3Form v. Lumicor

Filing 73

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING LUMICOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-Because the court holds that the 700 and 068 patents are INVALID, the court GRANTS Lumicors Motion for Summary Judgment, 48 , and DENIES 3forms Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 45 . See Order for details. Signed by Judge Clark Waddoups on 12/28/15. (jmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

3FORM, INC., a Utah corporation,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING LUMICOR’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
LUMICOR, INC., a Washington corporation,

Case No. 2:12-cv-00293-CW

Defendant.

Judge Clark Waddoups

INTRODUCTION
This case is before the court on 3form, Inc.’s (“3form”) Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, (Dkt. No. 45), and Lumicor, Inc.’s (“Lumicor”) Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt.
No. 48). There has been no Markman hearing. Instead, the parties opted to address the issue of
claim construction simultaneously with their motions for summary judgment. A hearing was held
on the motions and the matters were taken under advisement. For the reasons set forth below, the
court GRANTS Lumicor’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES 3form’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
3form and Lumicor are competitors in the manufacture of decorative laminate panels for
use in architecture and interior design. The disputes in this case concern panels made of
thermoplastic sheets that contain embedded objects. 3form argues that certain Lumicor products
infringe two of its patents: U.S. Patent No. 7,008,700, “Architectural laminate panel with

embedded compressible objects and methods for making the same,” (“the ‘700 patent”), and U.S.
Patent No. D621,068, “Architectural panel with thatch reed design,” (“the ‘068 patent”).1
Lumicor counterclaims seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity on the
ground that both patents are anticipated and/or obvious in light of its own earlier patent, U.S.
Patent No. 6,743,327, “Solid surface products,” (“the ‘327 patent”), alone or in combination with
other prior art references.
Decorative panels with embedded objects have historically been made by pouring “liquid
acrylic around the desired objects, and then solidifying the acrylic into a hardened panel.” ‘700
patent, col. 2:26–28; see also ‘327 patent, col. 1:27–31. A set of patents filed by Michael Eckart
and Raymon Goodson (“the Eckart patents”) from 1995 to 1998, and assigned to Eastman
Chemical Company, demonstrate that this can also be accomplished through a single pressure
lamination process. All of the Eckart patents call for the use of polyethylene terephthalate glycol,
generally known as PETG, and the application of a pressure ranging from about 40 to 500 psi.
The embedded objects can be: “a polymeric film with a high resolution printed thereon,” U.S.
Patent No. 5,643,666; “a printed or colored film layer having opposed surfaces wherein at least
one of the surfaces is colored or has an image printed thereon,” U.S. Patent No. 5,894,048; “a
fabric comprised of textile fibers selected from cotton, wool, silk, rayon, polyesters, synthetic
polyamides, acrylic, modacrylic and cellulose acetate fibers,” U.S. Patent No. 5,958,539;
“metallic wire, rod and/or bar,” U.S. Patent No. 5,998,028; and “a film which is colored or which
bears an image or pattern,” U.S. Patent No. 6,025,069.

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The Lumicor products accused of infringing the ‘700 patent are: “Zito (Spring and Autumn versions, including
those designated as ‘Light’), Serengeti, Kenya, Savannah, Pampas Reed, Birch, Rainforest, Madagascar (standard and
fade), Ginko Reed, Tortoise Reed).” (Dkt. No. 48-2, p. 35; see also Dkt. No. 2, ¶ 14). Those accused of infringing the
‘068 patent are: “Spring Zito and Autumn Zito panels . . . (including ‘Light’ versions).” (Dkt. No. 48-2, p. 41; see
also Dkt. No. 2, ¶ 25).

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Lumicor’s ‘327 patent was issued on June 1, 2004, and is the first to instruct on the use of
two pressures (40 psi and 160 psi) to embed decorative objects (“a dry material selected from the
group consisting of textile fabric, paper, plastic film, plastic sheet, metallic wire, rod, mesh, bar,
wood veneer, dried natural materials, tree bark, plant leaves, petals, and twigs”) between two
plastic resins (“polymethylmethacrylate, polyvinyl chloride, and polycarbonate”). See ‘327 patent,
claims 1 & 2. While the ‘327 patent application claims the benefit of a provisional application
filed on July 25, 2001, Lumicor concedes that the provisional application did not disclose the use
of two pressures, and as such, that the earliest priority date that can be claimed is the patent’s
filing date of March 25, 2002.
The ‘700 patent also uses a plurality of pressures to embed objects (organic materials like
thatch, bamboo, tree or bush branches or stems, willow reed, leaves, beans, and inorganic
materials like rock, glass, and other types of minerals) between two extruded resin sheets (made
of PETG, polycarbonate, and related copolyesters), which retain a substantial natural
conformation despite the fact that one of the applied pressures, if used independently, would
result in an unnatural conformation. The application for the ‘700 patent was filed on April 9,
2004, but was provisionally rejected by the PTO examiner on multiple grounds, including that it
was either anticipated or obvious in light of the Eckart and ‘327 patents.
3form appealed the rejection and distinguished the cited art. With respect to Eckart, 3form
argued that the only compressible object cited was textile fabric, which is essentially a twodimensional, i.e. flat, object rather than a three-dimensional object. With respect to the ‘327
patent, 3form argued that the prior disclosed objects were either two-dimensional (textile fabric,
mesh, wood veneer); rigid and non-compressible at 160 psi (metallic wire, rod, mesh, bar, wood
veneer, textile, or tree bark); or, in the case of the remaining objects that could be considered

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compressible (plant leaves, petals, or dried twigs), “would be significantly flattened to a primarily
two-dimensional conformation” that did not “preserve the given object’s respective natural crosssectional diameter(s) [at the recited pressures].” (Dkt. No. 48-2, p. 136). The PTO subsequently
issued the ‘700 patent on March 7, 2006. For purposes of priority, the ‘700 patent is argued to be
a continuation-in-part of application No. 10/465,465, filed on June 18, 2003. The ‘068 patent was
filed on March 20, 2009 and has an issue date of August 3, 2010. It concerns a specific design
using thatch reeds on the type of panels made following the ‘700 patent. Although the ‘068 patent
cites to various other related documents, including the ‘700 patent, 3form does not currently
contest that the ‘068 patent is entitled to a priority date no earlier than April 9, 2004.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). “A ‘material fact’ is one which could have an impact on the outcome of the lawsuit, while a
‘genuine dispute’ of such a material fact exists if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented.” Chasteen v. UNISIA JECS Corp., 216 F.3d 1212,
1216 (10th Cir. 2000). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that
are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986).
Since an invalid patent cannot be infringed, considerations of judicial economy dictate that
the court address the question of validity before making any determinations of infringement. The
Patent Act grants issued patents a presumption of validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. This presumption
applies to each claim of a patent, independent of the validity of other claims, and regardless of

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whether a claim is independent, dependent, or in multiple dependent form. Id. Accordingly,
Lumicor has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp.
v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). A determination of validity first requires that the
court construe any disputed claims. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). In the second step, the court then addresses whether “the claims as properly
interpreted are met by the prior art.” Id. (quoting Beachcombers, Int’l, Inc. v. Wildewood Creative
Prods., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
I. ‘700 PATENT
A. Claim Construction
Claim construction is a question of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 387 (1996). This inquiry starts with the language of the claims
themselves, which “define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.”
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Inova/Pure Water, Inc. v.
Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Because they are
part of a fully integrated document, claims “must be read in view of the specification,” Id. at 1315
(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d, 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)), which “is
the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). In addition to consulting the specification,
the court must also consider the patent’s prosecution history, which “consists of the complete
record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination
of the patent.” Id. at 1317.
There is a presumption that the words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at

