DeLima v. Burres

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 13 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead on 2/26/13. (alp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

ANDERSON DELIMA,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:12-cv-00469-DBP

GERRY F. BURRES,

Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead

Defendant.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Plaintiff is Anderson
DeLima. Defendant is Gerry F. Burres, Plaintiff’s former mother-in-law. Plaintiff alleges that,
on March 13, 2007, Defendant signed an affidavit of support (“Form I-864”) agreeing to
financially support Plaintiff at 125% above the poverty threshold until Plaintiff became a United
States Citizen. (Docket No. 2.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached the Form I-864 by failing
to support Plaintiff from 2009 to 2011. (Id.)
Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper
venue, and failure to state a claim. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 13.) As such, the Court will not address
Defendant’s remaining arguments.

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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 13.) She claims that, as a Montana resident, she “maintains no
contacts to the forum state [Utah] sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction . . . .” (Id. at 1.)
When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction prior to trial, the plaintiff bears
the burden to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Rambo v. Am. S. Ins. Co.,
839 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir. 1988). At this stage, the court decides the motion based on
“affidavits and other written materials,” and must resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiff’s
favor. Id.
To meet his burden, Plaintiff primarily asserts personal jurisdiction over Defendant is
appropriate under Utah’s long-arm statute. (Dkt. No. 25.) 1 To establish personal jurisdiction in
such circumstances, a plaintiff must first show Utah law authorizes jurisdiction. Rusakiewicz v.
Lowe, 556 F.3d 1095, 1100 (10th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must then show exercising such
jurisdiction “does not offend” the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Id. Courts
“frequently make a due process analysis first because any set of circumstances that satisfies due

1

Plaintiff does not allege this claim is governed exclusively by federal law. See Davis v. United
States, 499 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding an action to interpret a Form I-864 did not
arise under federal law). Likewise, Plaintiff does not allege Defendant is subject to Utah’s
general personal jurisdiction, which requires a defendant to conduct extensive activity in the
forum state. Abbot G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6 (Utah 1978). Rather,
Plaintiff alleges specific personal jurisdiction under Utah’s long-arm statute. In such
circumstances, this Federal District Court, which sits in Utah, may assert personal jurisdiction to
the same extent as Utah’s long-arm statute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons
. . . establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a
court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”).

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process will also satisfy” Utah’s jurisdictional requirements. SII Megadiamond, Inc. v. Am.
Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998).
However, Plaintiff’s argument focuses exclusively on Utah’s long-arm statute, and 8 C.F.R.
§ 213a.2(d). (Dkt. No. 25.) As such, the Court will analyze whether the provisions Plaintiff
cites allow the Court to constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
III.

UTAH’S LONG-ARM STATUTE REQUIREMENTS

Utah’s long-arm statute allows Utah courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction in the
following, relevant circumstances:
[A]ny person or personal representative of the person, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who, in person or through an agent, does any of the
following enumerated acts is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state
as to any claim arising out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of
warranty;
...
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at
the time of contracting;
....
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-205 (emphasis added).
IV.

FEDERAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

Regardless of Utah’s long-arm statute, a court may only exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant maintains sufficient “minimum
contacts” with the forum state such “that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux
Distrib., Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1276 (10th Cir. 2005).
A defendant maintains sufficient minimum contacts if he “purposefully avails [himself] of
the privilege of conducting activities with the forum [s]tate.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
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253 (1958). Purposeful availment requires a defendant to “create a substantial connection with
the forum state.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987). That
is, a defendant must “purposefully direct[] his activities at residents of the forum, and the
litigation [must] result[] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” OMI
Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998.)
If a defendant maintains sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, exercising
personal jurisdiction over the defendant must “not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); First City Bank, N.A. v. Air
Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F.2d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 1987).
This inquiry requires a court to determine whether exercising “personal jurisdiction over a
defendant with minimum contacts is reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the
case.” OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091. To determine reasonableness, a court must consider the
following factors: (1) “the burden on the defendant”; (2) the forum state's interest in resolving
the dispute; (3) “the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief”; (4) “the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies”; and (5) “the shared interest
of the several [s]tates in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at
113.
V.

8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) OBLIGATIONS

Executing a Form I-864 “creates a contract between the sponsor and the U.S. Government for
the benefit of the sponsored immigrant . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d). When Defendant signed the
Form I-864 as a sponsor, she accepted that Plaintiff, as the sponsored immigrant, could legally
enforce the Form I-864. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(B). That is, Plaintiff could file a civil action “in

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any appropriate court” “with respect to financial support.” Id. § 1183a(e)(1); 8 C.F.R. §
213a.2(d). Indeed, Defendant “agree[d] to submit to the jurisdiction of any Federal or State court
for the purpose of” enforcing the Form I-864. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(C).
VI.

