Eaton et al v. Shelton et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 36 Motion for Summary Judgment: Plaintiffs' causes of action against Penske are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs' causes of action against Ms. Shelton remain. Signed by Judge Dale A. Kimball on 6/6/14 (alt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

CARL EATON, heir of JOHN EATON
and MITCHELL SHUMWAY, heir of
MARY ERVA SHUMWAY EATON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 2:12CV232 DAK
LEAH SHELTON (fka Leah Rishor) and
PENSKE TRUCK LEASING
COMPANY, L.P.,
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on Defendant Penske Truck Leasing Company, L.P.’s
(“Penske”) Motion for Summary Judgment. A hearing on the motion was held on February 27,
2014. At the hearing, Penske was represented by Timothy J. Curtis. Plaintiffs Carl Eaton and
Mitchell Shumway were represented by Eric W. Hageman. Before the hearing, the court
carefully considered the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking
the matter under advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to this
motion. Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Memorandum Decision and
Order.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 1, 2011, John Eaton and his wife, Mary Erva Shumway Eaton (“the Eatons”)
were tragically killed in a head-on truck versus automobile collision when Defendant Leah
Shelton (“Ms. Shelton”) crossed the center line of US-191 near Blanding, Utah and collided with

their vehicle. Ms. Shelton was high on methamphetamine and driving a moving truck she had
rented from Penske two days prior to the accident.
Plaintiffs in this case are the heirs of the decedents, and they filed this action against both
Ms. Shelton and Penske. Plaintiffs’ claim against Penske rests on their assertion that Penske
negligently entrusted its moving truck to Ms. Shelton. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege, among
other things, that when Ms. Shelton rented the Penske vehicle, she was under the influence of
methamphetamine and that Penske knew or should have known that Ms. Shelton was under the
influence of methamphetamine and should have refused to rent to Ms. Shelton. In addition, they
allege that Penske knew or should have known that Ms. Shelton’s Colorado driver’s license was
suspended at the time she rented the vehicle and should have refused to rent to Ms. Shelton.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Shelton did not have automobile insurance at the time she
rented the truck and that Penske is liable as a result.
In the instant motion, Penske seeks summary judgment in its favor, arguing that the
undisputed facts demonstrate that Penske did not negligently entrust its vehicle to Leah Shelton
because (1) Ms. Shelton was not intoxicated at the time she rented the vehicle, (2) Ms. Shelton
presented a facially valid driver’s license at the time she rented the vehicle, and (3) Ms. Shelton
was not required to have a separate insurance policy or purchase supplemental insurance in order
to rent the vehicle. Penske also contends that none of Penske’s acts or omissions were the
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ loss. Accordingly, Penske maintains that it is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims against Penske. In response to the motion, Plaintiffs
argue that genuine issues of material facts exist, preluding the court from entering summary
judgment. Rather, they contend, these factual disputes must be decided by a jury.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
On July 30, 2011, at approximately 12:11 p.m., Defendant Leah Shelton rented a 16-foot
moving truck owned by Penske from Rent-A-Space in Grand Junction, Colorado. She intended
to move with her two daughters to Tucson, Arizona to flee an abusive spouse. Ms. Stephanie
Clark was the Penske agent who assisted Ms. Shelton in renting the Penske truck. Penske
policies require a potential renter to present a facially valid driver’s license in order to rent a
vehicle. It is undisputed that, at that the time Ms. Shelton rented the Penske truck, her driver’s
license was temporarily suspended due to her failure to maintain automobile insurance, and it is
undisputed that Ms. Shelton knew that her license had been suspended. There is a disagreement
between the parties concerning whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ms.
Shelton presented a facially valid driver’s license– or any license at all–to Ms. Clark at the time
of the rental. Similarly, there is a dispute between the parties about whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether Ms. Shelton was intoxicated at the time of the rental– and, if so,
whether Ms. Clark should have known she was intoxicated. These disagreements as to whether
Plaintiffs have created a genuine issue of disputed fact on these two subjects will be discussed
below. It is undisputed that Ms. Shelton did not have automobile insurance of her own at the
time she rented the Penske truck.
After renting the truck on July 30, 2011, Ms. Shelton loaded the truck with her
belongings, and, on the morning of August 1, 2011, two days after Ms. Shelton rented the Penske
truck, Ms. Shelton left Grand Junction, Colorado with her two young daughters. At

