Nevada Star Resource et al v. Angrisano et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM DECISION and Order Addressing Motion to Dismiss-denying 8 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Defendants alternative motion for change of venue is denied. Signed by Judge David Sam on 10/4/12. (jmr)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
NEVADA STAR RESOURCE CORP.
(U.S.) , ET AL.,
)
Plaintiffs,
)
vs.
Case No. 2:12CV00392 DS
)
ROBERT ANGRISANO, ET AL.,
)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ADDRESSING
MOTION TO DISMISS
(DOC. # 8)
)
Defendants.
)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and (3), Defendants, who
are all residents of Washington, move the court to dismiss this
case for lack of personal jurisdiction, or alternatively, to
transfer venue to the Western District of Washington. (Doc. #8).
“The essence of Plaintiffs’ suit is that Defendants have
violated fiduciary duties and interfered with Plaintiffs’ economic
relations
(among
other
improprieties)
by
improperly
claiming
interests in, and rights to proceeds from, mining operations in
Beaver County, Utah.”
Am. Compl. ¶10.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following.
Plaintiff Nevada Star Resource Corp. (U.S.) (“NSRC”) is a Nevada
Corporation with its principal place of business in Ontario,
Canada.
During the 1990s, NSRC was a wholly owned subsidiary of
Nevada Star Resource Corp., a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of British Columbia, Canada, and later under the
laws of Yukon, Canada (the “Yukon Entity”). The two companies were
operated essentially as one and are referred to jointly hereafter
as NSRC. NSRC acquired rights and interest in mining claims and
leases located in Beaver County, Utah.
In March of 2007, NSRC
became a wholly owned subsidiary of Plaintiff Pure Nickel, Inc.
(“Pure Nickel”) a Canadian Corporation with its principal place of
business in Ontario, Canada.
Defendant
Angrisano,
during
various
times,
served
as
an
officer and director of NSRC and Pure Nickel. Defendant Monty D.
Moore (“Moore”), during various times, served as an officer and/or
director or NSRC.
Regarding Defendant Monty L. Moore, Plaintiffs
allege that he is the son of Moore, and that in May of 2002, he was
appointed as an alternate director of the Yukon Entity.
Regarding
Defendant Nicholson, Plaintiffs allege that he “was involved with
NSRC in some unspecified role prior to the time that it became a
wholly owned subsidiary of Pure Nickel.
to Nicholson as an affiliate of NSRC.
Other Defendants referred
The full nature and extent
of his involvement with NSRC and the Yukon Entity is currently
unknown to Plaintiffs.”
In
May
of
1998,
Am. Compl. ¶ 19.
NSRC
entered
into
a
Purchase
and
Sale
Agreement with Grand Central Silver Mines, Inc. (“Grand Central”),
a Utah corporation with headquarters and operations in Utah, and
2
Dotson Exploration Company (“Dotson”), a Nevada Corporation with
headquarters
purchase
and
certain
operations
mining
in
Utah,
interest
in
whereby
Beaver
NSRC
agreed
to
County,
Utah,
in
exchange for 12% of the net profits from the ores and minerals
produced from certain Utah properties controlled by NSRC (the
“NPI”).
The assignment was signed by Moore as President of NSRC.
In February of 1999, Angrisano, Nicholson and either Moore or
Monty L. Moore1 took an assignment of the NPI (the “Assignment”)
from Grand Central and Dotson in exchange for $40,000.
The
Assignment was recorded in Beaver County, Utah.
In January of 2002, NSRC entered into an Option to Purchase
with Western Utah Copper Company (“WUCC”), a Utah corporation,
whereby WUCC was granted an option to purchase certain property
interests in Beaver County, Utah, previously acquired by NSRC. The
Option to Purchase was signed by Moore both in his individual
capacity and as President of NSRC.
On June 17, 2002, WUCC gave
notice of its intent to exercise its option.
NSRC and WUCC entered into an Agreement and NS Option (the
“Agreement”) effective July 23, 2002, whereby WUCC agreed to pay
NSRC specified production royalties as defined, and granted NSRC
the option to acquire the subject Beaver County, Utah properties
1
The Assignment does not specify whether the “Monty Moore” who
was one of the named assignees was Moore, or his son Monty L.
Moore.
3
conveyed, in the event WUCC failed to put the properties into
production.
In a November 1, 2008 letter, WUCC claimed that it had
achieved production and enclosed two checks payable to NSRC. The
two checks were never cashed. Notwithstanding WUCC’s assertion,
NSRC had serious doubts that WUCC had achieved production.