WHETHER UTAH LONG-ARM STATUTE CREATES PERSONAL
JURISDICTION

A. Transacting Business
Plaintiff asserts personal jurisdiction is appropriate under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-205(1),
which relates to “the transaction of any business within this state.” (Dkt. No. 25 at 4.) 2
Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant transacted business in Utah when she “hired a Utah Law
Firm, Esplin Weight, to prepare the Form I-864 . . . .” (Id.)
Notably, “an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone” cannot “establish
sufficient minimum contacts.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added). Rather, a court
should consider the following “factors” to determine a defendant’s minimum contacts: (1) “prior
negotiations”; (2) “contemplated future consequences”; (3) the contract terms; and (4) the
“parties’ actual course of dealing.” Id. at 479. See also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957).
Relevant here, the Tenth Circuit has held that Nevada defendants never purposefully availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting business in Utah when they hired a Utah “agent” to
assist in contract negotiations with Utah plaintiffs. Far W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071,
1076 (10th Cir. 1995). The Court reasoned to hold otherwise “would suggest that retaining legal
counsel . . . to consult regarding a part of a transaction would necessarily establish minimum
contacts with the consultant’s home forum. Such results are inconsistent with our personal
2

“Transaction of business within this state means activities of a nonresident person, his agents,
or representatives in this state which affect persons or businesses within the state.” Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-3-202(2).
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jurisdiction jurisprudence . . . . ” Id. (emphasis added). In so holding, the court emphasized that
“[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that defendants hired [the agent] because of his Utah
residence or that [the agent’s] Utah residence played any part in his role as a consultant.” Id.
Under Burger King and Far W. Capital, Defendant’s decision to hire a Utah firm to draft the
Form I-864, alone, does not constitute purposeful availment sufficient to create minimum
contacts with Utah. Plaintiff never suggested that Defendant hired the Utah firm because of the
firm’s Utah location. Likewise, Plaintiff never discussed any prior negotiations Defendant
conducted with the Utah firm, or Defendant’s course of dealing with the firm. Indeed, Defendant
executed the Form I-864 in Montana. (Dkt. No. 18 at 3.) Along the same lines, Plaintiff never
presented the terms of the hiring contract between Defendant and the Utah firm. Plaintiff never
explained how Defendant could foresee being sued in Utah merely because she hired a Utah firm
to prepare the Form I-864. Accordingly, the Court concludes it cannot constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over Defendant on this ground.
B. Causing Injury
Plaintiff claims personal jurisdiction is also appropriate under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3205(3), which relates to “the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach
of warranty . . . .” (Dkt. No. 25 at 4.) Plaintiff argues Defendant’s “callous disregard for the
Plaintiff’s financial wellbeing” caused Plaintiff “injuries in the state of Utah.” (Id.) Because
Defendant breached the Form I-864, Plaintiff “sustained approximately $50,340 in collection and
eviction damages.” (Id. at 3.)
Unfortunately, “the mere allegation that an out-of-state defendant has tortuously interfered
with contractual rights,” and thereby “injured a forum resident[,] does not necessarily establish
that the defendant possesses the constitutionally required minimum contacts.” Far W. Capital,

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46 F.3d at 1079. In such circumstances, the Tenth Circuit has examined the Burger King factors
listed above, as well as “the contacts created by the out-of-state defendant in committing the
alleged tort.” Id. at 1079-80 (finding “no evidence that defendants’ alleged torts had any
connection to Utah beyond plaintiff’s corporate domicile.”).
Applying the case law above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s financial injury in Utah does not
establish Defendant’s purposeful availment sufficient for minimum contacts. Plaintiff presented
no evidence that Defendant and the U.S. government, who are the only contracting parties to the
Form I-864, negotiated the Form I-864 in Utah. Indeed, Plaintiff presented no evidence that he
and Defendant negotiated the Form I-864 in Utah. Likewise, Plaintiff presented no evidence
that he and Defendant, or the U.S. government and Defendant, conducted dealings in Utah
related to the Form I-864. Similarly, Plaintiff failed to show that Defendant created any Utah
contacts when she breached the Form I-864. From what the Court can glean, Defendant never
left Montana to negotiate, sign, or breach the Form I-864.
In Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant likely contemplated the future consequences of signing the
Form I-864 would impact Plaintiff, who resided in Utah. Plaintiff, who relied on Defendant’s
financial support as the contract beneficiary, would suffer financial injury if Defendant breached
the Form I-864. However, this factor alone is insufficient to establish Defendant’s minimum
contacts with Utah. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (“[F]oreseeability alone has
never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”).
See also Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006) (“It is the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state that are of interest in determining whether personal jurisdiction
exists, not its contacts with a resident of the forum.”); Far W. Capital v. Towne, 828 F. Supp.
909, 913 (D. Utah 1993) (“Financial loss is an inadequate link with the forum state for

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jurisdictional purposes. It would have been suffered by the plaintiff wherever [he] resided.”).
Given the analysis above, the Court cannot constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over
Defendant on this ground.
VII.

WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S ROLE AS CONTRACT BENEFICIARY UNDER 8
C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) CREATES PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Unrelated to Utah’s long-arm statute, Plaintiff cites 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) to suggest personal
jurisdiction is appropriate. (Dkt. No. 25 at 4-5.) Plaintiff notes when Defendant signed the Form
I-864, she agreed to submit herself to the jurisdiction of any appropriate court relating to the
document’s enforcement. (Id.) Because Plaintiff expected to benefit from the contract in Utah,
Defendant should be subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah. (Id. at 5.)
The Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s expectations as the Form I-864 beneficiary.
However, Defendant’s decision to sign the Form I-864 under 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) does
constitute a waiver or replacement of her constitutional due process rights related to personal
jurisdiction. As such, it does not change the Court’s due process analysis above.
VIII. ORDERS
For the reasons stated above, the following orders shall issue:
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 13.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
Dated this 26th day of February, 2013.

Dustin B. Pead
United States Magistrate Judge

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