1

The following facts are undisputed, except where noted.
3

approximately 6:20 p.m., Ms. Shelton was traveling south on State Road 191 near Blanding,
Utah, when her vehicle crossed the center line and struck a vehicle headed northbound head on.
The passengers of the northbound vehicle were Mary Erva Shumway Eaton, age 84, and John
Eaton, age 89, from Blanding, Utah. Tragically, both Mr. Eaton and Mrs. Eaton were killed as a
result of the accident.
It is undisputed that Ms. Shelton injected methamphetamine two hours before the
accident and that her blood tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. She is currently
serving a prison sentence at the Utah State Prison after pleading guilty to negligent homicide for
the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Eaton.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). When considering a motion of summary judgment, the court views “all facts [and
evidence] in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” S.E.C. v. Smart,
678 F.3d 850, 856 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Grynberg v. Total S.A., 538 F.3d 1336, 1346 (10th
Cir. 2008) ) (alternations in original)).
The movant must prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010). “The moving party
has ‘both the initial burden of production on a motion for summary judgment and the burden of
establishing that summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.” Kannady v. City of
Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc.,
318 F.3d 976, 979 (10th Cir. 2003)). The moving party’s initial burden may be met merely by
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identifying portions of the record which show an absence of evidence to support essential
elements of the opposing party’s case. Kannady v. City of Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th
Cir. 2010); Sigmon v. CommunityCare HMO, Inc., 234 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2000).
However, “[i]f the movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant may not rest on its
pleadings, but must bring forward specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those
dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” Kannady, 590 F.3d at 1169
(quoting Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1996)); Smart, 678 F.3d at 858 (quoting L
& M Enters. v. BEI Sensors & Sys. Co., 231 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2000)). A genuine
dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a “reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir. 2013).
If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element with
respect to which he has the burden of proof, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. See
Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.2007) (quoted in Hansen v. PT Bank
Negara Indonesia (Persero), 706 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2013)). Summary judgment
“‘necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial
on the merits.’” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir.2007)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986)). A mere scintilla of
evidence will not suffice to allow a nonmoving party to survive summary judgment. Smith v.
Rail Link, Inc., 697 F.3d 1304, 1309 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012). Indeed, there must be evidence on
which the fact finder reasonably could find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 253. “In a
response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rest on ignorance of [the] facts, on
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speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that
something will turn up at trial.” Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988).
IV. DISCUSSION
To prevail on their claim for negligent entrustment, Plaintiffs must establish that, at the
time Penske gave permission to drive, Penske knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known that Ms. Shelton was a careless, reckless, incompetent, inexperienced, or intoxicated
driver. Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986); Utah Model Jury Instructions, 2nd Ed. CV631.
A. Intoxication Issue
First, Plaintiffs argue that Penske negligently entrusted a moving truck to Ms. Shelton
because Penske should have known that Ms. Shelton was intoxicated. Ms. Shelton, however, has
testified that she was not under the influence of methamphetamine or any other intoxicant on the
day she rented the truck. Indeed, she testified that she had not used methamphetamine for at least
a year and had not used marijuana for a couple of weeks, until she relapsed two hours prior to the
crash.2 Similarly, Penske’s agent who assisted Ms. Shelton in renting the truck testified that she
did not observe anything to suggest that Ms. Shelton was intoxicated at the time of the truck
rental–only that she seemed somewhat "stressed" and "overwhelmed," which Ms. Clark
attributed to the fact that Ms. Shelton was moving to another state. Even Ms. Shelton testified,
“I think that it is weird how they [Plaintiffs] kept saying Penske knew or should have known . . .

