Sanders et al v. Yellow Cab Drivers Association et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM DECISION and Ordergranting 15 Motion to Quash; granting 17 Motion to Quash; granting 19 Motion to Quash. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner on 2/13/12. (jmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

MICHELLE SANDERS, individually as
widow of DERRICK PRICE, deceased;
MARLENE PRICE, individually as
mother of DERRICK PRICE, deceased;
and RALPH (JAY) PRICE, individually as
father of DERRICK PRICE, deceased,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Case No. 2:11-cv-595-CW-PMW

Plaintiffs,
v.
YELLOW CAB DRIVERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. dba YELLOW
CAB, a Utah corporation; SARBJIT
SINGH, individually; and DOES 1 through
20,
Defendants.

District Judge Clark Waddoups
Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner

District Judge Clark Waddoups referred this case to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).1 Before the court are Michelle Sanders (“Sanders”),
Marlene Price, and Ralph (Jay) Price’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) (1) motion to quash a subpoena
duces tecum served on A&H Sign and Tape Co. (“A&H”);2 (2) motion to quash a subpoena
duces tecum served on Diggity Dog Resort (“DDR”);3 and (3) motion to quash a subpoena duces

1

See docket no. 21.

2

See docket no. 15.

3

See docket no. 17.

tecum served on Rich’s Cigar Store (“RCS”).4 The court has carefully reviewed the written
memoranda submitted by the parties. Pursuant to civil rule 7-1(f) of the Rules of Practice for the
United States District Court for the District of Utah (“Local Rules”), the court has concluded that
oral argument is not necessary and will determine the motions on the basis of the written
memoranda. See DUCivR 7-1(f).
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Sanders is the widow of Derrick Price (“Price”), who was killed as the result of a
collision between the scooter he was driving and a taxi. Among other general, special, and
punitive damages, Plaintiffs’ claims in this case seek damages on behalf of Sanders for the lost
wages and benefits of Price. Plaintiffs assert that all of their claims for damages arise directly
from and are related to the wrongful death of Price. Plaintiffs also assert that they are making no
claims regarding any loss of employment wages or benefits relating specifically to the
employment of Sanders.
At the time of Price’s death, he and Sanders were not living together. Price was living in
Salt Lake City, Utah, and Sanders was living somewhere in Oregon. After Price’s death, Sanders
filed a petition seeking a declaration in state court indicating that she was legally married to Price
at the time of his death and, therefore, was an heir for purposes of probate proceedings and
bringing a wrongful death lawsuit against Yellow Cab Drivers Association, Inc. dba Yellow Cab

4

See docket no. 19.
2

and Sarbjit Singh (collectively, “Defendants”). That petition was granted. In the findings of fact
and conclusions of law, the court found:
In January 2009, only a few months after [Price] and [Sanders]
were married in 2008, [Price]’s employment transferred him to
[Salt Lake City, Utah]. [Sanders] accompanied him. In the rough
economic climate, [Sanders] was unable to find suitably gainful
employment in Salt Lake City, which placed some stress on their
marriage. [Price] and [Sanders] agreed that [Sanders] would look
for a job in Oregon and that once she found one, [Price] would join
her there. [Sanders] returned to Oregon to commence her job
search at the end of July 2010, roughly three weeks before [Price]’s
death. During this three-week period, [Price] provided financial
support for [Sanders], [Price] and [Sanders] communicated
frequently, repeatedly reaffirming their love and commitment to
one another and their intent to reunite once [Sanders] found a job,
and continued to hold themselves out to friends and family as
husband and wife.5
Sanders was previously employed by A&H and DDR, but was no longer employed at
either of those entities at the time of Price’s death, nor was she subsequently employed at either
of those entities. Sanders gained employment at RCS after the incident that is the subject of this
case.
On or about December 7, 2011, Defendants served a subpoena duces tecum on each of
A&H, DDR, and RCS. The three subpoenas at issue (“Subpoenas”) seek the exact same
documents from A&H, DDR, and RCS. Specifically, the Subpoenas request the following
documents and information:
Complete personnel file, cell phone number, name of cell phone
provider, cell phone records, names of all superior(s),

5

Docket no. 22, Exhibit 1, ¶18.
3

supervisor(s), and/or those who worked directly with the employee,
notes, correspondence, reports, W-2 forms, governmental
assistance forms or applications, functional ability evaluations,
time logs, pay stubs, all payroll records, and all other documents of
any kind associated with or relating to: [Sanders].6
Defendants sent Sanders a copy of the Subpoenas on the same day Defendants sent the
Subpoenas to A&H, DDR, and RCS. On December 9, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the three motions to
quash before the court.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, the three motions to quash before the court seek the exact same
documents from three of Sanders’s employers. Because the arguments and issues raised in each
of the three motions are identical, the court will address the motions together.
All three of the motions before the court relate to discovery. “The district court has broad
discretion over the control of discovery, and [the Tenth Circuit] will not set aside discovery
rulings absent an abuse of that discretion.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Merrill Scott & Assocs.,
Ltd., 600 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted). The general scope
of discovery is governed by rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense. . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “[T]he scope of discovery under the federal rules is broad and . . . ‘discovery