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the time of the invention. Id. at 1312, 1320. However, “a definition of a claim term in the
specification will prevail over a term’s ordinary meaning if the patentee has acted as his own
lexicographer and clearly set forth a different definition.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery
Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In determining whether a patentee has
acted as his own lexicographer, the court must analyze whether a statement was intended to
define the terms as used in the specification and claims or whether it was intended to describe or
apply only to a preferred embodiment. LG Elecs. Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553
U.S. 617 (U.S. 2008). See also E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3COM Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). In making that determination, the court must consider the context in which the
definition is used as well as the parameters used by the patentee.
A patentee is required to set forth his claims with sufficient definiteness so as to point out
and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor regards as the invention. 35 U.S.C. §
112(b). To fulfill this requirement, “[t]he claims, when read in light of the specification and
prosecution history, must provide objective boundaries” for those skilled in the art. Interval
Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Where a patent’s claims fail to
inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty, the
patent will be found to be invalid for indefiniteness. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
With those principles in mind, the court now turns to the disputed terms, as indicated in
italics. Claim 1 of the ‘700 Patent states:
A decorative architectural panel comprising: one or more compressible objects
suspended between two extruded resin sheets formed together about the one or
more compressible objects using a plurality of pressures in a thermosetting
process, at least one of the plurality of pressures being greater than or equal to a
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critical pressure sufficient to otherwise compress the one or more compressible
objects to an unnatural appearing conformation; wherein the one or more
compressible objects maintain a substantially natural appearing conformation
between the two formed resin sheets.
This claim contains all disputed terms and is a representative example of how they are used in the
remaining claims.
1. “compressible objects”
This term appears in independent claim 1 and in dependent claims 8, 10–12, 17–18. 2 3form

contends that “compressible objects” should be construed as “Three-dimensional objects with a
critical pressure of up to approximately 80-92 psi, depending on the extruded sheet materials,
related temperatures and pressures, including, but not limited to, objects such as thatch, willow
reed, straw, coffee beans, twigs, bamboo and similar objects.” (Dkt. No. 45-1, p. 29). Lumicor
argues that 3form’s proposed interpretation is unduly lengthy, cumbersome, and improperly reads
concepts from the specification into the claims. Lumicor argues that because the term uses
ordinary words, a person of ordinary skill would understand that “compressible objects” means
“An object that is capable of being flattened under pressure.” (Dkt. No. 55, p. 23).
In the patent, 3form provides an express definition of the term: “As used herein,
‘compressible objects’ refers to three-dimensional objects that substantially deform at pressures
up to 80–90 psi.” ‘700 patent, col. 4:33–35. The definition appears in a section entitled “Detailed
Description of the Preferred Embodiments.” Thus, as required by LG Elecs., Inc. and E-Pass, the
court must determine whether the definition “as used herein” is intended to apply just to the
preferred embodiment or to the claims and specifications as well. In the very next sentence, the
patent reads, “That is, each ‘compressible’ object can be thought of as having a ‘critical

2

“Three-dimensional object” is used in independent claim 19, rather than “compressible object.” The parties do not
appear to argue that this term needs to be construed or has any meaning different from its ordinary meaning. The
court finds that the term has its ordinary meaning and does not require construction.

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pressure.’” Id. at 35-36. To understand the meaning of compressible objects one must also
understand critical pressure. The two concepts are intrinsically linked. The patent then continues,
“For the purposes of this specification and claims, ‘critical pressure’ refers to the pressure at
which the structural integrity of the object collapses . . . .” Id. at 36-39. Thus, the patentee
expressly states that the term is to apply, not just to the preferred embodiment, but to the
specification and claims.
The context in which the definition is provided makes this conclusion clear. Within that
same paragraph, the specification adds a further clarification that “for extruded PETG materials,
compressible objects will be understood as having a critical pressure of up to approximately 92
psi using conventional thermosetting processes.” Id. at 51–54. The phrases “As used herein” and
“will be understood as,” together with the term being set off by quotation marks, provide clear
evidence that the patentee intended these definitions to be used to define his invention. Moreover,
earlier in the patent, the patentee distinguishes his invention by comparing its application to prior
art applied to “fairly rigid three-dimensional materials, such as crushed glass or rocks that can
withstand the conventional pressure (80 psi or greater).” Id., col. 2:1-5. The patentee continues:
“It would be impossible, however, to embed compressible objects (i.e. relatively soft objects, such
as objects that would flatten at pressures of 80 psi or greater), such as thatch, willow reed, straw,
coffee beans, twigs, bamboo, and so forth, having any measurable diameter, in extruded sheets
using the pressure of conventional processing methods. In particular, compressible natural objects
would not carry their natural appearance in the final decorative laminate panel since they would
be flattened under conventional pressure.” Id. at 5-13. From this discussion it is clear that the
inventive idea was to apply the technology to “soft” objects within a range of psi. This range of
pressures is used throughout the specification, not just in describing a preferred embodiment.

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Indeed, the so-called description of the preferred embodiments focuses primarily on the type of
laminate and the application of the process rather than on the pressure range for compressible
objects. Finally, 3form itself proposes a definition that is cabined by the pressure ranges set forth
in the definition used in the patent. The additional language 3form proposes either does not relate
to the inherent structure of the object or provides examples, which by their very nature are not
definitional. The court concludes that the express definition provided in the patent was intended to
apply to both the specification and the claims, not just to the preferred embodiment. See
Sinorgchem Co. v. ITC, 511 F.3d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “As such, the patentee must be
bound by the express definition.” Id. Moreover, reading the patent as a whole and in context, the
court concludes the same definition is the correct definition for compressible objects as used in
the claims, even if the patentee intended it only to apply to the preferred embodiment. Absent the
pressure parameters, the patent would not provide sufficient boundaries for one skilled in the art
to meaningfully understand the scope of the claimed invention and what other practices would be
excluded. The court therefore construes compressible objects to mean three-dimensional objects
that substantially deform at pressures up to 80–92 psi.
2. “critical pressure”
This term appears in independent claims 1 and 19, and dependent claims 8, 10–11. As
discussed above, it is also expressly defined in the specification, stating that “For the purposes of
this specification and claims, ‘critical pressure’ refers to the pressure at which the structural
integrity of the object collapses, such that the object splits, cracks, or otherwise compresses into
an unnatural conformation.” ‘700 patent, col. 4:36–40. That definition is the same as 3form’s
proposed construction. For the same reasons stated above the court concludes that the express
definition was also intended to apply to the claims. Lumicor presents no construction and

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contends that the term is ambiguous because it calls for a single pressure at which an object
collapses into an unnatural conformation. This is something that Lumicor believes is a subjective
judgment call, given that an object may experience some discernible flattening and still retain a
natural conformation. There is no argument that splitting or cracking are ambiguous. Accordingly,
because unnatural conformation is also a disputed term which the court found amenable to
construction, Lumicor’s objections on the basis of ambiguity are rejected. The term “critical
pressure” is construed to mean the pressure at which the structural integrity of the object
collapses, such that the object splits, cracks, or otherwise compresses into an unnatural
conformation.
3. “unnatural appearing conformation”; “unnatural conformation”; “unnatural
appearance”
This term appears in independent claims 1 and 19, and in dependent claims 11 and 12.
3form contends that it should be construed as “The appearance of an object when its structural
integrity collapses, such that the object splits, cracks, or substantially deforms.” (Dkt. No. 45-1, p.
32). Lumicor accepts most of 3form’s proposed construction, but contends that “significantly”
should be used instead of “substantially.” (Dkt. No. 55, p. 24). While Lumicor concedes that “an
object that is split or cracked has become unnatural in its appearance,” it reiterates the argument
that the amount of flattening in the absence of cracking required to convert an object from a
natural to an unnatural conformation is indeterminate and maintains that the word substantially
only serves to magnify that ambiguity. Id. Since it agrees that “this term would be understood to
exclude small or minor degrees of deformation,” it contends that “significantly deforms” is more
consistent with the specification. Id. In the end, Lumicor concludes that no construction can
resolve the inherent ambiguity in this term.

