Burgess v. Global Clean Energy Holdings

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDERgranting 5 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Ordering Amendment. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 11/14/2011. (tls)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

DEIRDRA BURGESS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ORDERING AMENDMENT

vs.

GLOBAL CLEAN ENERGY HOLDINGS,
INC., a Utah Corporation and successor to
MEDICAL DISCOVERIES, INC., an expired
Utah Corporation, and DOES 1-10,

Case No. 2:11-CV-682 TS

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Global Clean’s Motion to Dismiss. Global
Clean asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court will grant
the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, without prejudice to the filing of an amended
complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Deirdra Burgess was an employee of Medical Discoveries Inc. (“MDI”).
Burgess alleges that MDI failed to pay her $80,000 in wages while employed. MDI merged with
Defendant Global Clean Energy Holdings (“Global”). After the merger, Burgess continued to be

employed by Global. Burgess alleges that Global assumed the $80,000 debt as a condition of her
continued employment, and that Global has since failed to pay the debt.
Burgess filed suit in state court against Global in pursuit of the $80,000 allegedly owed.
The suit was removed to this Court by Global. Global now moves to dismiss Burgess’s
complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded factual
allegations, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the nonmoving party.1 Plaintiffs must provide “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”2 and the court is not required to accept
“conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments.”3 “The court’s function on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to
assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief
may be granted.”4 The Supreme Court has explained that a plaintiff must “nudge[ ][his] claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss.5 As the Tenth
Circuit stated:
[T]he mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of
facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the

1

Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002).

2

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

3

Cory v. Allstate Ins., 583 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 2009).

4

Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).

5

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering
factual support for these claims.6
The Supreme Court provided greater explanation of the standard set out in Twombly in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.7 In Iqbal, the Court reiterated that while Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 does not
require detailed factual allegations, it nonetheless requires “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”8 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’
or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”9 “Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”10
The Court in Iqbal stated:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks
a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime
of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.
But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss
can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions

6

The Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis in original).
7

129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

8

Id. at 1949 (citing Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555).

9

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

10

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.11
III. DISCUSSION
Burgess alleges that MDI owed her $80,000, that Global assumed the debt and promised
to pay it, and that Plaintiff has never been paid. Burgess’s statements of fact relating to these
allegations are unsupported and conclusory. To support the contention that MDI owed her
money, Burgess offers only the following statement: “During the time she worked for MDI, MDI
failed to pay Dee Burgess wages owed to her in the approximate amount of $80,000.”12 Burgess
does not explain how the debt was incurred. Nor does she attach or reference documents that
indicate to the Court that the existence of the debt is plausible. Similarly, to support the claim
that Global assumed the debt, Plaintiff simply states that “[a]fter the merger, Global also
employed Dee Burgess. Among the terms and conditions of Dee Burgess’s employment was
Global’s promise to Dee Burgess that Global would promptly pay the wages owed by MDI to
Dee Burgess, which obligation had been assumed by Global.”13 These statements of “fact” are
exactly the kind of “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” that Rule 8 seeks
to avoid. Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief
can be granted and must be dismissed.14

11

Id. at 1949-50 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

12

Docket No. 1 Ex. B, at 2.

13

Id.

14

In response to Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff has not met the pleading standard,
Plaintiff cites to and explains Utah law interpreting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Though
this case was originally filed in state court, Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c) is clear: “[the Federal Rules] apply
to a civil action after it is removed from a state court.” Thus, the Court must apply the Rule 8

However, the Court notes that Plaintiff, in its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, has
attached exhibits and set forth additional factual matter pertaining to the claims alleged in the
Complaint. Without deciding the issue, the Court notes that this material may provide sufficient
facts to remedy the Complaint’s deficiencies. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to
file an amended complaint within twenty-one days of the issuance of this order.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 5) is GRANTED. Plaintiff
is instructed to submit an amended complaint within twenty-one days of this Order.
DATED November 14, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

_____________________________________
TED STEWART
United States District Judge

pleading standards despite the fact that a different standard may have applied when the complaint
was drafted. See Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) (analyzing a
complaint filed in state court under the federal pleading standards).