Winfield v. State of Utah
Filing
48
MEMORANDUM DECISION and Order Denying Habeas Petition. Petitioner's challenges are procedurally barred and do not qualify for exceptional treatment. IT IS THEREFOR ORDERED that this habeas corpus petition under 2254 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Tena Campbell on 9/27/2013. (kpf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________
CARL ALTON WINFIELD JR.,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION &
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ORDER DENYING HABEAS
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PETITION
Petitioner,
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Case No. 2:10-CV-938 TC
v.
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District Judge Tena Campbell
STATE OF UTAH,
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Respondent.
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______________________________________________________________________________
Petitioner, Carl Alton Winfield Jr., an inmate at Utah State Prison, petitions for habeas
corpus relief.1 The Court denies him.
BACKGROUND
A jury convicted Petitioner of aggravated robbery, a felony, for which he was sentenced
to five years to life. On direct appeal, Petitioner raised two issues before the Utah Supreme
Court: (1) The inadequacy of the trial court's voir dire examination of the jury pool; and (2)
insufficient evidence. Neither of these challenges was addressed on the merits. This is because
the former was "invited error," as Petitioner, representing himself at trial, specifically stated his
unreserved acceptance of the jury.2 And, the latter was not preserved at trial.3
On state-post-conviction review, Petitioner raised three issues: (1) improper bindover;
(2) perjured testimony by witnesses; and (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, based on
1
See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 (2013).
2
"The trial judge . . . asked if Winfield found the collective panel from which his jury would be selected to
be acceptable. Winfield responded, 'Absolutely,' and declined to use any of his four available peremptory
challenges, stating 'The defense concedes to the jury selection.' At the conclusion of voir dire, Winfield again stated,
"Let the record reflect that I have conceded to the jury selection.'" State v.Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 8.
3
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 28.
failure to attack the restriction of Petitioner's movements around the court room at trial. The court
declined to reach the merits of these issues because Petitioner improperly briefed them-specifically, by not setting forth how the trial court had erred but instead restating his original
arguments.4 The Utah Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari.5
Petitioner's current petition to this Court attacks these alleged violations in his state-court
criminal proceedings: (1) perjured testimony by witnesses and (2) unfair restraint of his
movements around the court room at trial. The State responds to the petition, correctly arguing
that these grounds are procedurally defaulted, as they were rejected on procedural grounds by the
Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS
This Court may not consider issues "defaulted in state court on independent and adequate
state procedural grounds 'unless [petitioner] can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider
the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'"6 The grounds are "independent
and adequate" when they are "'strictly or regularly followed' and employed 'evenhandedly to all
similar claims.'"7
4
Winfield v. State, 2009 UT App 323.
5
Winfield v. State, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah 2010) (table).
6
Hamm v. Saffle, 300 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750
(1991)).
7
See Hamm, 300 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Hickman v. Sears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998)) (quotation
omitted in original).
2
Under this Court's review of Utah procedural law, Utah appellate courts regularly apply
the "invited error doctrine," under which they "decline[] to engage in plain error review when [a
party] made an affirmative statement that led the court to commit the [alleged] error."8 The Utah
Supreme Court explicitly spoke to the regular and evenhanded nature of its use of the doctrine:
"Under the 'invited error' doctrine, we have held repeatedly that a party cannot on appeal 'take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error.'"9 This Court's research further reveals that the Utah appellate courts regularly and
evenhandedly apply the requirement that appellate litigants must properly brief their arguments.10
Under the federal law outlined earlier, then, this Court must dismiss Petitioner's defaulted
issues unless cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice redeems the default.11
Petitioner perhaps argues both cause and prejudice and a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Petitioner vaguely asserts cause and prejudice stem from his ignorance and lack of access to a
legal resources and fundamental miscarriage of justice stems from his innocence based on the
merits of his substantive claims.
8
State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 24.
9
State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 34 n.9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see, e.g., State v. Lee, 2006
UT 5, ¶¶ (applying invited-error doctrine in stating "where a party affirmatively expresses to the trial court his assent
to the composition of the jury, that party cannot challenge the composition of the jury on appeal").
