Amarosa v. Doctor John's et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER following 4/20/12 hearing (Minute Entry 26 ) dismissing motions to dismiss and granting 27 Motion to Amend Findings or Add Additional Findings. Signed by Judge David Nuffer on 7/5/12 (alt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

HANNAH AMAROSA,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO
DISMISS

vs.
DOCTOR JOHN'S INC., KEN
GREENTREE, and JOHN COIL,
Defendants.

Civil No: 2:11-cv-00676DN
Judge: David Nuffer

This matter came before the Court on April 20, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. on Defendants
John Coil’s and Ken Greentree’s Motions to Dismiss 1 The Plaintiff was represented by
Counsel, Russell T. Monahan. The Defendants were represented by Counsel, W. Andrew
McCullough.
At the hearing, the court orally denied the motions to dismiss and explained its
reasoning on the record. Subsequently, Defendants Coil and Greentree filed a motion 2
asking the court to address their contention that this court should decline jurisdiction over
Amarosa’s state law defamation claim on the ground that the defamation claim
“substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction.” 3 This court’s subject matter jurisdiction in this case is based on a
federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; specifically, Amarosa’s allegations that
1

Motion to Dismiss (Coil), docket no. 7, filed August 9, 2011; Motion to Dismiss (Greentree), docket no.
16, filed August 25, 2011.
2
Motion to Amend Findings or Add Additional Findings, docket no. 27, filed April 23, 2012.
3
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Defendants violated the Employee Polygraph Protection Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
The supplemental jurisdiction statute 4 provides that in any case over which the
court has original jurisdiction, the court shall have supplemental jurisdiction over related
state law claims. Subdivision (c)(2) provides that the court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if the state law claim substantially predominates over the
claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. 5 By the very language of the
statute, the court has discretion to decline jurisdiction, but it is not required to do so. 6
The court therefore declines to follow Defendants’ suggestion that it should not exercise
jurisdiction over Amarosa’s state law defamation claim. Amarosa has asserted two
federal claims. The defamation claim is related to those claims as it arises out of events
stemming from Amarosa’s former employment by Defendants. The court also concludes
that the defamation claim does not substantially predominate over the federal claims.
Having reviewed the file, the submissions of the parties, and having heard the
arguments of the parties,
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant Greentree’s Motion to Dismiss 7 the Plaintiff’s Third Cause of

Action is denied. Defendant Coil’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Third Cause of
Action is denied. 8

4

28 U.S.C. § 1367.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2),
6
See, e.g., Gold v. Local 7 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.
1998) (stating that the exercise of jurisdiction under section 1367 is discretionary), overruled on other
grounds by Styskal v. Weld Cnty Bd. of Comm’rs, 365 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. (2004).
7
Docket no. 16, filed August 25, 2011.
5

2.

Defendant Coil’s Motion to Dismiss,9 based on lack of personal

jurisdiction, is denied.
3.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, based on the theory that the state law

claims substantially predominate over the federal claims, are denied. 10
4.

Defendants’ Motion to Amend Findings or Add Additional Findings 11 is

granted as discussed above.
Dated July 5, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________
David Nuffer
United States District Judge

8

Docket no. 7, filed August 9, 2011.
Docket no. 7.
10
Docket nos. 7 & 16.
11
Docket no. 27, filed April 23, 2012.
9