In an action commenced June 6, 2009, NSRC sued WUCC in this
court regarding whether NSRC was entitled to exercise its option
under the Agreement to reacquire the properties covered by the
Agreement.
WUCC
subsequently
filed
a
voluntary
petition
in
bankruptcy.
CS Mining, LLC, and Skye Mineral Partners, LLC (jointly “CS
Mining”), thereafter acquired substantially all of the assets of
WUCC.
In November of 2011, CS Mining and Pure Nickel entered into a
Settlement
and
Release
Agreement,
which,
among
other
things,
provided for the termination of the litigation between NSRC and
WUCC, for NSRC to transfer certain property interests to CS Mining,
and for NSRC to relinquish any claim or right to reacquire the
properties covered by the Agreement.
Following execution of the Agreement, Angrisano claimed in an
email to the Yukon Entity’s corporate secretary that at the time
that NSRC
“did the deal” with WUCC, Angrisano, Monty L. Moore and
Nicholson agreed to change their claimed NPI to a 12% net profits
4
interest “in only the money that [NSRC] received as a result of the
agreement with [WUCC].” Angrisano would make the same assertion on
multiple occasions during Pure Nickel board meetings.
Consistent with Angrisano’s assertion that the NPI had been
converted to a 12% nets profits interest in the monies that NSRC
was entitled to receive pursuant to the Agreement, in a letter
dated December 17, 2008, from Mark Dotson, President and CEO of
WUCC, to “Monty Moore”, WUCC acknowledged the 12% interest and
enclosed a check payable to “Monty Moore” in the amount of $3,000
based on the allegedly modified NPI.
Plaintiffs
seek
declaratory
relief,
and
claim
breach
of
fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, civil
conspiracy, equitable estoppel, and intentional interference with
contractual relations.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs
jurisdiction.
F.3d
1063,
bear
the
burden
of
establishing
personal
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc. 514
1069
(10th
Cir.
2008).
Where
“there
has
been
no
evidentiary hearing, as in this case, and the motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction is decided on the basis of affidavits and
other written material, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie
showing that jurisdiction exists. Rusakiewicz v. Lowe, 556 F.3d
1095, 1100 (10th Cir. 2009)(internal quotation marks and citations
5
omitted).
“All factual disputes are resolved in favor of the
plaintiffs when determining the sufficiency of this showing.” Id.
“To obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
in a diversity action, a plaintiff must show that jurisdiction is
legitimate under the laws of the forum state and that the exercise
of jurisdiction does not offend the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d
1071, 1074 (10th Cir. 1995). In Utah, jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants can be either general (doing business concept) or
specific (arising out of or related to enumerated activities). STV
Int’l Mktg v. Cannondale Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (D. Utah
1990); Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d
850, 853 n.6 (Utah 1978).
1. Specific Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs assert that all Defendants are subject to specific
personal jurisdiction in Utah.2
In determining jurisdiction, Utah
employs a two part test.
The proper test to be applied in determining whether
personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant
involves two considerations. First, the court must assess
whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant. This means that a court may rely
2
Plaintiffs also contend that Moore is subject to general
jurisdiction due to his continuous and substantial activity in
Utah. Because the Court finds that it has specific jurisdiction
over
Moore, it will not address Plaintiffs’ claim of general
jurisdiction.
6
on any Utah statute affording it personal jurisdiction,
not just Utah’s long-arm statute. Second, assuming Utah
law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant, the court must assess whether an assertion of
jurisdiction comports with the due process requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
State el rel. W.A., 63 P.3d 607, 612 (Utah 2002), cert. denied, 538
U.S. 1035 (2003).
a. statutory basis for jurisdiction
Absent any other relevant statute, the Court looks to Utah’s
long-arm statute.
That statute requires that a defendant have
performed one or more of several enumerated acts within the State
of Utah for it to apply. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-205.
Here, Plaintiffs’ assert that “Defendants contracted with and
paid money to companies operating in Utah for a Net profits
interest (the “NPI”) in mining properties located in Beaver County,
Utah” and that “Defendants took numerous actions directed at Utah
to protect and promote their NPI.”
Mem. Opp’n at 2.
Plaintiffs
also assert that their claims arise directly out of Defendants’
contacts with Utah.
Utah’s long-arm statute provides in relevant part as follows.
[A]ny person or personal representative of the
person, whether or not a citizen or resident
of this state, who, in person or through an
agent, does any of the following enumerated
acts is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising
out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business with the state;
. . .