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The court again notes that this term is expressly defined in the specification, which states
that “an ‘unnatural conformation’ may mean that an object has compressed to 90% of its
thickness in one direction, 75% of its thickness in one direction, and so on.” ‘700 patent, col.
4:42–45. The specification defines an unnatural conformation solely in terms of compression,
with some sort of collapse envisioned. Id. at 47–48. Both 3form and Lumicor incorrectly contend
that an unnatural conformation also includes splitting and cracking, but that is explicitly
foreclosed by the use of commas to denote a series, together with the disjunctive “or otherwise”
directly preceding the term “unnatural conformation.” See id. at 36–40 (“‘critical pressure’ refers
to the pressure at which the structural integrity of the object collapses, such that the object splits,
cracks, or otherwise compresses into an unnatural conformation.”) (emphasis added). Absent a
reference point, it is impossible for the court to determine the line between what is natural and
unnatural. In order to resolve the ambiguity, the court limits construction of the term to at least its
stated range. See ‘700 patent, col. 4:42–45. Accordingly, the court construes this term to mean an
object that has compressed in an amount equal to or greater than 75% of its thickness in one
direction.
4. “substantially natural appearing conformation”; “substantially natural
conformation”
This term appears in independent claims 1 and 19. 3form proposes that this term be
construed as “The appearance of an object in a relatively uncompressed or natural state, even if
not perfectly natural or uncompressed.” (Dkt. No. 45-1, p. 33). Lumicor contends that the term is
insolubly ambiguous and proposes no construction. This is the only disputed term not explicitly
defined in the specification. The court concludes, however, that this term is defined by exclusion.
Because anything that falls outside of the 75% plus compression range cannot be unnatural, it

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must necessarily mean that it is natural. As such, the court construes the term to mean any
conformation where the object has experienced compression of less than 75% of its thickness in
one direction.
B. Anticipation
Novelty is a prerequisite for patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 102. Where the claimed invention
“was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention,” it is said to be anticipated
and therefore invalid. Id.; see also Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2008). “It is well settled that a claim is anticipated if each and every limitation is found either
expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l
Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). And while “those elements must be arranged or
combined in the same way as in the claim, the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test.”
In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). It is also necessary that the prior art reference
“enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation.”
Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “Anticipation is
a question of fact, including whether an element is inherent in the prior art.” In re Gleave, 560
F.3d at 1334–35. “If an inventor seeks to claim an advantage or modification that flows
necessarily from a prior art reference, the reference inherently anticipates the inventor’s claim,”
Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 830 F. Supp. 871, 874 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (emphasis added), aff’d,
52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995), “even if the advantage was not appreciated by the inventor of the
prior art.” Id. Furthermore, “[i]n order for a claim to be inherent in the prior art it is not sufficient
that a person following the disclosure sometimes obtain the result set forth in the claim, it must
invariably happen.” Id. “Whether a prior art reference is [thus] enabling is a question of law based

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upon underlying factual findings.” Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294,
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1. Independent Claims 1 and 19
a. Claim 1
Claim 1 of the ‘700 patent is anticipated. Its limitations are: (1) a decorative architectural
panel, (2) with a compressible object(s) (such as reed and bamboo) suspended between two
extruded resin sheets, (3) which are formed together about the object(s) using a plurality of
pressures in a thermosetting process, (4) at least one of the plurality of pressures being greater
than or equal to a (critical) pressure sufficient to otherwise compress the object(s) to an unnatural
appearing conformation, (5) wherein the compressible object(s) maintains a substantially natural
conformation between the two formed resin sheets. ‘700 patent, col. 11:1-13.
The ‘327 patent expressly discloses the following limitations: (1) An architectural panel
(“A flat non-porous unitary solid surface structure,” for “kitchen countertops and decorative
architectural surfaces or facades”) with “a visible decorative object,” ‘327 patent, col. 1:9-15, 6667, (2) with twigs from reed and bamboo (which are undisputed compressible objects), Id., col.
8:32-33, which are suspended between two polymeric sheets, Id., col. 3:8-19, (3) where heat is
applied to the lay up sandwich, whereby the first and second polymeric sheets melt together to
provide a unitary product, Id., col. 3:24-32, applying first 40 psi and then later 160 psi (i.e. a
plurality of pressures), Id., col. 9:14-29.
The remaining limitations are also inherent in the ‘327 patent: (4) a critical pressure,
whereby 160 psi is greater than the pressure required to unnaturally conform the disclosed reeds
and bamboo, and (5) that this process used with compressible objects will always produce a
product which maintains their substantially natural conformation within two formed resin sheets.

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The concept that objects compress under some critical pressure was not invented by 3form and is
inherent in all objects. 3form’s expert admitted that all objects, even hard objects like steel, are
compressible given an appropriate amount of force.3 (Dkt. No. 63-1, p. 16:6-20). This inherent
property of all objects is a law of nature not subject to patentability by 3form, see Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010), though it is also a law of nature applicable to the ‘327 patent.
Furthermore, 3form did not invent a method for measuring the amount of force required to
deform an object until it appears unnatural. Id. (noting that the application of a law of nature to a
product or process may be patentable). Instead, it is inevitable that when subjected to an
appropriate amount of force, all objects will become deformed. See Glaxo, Inc. 830 F. Supp. at
874.
During the process of sandwiching decorative objects between two layers of plastic resin,
the ‘700 patent limitations (4) and (5) disclose that at some point an undefined amount of pressure
will be applied that would otherwise be high enough to compress an object, such as a reed, to the
point where it is compressed too much to appear natural. Given that all objects inherently deform
at some pressure, for the ‘327 patent to anticipate the ‘700 patent requires the use of one pressure
high enough to definitively deform anticipated objects such as reeds and bamboo, and the use of
another pressure that will not. Inherency does not require that the patentees realize that something
is inherent; what matters is that here, the ‘327 patent explicitly discloses the pressure of 40 psi
(which does not compress reeds and bamboo to an unnatural conformation), and 160 psi (which
always will). ‘327 patent, col. 9:13-38. Therefore, even though the exact words “critical pressure”

3

Notwithstanding that both parties focused argument on softer objects typically thought of as compressible, the court
notes that both the ‘700 patent and the ‘327 patent disclose three-dimensional hard objects typically thought of as
noncompressible as examples of decorative materials each party’s process could incorporate, such as “rock, glass,
other types of minerals” ‘700 patent, col. 7:16-23, and a variety of metals in shapes including rods and cables. ‘327
patent, col. 8:37-47.

