Navajo Nation et al v. San Juan County et al

Filing 166

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- The court Denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First and Second Claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), 12(c), and 19. Signed by Judge Robert J. Shelby on 3/12/2015. (las)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

NAVAJO NATION, a federally recognized
Indian tribe, et al.,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 2:12-CV-00039

SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah governmental
subdivision,

Judge Robert J. Shelby

Defendant.

Plaintiffs Navajo Nation and several individual tribe members (collectively Navajo
Nation) filed this action, alleging that Defendant San Juan County has violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. (Dkt. 75.) San Juan County moves the court to dismiss
Navajo Nation’s First and Second Claims for Relief, based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), 12(c), and 19. (Dkt. 98.)
For the reasons stated below, the court denies San Juan County’s Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Navajo Nation is a federally recognized Indian tribe, occupying lands held in trust by the
United States, some of which are located in parts of San Juan County. San Juan County is a
governmental subdivision of the State of Utah. The County’s executive and legislative body is
the San Juan County Commission (the Commission).

In 1983, the United States Justice Department filed suit against the County in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging that election of commissioners through an
at-large election system diluted the voting strength of Native Americans.1 This litigation resulted
in an injunction against the County, and entry of an Agreed Settlement and Order (Settlement)
between the United States and San Juan County. United States v. San Juan County, et al., No. C83-1286W (D. Utah, April 4, 1984). The Settlement stated that “the process leading to the
selection of County Commissioners in San Juan County” had failed to “comply fully” with
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and directed the County to pursue a change in its form of
government to remedy this failure. The Settlement envisioned an alternative form of government
based on “fairly drawn single member districts,” replacing the existing at-large system.
Three single-member election districts were duly created in 1984. Since then, the
commissioners elected from Districts One and Two have been white, and the commissioners
elected from District Three have been Native American.
Navajo Nation sought reapportionment of these districts through political means, based
on the current demographics of San Juan County. The 2010 U.S. Census determined that the
total population of San Juan County was 14,746 and that the non-Hispanic white percentage was
46.2%. Navajo Nation claims that the County’s current population of Native Americans is
52.17% of the total population, and that the voting-age population is 50.33%. In Navajo
Nation’s view, District Three has an inordinately large population of Native Americans, thus
“packing” minority voters into one district. Navajo Nation argues that the Commission should

1

At-large systems have historically proven vulnerable to Section 2 challenges. See Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/about_sec2.php (“Most of the cases
arising under Section 2 since its enactment involv[e] challenges to at-large election schemes.”).

have two or more single-member districts with majority voting-age Native American
populations.
At a November 14, 2011 meeting, the Commission considered plans for redrawing
election district boundaries. Representatives of Navajo Nation attending the meeting presented a
proposed reapportionment plan, but the Commission did not adopt it. Instead, the Commission
made boundary changes to Commission election Districts One and Two, but not to District
Three. Commissioners from Districts One and Two voted in favor of the plan, and the
Commissioner from District Three voted against it. In Navajo Nation’s view, this
reapportionment retained an inordinate concentration of white voters in Districts One and Two,
and of Native American voters in District Three.
Navajo Nation then brought suit in this court. At issue in this Motion are Navajo
Nation’s first two claims, alleging violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. (Dkt. 75, pp. 4-9.) San Juan
County has moved to dismiss these claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), 12(c), and 19. (Dkt. 98.) San Juan County’s argument centers on the 1984
Settlement and its potential impact on both this court’s jurisdiction and Navajo Nation’s ability
to bring these claims.
ANALYSIS
San Juan County argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the case.
The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter “spring[s] from the nature
and limits of the judicial power of the United States” and is “inflexible and without exception.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. &