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real
7
estate situated in this state;
. . .
Utah
Code
Ann.
§
78B-3-205
(emphasis
added).3
Plaintiffs’
allegations clearly arise out of or relate to claimed mining
interests and operations which Plaintiffs assert are property
interests in Utah, and which they allege Defendants contracted with
Grand Central and Dotson to acquire.
In the Court’s opinion,
Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to satisfy Utah’s long-arm
statute.4
3
Plaintiffs also assert that their claims arise out of the
causing of injury in Utah.
4
See Pohl, Inc. of America v. Webelhuth, 201 P.3d 944, 951952 (Utah 2008)(quotation marks and citations omitted), noting that
allegations that defendants caused one of the enumerated acts and
that the claims arise out of that act, satisfies Utah’s long-arm
statute.
We acknowledge the analytical difficulty of
distinguishing between the satisfaction of minimum
contacts in the due process analysis and the satisfaction
of the long-arm statute.
For this reason, we often
assume the application of the statute - and go straight
to the due process issue. Nevertheless, it is important
to articulate whether the limitation on jurisdiction
stems from the breadth of the long-arm statute or whether
it stems from the principles of due process. Contrary to
the court of appeals’ conclusion, the plain language of
the long-arm statute does not exclude financial injuries
caused by tortious actions, and any such limitation must
come from the Due Process Clause, which we analyze below.
Thus, to satisfy the long-arm statute requirement,
a plaintiff must allege only that the defendants caused
[i.e.] a tortious injury in Utah and that the plaintiff’s
claims arise out of the tortious injury.
8
b. due process
The focus, therefore, is whether subjecting Defendants to suit
in Utah comports with due process.
A two-part test exists to guide the court in this
determination. First, the court must find that certain
“‘minimum contacts’” exist between the State of Utah and
[defendant] . . . .
Second, if the court finds that
minimum contacts exist, exercising jurisdiction over
[defendant] must “not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’”
Harnischfeger Eng’rs, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp.
608, 614 (D. Utah 1995)(citations omitted).
1.
A
Minimum Contacts
federal
court
sitting
in
diversity
'may
exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as
there exists "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum
State.'" Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th
Cir. 1995)(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 291 (1980)).
“The
minimum
jurisdiction
may
contacts
be
necessary
established
for
where
specific
the
personal
defendant
has
purposefully directed its activities toward the forum jurisdiction
and where the underlying action is based upon activities that arise
out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”
Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006)(internal
quotations and citations omitted).
9
a. Defendants Moore & Angrisano
Plaintiffs assert that “the repeated contacts with Utah by
Moore and Angrisano while serving as officers and directors of the
Yukon
Entity
and
NSRC
dictate
jurisdiction in this case.”
that
the
Court
Mem. Opp’n at 16.
has
personal
Plaintiffs also
assert that their claims arise directly out of Defendants’ contacts
with Utah.
Defendants Angrisano and Moore urge that Plaintiffs have
failed to establish that they have transacted any business within
Utah and that they do not have the minimum contacts with Utah
necessary
for
the
Court
to
exercise
jurisdiction
over
them.
Relying on Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service
Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1527 (10th Cir. 1987), they contend that
Plaintiffs must establish jurisdiction based on their personal
contacts with Utah, and not on the acts and contacts carried out
solely in a corporate capacity.
Defendants reliance on Ten Mile and the corporate shield
doctrine is misplaced.
As this court recently explained in Rusakiewicz v. Lowe,
556 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2009), “Ten Mile held that
the [district] court [in that case] lacked jurisdiction
over an ‘executive committee’ of a corporation for the
contacts made by the corporation,” based on “[t]he
rationale ... that an officer in a corporation is not
personally
liable
for
all
the
acts
of
the
corporation....”
In other words, “an officer of a
corporation is ‘not personally liable for torts of the
corporation or of its other officers and agents merely by
virtue of holding corporate office, but can only incur
personal liability by participating in the wrongful
10
activity.’” Rusakiewicz,
case, the record firmly
Lonny Bowers participated
thus the corporate shield
to him.
at 1103 .... In the instant
establishes that [defendant]
in the wrongful activity, and
doctrine has no applicability
Clearone Communications, Inc. v. Bowers, 643 F.3d 735, 764 (10th
Cir. 2011).
As was the case in Bowers, the pleadings submitted by
Plaintiffs allege that Moore and Angrisano participated in the
alleged
wrongful
activity.