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Ms. Shelton testified that she had found her abusive husband hiding in her moving
truck on the morning of August 1, 2011– the morning she was leaving Grand Junction–and that
she later found the methamphetamine in an eyeglass case that he had left in the truck. She
testified that she injected methamphetamine at the first rest stop on the way to Tucson.
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a lot of things. As far as me injecting methamphetamine, I don’t know how in the world they
would have known that, but….”3
Plaintiffs contend, however, that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
them, as the non-moving party, there is a genuine issue of disputed fact about whether Ms.
Shelton was under the influence of methamphetamine when she rented the Penske truck.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on a written statement Ms. Shelton gave to the investigating police officer
on the day of the accident. According to the statement, Ms. Shelton told the officer that she had
relapsed “two days” earlier, which, Plaintiffs argue, would have been the day she rented the
Penske vehicle. Ms. Shelton has testified that she told the officer that she had relapsed two hours
before the accident and that the officer, who wrote Ms. Shelton’s statement for her, wrote it down
incorrectly. She claims she repeatedly corrected the officer, but she was sedated and ultimately
signed the statement.4
Plaintiffs argue that a reasonable jury could conclude, based on Ms. Shelton’s statement

3

See Shelton Depo at 64.

4

In her deposition, Ms. Shelton explained:
And actually that police report was taken from me while I was
under medication in the hospital. I never got to write it. He was
writing it for me and wouldn't let me read it. He kept repeating it to
me, saying the wrong thing. And I didn't understand why. And it
turned out it was because he was telling me what he had written,
not what I was saying to him. He threw in a couple of things that I
had said in that police report, and then had me sign it. And even
my signature looks like a 90-year-old stroke victim. I had blurred
vision. I was under medication at that time, and -- yeah.

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to the police that she had relapsed two days before the accident – which was the day she rented
the truck. According to Plaintiffs, this conclusion is supported by Ms. Shelton’s blood test on the
day of the accident, which was positive for methamphetamine and marijuana, and is also
supported by evidence that Ms. Shelton is a previous drug addict who was in therapy for drug
addiction and other emotional issues at the time she rented the truck.5 Based on this evidence,
Plaintiffs contend that a reasonable jury could find that she was under the influence of
methamphetamine when she rented the truck and that Ms. Clark should have known that Ms.
Shelton was intoxicated.
While the court recognizes that the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party and that all reasonable inferences should be drawn in their favor, Plaintiffs
have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. While they have perhaps
created a disputed fact about whether she was under the influence of methamphetamine at some
point during the day on July 30, 2011, there is simply no evidence to support the conclusion that
Ms. Shelton was intoxicated at the time she rented the truck. Even if a jury chose to discredit
Ms. Shelton’s testimony that the relapse occurred two hours–not two days–before the accident,
and even if they believed Plaintiffs’ other evidence that Ms. Shelton was in therapy for drug
addiction, etc., there is simply no evidence to suggest that the relapse occurred prior to renting
the truck on August 30, 2011. Moreover, a jury would also have to conclude, also without any
evidentiary support, that Ms. Shelton exhibited signs of intoxication while she was renting the
truck and that Ms. Clark should have detected that Ms. Shelton was intoxicated. To conclude

5

The court has assumed, for purposes of this motion, that evidence of Ms. Shelton’s
prior drug addiction and therapy would be admissible at trial.
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that Ms. Shelton was high on methamphetamine at the time she rented the truck, that she
exhibited signs of such intoxication, and that Ms. Clark should have detected this intoxication, a
jury would necessarily have to speculate.
If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element with
respect to which he has the burden of proof, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. Hansen
v. PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero), 706 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs bear the
burden in this case to make a sufficient showing that Penske knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known that Ms. Shelton was an intoxicated driver. Lane v. Messer,
731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986). “In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rest
on . . . speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that
something will turn up at trial.” Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988).