6

Docket no. 16, Exhibit 1; Docket no. 18, Exhibit 1; Docket no. 20, Exhibit 1.
4

is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define and
clarify the issues.’” Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). “Although the scope of
discovery under the federal rules is broad, however, parties may not engage in a ‘fishing
expedition’ in an attempt to obtain evidence to support their claims or defenses.” Richards v.
Convergys Corp., No. 2:05-cv-00790-DAK & 2:05-cv-00812-DAK, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9131, at *10 (D. Utah Feb. 6, 2007) (quoting Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160,
1169 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiffs argue that the Subpoenas should be quashed because they seek information that
is confidential and irrelevant. Plaintiffs also argue that the Subpoenas are overly broad and seek
information that is of no probative value whatsoever.
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ motions should be denied because Plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the meet-and-confer requirements of rule 37-1(a) of the Local Rules. See
DUCivR 37-1(a). Defendants also argue that the information sought by the Subpoenas is
relevant and discoverable.
The court will first address Defendants’ argument concerning the meet-and-confer
requirement of the Local Rules. The court will then turn to Plaintiffs’ substantive arguments
concerning the Subpoenas.

5

I. Meet-and-Confer
Defendants correctly note that there is a meet-and-confer requirement imposed on parties
that must be satisfied before any discovery motion will be heard by the court. See id.
Specifically, civil rule 37-1 of the Local Rules provides:
Unless otherwise ordered, the court will not entertain any discovery
motion, except those motions brought by a person appearing pro se
and those brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) by a person who is
not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the
court, at the time of filing the motion, a statement showing that the
attorney making the motion has made a reasonable effort to reach
agreement with opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the
motion. Such statement must recite, in addition, the date, time, and
place of such consultation and the names of all participating parties
or attorneys.
Id.
However, there is also a requirement that a party provide all other parties with notice of a
subpoena directed to a nonparty. See DUCivR 45-1. Specifically, civil rule 45-1 of the Local
Rules provides:
The notice of issuance of subpoena with a copy of the proposed
subpoena that is (i) directed to a nonparty, and (ii) commands
production of documents and things or inspection of premises
before trial shall be served on each party as prescribed by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 45(b)(1). Service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(A) shall be
made at least five (5) days prior to service of the subpoena on the
non[]party. Service on parties under Fed.R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B),(C)
or (D) shall be made at least eight (8) days prior to service of the
subpoena on the non[]party.

6

Id.

As noted by Plaintiffs, one obvious purpose of the above-referenced notice periods is to

provide parties with an opportunity to conduct a meet-and-confer concerning a subpoena and, if
necessary, move to quash that subpoena before it is actually served on the nonparty.
The Subpoenas indicate that Defendants served them via U.S. Mail, which required
Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with at least eight days’ notice prior to serving the Subpoenas on
A&H, DDR, and RCS. Instead, Defendants sent the Subpoenas to Plaintiffs on the same day
they were sent to A&H, DDR, and RCS.
In the court’s view, when Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with the requisite notice
of the Subpoenas before serving them on A&H, DDR, and RCS, Defendants effectively excused
Plaintiffs from satisfying the meet-and-confer requirement. As Plaintiffs have noted, had they
not filed their motions to quash, the potential existed that A&H, DDR, and/or RCS would
produce documents responsive to the Subpoenas. For these reasons, the court declines to decide
Plaintiffs’ motions to quash on the grounds of any failure to comply with the Local Rules.
II. Substantive Arguments
As noted above, Plaintiffs argue that the Subpoenas should be quashed because they seek
information that is confidential and irrelevant. Plaintiffs also argue that the Subpoenas are overly
broad and seek information that is of no probative value whatsoever.
Defendants respond by arguing that the Subpoenas seek information that is relevant and
discoverable. More specifically, Defendants argue that they
believe whether [Sanders] had obtained ‘meaningful’ or ‘suitable’
employment here in Salt Lake City, or whether she left Salt Lake
for a purpose other than employment, is relevant to her claim that
7

she relied on Price’s income now and in the future, or whether it
was Sanders’[s] intent to reunite with Price.7
After carefully considering the parties’ arguments, the court concludes that the Subpoenas
seek information that is not relevant to this case. Defendants have failed to cite any authority for
the proposition that a surviving spouse’s employment records are relevant in a wrongful death
action. Further, the court agrees with Plaintiffs’ assertion that there is no reliable or predictable
relationship between Sanders’s earnings and the amount of financial support she received from
Price. Additionally, while Defendants have stated in a conclusory fashion the purpose for
obtaining the information sought by the Subpoenas, they have failed to explain how that
information, if obtained, will achieve that purpose. Finally, and most importantly, the
information sought by the Subpoenas is not relevant because damages in a wrongful death case
are determined based on the circumstances at the moment of death. See, e.g., Petersen v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 1:06-cv-108-TC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66862, at *10 (D. Utah
June 22, 2011) (“[U]nder Utah law, damages for wrongful death are measured at the moment of
death and . . . changed circumstances occurring after death but before trial are irrelevant.”). At
the time of Price’s death, Sanders’s employment at A&H and DDR had terminated, and Sanders
did not obtain employment at RCS until months after Price’s death.
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Subpoenas should be quashed.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ (1) motion to quash a subpoena duces

7

Docket no. 22 at 5; docket no. 23 at 5; docket no. 24 at 5.
8

tecum served on A&H,8 (2) motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on DDR,9 and (3)
motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on RCS10 are all GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

PAUL M. WARNER
United States Magistrate Judge

8

See docket no. 15.

9

See docket no. 17.

10

See docket no. 19.
9