functional assessment” (“IFA”) regulations (Doc.
18, at 4-6).2
Thus, because the DIB Review Sheet is not material
evidence in this case, this court concludes that the DIB Review
Sheet does not meet the requirement that the ALJ’s decision
As the Commissioner explains, beginning in 1991, the agency
evaluated child disability applications using an IFA. (Doc. 18,
at 4 (citing Interim Final Rules with Request for Comments, 62
Fed. Reg. 6408 (Feb. 11, 1997)). If a child did not meet a
listing at step three of the sequential evaluation process, these
IFA regulations provided that a child would be disabled if he
showed at least “moderate” limitations in three areas of
functioning. Id. In 1996, Congress passed amendments to the
Act, which made the definition of childhood disability more
stringent. Id. (discussing the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105). The agency then abolished the IFA regulations and
determined that if a child did not meet a listed impairment, he
had to show at least “marked” limitations in order to be found
disabled. Id.
The Commissioner explains that Plaintiff received benefits
in 1994, under the less-stringent IFA regulations. On page two
of the DIB Review Sheet it gives a “Basis Code for Decision”
regarding Plaintiff’s receipt of child benefits in 1994 of “A67,”
and a redacted phrase follows, of which the last portion “(IFA)”
is legible. Id. The Commissioner explains that the code A67 and
the reference to the IFA show that the agency found Plaintiff did
not meet the listing for mental retardation; instead, the agency
continued with the evaluation process and found that Plaintiff
demonstrated at least “moderate” limitations as required under
the IFA regulations (Doc. 18, Attachment (portion of agency
instructional manual)). Thus, as the Commissioner argues, it is
particularly unpersuasive for Plaintiff to now suggest that the
DIB Review Sheet is relevant evidence that he meets or equals the
listing for mental retardation when Plaintiff was not found
disabled based on his meeting the mental retardation listing.
Instead, Plaintiff was found disabled as a child under lessstringent IFA regulations.
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“might reasonably be different if that evidence were presented.”
Cagle, 638 F.2d at 221.3
As a result, the Court concludes that remand under sentence
six is not appropriate because a motion for a sentence six remand
has not been filed, and even were the Commissioner to file such a
motion, Plaintiff has not shown that the DIB Review Sheet is
material evidence.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s motion to
supplement the record with the DIB Review Sheet is denied.
II.
Plaintiff’s Arguments on Appeal
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision in three main ways.
First, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s failure to find that
Plaintiff’s mental impairments satisfied Listing 12.05.
Second,
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) assessment.
Third, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s
credibility analysis.
A.
Listing 12.05
First, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s failure to find that
Plaintiff’s mental impairments satisfied Listing 12.05(c),
concerning mental retardation.
At step three, the ALJ determines whether any medically
severe impairment, alone or in combination with the other
impairments, meets or is equivalent to any of a number of listed
impairments that are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful
One could even argue that the DIB Review Sheet actually
undermines Plaintiff’s claim.
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activity.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925 & pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1;
Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005).
The
claimant has the burden to present evidence establishing that his
impairments meet or equal a listed impairment.
431 F.3d at 733.
See Fischer-Ross,
To meet a listing, a claimant must show that
his impairment “satisfies all of the criteria of that listing,
including any relevant criteria in the introduction, and meets
the duration requirement.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.925(c)(3).
To equal
a listing, a claimant must show medical findings of “equal
medical significance” to the required criteria.
20 C.F.R. §
416.926(b)(1)(ii).
To meet Listing 12.05(c) concerning mental retardation, a
claimant must first meet the “capsule definition” (a/k/a,
“diagnostic description”) of Listing 12.05, which describes
mental retardation as “significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning
initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e., the
evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before
age 22.”
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, Listing 12.05; see
Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1062 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that
claimant must meet this “capsule definition” to satisfy Listing
12.05); Lax, 489 F.3d at 1085 (same); see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, 12.00B (“We will find that you have a listed
impairment if the diagnostic description in the introductory
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paragraph [of Listing 12.05] and the criteria of both paragraphs
A and B . . . of the listed impairment are satisfied.”).
The Court has carefully reviewed the ALJ’s entire decision
and concludes that substantial evidence was set forth in that
decision supporting that Plaintiff does not meet or equal the
requirements of Listing 12.05(c).
At step two of his decision,
the ALJ discussed the evidence relevant to mental retardation and
Listing 12.05(c), and his findings make clear that he considered
and rejected the notion that Plaintiff was mentally retarded
under that Listing.
See Fischer-Ross, 431 F.3d at 733 (holding
that “an ALJ’s findings at other steps of the sequential process
may provide a proper basis for upholding a step three conclusion
that a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal any listed
impairment”).
The ALJ explained that although Plaintiff was
diagnosed with mild mental retardation in 1994 when he was 15
years old, in May 2008, Dr. Ririe, a consultative psychologist,
examined, tested, and administered IQ testing to Plaintiff, and
diagnosed Plaintiff with borderline intellectual functioning.