There is

simply no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff had
demonstrated–by a preponderance of the evidence– that Ms. Shelton was in fact under the
influence of methamphetamine at the time she rented the truck and that Ms. Clark should have
recognized this intoxication. Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact that Penske negligently entrusted a moving truck to Ms. Shelton
when it should have known that she was intoxicated.
B. Facially Valid Driver's License
Plaintiffs' second theory of negligent entrustment is that Penske rented a moving truck to
Ms. Shelton when it knew or should have known that Ms. Shelton’s driver's license had been
suspended. Again, Plaintiffs contend that there is a genuine issue of disputed fact on this issue,
thereby precluding summary judgment.
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Penske argues that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that: (1) Penske followed its
procedures with respect to inspecting Ms. Shelton's driver's license prior to renting the vehicle,
(2) at the time of the rental, Ms. Shelton presented a facially valid and unexpired driver's license,
and (3) the fact that Ms. Shelton's driver's license was temporarily suspended (due to failure to
maintain insurance) was not the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs' damages. Ms. Shelton testified
that she gave her driver’s license to Ms. Clark. Ms. Shelton knew that her license had been
temporarily suspended for not having automobile insurance, and she was worried that she might
not be able to rent a truck because of the suspension, but she admits that did not tell the Penske
agent that the license had been suspended.
Ms. Clark testified that she remembered asking for Ms. Shelton’s license, that Ms.
Shelton presented her driver’s license to Ms. Clark; and that as far as Ms. Clark could tell, Ms.
Shelton’s driver’s license was a valid license. Ms. Clark testified that she entered Ms. Shelton's
driver's license number, first and last name, expiration date, date of birth, license class, and
issuing state into the computer prior to renting the truck to Ms. Shelton.
Plaintiffs, though, contend that there is a genuine dispute about whether Ms. Shelton
presented a facially valid driver's license. Plaintiffs argue that a reasonable jury could conclude
that Penske’s agent, Ms. Clark, never asked for Ms. Shelton’s driver’s license, that Ms. Clark
failed to recognize that the license was suspended, and/or that Ms. Clark did not confirm with
any agency that the license was valid. In attempting to create a disputed fact, Plaintiffs point to
some uncertainty in both women’s testimony.
For example, when Ms. Shelton was asked in her deposition if her license had a hole
punched in it–rendering it facially invalid–she admitted that it might have had a hole in it, but she
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couldn’t remember if it was her license or some other card she had. Similarly, while Ms. Clark
testified that she remembers asking for Ms. Shelton's license, Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Clark was
testifying as to her general practice and that she had no specific recollection of asking for Ms.
Shelton’s license.6 Plaintiffs also rely on Penske’s failure to produce any evidence that Ms.
Shelton's driver's license information was actually obtained from Ms. Shelton because the rental
agreement does not contain any information from the license. Also, Plaintiffs argue that Penske
supervisor Cynthia Williamson acknowledged that because Penske’s computer system simply
accepts whatever driver’s license information is input into the computer by the rental agent, it is
possible to rent to someone without obtaining a valid driver’s license (or even any license at all.)
While it would be helpful if Penske had some evidence that its agent obtained Ms.
Shelton’s driver’s license information, it is not Penske’s burden to demonstrate that it obtained
this information. Rather, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the

6

Ms. Clark’s testimony is as follows:
Q:
Do you have a specific recollection of obtaining her driver’s license information?
A:
No.
Q:
And if I understand what you are telling me, though, you believe that you would
have to have obtained it because you can’t rent it without inputting driver’s
license information?
A:
Correct. I know I had it.
Q:
You know you had it. But you can’t remember that?
A:
Well, no, I remember that I, -- I guess I don’t understand what you mean by
specific.
Q:
Do you remember asking her for her driver’s license?
A:
Oh, yeah.
Q:
And tell me everything you remember about that.
A:
It is what I do with every customer, is I ask them for their license. I asked her for
her license. I got the information that I needed off of it. I put all of the information
in the computer. And I handed her back her license.

See Clark Depo. at 41-42.
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evidence, that Penske failed to obtain a facially valid license from Ms. Shelton. Given the
testimony presented, a jury would have to find both Ms. Shelton’s and Ms. Clark’s testimony
unbelievable, and it would have to speculate as to what happened, given that Plaintiffs have no
actual evidence on this essential element of their claim.7 Plaintiffs cannot defeat summary
judgment by speculating about the events in question. See Doan v. Seagate Tech. Inc., 82 F.3d
974, 977 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiff's “[s]peculation ... will not suffice for evidence”).
It is undisputed that Ms. Clark never confirmed the validity of the license with any public
agency. But Plaintiffs have not provided any authority for imposing a duty on a rental agency to
verify the validity of a driver’s license.8 Indeed, there are many cases in which courts have found
that rental companies do not have a duty to verify the status of a facially valid driver's license or
to otherwise investigate a renter’s driving record. See Young v. U-Haul Company of D.C, 11
A.3d 247 (D.C. Ct. App. 2011); Cousin v. Entertainment Leasing Co.-S. Cent. Inc., 948 So. 2d
1287 (Miss. 2007) (no evidence of negligence per se under statute requiring that owner rent
vehicle only to persons “then duly licensed” where rental company accepted facially valid,
unexpired licenses without further verification); Cowan v. Jack, 922 So. 2d 559 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that car company has no duty to inquire further if a customer presents a valid
driver’s license); Nunez v. A&M Rentals, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 743 (Ma. Ct. App. 2005) (rental