Therefore,
the
corporate
shield
doctrine is inapplicable.
Under the totality of allegations and assertions, the Court is
satisfied that Plaintiff’s have made a prima facie showing that
specific jurisdiction exists as to Angrisano and Moore. See, e.g.,
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-51; Decl. of David R. McPherson; and, Decl. of
Mark Dotson.
b. all Defendants
Plaintiffs also assert that “[a]ll of the Defendants were
involved in reaching into Utah to enter into a contract with
companies operating in Utah and pay them money in exchange for an
NPI in mining interests and operations in Beaver County, Utah”, and
that Defendants “took these actions as part of a conspiracy to
profit at the expense of NSRC and/or the Yukon entity in violation
of the fiduciary duties owed by Angrisano and Moore.” Mem. Opp’n at
19. Therefore,
Plaintiffs
assert
that
the contacts
Defendant are imputed to the other Defendants.
of
each
See Melea Ltd. v.
Jawer SA, 511 F.3d 1060, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007)(“a co-conspirator’s
11
presence within the forum might reasonably create the ‘minimum
contacts’ with the forum necessary to exercise jurisdiction over
another co-conspirator if the conspiracy is directed towards the
forum, or substantial steps in furtherance of the conspiracy are
taken in the forum”).
To base personal jurisdiction on allegations of conspiracy,
Plaintiffs
bear
“the
burden
of
clearly
alleging
demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy.”
Webelhuth, 201 P.3d 944, 955 (Utah 2008).
facts
that
Pohl, Inc. of Am. v.
Plaintiffs must offer
more than bare allegations that a conspiracy existed and must
allege facts, beyond conclusory allegations and general averments,
that would support a prima facie showing of conspiracy.5
Id.
In general and conclusory fashion, Plaintiffs allege that the
“Defendants
agreed
to
work together
to
acquire an
NPI”
that
Defendants “agreed upon a plan” and “executed that plan by paying
$40,000 to acquire the NPI” Am. Compl. ¶ 103, see also ¶ 107.
Plaintiffs’ further allege “that Defendants took affirmative steps
in furtherance of the conspiracy, including paying money for the
NPI, agreeing to the Assignment of the NPI, and participating in
5
In Utah, civil conspiracy requires proof of five elements:
“(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be
accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of
action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a
proximate result thereof.” Pohl, Inc., 201 P.3d at 954-55.
12
demanding proceeds from mining operations in Utah pursuant to the
NPI.”
Id. ¶ 106.
After
reviewing
the
Amended
Complaint
and
documentation
submitted, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs allegations of
conspiracy are conclusory and generally devoid of facts that would
support a claim of conspiracy.
Plaintiffs, therefore, have failed
in their burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists as to all
Defendants, including Nicholson and Monty L. Moore, based on
allegations of conspiracy.6
2. Fairness Considerations
Having found minimum contacts as to Moore and Angrisano, for
federal due process to be satisfied the Court must still find that
“[t]he defendant's contacts with the forum state must also be such
that maintenance of the suit 'does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.'" Far West Capital, Inc., 46
F.3d at 1074 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Factors to be considered include “‘the
burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in adjudicating
the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies’”. Burger
6
Plaintiffs’ also state that Nicholson in a letter dated
September 14, 2011, to NSRC’s attorney in Salt Lake City, asserted
that he had rights to a 1/3 share of the NPI. See Decl. of Derek
Langton, ¶ 5. The Court is not persuaded that this act satisfies
the minimum contacts requirement as to Nicholson.
13
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (citing WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292).
If the Court
finds that there have been minimum contacts, however, “the burden
is on the defendant to ‘present a compelling case that the presence
of
some
other
unreasonable.’”
considerations
would
render
jurisdiction
Rusakiewicz, 556 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 477).
“Such cases are rare.”
Id.
The court concludes that the assertion of jurisdiction over
Angrisano and Moore under the facts presented would not be contrary
to the notions of fair play and substantial justice. Angrisano and
Moore’s alleged contacts with Utah were voluntary and undertaken
with a profit motive.
While it can be presumed that it would be
more convenient for Moore and Angrisano to respond to Plaintiffs’
claims in Washington, other than conclusory claims of financial and
personal hardship, no specific evidence has been provided that
suggests an undue burden by requiring them to litigate in Utah. And
as Plaintiffs’ note, “[o]utside of Defendants, many witnesses will
likely be from Utah, such as Mark Dotson (who is located in Utah)
and the other parties that negotiated and/or entered into the
Assignment, David Leta, the Utah attorney for CS Mining who was
contacted by Angrisano, and Ted Posey, a principal of Cortex Mining
located in Utah who is likely familiar with representations Moore
and/or Angrisano made regarding the NPI.”