The ALJ noted that Dr. Ririe reached this diagnosis despite
Plaintiff’s low IQ scores because Plaintiff’s adaptive
functioning showed that he had good independent living skills and
was able to take care of his personal needs reasonably well.
The
ALJ explained he agreed with Dr. Ririe’s diagnosis because the
treatment records show multiple times that Plaintiff was able to
seek and secure gainful work activity, which was inconsistent
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with a diagnosis of mild mental retardation.
(Tr. 13-14.)
Thus,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the
requirements of the “capsule definition” of Listing 12.05.
As
set forth by the Commissioner in his brief, the record supports
the ALJ’s characterization of the record.
(Doc. 14, at 15-16;
Tr. 13-24 301, 302, 314-24.)
Furthermore, the record does not show that Plaintiff
satisfied Listing 112.05D as a child; this includes that neither
Plaintiff nor his counsel asserted at the administrative hearing
that Plaintiff met Listing 112.05D as a child.
In any event, as explained already in Section I above, even
if Plaintiff could show that he satisfied the child’s listing,
that would not establish that he satisfied Listing 12.05 as an
adult.
As explained in Section I, when a child who was entitled
to SSI disability benefits attains eighteen years of age, the
agency must redetermine whether he is disabled under the adult
standards.
416.987.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(iii); 20 C.F.R. §
The Act and regulations specify that, in such a
redetermination, the agency must not apply the rules for
cessation of benefits or apply any presumption of continuing
disability.
See id.
Instead, the agency must determine anew
whether the claimant meets the adult standard of disability.
id.
See
Thus, Plaintiff’s contention that he must be found disabled
under Listing 12.05 because he met Listing 112.05D as a child is
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contrary to law.4
See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.987(a)(2) (“We may
find that you are not now disabled even though we previously
found that you were disabled.”) The relevant question before the
ALJ was whether Plaintiff proved that he was disabled under the
adult standards, regardless of whether he might have been
disabled as a child.
As mentioned above, the Court “‘will not reweigh the
evidence or substitute [its] judgment for the Commissioner’s’ . .
. [and] may not ‘displace the agenc[y’s] choice between two
fairly conflicting views, even though the [C]ourt would
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo.’”
Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (citations omitted).
Despite how sympathetic the Court may be to Plaintiff’s
condition, and despite that some evidence may exist that supports
that Plaintiff may meet the listing requirements, the Court must
simply examine whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
Having carefully considered the parties’
memoranda and the complete record in this matter, the Court
concludes that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s impairments did
not meet the requirements of a listing is supported by such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support the ALJ’s conclusion.
Because the ALJ’s decision is
Furthermore, as discussed in Section I, it appears that
Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of the mental retardation
listing as a child.
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supported by substantial evidence, and because Plaintiff has not
shown that the decision is not free of reversible legal error,
that decision is affirmed.
See Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d
1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992) (“A finding of ‘no substantial
evidence’ will be found only where there is a ‘conspicuous
absence of credible choices’ or ‘no contrary medical evidence.’”
(citations omitted)); Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1371 (10th
Cir. 2000).
B.
RFC Assessment
Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
Having reviewed all of Plaintiff’s arguments challenging the
ALJ’s RFC assessment, the ALJ’s decision, and the record, the
Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments and instead concludes that
the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence and
free of reversible legal error.
First, as the Commissioner explains in his brief, the ALJ’s
RFC assessment is not required to match the DOT.
19-21.)
(Doc. 14, at
RFC assessments must be based on all relevant evidence
in the record, not only the medical evidence, see 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5; thus, a claimant’s
RFC is based on the evidentiary record of his abilities.
A
publication of job descriptions, such as the DOT, has no
necessary bearing on the functional capacity possessed by any
particular claimant.
As a result, although the ALJ may refer to
outside sources such as the DOT to describe what the ALJ intends
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by the expressed limitations, it is immaterial whether the ALJ’s
assessment of Plaintiff’s functional capacity is consistent with
the DOT.
As the Commissioner explains in his brief, the ALJ’s
reference to the DOT informed and gave context to the ALJ’s
earlier finding that Plaintiff could carry out only “simple work
instructions.”
(Doc. 14, at 20.)
Further, unlike in Hackett v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2005), cited by Plaintiff, in
this case Plaintiff does not allege an inconsistency between the
ALJ’s step five finding and the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
Also as
explained by the Commissioner, no conflict exists between the
vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT; in fact, the
occupations identified by the expert, and adopted by the ALJ, all
had reasoning levels of 1, and the fact that those occupations
had DOT SVP levels of 2 was consistent with the ALJ’s finding
that Plaintiff was limited to relatively simple work.
(Doc. 14,
at 21; Tr. 55.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s anxiety and bipolar
disorder were well controlled with medication.
The treatment
notes in the record consistently demonstrated that Plaintiff was
functioning well on medication in 2008 and that he did not report
side effects.
380.)
(Tr. 289, 291, 293, 335, 337, 339-42, 372-78,
Dr. Ririe found that Plaintiff was functioning well and
did not appear to be struggling with bipolar disorder while
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abstinent from illicit drugs.