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and “unnatural conformation” were not used, the ‘327 patent inherently anticipates those
concepts.
The final question regarding limitation (5) is whether the process set forth in the ‘327
patent always enables the production of a panel with a substantially natural conformation.
Although someone using the processes in the ‘327 patent might “sometimes obtain” architectural
panels with compressible objects which maintain their substantially natural conformation within
two formed resin sheets, to inherently anticipate, such panels must “invariably happen.” See
Glaxo Inc., 830 F. Supp. at 874. Glaxo underscores how predictable a prior art process must be to
anticipate a product claim. 52 F.3d 1043. In Glaxo, the defendant’s experts performed a process
“thirteen times and each time they made” the claimed product. Id. at 1047. But the fact that
plaintiff’s experts “could yield” a different result following the same process meant inherency
was inapplicable. Id. at 1047-48.
Here, the record shows that with the exception of the tests performed by 3form’s expert,
Jeffrey T. Gotro, Ph.D., every single panel produced utilizing the procedure set forth in the ‘327
patent resulted in a substantially natural conformation. (Dkt. No. 50-7, pp. 15-16). While the court
acknowledges that this is evidence that the ‘327 patent methods “could yield” such panels, 3form
failed to produce evidence to show that any nonconforming product could be produced using the
‘327 patent methods. The Gotro tests, which are the only evidence cited by 3form to dispute that
the ‘327 patent always produces a panel with a substantially natural conformation, are either
inadmissible due to unreliability or, even if admissible, failed to use the process taught in the ‘327
patent and are thus irrelevant.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, “A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or

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otherwise if: . . . the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.” Gotro failed to reliably apply the principles and methods to the facts of this case. When he
produced panels with deformed objects and bowed polymer, he failed to follow the ‘327 patent
methods.
First, Gotro’s test applied too high a temperature for the specific resin used. (Dkt. No. 572, p. 13). The ‘327 patent clearly teaches, both descriptively and in specification sheets for each
resinous material, that an appropriate temperature must be applied to the corresponding material.
‘327 patent, cols. 5-9. Gotro admitted that a person ordinarily skilled in the art would have used
the temperature outlined on the spec sheet for the given material, (Dkt. No. 63-1, p.4:13-16, “one
skilled in the art would know that heating a polymer too hot is going to cause degradation of the
polymer. That’s known.”), and that the method he used ignored that principle. Id. at 10-13 (“I
mean, I don’t know that a person of ordinary skill in the art would -- I mean, if they look at the
data sheet, they would say the temperature was -- the melt – the softening point is low, so they
would adjust it,” p. 12:17-21, and “Q. So a person of ordinary skill in the art wouldn’t use the
acrylic melting temperatures when trying to make a PETG laminate panel; right? . . . A. Correct.”
p. 13:2-6).
Second, Gotro’s test also failed to track the time at which the higher pressure and
temperature were held. Id. at 6-7, “Q. Did you track temperature over time? A. .

. .So we didn’t

actually track it with a data log, no,” p. 6:5-19, and “Q: So you don’t have any idea how long the
test took? You didn’t keep that data? A. No.” pp. 6:25-7:3). Furthermore, Gotro did not
personally know how long the higher pressure and temperature were held because he did not
perform the tests nor was he there when the tests were performed. Id. at 7:22-8:3. The ‘327 patent
specifically states a duration of 1 to 6 minutes, depending on thickness. ‘327 patent, col. 9:35-37.
16

2. Dependent Claims 2-3, 5-6, 8-14, and 16-18
Dependent claims 2-3, 5-6, 8-14, and 16-18, as discussed below, are anticipated. The
court will consider dependent claims 4, 7 and 15 below under the section discussing obviousness.
a. Claim 2
Claim two of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the panel in claim one
being “at least partially translucent.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:14-15. The sheets in the ‘327 patent are
illustrated and described as being translucent. ‘327 patent, col. 5:20-23. 3form’s argument is
unavailing that because the ‘327 patent provides that the sheets may also be colored, textured,
frosted, opaque and/or contain fire-retardant additives and performance additives that
translucency was not anticipated. The court finds that “translucent” sheets are expressly described
and anticipated by the ‘327 patent, whatever other finishes the sheets may also have.
b. Claim 3
Claim three of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the laminate panel in
claim one having “a thickness of between 0.25 and 2 inches.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:16-17. The ‘327
patent anticipates the claimed range by explaining that “the thickness of product 10 may range
from about 0.030 inch (0.7937 mm) to 2.0 inches (50.80 mm). However, thicker and thinner
gauges are possible based on the press capabilities and starting material availability,” ‘327 patent
at col. 5:12-15, and “the polymeric sheets 16 and 18 may vary in thickness from about 0.004 inch
(0.100 mm) to 1.0 inch (25.4).” Id., col. 5:25-26. Prior art that discloses a range is anticipatory if
it “describes the claimed range with sufficient specificity such that a reasonable fact finder could
conclude that there is no reasonable difference in how the invention operates over the ranges.”
Ineos USA LLC v. Berry Plastics Corp., 783 F.3d 865, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The ‘327 patent
discloses a range from 0.004 inch to 2.0 inches, and explains that differences in thickness are a

19

factor of press capability and starting material. The ‘700 patent range of 0.025 and 2 inches is
encompassed entirely within the ‘327 patent ranges. The court finds that patent differences in the
range of thickness sizes are a reflection of press capability and starting material and there is no
reasonable difference in how the invention operates over the ranges.
c. Claim 5
Claim five of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the panel in claim one,
“wherein at least one of the first and second extruded sheets comprise extruded polycarbonate
having a thickness of between 0.1 inches and 0.50 inches.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:22-25. The ‘327
patent describes the use of polycarbonate, which 3form admits. 3form disputes that this claim is
anticipated only because the thickness range described by the ‘327 patent does not perfectly
match its own claim. However, as analyzed above for claim 3, the court finds that 3form’s range
of thickness is within the ranges disclosed by Lumicor and that the patent differences in the range
of thickness sizes is a reflection of press capability and starting material, with there being no
reasonable difference in how the invention operates over the ranges.
d. Claim 6
Claim six of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the panel in claim one
“wherein at least one of the first and second extruded sheets has a width and length dimensions of
approximately 3’x5’, approximately 4’x8’, or approximately 5’x10’.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:26-29.
The ‘327 patent describes several examples with 4’x8’ dimensions, i.e. “a bottom sheet of the
preferred polymethylmethacrylate material that is . . . 48 inches wide, and 96 inches long,” ‘327
patent, col. 10:35-37. The ‘700 patent only requires at least one of the panels to have dimensions
in the stated ranges, which the ‘327 patent does (4’x 8’). Furthermore, the ‘327 patent dimensions
fall directly between the ‘700 patent ranges. When it is the patent at issue claiming a range, rather

