Ellis v. Stoney et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 23 Motion for Partial Dismissal. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 02/22/2013. (asp)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

ZACHARY LEE ELLIS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
PARTIAL DISMISSAL

vs.
HON. KEITH L. STONEY, Saratoga Springs
Justice Court Judge; CITY OF SARATOGA
SPRINGS, a municipal corporation;
DAPHNE RIVERA, Saratoga Springs
Justice Court Clerk; NATHAN HARRIS, in
his individual capacity and official capacity
as a Saratoga Springs Police Officer; JAMES
O. TRACY, JR., Utah County Sheriff;
UTAH COUNTY; JOHN AND JANE DOES
1-10, Utah County Deputy Sheriffs; and
JOHN AND JANE DOES 11-20, Employees
of the City of Saratoga Springs; inclusively,

Case No. 2:12-CV-335 TS

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Keith L. Stoney, Nathan Harris, Daphne
Rivera, and City of Saratoga Springs’ (the “City”) Motion for Partial Dismissal. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant the Motion for Partial Dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his civil rights when Judge Stoney sent Plaintiff
to jail without a commitment order after his arraignment on charges of domestic violence. He
was held without bail for approximately one month. Plaintiff further alleges that Judge Stoney

1

subsequently created a commitment order and instructed his clerk, Defendant Rivera, to backdate
it to justify Plaintiff’s incarceration.
Plaintiff brings various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against all Defendants, and state tort
claims against some of the Defendants including assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligence.
In this Motion, Defendants Stoney, Harris, Rivera, and the City seek partial dismissal of
Plaintiff’s complaint. 1 The individual Defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity, and
the City argues that Plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim and that Plaintiff’s state law claims
against them are barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all
well-pleaded factual allegations, not conclusory allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff. 2 Plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a claim . . .
that is plausible on its face,” 3 which requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully
harmed-me accusation.” 4 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 5 “The court’s function on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to

1

Defendants Utah County and Sheriff James O. Tracy recently filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Docket No. 31.
1

GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir.

2

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).

3

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

4

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original).

1997).

2

assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief
may be granted.” 6 As the Court in Iqbal stated, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 7
III. DISCUSSION
A.

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
“A long line of [Supreme Court] precedents acknowledge[] that, generally, a judge is

immune from a suit for money damages.” 8 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]though
unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, ‘it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer . . . shall be free
to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” 9
Judicial immunity is not “overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice” or corruption. 10 This
immunity can be overcome only when a judge either (1) acts outside the judge’s judicial
capacity, or (2) takes judicial action in absence of all jurisdiction. 11

5

Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).

6

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
8

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991).

9

Id. (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872)).

10

Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).

11

Id. at 11-12.
3

Acts outside a judge’s judicial capacity are those not “normally performed by a judge” or
those where a party does not believe the party is dealing with a judge in the judge’s judicial
capacity. 12 Such actions may include promulgating rules, 13 or hiring and firing staff. 14 These
types of administrative acts are not covered by judicial immunity.
Plaintiff argues that since his hearing was over when he was committed to jail, the
commitment was an administrative action. As stated, Plaintiff was before Judge Stoney to be
arraigned on charges of domestic violence. Even though the hearing was over when Judge
Stoney ordered Plaintiff to be sent to jail, Judge Stoney was still presiding in his court.
Furthermore, the fact that Judge Stoney’s order was carried out by police officers does not
“somehow transform his action from ‘judicial’ to ‘executive’ in character.” 15
Plaintiff further alleges that falsifying a court record is an administrative act, but the
Tenth Circuit has held that a clerk’s creation of a court order is a judicial act even when the clerk
does not follow proper procedures. 16 Therefore, even if some “unfairness and injustice” resulted
from Judge Stoney’s actions, he did not act outside his judicial capacity.
Plaintiff next argues that Judge Stoney acted in the absence of all jurisdiction. Utah
justice courts, although not courts of record,17 have “jurisdiction over class B and class C

12

Id. at 12.

13

Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980).

14

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).

15

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13.