7

Ms. Shelton no longer possesses the driver’s license, implying that it was either lost in
the accident or when she was taken into custody. Regardless of its physical existence, if the
license was facially invalid, Plaintiffs presumably could have presented such evidence from the
department of motor vehicles in the licensing state.
8

Given the court’s ruling on this issue, the court declines to address Penske’s argument
that Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding proximate cause.
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company had no duty to verify status of license with commercially available technology to satisfy
statutory requirement to rent only to holders of “a duly issued license”); Hall v. CAMRAC, LLC,
2013 WL 6925959 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2013); Short v. Ross, 2013 WL 1111820 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2013); Osborn v. Hertz Corp., 252 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). This
court declines to create such a duty in this case.
Thus, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue of disputed fact
regarding whether Penske knew or should have known that Ms. Shelton had a suspended driver’s
license.
C. No Separate Insurance
Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that Penske negligently entrusted its vehicle to Ms. Shelton by
failing to determine whether or not Ms. Shelton had insurance to protect third-party motorists.
Plaintiffs do not contend that Penske did not provide liability protection for its vehicle; but
rather, that Penske had a duty to ascertain whether or not Ms. Shelton had separate automobile
liability insurance prior to renting to her. While neither Colorado nor Utah has addressed
whether a rental car company has a duty to ascertain whether or not a prospective renter has
liability insurance, Penske argues that courts in other states have uniformly held that no such duty
exists.
Whether or not a duty exists is question of law for the court to decide. Hunsaker v. State,
870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993); Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1320
(Colo. 1992). Plaintiffs have not cited any authority giving rise to a duty on Penske’s part to
verify that a potential renter has their own liability insurance–and the court is not aware of any
such authority.
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Indeed, it appears that courts have uniformly declined to create such a duty when it is not
legislatively mandated.9 See., e.g., Enterprise Leasing Co. S. Cent., Inc. v. Bardin, 8 So.3d 866,
868 (Miss. 2009) (finding that rental car company had no duty to refuse to rent a car to a driver
who failed to produce proof that he was insured under his own automobile liability insurance
company and that the court was unaware of any such authority); Danler v. Rosen Auto Leasing,
Inc., 609 N.W.2d 27, 32-33 (Neb. 2000) (concluding that “it is properly the province of the
Legislature, and not this court, to make such a policy determination.”); Collette v. Ledet, 640 So.
2d 757, 760 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (“Plaintiff can cite no authority giving rise to a duty on the part
of [a rental-car company] to inquire into the status of [a driver's] insurance and we can find
none.”).
This court concludes that neither the Utah nor Colorado legislatures have imposed a duty
on rental car companies to verify that a prospective renter has her own automobile liability
insurance, and the court declines to do so.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment claim

based upon Penske’s failure to verify that Ms. Shelton had her own insurance fails.

9

For example, it appears that the state of Georgia requires a rental car company to ensure
that a renter has his own liability insurance on the vehicle or to offer the renter “spot” insurance,
which shall be purchased by the renter before the rental car company may turn the vehicle over to
the renter. OCGA § 40-9-102. The coverage the renter provides is the primary coverage in the
case of liability arising from the use of the rental car. However, failure by the rental car company
to ensure the renter has coverage merely voids the exemption and causes the company's insurance
coverage to become primary. OCGA §§ 40-9-102; 40-9-4; A. Atlanta Autosave v. Generali-U.S.
Branch, 514 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1999). Georgia courts have found that when a rental car has
injured plaintiffs, the rental car company's “failure to comply with OCGA § 40-9-102 was not the
cause of any harm to plaintiff[s].” Scott v. Joe Thomson Auto Rental & Leasing, Inc., 453 S.E.2d
475, 477 (Ga. 2002) (quoting Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Hamilton, 455 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1995)).
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Penske’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Docket No. 36] is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ causes of action against
Penske are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ causes of action against Ms. Shelton remain.
DATED this 6th day of June, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge

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