20

than the prior art reference claiming a range as in claims 3 and 5 above, the patent at issue’s
“range is anticipated by a prior art reference if the reference discloses a point within the range.”
Ineos USA, 783 F.3d at 869. Moreover, there is nothing in the ‘700 patent to suggest that the size
points are unique, that the size is critical to the invention or that the invention would work
differently than when using the size disclosed in the prior art. See id. at 869-70. The ‘327 patent
having disclosed a size point (4’x8’ panels) within the range of the ‘700 patent sizes (3’x5’, 4’x8’,
5’x10’ panels), the court finds that the ‘700 patent is anticipated by the ‘327 patent.
e. Claim 8
Claim eight of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the panel as in claim
one, wherein “one or more compressible objects,” such as “bamboo” and twigs, have a “natural
diameter that is substantially compressed at a critical pressure between about 10 psi and about 100
psi.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:34-39. The ‘327 patent discloses “the material to be fixated in the
matrix 12 may also be made of . . . plant fiber and parts. Non-limiting examples are: . . . dried
plant materials and fibers including long-stem grass, . . . bark and twigs from reed, bamboo,
papyrus, banana, mulberry, and wicker,” ‘327 patent, col. 8:25-35, that would lose their
“aesthetically pleasing” aspect, Id., col. 2:62-63, cols. 8-9, when compressed at pressures higher
than 40 psi and up to 160 psi. Id., col. 9:14-28. The parties do not dispute that bamboo and twigs
are disclosed by the ‘327 patent, and it is undisputed by the parties that the critical pressure for
twigs and reeds is about 75 psi, (Dkt. No. 57, p. 9), which falls directly within this range. The
court notes that after describing “compressible objects” to mean three-dimensional objects that
substantially deform at pressures up to 80–92 psi in the specification, the ‘700 patent is internally
inconsistent when in claim eight it claims an object “is substantially compressed at a critical

21

pressure between about 10 psi and about 100 psi.”4 Nevertheless, because twigs and bamboo
deform at pressures up to 80-92 psi, the court finds that their disclosure in the ‘327 patent
anticipates claim eight of the ‘700 patent.
f. Claim 9
Claim nine of the ‘700 patent is inherently anticipated. It refers to the panel as in claim
one, wherein there is uniformity in the viewable surface of the decorative panel “such that no
lakes or air bubbles are exposed.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:40-43. The ‘327 patent specification states
“[i]n order to produce products which are free of defects (such as air or gas bubbles entrapped in
the matrix, voids in the matrix, or cracks in the matrix), it has been found to be critical to process
the above-described basic lay-up sandwich according to the following operating parameters.”
‘327 patent, col. 8:60-col. 9:5. 3form does not dispute that defects such as gas and air bubbles
were anticipated in the ‘327 patent, merely that the ‘327 patent did not aim to produce a panel free
of any kind of defect whatever. This dispute is immaterial because 3form does not dispute that the
‘327 patent discloses the defect at issue, and because the ‘327 patent describes how this defect can
be avoided, thus providing the court with clear and convincing evidence that it inherently
anticipates the ‘700 patent.
g. Claim 10
Claim ten of the ‘700 patent is inherently anticipated. It refers to the panel as in claim one,
“wherein the one critical pressure is less than about 92 psi for the one or more compressible
objects.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:44-46. After the court’s construction of the term “compressible
objects,” all of the decorative objects in the ‘700 patent must have a critical pressure of less than
92 psi to count as a “compressible object.” For this claim to be anticipated, however, the ‘327
4

By arguing that a “compressible object” should be construed to be an object that deforms at “a critical pressure of
up to approximately 80-92 psi,” 3form must be found to have abandoned any claim that a compressible object has a
different meaning in claim eight. See 3form’s Mot. Partial Summ. J., (Dkt. No. 45-1, p. 29).

22

patent is only required to disclose at least one compressible object with a critical pressure of less
than 92 psi. 3form does not dispute that at least one of the decorative objects (twigs) in the ‘327
patent has a critical pressure of less than 92 psi, (Dkt. No. 57, p. 15), which is all that is required.
Additionally, it is undisputed by the parties that the critical pressure for reeds is about 75 psi, Id.
at 9, which makes a second anticipated object that compresses at less than 92 psi. Finally, the
‘327 patent describes numerous objects, softer than twigs, as examples that inherently compress at
pressures less than 92 psi. ‘327 patent, col. 8:28-33 (such as “cellulose, cotton, linen, pulp, rag,
dried plant materials and fibers including long-stem grass, leaves, petals . . . ”). Id. at col. 8:4, 3032. Because one or more qualifying objects is expressly disclosed, the court finds clear and
convincing evidence that claim ten is inherently anticipated by the ‘327 patent.
h. Claim 11
Claim eleven of the ‘700 patent is inherently anticipated. It refers to the panel in claim ten,
where a lower limit of 10 psi is identified and “compressible three-dimensional objects ordinarily
appear to have an unnatural conformation when subjected to the critical pressure of between
about 10 psi and 92 psi.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:47-51. As discussed in the court’s analysis of claim
one, because the pressure at which any object ultimately deforms is an inherent property of the
given object, the ‘327 patent disclosures of the same types of objects disclosed in the ‘700 patent
(that necessarily fall within the psi range identified by this claim in the ‘700 patent) are inherent
disclosures of the pressures that would deform the objects listed by the ‘700 patent. The ‘700
patent describes as examples of objects that compress at pressures between 10 psi and 92 psi “any
natural or synthetic decorative materials, such as thatch, bamboo, tree or bush branches or stems,
willow reed, leaves, beans (e.g. coffee beans), and so forth.” Id. at col. 7:12-16. The ‘327 patent
describes as examples “wood veneer, paper, dried plant fibers and parts[, n]onlimiting examples

23

. . . [such as] long-stem grass, leaves, petals, bark and twigs from reed, bamboo, papyrus, banana,
mulberry, and wicker.” ‘327 patent, col. 8:29-33. Each patent’s examples were nonlimiting and
directed toward one or more class of objects (“any natural . . . decorative material,” “such as” and
“so forth” in the ‘700 patent; “plant fibers and parts,” “[n]onlimiting examples” in the ‘327
patent), although exact matches were also present (bamboo, reed, leaves). Because each patent
described natural, plant materials as a general class as well as one or more identical compressible
objects, the court finds that the relevant pressures at which these objects deform are inherently
disclosed and anticipated by the ‘327 patent.
i. Claim 12
Claim twelve is similarly inherently anticipated. It refers to the panel in claim ten
(identifying a pressure to be applied not more than 92 psi), where the “unnatural appearance
comprises a substantially flattened appearance for the one or more compressible threedimensional objects when viewed through the first or second extruded sheet.” ‘700 patent, col.
11:52-col. 12:2. Again, only one object is required to have a critical pressure of less than 92 psi in
this claim. Because the pressure at which any object ultimately deforms is an inherent property of
the object, the ‘327 patent disclosures of three-dimensional objects that inherently compress at
pressures less than 92 psi would necessarily have the same unnatural, substantially flattened
appearance when viewed through the sheets if subjected to pressures greater than 92 psi. 3form
“does not dispute that certain twigs or reeds [described in the ‘327 patent] may flatten if subjected
to the critical pressure,” (Dkt. No. 57, p. 16). This is clear and convincing evidence that at least
two sets of objects (twigs and reeds) disclosed by the ‘327 patent anticipate claim twelve of the
‘700 patent.

