Horton v. Murray Energy et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting in part 49 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting in part 51 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. State law claims are remanded to state court. Signed by Judge David Nuffer on 8/6/13 (alt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
MITCH HORTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MURRAY ENERGY CORPORATION, an
Ohio corporation; UTAH AMERICAN
ENERGY, INC., a Utah corporation;
ANDALEX RESOURCES, INC., a Delaware
corporation; AGAPITO ASSOCIATES, INC.,
a Colorado corporation; MIKE HEWLETT as
General Manager of INTERMOUNTAIN
POWER AGENCY, a political subdivision of
the State of Utah; 10 unknown persons
working for or under the authority of
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY; LOS
ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER
AND POWER, a political subdivision of the
State of California; 10 unknown persons
working for or under the authority of LOS
ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER
AND POWER; GENWAL RESOURCES,
INC., an Ohio corporation; and JOHN DOES
1-10,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS AND
REMANDING TO STATE COURT
Case No. 2:11-cv-1147-DN
District Judge David Nuffer
Before the court are:
•
•
•
Intermountain Power Agency's ("IPA"), the General Manager of IPA, James
Hewlett's, and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power's ("LADWP")
(collectively the "IPA Defendants") motion to dismiss; 1
Murray Energy Corporation's ("MEC"), UtahAmerican Energy, Inc.'s ("UEI"),
Andalex Resources, Inc.'s ("ARI"), and Genwal Resources, Inc.'s ("GRI")
(collectively the "Murray Defendants") motion to dismiss; 2 and
Agapito Associates, Inc.'s motion to dismiss.3
1
Docket no. 49, filed September 5, 2012.
2
Docket no. 51, filed September 5, 2012.
In this order, IPA Defendants' motion to dismiss 4 and the Murray Defendants' motion to
dismiss 5 are GRANTED in part. Plaintiff's sixth cause of action, "Section 1983 Violation of
Plaintiff's Civil Rights," 6 is DISMISSED. The balance of Horton's remaining causes of action
and any pending motions to dismiss those causes of action are remanded to the Third Judicial
District Court for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from what is commonly referred to as the Crandall Canyon Mine
Disaster (the "Accident") that occurred in August 2007. Plaintiff Mitch Horton ("Horton")
claims he was injured during an attempt to rescue several trapped miners on August 16, 2007. 7
On August 3, 2011, Horton filed suit in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah against Murray Energy Corporation ("MEC"), Utah American Energy, Inc.
("UEI"), Andalex Resources, Inc. ("ARI"), Agapito Associates, Inc. ("Agapito"), Intermountain
Power Agency ("IPA"), and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power ("LADWP") asserting
five causes of action arising from injuries he purportedly sustained in the Accident. After
amending his complaint to add parties, 8 including but not limited to Mr. Mike Hewlett
3
Docket no. 47, filed September 5, 2012. For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Decision and Order,
Agapito's motion will be remanded to the Third Judicial District Court for further proceedings.
4
Docket no. 49, filed September 5, 2012.
5
Docket no. 51, filed September 5, 2012.
6
Second amended compl., docket no. 42 at pp. 37- 42.
7
Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.
8
Horton's amended complaint adds the following defendants: "Mike Hewlett General Manager of Intermountain
Power Agency (IPA) a political subdivision of the State of Utah;" "10 unknown persons working for or under the
authority of Intermounatin Power Agency;" and "10 unknown persons working for or under the authority of Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power." It is unclear whether Horton intends on bringing suit against Mr.
Hewlett or against IPA, as the amended and second amended complaints do not list IPA as a defendant in the
caption of the suit, but do make allegations against IPA, yet Mr. Hewlett is named as a defendant in the caption of
the amended and second amended complaints, but no allegations are made against him. Notwithstanding this lack of
clarity, this issue is irrelevant to the 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims, so the court declines to address this issue.
2
("Hewlett"), general manager of IPA, 9 and to assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act 10 (the "Mine Act"), Horton's case was
removed to this court on December 9, 2011. Subsequently, each of the defendants filed
respective motions to dismiss the amended complaint on various grounds. The IPA Defendants'
and the Murray Defendants' motions were based in part on the contentions that Horton's § 1983
claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the Mine Act did not confer individual
rights enforceable under § 1983.