Mem. Opp’n at 26.
Moreover, because NSRC’s mining interests are located in Utah, it
14
would seem that Utah has an interest in maintaining this action in
its
forum.
It
characterization
appears
of
the
to
NPI
be
will
uncontroverted
be
a
matter
of
that
the
Utah
law.
Plaintiffs have selected Utah as their forum of choice to seek
relief, and Defendants have failed to articulate any persuasive
reason why Washington would be a more efficient place to resolve
this matter than would Utah.
B.
Venue
Defendants also urge that the case should be dismissed or
transferred out of Utah under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
As Plaintiffs
note, that statute is applicable only if venue is inappropriate in
the first place. Civil actions may be brought in the judicial
district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated.”
28 U.S.C.
§1391(b)(2).
As a recap of events giving rise to their claims, Plaintiffs
allege that “(i)Defendants contracted with companies operating in
Utah to obtain the NPI and usurp Plaintiffs’ corporate opportunity;
(ii)Defendants accepted money purportedly from mining operations in
Utah; (iii)Defendants sent communications to Plaintiffs’ attorney
in Utah claiming rights under the NPI; and (iv)Defendants sent
communications to CS Mining’s attorney in Utah claiming rights
under the NPI.”
Mem. Opp’n at 29-30.
15
The Court is satisfied that venue in Utah is appropriate.
C.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) Transfer
In the alternative, Defendants request that this case be
transferred to the Western District of Washington “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice
....”
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
In evaluating a motion to transfer,
the court considers the following.
“Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the
district court to adjudicate motions for transfer
according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’”
Stewart Org. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2244, 101
L. Ed.2d 22 (1988)(quoting Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622, 84
S. Ct. at 812).
Among the factors [a district court] should
consider is the plaintiff’s choice of forum; the
accessibility of witnesses and other sources of
proof, including the availability of compulsory
process to insure attendance of witnesses; the cost
of making the necessary proof; questions as to the
enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained;
relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial;
difficulties that may arise from congested dockets;
the possibility of the existence of questions
arising in the area of conflict of laws; the advantage of having a local court determine questions of
local law; and, all other considerations of a
practical
nature
that
make
a
trial
easy,
expeditious and economical.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 147 (10th
Cir. 1967).
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516
(10th Cir. 1991).
As master of the complaint, deference is given
to plaintiff’s forum selection. Frontier Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n
v. National Hotel Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1293, 1301 (D. Utah 1987).
16
“The defendants’ burden is heavy, and unless the circumstances of
the case weigh heavily in favor of the transfer, the plaintiff’s
choice should not be disturbed.”
Co.
v.
Bartile
Roofs,
2010)(quotation
and
Inc.,
other
Id.
618
marks
See also, Emp’rs Mut. Cas.
F.3d
1153,
(10th
1169
omitted)(“[t]o
Cir.
demonstrate
inconvenience, the movant must (1) identify the witnesses and their
locations;
(2)
indicate
the
quality
or
materiality
of
their
testimony; and (3) show that any such witnesses were unwilling to
come to trial, that deposition testimony would be unsatisfactory,
or that the use of compulsory process would be necessary”).
In support of their position that venue should be transferred,
Defendants
simply
assert
that
litigating
in
Utah would
be
a
hardship on them and their families because they will be witnesses
and live in western Washington, and because relevant documents are
located in Washington and Canada.
The Court has previously concluded that Defendants claim of
burden on them and their families is supported by nothing more than
their
conclusory
witnesses
statements.
beyond
representatives.
Defendants
themselves
and
do
not
identify
possibly
any
Plaintiffs’
Additionally, Defendants fail to elaborate why
the location of documents creates any hardship for them given
modern means of communication.
The Court, therefore,
17
concludes
that Defendants have failed in their burden of establishing that
the circumstances of this case weigh in favor of transfer.7
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is denied
as to Angrisano and Moore, but granted as to Monty L. Moore and
Nicholson.
Defendants’ alternative motion for
change of venue is
denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 4th day of October, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
DAVID SAM
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
Having so concluded, Plaintiffs, who have not addressed this
issue in their pleadings, may wish to re-examine their choice of
venue in Utah in the context of whether, if they prevail, they can
achieve complete relief without the presence of Nicholson and Monty
L. Moore.
18
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