24

j. Claim 13
Claim thirteen of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the laminate sheet
assembly used to create the panel recited in claim one, where the assembly “is subjected to the
plurality of pressures in the thermosetting process” and consists of: (1) “the first extruded sheet,”
(2) “one or more three-dimensional objects arranged on the first extruded sheet,” (3) “a second
extruded sheet positioned about the one or more embedded objects, and where when so
positioned, (4) “sufficient air escapes from between the embedded objects as pressure is
increased, such that lakes or air bubbles are avoided” when the sheets are formed together. ‘700
patent, col. 12:3-19.
Figure 2 of the ‘327 patent illustrates the configuration of the laminate assembly, with a
(1) bottom sheet 16, (2) decorative materials 14 arranged on the bottom sheet, and (3) a top sheet
18. ‘327 patent, sheet 1 of 2. 3form does not dispute this configuration, although it argues that the
‘327 patent primarily addresses two-dimensional objects rather than three-dimensional objects.
The ‘700 patent, however, only requires one three-dimensional object and 3form does not dispute
that at least some of the ‘327 patent objects are three-dimensional. Therefore, the court finds that
limitations 1-3 in the ‘700 patent are anticipated by the ‘327 patent.
As for limitation (4), claim one of the ‘327 patent states that “a lay-up sandwich is formed
comprised of said first flat sheet of polymeric material, said decorative object which extends
beyond at least one edge of both of said sheets of polymeric material, and said second flat sheet of
polymeric material.” ‘327 patent, col. 14:3-7 (emphasis added). The specification further states
that the decorative object layer “functions as a breather layer for air and gases to escape during
the manufacturing process,” Id., col. 4:50-63 (emphasis added), and explains that the “decorative
material 14 extends beyond the edges of polymeric sheets 16 and 18 . . . [to] provide[] an escape

25

path for air, water, vapor, and gasses generated during the pressing operation.” Id. at 63-67
(emphasis added). 3form admits that the layer of decorative objects as a whole acts as a “breather
layer.” It disputes that the ’327 patent explains that these resulting “escape paths” avoid creation
of lakes and air bubbles when forming the panel. (Dkt. No. 57, p. 17.) The court finds this dispute
to be immaterial. The ‘327 patent discloses both the problem and the placement that solves the
problem. It discloses in several places that the placement of the decorative object layer is for the
purpose of allowing trapped air and gases to escape. Its background discloses one of the problems
solved by this invention is avoiding the creation of defects such as “air bubbles entrapped in the
matrix, voids in the matrix, or cracks to the matrix.” ‘327 patent, col. 2:54-55. Because all it takes
to explain that air bubbles and lakes in the finished product can be avoided by arranging the
materials in the decorative layer such that trapped air and gas can escape during the pressing
process is to put these two disclosures together, the court finds that claim thirteen is anticipated.
Claim four of the ‘327 patent also states that after “applying a pressure of about 40 psi . . .
[the press is opened and pressure is removed] from the lay-up sandwich to allow air and gases to
escape from the lay-up sandwich; [after which the press is closed and 160 psi is applied for a
period of time such that] “said first and second . . . sheets melt together in the lay-up sandwich to
provide a unitary product.” Id., col. 15:27-37 (emphasis added). Claim four of the ‘327 patent
applies to claim thirteen of the ‘700 patent because it explicitly addresses the “plurality of
pressures” and “thermosetting process” noted therein. It is also worth noting that the parties
referred to the step involving opening and closing the press to release air and gases as “bumping.”
3form’s expert admitted that the ‘327 patent teaches a method for eliminating “trapped air and
gases,” although he also claims that not only were the bubble-free products produced by
Lumicor’s experts without following the “bumping” method, but that Lumicor’s current

26

commercial manufacturing process similarly does not use the “bumping” method to produce
defect-free products. This does not change the court’s analysis, except to note that in addition to
being anticipated, arrangement of the decorative object layer as a method of eliminating defects
caused by air and gas bubbles may also be obvious.
k. Claim 14
Claim fourteen of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the laminate sheet
assembly recited in claim thirteen, which further has “a pressure pad positioned about one of the
first and second extruded sheets.” ‘700 patent, col. 12:20-23. The use of pressure pads in an
assembly to create laminate panels is described in significant detail in the ‘327 patent, ‘327
patent, col. 11:56-65, as well as in the Eckart patent ‘028, col. 4:53-59, and this fact was admitted
by 3form’s expert. (Dkt. No. 57-2, p. 26). In detail, the ‘327 patent describes the pressure pads as
follows: “First, an intermediate lay-up book is made consisting of the following sequence from
top to bottom: (1) four plies of canvas padding; caul plate; (2) textured release paper or plate
providing 0.005 inch relief; (3) 0.060 inch clear polymethylmethacrylate sheet (size 48 inches by
96 inches); (4) a layer of the delicate decorative material; (5) 0.060 inch clear
polymethylmethacrylate sheet (size 48 inches by 96 inches); (6) textured release paper or plate
providing 0.005 inch relief; (7) caul plate; and, (8) four plies of canvas padding.” ’327 patent, col.
11:56-65 (emphases added). 3form expert witness Jeffrey T. Gotro admitted this and its
implication by refuting as incorrect a statement that “the Lumicor patent does not describe the use
of pressure pads.” He stated that it does, because “the ‘327 patent specifically calls out ‘Four
plies of canvas . . . placed below the bottom caul plate and above the top caul plate to evenly
distribute the pressure and heat during the pressing/heating operation.’ (327 patent, column 10:62-

27

67).” (Dkt. No. 57-2, p. 26). This admission demonstrates that pressure pads were anticipated by
the ‘327 patent.
l. Claim 16
Claim sixteen of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the laminate sheet
assembly recited in claim thirteen, “wherein the first and second extruded sheets comprise
polycarbonate.” ‘700 patent, col. 12:27-29. The ‘327 patent expressly discloses the use of
polycarbonate, ‘327 patent, col. 7:22-24, and 3form admitted this fact in its response to claim
five, which it incorporated in its response to claim 16. This is clear and convincing evidence that
claim 16 is anticipated by the ‘327 patent.
m. Claim 17
Claim seventeen of the ‘700 patent is expressly anticipated. It refers to the panel recited in
claim one, “wherein the one or more compressible objects comprise thatch or willow reed.” ‘700
patent, col. 12:30-33. The ‘327 patent expressly describes the use of “twigs from reed.” ‘327
patent, col. 8:32-33, and 3form admits this is the case. Because this claim requires only one object
comprising either thatch or willow reed and 3form has admitted that the ‘327 patent contains at
least one qualifying object, the court finds clear and convincing evidence that claim seventeen is
anticipated. Lumicor, additionally, argues that “thatch is a generic word for reeds,” and thus the
term “reed” is encompassed by the word “thatch.” 3form disputes that “thatch is a generic word
for reeds.” The court takes judicial notice that “thatch” generically refers to reeds and similar
plant material, and thus by referring to reeds in the ‘327 patent, thatch is also anticipated. See
Thatch, Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/
thatch (last visited December 22, 2015).

28

n. Claim 18
Claim eighteen is expressly anticipated as it refers to the panel recited in claim one,
“wherein the one or more compressible objects comprise bamboo.” ‘700 patent, col. 12:33-35.
After the court’s construction of “compressible objects” as three-dimensional objects that
substantially deform at pressures up to 80–92 psi, the court notes that bamboo will not count as a
“compressible object” for the ‘700 patent unless it has a critical pressure of less than 92 psi. The
specific critical pressure of bamboo was not addressed by the parties. However, the ‘327 patent
expressly discloses bamboo, ‘327 patent, col. 8: 28-33, (“the material to be fixated in the matrix
12 may also be made of . . . bamboo”) and this is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the
disclosure of bamboo is clear and convincing evidence that claim eighteen is anticipated by the
‘327 patent.
C. Obviousness
“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. “The combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than
yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). “When a work is
available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt
variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can
implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. On the other
hand, when “the prior art teaches away from combining certain known elements, discovery of a
successful means of combining them is more likely to be nonobvious.” Id. at 416.