On July 5, 2012, the court issued its memorandum decision and order 11 dismissing
certain causes of action in Horton's amended complaint and reserving ruling on Horton's § 1983
claims until after Horton filed his second amended complaint. Horton's second amended
complaint 12 made significant changes to the facts and allegations of the first, second and fifth
causes of action, but Horton's sixth cause of action was relatively unchanged. Horton's sixth
cause of action alleges in relevant part:
163. The Mine Act directs "the Secretary of Health and Human Services
and the Secretary of Labor to develop and promulgate improved mandatory health
or safety standards to protect the health and safety of the Nation's coal or other
miners," and it is mandatory "that each operator of a coal or other mine and every
miner in such mine comply with such standards."
…
165. The Mine Act created a statutory civil right to safety and
protection for miners, such as Plaintiff, enforceable under Section 1983. Because
the purpose of the Mining Act was to protect miners like Plaintiff Horton, the law
is clear in imposing mandatory standards and/or requirements. 13
9
According to Defendants IPA and Hewlett, Plaintiff was notified that there is no "Mike Hewlett" who has served as
General Manager of IPA, and that the current General Manager of IPA is James Hewlett. Plaintiff failed to remedy
this defect in his second amended complaint.
10
30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
11
Docket no. 41.
12
Docket no. 42, filed August 6, 2012.
13
Id.
3
Horton's second amended complaint also lists several sections of the Code of Federal
Regulations allegedly violated by various defendants, purportedly as a basis for his § 1983 cause
of action.
All of the defendants again moved to dismiss Horton's second amended complaint. The
IPA Defendants and the Murray Defendants renewed their arguments that Horton's sixth cause of
action fails because it is barred by the statute of limitations and because the Mine Act does not
confer individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Horton argues that his sixth cause
of action relates back under Rule 15(c)(1)(B) and that the Mine Act confers individual rights.
As detailed below, the Mine Act does not unambiguously confer individual rights to
permit a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 14 Accordingly, Horton's sixth cause of action is
dismissed.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move to dismiss a
plaintiff's claims for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 15 When
evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must "accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations
in a complaint and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." 16 "Wellpleaded factual allegations" are those allegations that include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." 17 Conclusory allegations are not facts and a complaint that
makes "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" will not suffice under
14
Because Horton's sixth cause of action fails as a matter of law because the Mine Act does not create a private right
of action, the IPA Defendants' and the Murray Defendants' arguments regarding the statute of limitations are moot
and will not be addressed herein.
15
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
16
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 1997).
17
Self v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 48976, *1 (D. Utah 2010) (applying Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
4
12(b)(6). 18 Regardless of the sufficiency of factual allegations, if the proposed legal theory
behind the claim does not entitle the plaintiff to relief, dismissal is proper.
DISCUSSION
42 U.S.C. § 1983 "imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the constitution
or laws of the United States, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law." 19
"Remedies for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under the traditional tort-law
principles." 20 Section 1983 does not create rights, but "merely provides a mechanism for
enforcing individual rights secured elsewhere, i.e., rights independently secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States." 21 Indeed, "[o]ne cannot go into court and claim a
violation of § 1983 – for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything." 22
The threshold inquiry, therefore, is whether the Mine Act confers individual rights that
are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A three part test is used to determine whether a federal
statute is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, "Congress must have intended the [Mine
Act] to benefit [Horton]." 23 Second, "[Horton] must demonstrate that the right assertedly
protected by the [Mine Act] is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain
judicial competence." 24 Third, "the [Mine Act] must unambiguously impose a binding
obligation on the States." 25 Failure of any one of these elements requires dismissal of Horton's
sixth cause of action.
18
Id. at *2.
19
Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 496 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).
20
Id.
21
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002).
22
Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
23
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citations omitted).
24
Id. at 340-41 (citations omitted).
25
Id. at 341.