L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). The court first addresses this argument,
concluding that there is subject-matter jurisdiction over Navajo Nation’s claims.
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
San Juan County submits that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a
collateral attack on a consent decree to which another court retains jurisdiction. Specifically, the
County argues that the original court, in its ongoing supervision of the 1984 Settlement, retains
jurisdiction over disputes involving County election districts. Second, San Juan County argues
that the Settlement is a form of contract, and that modifying this judgment is impermissible. San
Juan County claims that the election district boundaries were agreed to by the United States and
San Juan County and fixed by the Settlement, and that the court therefore lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to modify the prior judgment.
San Juan County’s first argument fails because Navajo Nation’s first and second claims
are not a collateral attack on the Settlement. San Juan County’s second argument fails because
Navajo Nation is not seeking to modify the Settlement. The Settlement does not deprive this
court of subject-matter jurisdiction to decide Navajo Nation’s claims.
Turning to the County’s first argument, it is well established that parties to a consent
decree may not collaterally attack the judgment in a separate action. See Barfus v. City of Miami,
936 F.2d 1182, 1185 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting “case law holding that a party or privy to a consent
decree cannot launch a collateral attack upon the decree”). However, Navajo Nation is not a
party to the 1984 Settlement, nor is it in privity with anyone who is. For this reason, the doctrine
prohibiting collateral attacks does not apply to Navajo Nation. See Ashley v. City of Jackson,
Miss., 464 U.S. 900, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J. & Brennan, J. dissenting from a denial of

certiorari) (“It is fundamental premise of preclusion law that nonparties to a prior action are not
bound by the judgment.”).
San Juan County’s argument rests in part on the faulty notion that the court in control of
the Settlement retains exclusive jurisdiction over its subject matter, rendering any action
touching its concerns “collateral.” San Juan County cites O’Burn v. Shapp2 as authority that
addressing the subject of a prior binding agreement can render an action an impermissible
collateral attack, even when plaintiffs are not parties and lack privity. This cited authority is
unconvincing. “Collateral attacks” are best understood as challenges to binding final judgments.
Even if the court accepted that in some situations the subject matter of consent decrees could bar
even unrelated parties from bringing suit, the present suit does not address the subject matter of
the 1984 Settlement.
In entering the 1984 Settlement, the District Court of Utah stated that “[t]his Court has
jurisdiction over this matter and shall retain jurisdiction for all purposes.” (Dkt. 98-2, p. 3.) The
court’s order includes no time limit or set expiration on its jurisdiction. In San Juan County’s
reading, “this matter” includes the election districts that were to be established. Navajo Nation’s
present lawsuit seeks to alter the districts that were thereafter formed, and therefore, in San Juan
County’s view, addresses issues within the scope of the Settlement. San Juan County, however,
reads the scope of the Settlement too broadly. Navajo Nation is not seeking relief inconsistent
with the Settlement, nor even touching on its substance.
As Navajo Nation correctly notes, the “substance” of the 1984 Settlement “was the
establishment of an election system in which San Juan County Commissioners were selected
from three single-member districts rather than through at-large voting.” (Dkt. 101, p. 5.) The

2

70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. Pa 1976).

Settlement repeatedly focuses on the form of government in San Juan County and the general
method or process of selection. The court refers to continued pursuit of an “optional form of
government consisting of fairly drawn single member districts as authorized by state law”; the
need to “modify the process leading to the selection of County Commissioners in San Juan
County, Utah”; and the possibility of a hearing “limited to the consideration of election plans
designed to replace the current at-large method of selecting County Commissioners in San Juan
County.” (Dkt. 98-2, p. 2.) (emphasis added). The Settlement further envisions that “should an
alternative form of government consisting of single member districts be approved,” San Juan
County would be required to take certain steps to ensure that elections are not unduly delayed.
Id at 2-3.
The Settlement describes the “issue of liability” it addresses as “the current method of
electing County Commissioners.” This method is no longer in place. In 1984, the “method” and
“process” of elections in San Juan County transitioned, as contemplated by the Settlement, from
election through at-large districts to an “alternative form of government” based on singlemember election districts. The Settlement involves questions regarding the form of government,
not the particulars of its composition. This construction does not minimize the Settlement’s
import, since the transition itself is significant: according to San Juan County, the county remains
unique in the state of Utah in using single-member election districts in commission elections.
(Dkt. 80, p. 8.) With the change in the form of government achieved and preserved, however, as
Navajo Nation notes, “[t]here is actually nothing left for the Court to do” in the 1984 case. (Dkt.
101, p. 4, n.3.) Contrary to San Juan County’s suggestion, the Settlement did not expressly
establish the single-member districts and did not set forth their boundaries.