29

“Whether a claimed invention would have been obvious is a question of law, based on
factual determinations regarding the scope and content of the prior art, differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue, the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and any objective
indicia of non-obviousness.” Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing
KSR Int’l Co. at 406; Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).
1. Level of ordinary skill
Lumicor’s expert opined that “an individual with a Bachelor’s degree in materials science
and engineering or related technology and 3 to 5 years of experience in the design, fabrication or
manufacture of laminated resin panels, or equivalent work experience, would have ordinary skill
in the relevant art at the time of filing of the subject patents." (Dkt. No. 50-7, p. 9 ¶ 28.) Because
both parties and their experts’ arguments relied on this level of expertise as constituting the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, so does the court.
2. Scope and content of prior art
Each party limited its argument on the relevant prior art to the ‘327 patent and the five
Eckart patents; therefore, the court finds that the parties agree on the scope of the prior art and
similarly limits its discussion to these patents. The parties disagree, however, on the content of the
teachings of the prior art. Each party agrees that the use of PETG in the production of laminate
panels is taught by the Eckart patents. 3form contends that the combination of the Eckart patents
and the ‘327 patent do not teach the use of PETG with compressible objects, plurality of
pressures, a critical pressure, or maintaining a substantially natural appearing conformation.
However, the court has now construed each of these terms and found that they are all anticipated
by the ‘327 patent; therefore, 3form’s contention that the ‘327 patent does not teach these
concepts is rejected as immaterial. The ‘327 patent and the five Eckart patents contain all of the

30

content necessary to analyze whether 3form’s combination of these familiar elements yields
predictable results.
3. Obviousness of ‘700 patent as a whole
While Lumicor argued that its ‘327 patent, alone or with prior art, renders all of the
asserted claims of the ‘700 patent obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, each of the ‘700 patent claims
was not individually briefed as being obvious. Accordingly, the court declines to address whether
claims 1-3, 5-6, 8-14, and 16-19 are obvious because it has already found them to be anticipated
and therefore invalid. The remaining claims of the ‘700 patent, claims 4, 7, and 15, all deal with
the use of polyethylene terephthalate glycol, generally known as PETG, which the court will now
address.
a. Claim 4
Claim four is obvious. It recites the panel as in claim one, “wherein at least one of the first
and second extruded sheets comprise extruded PETG having a thickness of between 0.1 inches
and 0.50 inches.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:18-21. As previously noted, the parties agree that the Eckart
patents teach the use of PETG in the production of decorative laminate panels (with neither party
arguing about thickness, although the court notes that the Eckart ‘028 patent describes PETG
sheets in the relevant range with a thickness of 0.25 inches). Lumicor argues that this teaching
makes it obvious to try combining the use of PETG material with the method for embedding
decorative objects taught by the ‘327 patent, even if its patent did not list it as a preference. 3form
argues that if it had been obvious, Lumicor would have included PETG in its patent, but it failed
to do so because “the vast majority of the decorative materials taught in the ‘327 patent are not
compressible,” (Dkt. No. 57, p. 65), and thus Lumicor failed to notice the advantages of PETG’s
lower melting point when used with three-dimensional compressible objects. Thus, 3form argues

31

that the advantages of PETG were not obvious until its own invention and that the ‘327 patent
teaches away from combining its method with the use of PETG.
The court disagrees. 3form’s argument relies on its assertion that “the vast majority of the
decorative materials taught in the ‘327 patent are not compressible.” This is at odds with the
opinion of 3form’s expert (as well as the inherent law of nature) that all objects are compressible
upon application of an appropriate amount of force. Therefore all of the objects taught by the ‘327
patent are “compressible” in the sense required by 3form’s argument, even if neither they nor
some of the objects listed in the ‘700 patent are “compressible objects” as construed by the court
above. Rather, the court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would implement this
predictable variation of material types, particularly because the design incentives to do so are
explicit in the ‘327 patent, the point of which is to aesthetically embed a wide range of decorative
objects within a variety of resin matrices by using a two-step process that includes a lower
pressure first step to limit deformation of the decorative layers. The ‘700 patent merely combines
old elements (PETG and the method anticipated by the ‘327 patent) “with no change in their
respective functions . . . withdraw[ing] what already is known into the field of its monopoly and
diminish[ing] the resources available to skillful” persons. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. 398 at 416 (citing
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-153
(1950)). This is impermissible pursuant to § 103. Furthermore, “A reference does not teach
away . . . if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not
'criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation” into the claimed invention. Depuy
Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The
expression of a preference for a group of resins that happens not to include PETG in the ‘327
patent does not teach away from the use of that resin.

32

c. Claim 7
Claim seven is obvious. It recites the panel as in claim one, “wherein at least one of the
first and second extruded sheets comprises a copolyester that has a melting point between 180° F.
and 230° F. in a pressure range of up to 40 psi.” ‘700 patent, col. 11:30-33. Eckart patent ‘028
describes temperature ranges for copolyester sheets with a melting point between 194° to 572° F.,
noting that “the optimal temperature for bonding the thermoplastic sheets will vary, for example,
depending on the particular copolyester(s) employed and the thickness of the sheet materials used,
and may be determined by those skilled in the art.” Eckart ‘028 patent, col. 4:20-28. Eckart
patent ‘066 similarly describes PETG temperature melting ranges between 195° to 510° F. and
notes that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art can select [a temperature suitable to cause the
PETG layers to bond together without causing decomposition, distortion, or other undesirable
effects] without undue experimentation.” Eckart ‘066 patent, col. 6:66-68, col. 7:1-10. The ‘327
patent describes a pressure range of 40 psi. ‘327 patent, col. 9:14.
Lumicor’s argument is that the Eckart patents describe copolyester resins having melting
points within the range of the ‘700 patent, and particularly that both patents identify that the
appropriate temperature range for use for a particular resin material can be determined without
undue experimentation by one ordinarily skilled in the art. Lumicor further argues that the parties
do not disagree that the appropriate melting temperature for PETG would be obvious to one
ordinarily skilled in the art, in part because 3form admitted that the Eckart ‘028 patent states it
and because 3form did not dispute that PETG resins are sold with a data sheet that identifies its
softening or melting temperatures. 3form’s argument is again that a person of ordinary skill in the
art would not have “appreciated the use of PETG with compressible objects,” and reiterates that
its argument is not that “the temperatures that would work with PETG would not be obvious,” but

33

that Lumicor failed to recognize the advantages of PETG’s lower melting point for use with
compressible objects. (Dkt. No. 57, p. 66).
The court disagrees with 3form for reasons similar to those regarding claim four, namely,
that 3form cannot rely on compressibility as the nonobvious element that distinguishes this claim
from the prior art. Because the temperatures at which PETG melts is either obvious based on data
sheets that arrive with the manufactured material or because one ordinarily skilled in the art can
determine the appropriate temperature of this copolyester without undue experimentation, the
design incentives explicit in the ‘327 patent make it obvious to combine the use of the proper
copolyester temperature at 40 psi to aesthetically embed a wide range of decorative objects within
the resin matrix. The ‘700 patent’s definition of “compressible objects” has been construed such
that they are a subset of the set of all objects capable of compression, which means that the Eckart
patents and their use of PETG with its associated temperatures along with the ‘327 patent and its
associated teachings make 3form’s known subset of “compressible objects” obvious. Therefore,
compressibility as a distinction fails to distinguish claim seven as being nonobvious.
d. Claim 15
Claim fifteen is obvious. It refers to the “laminate sheet assembly as recited in claim 13,
wherein the first and second extruded sheets comprise PETG.” ‘700 patent, col. 12:23-25. As
previously discussed, the only term in this claim that the ‘327 patent does not make obvious is the
use of PETG as the laminate material, and it is undisputed that the Eckart patents teach the use of
PETG. The parties argued this claim precisely the same as they argued claim four; therefore, the
court finds this claim obvious and invalid for the reasons cited therein.

