Cardona v. Cook

Filing 82

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT granting 52 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against the Plaintiff and dismiss this case forthewith. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 1/13/2014. (kpf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
RENE CARDONA,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. COOK, Sergeant at the Central Utah
Correctional Facility, individually; JOHN
DOES 1-10, employees at the Utah State
Prison,

Case No. 2:11-CV-388 TS
District Judge Ted Stewart

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Sergeant Randall Cook’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed, except where specifically indicated. During the
relevant time period, Plaintiff Rene Cardona was an inmate housed at the Central Utah
Correctional Facility (“CUCF”) in Gunnison, Utah. Plaintiff suffered from a number of physical
and mental health ailments. As a result of these ailments, Plaintiff had a bottom bunk clearance
allowing him to occupy the bottom bunk of his cell.
On December 1, 2010, Plaintiff moved from the Secure Management Unit (“SMU”) to
the Hickory Housing Unit (“Hickory Unit”). Defendant Cook was assigned to the Hickory
Housing Unit and, as part of his responsibilities, oversaw inmate housing. Specifically,
Defendant assisted in transferring Plaintiff to the Hickory Unit, assigned him a cell, and escorted
him to the top bunk in his assigned cell.

1

It is disputed whether Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s bottom bunk clearance.
Plaintiff has provided a declaration stating that it was well known that he had a bottom bunk
clearance and that he specifically told Defendant that he had such clearance. However,
Defendant has provided a declaration stating that he was unaware of Plaintiff’s bottom bunk
clearance and that Plaintiff specifically told him that he did not have a bottom bunk clearance.
What is not in dispute is that when Plaintiff was transferred to the Hickory Unit he was
not given a bottom bunk, but rather was provided a top bunk. It appears that Plaintiff protested
this assignment. According to Plaintiff, Defendant responded that there were no available
bottom bunks but Plaintiff could put his mattress on the floor and that he would not get written
up for doing so.1 Defendant confirms that he gave Plaintiff the option of putting his mattress on
the floor and passed that information on to the night shift officers so that there would be no
issues concerning Plaintiff putting his mattress on the floor.2 There is a dispute as to whether
Defendant provided Plaintiff other options, such as allowing Plaintiff to return to the SMU.
Plaintiff’s cellmate objected to Plaintiff putting his mattress on the floor and, as a result,
Plaintiff spent the night on the top bunk. During the night of December 1, 2010, or early
morning hours of December 2, 2010, Plaintiff fell while attempting to descend from the top
bunk. Plaintiff alleges that he sustained certain injuries as a result of his fall.
Plaintiff initially filed this action pro se. Defendant moved for summary judgment on
July 13, 2012. Thereafter, the Court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff. Counsel has now
responded to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and that Motion is ripe for decision.

1

Docket No. 73, ¶¶ 22–23.

2

Docket No. 79, Ex. D at 5.

2

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”3 In
considering whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court determines whether a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence
presented.4 The Court is required to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.5
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claim that he
violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields
public officials . . . from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of
clearly established law.”6 “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and
(2) the constitutional right was clearly established.”7 In determining whether a right is clearly
established, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”8

3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

4

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182,
183 (10th Cir. 1991).
5

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wright v.
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991).

6

Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994).

7

Courtney v. Okla. ex rel., Dep't of Pub. Safety, 722 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

8

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

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A.

CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
In Estelle v. Gamble,9 the Supreme Court held that “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”10 “Deliberate indifference involves both an objective
and a subjective component.”11 The objective component is met if the deprivation is
“sufficiently serious.”12 A medical need is sufficiently serious “if it is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”13
The subjective component is met only if a prison official “knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.”14
1.

Objective Component

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need. Defendant
argues that while Plaintiff had a bottom bunk clearance, his medical need for that clearance was
not serious. The Court will assume for the purposes of Defendant’s Motion, that Plaintiff’s
medical need was sufficiently serious and that a deprivation of a bottom bunk could satisfy the
objective component. However, that is not what occurred in this case. The undisputed facts
show that Defendant offered Plaintiff an alternative to a top bunk. Defendant permitted Plaintiff
9

429 U.S. 97 (1976).

10

Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).

11

Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000).

12

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

13

Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).