(Tr. 297-302.)
After reviewing
these medical records, Dr. Gill found that Plaintiff could do
non-complex work tasts.
(Tr. 329, 312.)
These medical records
and opinions were consistent with the ALJ’s decision.
No medical
professional ever opined that Plaintiff, as an adult, had
significant functional limitations while abstaining from drug
abuse.
Finally, to the extent the ALJ included limitations to his
RFC assessment, such as essentially no working with the general
public, and the limitations to specific DOT GED reasoning levels,
such inclusions were beneficial to Plaintiff and certainly did
not prejudice Plaintiff or constitute reversible error.
See
Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that the principle of harmless error applies to Social Security
disability cases); St. Anthony v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 309 F.3d 680, 691 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he party
challenging the action below bears the burden of establishing
that the error prejudiced the party.”); see also Shinseki v.
Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1706 (2009) (recognizing that “the
burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon
the party attacking the agency’s determination”).
Thus, based on the Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision and
the record, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s RFC arguments and
concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC
assessment.
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C.
Credibility Assessment
Finally, Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s credibility
assessment.
The ALJ found
After careful consideration of the evidence,
the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not
credible to the extent they are inconsistent
with the above residual functional capacity
assessment.
(Tr. 17.)
The ALJ is “‘optimally positioned to observe and assess
witness credibility.’” Adams v. Chater, 93 F.3d 712, 715 (10th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Casias v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991)).
In other words:
The opportunity to observe the demeanor of a
witness, evaluating what is said in the light
of how it is said, and considering how it
fits with the rest of the evidence gathered
before the person who is conducting the
hearing, is invaluable, and should not be
discarded lightly.
Therefore, special deference is
traditionally afforded a trier of fact who
makes a credibility finding.
Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 755 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted); see also Lax, 489 F.3d at 1089 (because the ALJ is in
the best position to observe the demeanor of witnesses, the ALJ’s
credibility findings deserve special deference).
In this case, the ALJ gave multiple reasons for declining to
credit all of Plaintiff’s subjective allegations.
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The ALJ
explicitly mentioned the relevant law, including 20 C.F.R. §
416.929 and SSR 96-7p (Tr. 16), and analyzed Plaintiff’s daily
activities and the treatment he received (Tr. 16-18).
Contrary
to Plaintiff’s suggestion, it was entirely appropriate for the
ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s daily activities.
See, e.g., 20
C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(I); Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213
(10th Cir. 1995) (upholding ALJ’s credibility finding where
claimant described her daily activities as including cooking,
dusting, doing laundry, grocery shopping, driving, and watching
television).
The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s work activity
before and after his alleged onset date (Tr. 18.)
See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.971 (“Even if the work you have done was not substantial
gainful activity, it may show that you are able to do more work
than you actually did.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) (in assessing
credibility, ALJ may consider claimant’s prior work record).
In addition, the ALJ considered the fact that the objective
medical evidence, as well as Plaintiff’s reports to his medical
providers, contradicted his testimony about extreme functional
limitations (Tr. 17-18).
See, e.g., Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d
1125, 1132 (10th Cir. 1988) (in evaluating credibility, the ALJ
may consider the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical
testimony with objective medical evidence, the nature of daily
activities, and the frequency of medical contacts and
extensiveness of attempts to obtain relief); White v. Barnhart,
287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2002) (same).
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Although Plaintiff
disputes the weight that should be given to some of these facts
(Doc. 11, at 18-19), this analysis was committed to the ALJ’s
judgment.
In other words, it was the ALJ’s province to weigh the
evidence because the ALJ was “‘optimally positioned to observe
and assess witness credibility.’” Adams, 93 F.3d at 715 (10th Cir.
1996) (citations omitted).
Hence, regardless of whether
Plaintiff or this Court would have arrived at the same
conclusion, the ALJ’s articulated reasons are sufficient to
uphold the ALJ’s credibility finding because they are supported
by substantial evidence.
See Shubargo v. Barnhart, 161 F. App’x
748, 753 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Our job as a reviewing court . . . is
to determine whether the ALJ’s credibility determination is
sufficiently detailed and supported by substantial evidence.
The
fact that he may have missed, ignored, or misunderstood certain
evidence that might support [the claimant’s] claims of disabling
pain does not mandate reversal as long as, on the whole record,
substantial evidence supports his credibility determination.”)
(unpublished) (citing Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214
(10th Cir. 2004)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s challenge to the
ALJ’s credibility finding fails.
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ORDER
The Commissioner has not filed a motion for a sentence six
remand, and, even were the Commissioner to file such a motion,
the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the
DIB Review Sheet is “material” evidence in that it might
reasonably change the agency’s decision.
Thus, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc.
16) is DENIED.
In addition, based on the above analysis, IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED because it
is supported by substantial evidence and is free of reversible
legal error.
DATED this 11th day of July, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
Samuel Alba
United States Magistrate Judge
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