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II. ‘068 PATENT
A. Claim Construction
The parties do not dispute the construction of the ‘068 patent. Because design patents are
generally claimed as shown in drawings, claim construction for design patents does not typically
require “a detailed verbal description of the claimed design, as is typically done in the case of
utility patents,” although the decision to do so is left to the court’s discretion. Egyptian Goddess,
Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Instead, claim construction for “a design is
better represented by an illustration ‘than it could be by any description.’” Id. at 679 (quoting
Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886). The court accordingly construes the patent claims as
an architectural panel with thatch reed design as shown below in figures 1-7 of the ‘068 design
patent.

Having set forth the claimed design in the ‘068 patent, the court next turns to whether this design
is met by the prior art.

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B. Obviousness
While Lumicor has argued that the ‘068 patent is invalid as obvious and under the on-sale
bar, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the court finds that an analysis of the patent’s obviousness in light of the
prior art conclusively resolves the question of validity and as such, there is no need to address the
on sale bar.
The elements of obviousness have been set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 103, KSR Int’l Co., 550
U.S. at 406, 416-417, Randall Mfg., 733 F.3d at 1362, and Graham, 383 U.S. at 1, 17–18 as
previously discussed in subsection I(C), supra. In addition, “in the design patent context, the
ultimate inquiry under section 103 is whether the claimed design would have been obvious to a
designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of the type involved.” Durling v. Spectrum
Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Specifically, the court must determine
whether a designer of ordinary skill “would have combined teachings of the prior art to create the
same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.” Id. As a prerequisite to combining the
prior art designs for this assessment, the court must follow a two-step process: first, find a single
reference in existence which has “basically the same” design characteristics as the claimed
design, and second, once this reference is found, then other references may be used to modify the
primary reference to create a design that has the same “overall visual appearance as the claimed
design,” High Point Design, LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 18836 (Fed. Cir.
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 13621 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
as long as such secondary references are related enough that the appearance of certain
“ornamental features in one . . . suggest the application of those features to the other.” Durling,
101 F.3d at 103. In addition, particularly for simple technologies, obviousness may be a matter of
common sense and logic that may not require explicit teachings in published references or resort

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to expert opinions. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
Lumicor has proposed numerous alternatives as prior art that render the ‘068 patent
obvious. Some of those include the following three patent drawings:

‘327 patent
drawings

Great Britain patent
No. 29,349

U.S. patent No.
4,690,874

and others include Lumicor’s embedded grass products produced pursuant to its ‘327 patent
(Dkt. No. 48-1, ex. 1-3, 5-6), shown below:

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

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Exhibit 3

Exhibit 6

Exhibit 5

The court notes that 3form’s argument focused on drawings from the ‘327 patent which it
criticized as dissimilar due to having “flat” grass with no nodes versus “cylindrical” reeds with
nodes, and sparse density versus the more closely set density of the ‘068 design. The court
dismisses this argument because 3form did not address the primary or secondary prior art
references that are most similar to its ‘068 patent design. Because of the similarity in density, use
of long-stemmed plant material, and organization in a generally parallel fashion with some
overlap of plant stalks, the court determines that the single prior art reference with “basically the
same” design as a primary reference for the ‘068 patent is Lumicor’s Exhibit 5 depicting
embedded beach grass, as shown by its comparison to the ‘068 patent below:

‘068 patent

Lumicor Exhibit 5

Having thus determined the primary reference pursuant to High Point Design, LLC, the court
notes that the most relevant secondary prior art reference that can be used to modify Lumicor
Exhibit 5 to create a design with the same “overall visual appearance” as the ‘068 patent is
Lumicor’s own ‘327 patent, which states that other materials such as twigs from reed may be used
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instead of grass. ‘327 patent, col. 8:31-34. This statement is undisputed by 3form and is “related
enough” pursuant to Durling because it expressly states, rather than merely suggests, that reeds
may replace grass as the decorative, ornamental material. That this replacement would create a
panel with the same “overall visual appearance” as the ‘068 patent is not difficult for the court to
imagine. It would have the same overall visual appearance as 3form’s Varia Thatch product5
shown below, (Dkt. No. 48-4, p. 81), if each stalk of grass in Lumicor’s exhibit 5 were replaced
with a stalk of reed in exactly the same position.

Lumicor Exhibit 5

3form Varia Thatch

As support for the court’s reasoning on this point, the court notes that 3form’s design expert,
Caroline Lewis, agreed that if the grass in Lumicor’s Exhibit 6, shown below, were replaced with
reeds having nodes, the panel that resulted would have the same design as shown in the ‘068
patent. (Q: “If you replaced the grass [in deposition exhibit 376, which is Lumicor Exhibit 6

Lumicor Exhibit 6

5

3form Varia Thatch

3form undisputedly described the Varia Thatch product in a press release dated August 2002.

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herein] with reeds having nodes, would you end up with the same design as that shown in the
‘068 patent? A: “I would say it would be close enough. If you substituted reeds, yes, and you
know – yes.”) (Dkt. No. 48-2, p. 191:14-21). If this is true about Lumicor Exhibit 6, which is less
dense than Lumicor Exhibit 5, the court finds it would be equally or more true about the denser
Lumicor Exhibit 5.
Having identified the primary and secondary prior art relevant to the court’s analysis, it
remains only to determine whether a designer of ordinary skill would be motivated to combine the
teachings of the prior art to create a panel with the same “overall visual appearance as the claimed
design” pursuant to High Point Design, LLC. The motivation to do so is contained within the text
of the Lumicor ‘327 patent itself. The direction to try reeds--along with a large number of other
natural and synthetic materials--as the ornamental layer of its lay-up sandwich could not be more
clear in the ‘327 patent. 3form’s argument that such motivation would not exist is based on its
expert’s opinion, which mistakes the standard. Lewis argues in terms of a designer choosing to
purchase a reed-based product as part of an overall aesthetic design for a room or building, and
then states that such a designer would not be motivated to substitute a grass product for a reed
product that fits in with the overall impact of other design choices for such room or building.
(Dkt. No. 57-4, p. 7). The Durling test, however, is directed to a “designer of ordinary skill who
designs articles of the type involved.” 101 F.3d at 103 (emphasis added). The question is whether
a “designer of interlayers,” as Lewis later clarifies in deposition testimony, rather than an “interior
designer choosing panels,” would be motivated to substitute reed for grass. (Dkt. No. 48-2,
p.189:6-7). For the very market reasons described by Lewis, the court concludes that a designer of
laminate architectural panels would be motivated not to stop at grass panels, but to proceed to
produce panels using a wide variety of decorative materials—including the explicitly disclosed

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reed material—from among which interior designers could choose. Given that the prior art
identifies predictable solutions to the market pressure to produce decorative panels with a wide
variety of ornamental designs, a designer of such panels “has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the
product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.” KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at
421. No prior art teaches away from combining the prior art in this way, as 3form’s expert
essentially admitted. See supra. For the foregoing reasons, the court finds clear and convincing
evidence that the ‘068 design patent was obvious in light of the prior art.
CONCLUSION
Because the court holds that the ‘700 and ‘068 patents are INVALID, the court GRANTS
Lumicor’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 48), and DENIES 3form’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 45).
SO ORDERED this 28nd day of December, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

______________________________
Clark Waddoups
United States District Court Judge

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