5
The United States Supreme Court applied these three factors in Blessing v. Freestone. 26
In that case, three Arizona mothers brought suit under § 1983 against the Director of the Arizona
Department of Economic Security, alleging that the agency failed to take adequate steps to
obtain child support payments from the fathers of their children. The Court held that Title IV-D
of the Social Security Act did not confer specific, individually enforceable rights allowing the
plaintiff mothers to bring suit under § 1983:
Far from creating individual entitlement to services, the standard is simply a
yardstick for the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] to measure the
systemwide performance of a State's Title IV-D program. Thus, the Secretary [of
Health and Human Services] must look to the aggregate services provided by the
State, not to whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied. 27
Because the provision of the statute at issue in Blessing "focused on the aggregate services
provided by the State, rather than the needs of any particular person, it conferred no individual
rights and thus could not be enforced by § 1983." 28 Blessing emphasized: "[T]o seek redress
through § 1983, … a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation
of federal law." 29
That emphasis is equally important and applicable in evaluating Horton's sixth cause of
action. While Horton may have alleged violations of federal law contained in the Mine Act and
related regulations, Horton has not established that the Mine Act created any individual rights. 30
26
520 U.S. 329 (1997).
27
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340.
28
Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 281.
29
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340 (emphasis in original).
30
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) ("Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of
action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not. Thus, when a
statute has provided a general authorization for private enforcement of regulations, it may perhaps be correct that the
intent displayed in each regulation can determine whether or not it is privately enforceable. But it is most certainly
incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that has not been authorized by
Congress. Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.")
6
Additionally, the fact that Horton is a miner and an intended beneficiary of the Mine Act
does not necessarily endow him with the requisite individual rights. This "general zone of
interest" theory was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe. In that case,
the plaintiff claimed that because the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA) benefitted a class of putative plaintiffs, Congress therefore intended it to confer
individual rights enforceable under § 1983. The Court disagreed, holding that Congress must
have "unambiguously conferred" individual rights in a statute to permit a private right of action
to enforce the statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 31 "Section 1983 provides a remedy only for
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States." 32 "[I]t is rights, not the broader or vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests,' that may be
enforced under the authority of [§ 1983]." 33
Because Congress did not unambiguously intend for the Mine Act to create individual
rights, Horton cannot enforce it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "The question whether Congress …
intended to create a private right of action [is] definitively answered in the negative where a
statute by its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable class." 34 "[W]here the text and
structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights,
there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action." 35
31
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 283-84 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692, n. 13 (1979)).
35
Id. at 286.
7
Indeed, the language of the Mine Act is in stark contrast to the language of federal
statutes that do unambiguously confer individual rights. For example, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 has "an unmistakable focus on the benefited class:" 36
No person in the United States shall … be subject to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 37
Similarly, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which also confers individual rights,
states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, … be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance... 38
The Mine Act contains no such language that "unambiguously confers" individual rights on
Horton that are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rather, the Mine Act, like FERPA in
Gonzaga, contains no "rights-creating language critical to showing the requisite congressional
intent to create new rights" 39 and instead has an "aggregate, not individual, focus" 40 on the safe
operation of mines. The lack of unambiguous rights creating language is fatal to Horton's sixth
cause of action.
Because Horton's sixth cause of action is dismissed, and because diversity jurisdiction
does not exist in this case, the court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims, none of which arise under federal law. 41 Horton's remaining claims
are therefore remanded to the Third Judicial District Court.
36
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted).
37
42 U.S.C. 2000d (emphasis added).
38
20 U.S.C. 1681(a) (emphasis added).
39
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287.
40
Id. at 290.
41
28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction … if the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."); see also Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) ("[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
8
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth herein, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act does not confer
individual rights to Horton.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Intermountain Power Agency's, the
General Manager of IPA, James Hewlett's, and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power's
motion to dismiss (docket no. 49) and Defendants Murray Energy Corporation's, UtahAmerican
Energy, Inc.'s, Andalex Resources, Inc.'s, and Genwal Resources, Inc.'s motion to dismiss
(docket no. 51) are GRANTED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Mitch Horton's sixth cause of action is
DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the balance of Plaintiff Mitch Horton's claims, along
with any pending motions to dismiss those claims, are REMANDED to the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah for further proceedings.
Dated August 6, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________
David Nuffer
United States District Judge
balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine – judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity – will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims."),
superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in Fent v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 235 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir.
2000).
9
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