Miller et al v. Corinthian Colleges

Filing 52

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER: It is Ordered that Plaintiffs' Objection to Magistrate Judge's Order 47 is OVERRULED. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 5/5/2011. (las)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

CHELSI MILLER, DANIEL MARTY, and
CHRISTIE COTTON on behalf of
themselves and all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER OVERRULING
PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER

vs.

CORINTHIAN COLLEGES, INC., and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Case No. 2:10-CV-999 TS

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order on
Emergency Motion for Protective Order. For the reasons discussed below, the Objection will be
overruled.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, former students at Everest College, brought this action against Defendant on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated alleging four causes of action under the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act (“UCSPA”), as well as claims for fraudulent misrepresentation,

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negligent misrepresentation, and declaratory judgment.1 Defendant sought an order compelling
Plaintiffs to submit their claims to arbitration before the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”) and to stay this matter pending arbitration, in accordance with the enrollment
agreements signed by each Plaintiff.2
As part of their opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, Plaintiffs
submitted certain documents (the “Ignition Documents”) that are the subject of the Magistrate
Judge’s Order. In response to Plaintiffs’ submission, Defendant filed an Emergency Motion for
Protective Order (the “Emergency Motion”).3 The Emergency Motion was referred to the
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).4
The Magistrate Judge heard argument on the Emergency Motion on February 10, 2011.5
At that hearing, the Magistrate Judge granted the Emergency Motion.6 The Magistrate Judge
found the Ignition Documents constituted trade secrets and ordered them sealed during the
pendency of this litigation.7 Additionally, the Magistrate Judge ordered that counsel could not

1

Docket No. 2, Ex. A.

2

Docket No. 6.

3

Docket No. 25.

4

Docket Nos. 28 & 29.

5

Docket No. 49.

6

Id. at 29.

7

Id.
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further disseminate the Ignition Documents.8 A written order followed.9 That Order provided
that: (1) the Ignition Documents were to be sealed until otherwise ordered by the Court; (2)
copies of the Ignition Documents being maintained in the Clerk’s office were to be sealed; (3)
Plaintiffs and their counsel were allowed to use the Ignition Documents for the purposes of this
litigation only; and (4) Plaintiffs and their counsel were prohibited from making any
dissemination of the Ignition Documents.10
Plaintiffs have now filed an Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order.
II. DISCUSSION
The first issue that must be decided in this matter is the proper standard of review to
apply. Plaintiffs argue that the Magistrate Judge exceeded his authority under 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A) and, therefore, the Court should apply a de novo standard of review.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) allow a Magistrate Judge to consider
nondispositive pretrial matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) lists eight matters that are dispositive
as a matter of law and are not within the authority of the Magistrate Judge under that provision.
Among the eight categories of matters that cannot be considered by a Magistrate Judge under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) are motions for injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs argue that the Magistrate Judge’s Order provides for injunctive relief and,
therefore, the Magistrate Judge exceed his authority and de novo review should be applied.

8

Id.

9

Docket No. 46.

10

Id.
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Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that by restricting Plaintiffs’ and their counsel’s use of the Ignition
Documents to this litigation and prohibiting the dissemination of the Ignition Documents by
Plaintiffs and their counsel, the Magistrate Judge acted beyond the scope of the referral.
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge acted within his authority. As both parties
recognize, courts distinguish between express injunctions and orders that merely have the
practical effect of some injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has held that “[a]n order by a
federal court that relates only to the conduct or progress of litigation before that court ordinarily
is not considered an injunction.”11 The Magistrate Judge’s Order here merely regulates the
parties conduct. As a result, the Order is not an injunction and the Magistrate Judge acted within
his authority. Therefore, the Court finds that the Order concerns a non-dispositive pretrial
matter.
For non-dispositive pretrial matters, this Court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s orders
under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard of review.12 Under the clearly erroneous
standard, this court will affirm the Magistrate Judge’s ruling “unless it ‘on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”13
Having reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s Order and Plaintiffs’ Objection thereto, the
Court is not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Objection will be overruled.
11

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279 (1988).

12

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).

13

Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
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III. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order (Docket No. 47) is
OVERRULED.
DATED May 5, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

_____________________________________
TED STEWART
United States District Judge

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