14

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

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to put his mattress on the floor, told Plaintiff that he would not get in trouble for doing so, and
informed the night shift that Plaintiff was permitted to put his mattress on the floor. While
Plaintiff’s cellmate may have objected to this practice, it is undisputed that Plaintiff had a viable
alternative to sleeping in a top bunk. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot meet the
objective component of the deliberate indifference test.15
This case is directly analogous to Hillman v. Hansen, a case decided by the Honorable
Tena Campbell. In Hillman, the plaintiff was a sixty-nine year old woman who was transferred
to a new cell and assigned a top bunk.16 The plaintiff requested a bottom bunk, but was instead
offered the option of placing her mattress on the floor.17 The plaintiff apparently declined that
option and fell while trying to climb down from the top bunk during the night.18 The plaintiff
brought suit alleging that assigning her to a top bunk violated the Eighth Amendment.19 The
defendants filed for summary judgment, contending that they were entitled to qualified
immunity.20
Judge Campbell stated that “[t]here is little doubt that even a short-term assignment to a
top bunk, which requires its user to repeatedly climb up and down a railing at night in close
quarters, would pose a substantial risk of serious harm to an average woman of nearly seventy

15

See Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1250–51 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Eighth Amendment
claim where plaintiff was given a choice of accepting an upper bunk or returning to a lower bunk
in a segregation unit); Hillman v. Hansen, 2007 WL 189390, at *5 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 2007)
(rejecting Eighth Amendment claim where plaintiff was given the option of putting her mattress
on the floor).
16

Hillman, 2007 WL 189390, at *1.

17

Id. at *2.

18

Id.

19

Id. at *3.

20

Id.

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years of age.”21 Thus, “knowingly assigning [the plaintiff] to a top-bunk without providing her
an alternative sleeping arrangement, would pose a sufficiently serious safety risk to satisfy the
objective prong of the deliberate indifference inquiry.”22 However, as in this case, that was not
what happened.
The record here shows that Plaintiff was not forced to use the top bunk, despite
the initial assignment, because she was given the alternative of placing her
mattress on the floor for one night before being relocated the next morning. At
first blush, merely telling an inmate to sleep on the floor rather than providing a
lower bunk might seem unreasonable. However, the Court finds that given the
short duration involved here, and the lack of readily available alternatives, this
accommodation was a reasonable means of mitigating any risk posed to Plaintiff
in this instance. As other Courts have recognized, when an inmate is offered a
viable, but perhaps less desirable, alternative to a potentially dangerous
condition—rather than being forced into an “impossible situation in which he
could not avoid pain or permanent injury”—the condition is not “sufficiently
serious” to state an Eighth Amendment claim.23
The Court agrees with this analysis. As with the plaintiff in Hillman, Plaintiff was
provided a viable, although less desirable, alternative to sleeping on the top bunk.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Hillman by arguing that he was not presented a viable
alternative to accepting a top bunk assignment because Plaintiff’s cellmate objected to Plaintiff
placing his mattress on the floor. However, the question before the Court concerns Defendant’s
actions, not the actions of Plaintiff’s cellmate. The fact remains that Defendant permitted
Plaintiff to place his mattress on the floor as an alternative to sleeping in the top bunk.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show the objective component of his Eighth
Amendment claim.

21

Id. at *4.

22

Id. at *5.

23

Id. (quoting Williams, 71 F.3d at 1250–51).

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2.

Subjective Component

For substantially the same reasons, Plaintiff cannot meet the subjective component of his
Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety where Defendant provided Plaintiff a viable
alternative to sleeping in a top bunk. As stated, Plaintiff was given the option of placing his
mattress on the floor of his cell, but did not do so.
B.

CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
Even if the Court were to find that Defendant Cook violated Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, that right would not be clearly established. Plaintiff cites a number of cases where courts
have held that assigning an inmate to a top bunk when the inmate holds a bottom bunk clearance
may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. While the Court acknowledges that there
may be instances where assigning an inmate to a top bunk may be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, the cases cited by Plaintiff are distinguishable from the facts before the Court. In
none of the cases cited by Plaintiff was the prisoner provided the option of putting his or her
mattress on the floor, as Plaintiff was here. Therefore, qualified immunity is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 52) is
GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and
against Plaintiff and dismiss this case forthwith.

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Dated this 13th day of January, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

Ted Stewart
United States District Judge

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