16

Newton v. Buckley, No. 96-4202, 127 F.3d 1109, at *4 (10th Cir. Oct. 17, 1997)
(unpublished) (“The circuits are in agreement that a clerk’s issuance of a warrant involves a
quasi-judicial act and, therefore, carries with it the protections of absolute immunity”.)
17

Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-101.
4

misdemeanors” 18 and “have the same authority regarding matters within their jurisdiction as
judges of courts of record.” 19 Plaintiff’s charge of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child
is a class B misdemeanor within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Saratoga Springs Justice
Court. Also, the Utah legislature has granted authority to deny bail to those charged with
domestic violence crimes “if there is substantial evidence to support the charge, and if . . . the
alleged perpetrator would constitute a substantial danger to an alleged victim.” 20 Even if Judge
Stoney’s action “was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority,” 21 Judge
Stoney still did not act in absence of all jurisdiction. Therefore, he is entitled to immunity.
Defendant Daphne Rivera, the court clerk, is also protected by judicial immunity.
Judicial immunity “applies not only to judges but also to any judicial officer” who acts either to
“resolve disputes between parties” or “adjudicate private rights.” 22 Defendant Rivera was
assisting Judge Stoney in resolving a dispute regarding Plaintiff’s criminal case, and thus also
enjoys absolute judicial immunity.
The case cited by Plaintiff, Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 23 is distinguishable
because it involved a court reporter, not a court clerk. The Supreme Court held that since court
reporters are not afforded any discretion in carrying out their duties, but are “required by statute

18

Id. at § 78-5-104.

19

Id. at § 78-5-106(b).

20

Id. § 77-36-2.5(12).

21

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 356, 356–57 (1978) (internal citations omitted).

22

Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002).

23

508 U.S. 429 (1993).
5

to record verbatim court proceedings in their entirety,” 24 they are not protected by judicial
immunity. Court clerks, in contrast, have discretion in how they assist judges in “resolving
disputes between parties.” 25 Therefore, court clerks are protected by judicial immunity unless
they act outside of their jurisdiction. 26
B.

QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Defendant Harris is similarly protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Police

officers, although executive officers, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity when they
are acting as “an official aid of the judge” 27 and executing orders that are “facially valid.” 28 The
concept of facial validity is extremely broad so that state officials are not “‘required to act as
pseudo-appellate courts scrutinizing the orders of judges.’” 29 A facially valid order can be
“unlawful or erroneous” 30 but not rise to the “level of illegality necessary to render them facially
invalid for purposes of quasi-judicial immunity.” 31 The Tenth Circuit has concluded that “public
interest demands strict adherence to judicial decrees” 32 and that “it is simply unfair to spare the

24

Id. At 436 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 753(b)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

25

Lundahl, 296 F.3d at 939.

26

Newton, 127 F.3d 1109, at *4.

27

Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000).

28

Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2009).

29

Id. at 1165 (quoting Valdez v. City and Cnty of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 1166.

32

Id. at 1165.

1989)).

6

judges who give orders while punishing the officers who obey them.” 33 Therefore, Defendant
Harris is entitled to immunity.
C.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Defendants initially argued that Plaintiff failed to file the required notice of claim with

the City, but have since withdrawn this argument. The Court therefore makes no ruling on the
sufficiency of any notice of claim. The City further argues that it is protected by governmental
immunity for any state claims. Plaintiff has failed to respond to this argument.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a three-step process to determine whether a
government entity is immune under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. For an activity to be
eligible for governmental immunity: (1) it must be determined to be a governmental function for
which governmental immunity has been granted under Utah Code § 63G-7-201; (2) the
immunity must not have been waived by another section of the Act; and (3) if the immunity has
been waived, there is no exception to the waiver that would reinstate the immunity. 34
Under the first prong, the activity must constitute a government function. Government
function is defined in § 63G-7-102(4)(b) as “each activity, undertaking, or operation performed
by a department, agency, employee, agent or officer of a governmental entity.” The municipal
justice court is a department of the municipal government and thus its activities are government
functions. A government entity is not liable for government functions unless the Act specifically
provides an exception.
Although under § 63G-7-301(4), immunity is waived “as to any injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of

33

Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289.

34

Ledfors v. Emery Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993).
7

employment,” § 63G-7-301(5)(b) specifically states that immunity is not waived under
subsection (4) if the injury arises out of “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest . . .
deceit . . . infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights.” Therefore, the City is
immune from Plaintiff’s state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal (Docket No. 23) is
GRANTED.
DATED February 22, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

_____________________________________
TED STEWART
United States District Judge

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