In this suit, Navajo Nation is not seeking to replace at-large districts with single-member
districts; this aim was accomplished in 1984. Nor is Navajo Nation seeking to return to at-large
districts. Navajo Nation instead argues that the single-member districts as presently drawn
violate both the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, and seeks alteration of those districts’
boundaries and demographic composition.
Navajo Nation seeks a remedy under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as the United
States did in the prior litigation. Proceeding under the same statute does not mean that Navajo
Nation’s claims touch on the subject matter of the 1984 Settlement, in part because there are
different ways to violate Section 2. When the court found in 1984 that the “process leading to
the selection of County Commissioners in San Juan County, Utah” violated the Voting Rights
Act, this meant that a system based on at-large districts impermissibly blocked Native American
voters from appropriate representation, specifically by denying rights to a then-minority Native
American population. Navajo Nation in this suit claims that a subsequent system of singlemember election districts has denied rights to a majority Native American population, based on
boundaries last altered in 2011—27 years after the Settlement was adopted in 1984. The
difference between the subject and purpose of the two suits is clear.
Finally, the court notes that San Juan County’s present position is at odds with its own
prior conduct. If alteration of election district boundaries is permissible only through the original
litigation, then it is unclear how the Commission could have redrawn its boundaries in 2011
without first obtaining relief from the original court. Given that the original court was not
involved, and that San Juan County has provided no reason to believe that the Commission’s
actions in 2011 were unauthorized, San Juan County cannot fairly argue that its construction of
the scope and preclusive effect of the Settlement bars Navajo Nation’s present claims. See

Penny v. Giuffrida, 897 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing equitable estoppel, and
noting that “the government is ordinarily bound by the authorized acts of its agents under
traditional concepts of agency or contract law.”).
San Juan County also argues for precluding Navajo Nation’s claims because they would
modify the Settlement. But San Juan County’s claim that the boundaries were a part of the
consent decree is inaccurate; the decree did not establish these boundaries, either explicitly or by
reference. (Dkt. 98-2, pp. 1-3.) Of at least equal importance, the scheme of boundaries enacted
in 1984 is not at issue in the present litigation. The election boundaries as they stood in 1984 no
longer exist, given the alterations made in 2011. If Navajo Nation prevailed, the remedy would
by necessity involve redrawing one or both of Districts One and Two, thereby addressing actions
taken in 2011, rather than 1984.
Navajo Nation has not made an impermissible collateral attack on the Settlement, and
does not seek to modify the Settlement. Consequently, the Settlement does not bar subjectmatter jurisdiction over this case. The court finds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claims enumerated in the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3)-(4), 1357, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973j(f) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988(a).
B. The United States as an Indispensable Party
San Juan County also argues that because the Settlement is a contractual agreement, the
United States is an indispensable party. San Juan County moves on this basis under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 19, requiring joinder of certain parties, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(7), requiring dismissal of a claim where an indispensable party is not joined.
As San Juan County argues, a “contracting party is the paradigm of an indispensable
party.” (Dkt. 98, p. 7.) Navajo Nation acknowledges that “[t]he County has shown that the

United States has an interest, through the [Settlement], in the establishment of single-member
County Commission election districts.” (Dkt. 101, p. 11, n.9.) But as Navajo Nation notes, the
County “has failed to show any impairment to that interest because the First and Second Claims
simply do not seek to displace those election districts with some other form of government.” Id.
As explained above, Navajo Nation does not seek relief under the Settlement, does not
address the subject matter of the Settlement, and is not seeking to modify the Settlement. The
United States would be an indispensable party to litigation involving the Settlement, but the
Settlement is not at issue in this case. Accordingly, the United States is not an indispensable
party, and the County’s Motion under Rule 12(b)(7) and Rule 19 fails.
C. Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c)
In addition to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(7), and 19, San Juan
County also moves to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c). San Juan County has not
provided specific argument to support its Motion on this point, and its proposed bases for these
Motions are unclear. See Dkt. 101, pp. 3-4, n. 2. San Juan County has not elaborated in its
Reply. (Dkt. 105.)
Having established subject-matter jurisdiction and the joinder of all necessary parties, the
court finds that Navajo Nation has provided “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). It has thus
satisfied the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 12(c) further states that “[a]fter the pleadings
are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” The court finds no basis on which San Juan County would be entitled to judgment
on the merits on the basis of this briefing.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
and Second Claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), 12(c),
and 19.
SO ORDERED this 12th day of March, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________
ROBERT J. SHELBY
United States District Judge