10
See, e.g., Peak Alarm Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2010 UT 22, ¶ 67 (declining to address asserted trialcourt error when appellant's brief provided no meaningful analysis on issue); Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp.,
2009 UT 2, ¶ 50 (same); Kell v. Utah, 2008 UT 62, ¶ 14 (holding post-conviction court correctly dismissed claims
that had been previously raised and rejected, or could have been but were not raised, on direct appeal); State v.
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address asserted trial-court error when appellant's brief
provided no meaningful analysis on issue); State v. Womack, 967 P.2d 536, 540 n.1 (Utah App. 1998) (same).
11
See Gonzales v. Jordan, No. 01-6415, 2002 WL 1203905, at *3-4 (10th Cir. June 5, 2002) (unpublished).
3
The Court first examines cause and prejudice, as to Petitioner's assertion that his lack of
knowledge and legal resources provides a path to allow this Court to address his procedurally
defaulted claims on the merits. "[T]o satisfy the 'cause' standard, Petitioner must show that 'some
objective factor external to the defense' impeded his compliance with Utah's procedural rules."12
Meanwhile, to demonstrate prejudice, "'[t]he habeas petitioner must show not merely that . . .
errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial
disadvantage.'"13
Petitioner has not done this. Under Tenth Circuit case law, lack of legal knowledge and
resources do not carry Petitioner's burden to show cause.14 Indeed, this is a factor internal to
Petitioner's defense. Moreover, the fact that Petitioner rather ably represents himself in this case,
with rational arguments and plenty of pleadings, belies his assertion that he had inadequate
access to or understanding of the law. The Utah Supreme Court even endorsed Petitioner's legal
capabilities as a pro se litigant.15 Finally, it is the Utah Court of Appeals' determination under
12
Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
13
Butler v. Kansas, No. 02-3211, 2002 WL 31888316, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2002) (unpublished)
(alteration in original) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986) (emphasis in original)).
14
See also Gilkey v. Kansas, No. 02-3227, 2003 WL 245639, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2003) (unpublished)
(holding limited knowledge of the law is insufficient to show cause for procedural default); Rodriguez v. Maynard,
948 F.2d 684, 688 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding petitioner's pro se status and his corresponding lack of awareness
and training on legal issues do not constitute adequate cause for his failure to adequately raise claims).
15
In this case, Winfield's decisions during voir dire can hardly be accredited to a lack of technical
knowledge of law and procedure. While Winfield is not an attorney, he had previously defended himself in another
trial and appeared to have a reasonable knowledge of his rights and of trial procedure. Indeed, during voir dire,
Winfield effectively made a for-cause challenge to a potential juror, requested additional questioning of another
potential juror, and even objected to the trial court's repeated use of the term "overabundance of caution" when
striking potential jurors from the panel for cause. We therefore decline Winfield's invitation that we disregard the
invited error doctrine because of his pro se status.
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 20.
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state law that Petitioner did not properly follow briefing rules. Although Petitioner may hotly
contest that determination--because it involves an interpretation of state law--it is not the kind of
question that may be reviewed in a federal habeas proceeding.16
Finally, Petitioner possibly suggests that a miscarriage of justice will occur if this Court
does not address the defaulted claims in his petition. To be plausible, an actual-innocence claim
must be grounded on solid evidence not adduced at trial.17 Because such evidence is so rare, "'in
virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.'"18
Petitioner is burdened with making "a proper showing of factual innocence."19
Petitioner's mere rehashing of the evidence and alleged violations of his civil rights in
state proceedings do nothing to convince this Court that the exception applies. Indeed, the kernel
of the Court's analysis regarding actual innocence is not whether Petitioner urgently believes
there were errors--or whether there were indeed errors--in the state proceedings, but whether
Petitioner is factually innocent. This factual innocence must also be supported with new
evidence, which Petitioner has not provided.
In sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner's issues are procedurally defaulted. And,
these issues do not qualify for consideration under the cause-and-prejudice or miscarriage-ofjustice exceptions to the procedural bar. The Court thus denies Petitioner federal habeas relief.
16
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975).
17
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998).
18
Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (citation omitted)).
19
Byrns v. Utah, No. 98-4085, 1998 WL 874865, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 1998) (unpublished) (citing
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1992)).
5
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's challenges are procedurally barred and do not qualify for exceptional
treatment. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this habeas corpus petition under § 2254 is
DENIED.
DATED this 27th day of September, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
__________________________
JUDGE TENA CAMPBELL
United States District Court
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