Bird v. West Valley City et al
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM DECISION denying 23 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner on 07/16/2014. (tls)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
KAREN BIRD,
Plaintiff,
v.
WEST VALLEY CITY, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah; and
KELLY DAVIS, in his official and
individual capacities,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Case No. 2:12-cv-903-PMW
Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner
All parties in this case have consented to United States Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner
conducting all proceedings, including entry of final judgment, with appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Before the
court is Karen Bird’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for leave to amend her complaint. 2 The court has
carefully reviewed the written memoranda submitted by the parties. Pursuant to civil rule 7-1(f)
of the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the District of Utah, the court has
concluded that oral argument is not necessary and will determine the motion on the basis of the
written memoranda. See DUCivR 7-1(f).
1
See docket no. 11.
2
See docket no. 23.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s motion is brought under rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Under that rule, “[t]he court should freely give leave” to amend
pleadings “when justice so requires.” Id.; see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The decision about whether to provide a party leave to amend its pleadings “is within the
discretion of the trial court.” Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quotations and citation omitted). “Refusing leave to amend is generally only justified upon a
showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive,
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Bylin
v. Billings, 568 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted).
The court has determined that only the factors of undue delay and prejudice are
applicable in this case. The court turns to addressing those factors.
I. Undue Delay
With respect to undue delay, the Tenth Circuit has instructed courts to “focus[] primarily
on the reasons for the delay.” Minter, 451 F.3d at 1206. The Tenth Circuit has “held that denial
of leave to amend is appropriate when the party filing the motion has no adequate explanation for
the delay.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Further, “[c]ourts have denied leave to amend
in situations where the moving party cannot demonstrate excusable neglect. For example, courts
have denied leave to amend where the moving party was aware of the facts on which the
amendment was based for some time prior to the filing of the motion to amend.” Fed. Ins. Co. v.
Gates Learjet Corp., 823 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1987).
2
In addition to showing that there was no undue delay, when
an amendment is sought after the deadline for the amendment of
pleadings set forth in a scheduling order, most circuits require that
the parties show good cause as required under Rule 16(b) [of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]. The Tenth Circuit “has not
ruled on [this] question in the context of an amendment to an
existing pleading.”
DeMarco v. LaPay, No. 2:09-cv-190 TS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124911, at *4 (D. Utah Oct. 27,
2011) (quoting Bylin, 568 F.3d at 1231 n.9) (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the
judge’s consent.”). “However, it has noted the rough similarity between the good cause standard
of Rule 16(b) and [the Tenth Circuit’s] undue delay analysis under Rule 15 and that appellate
courts that have applied Rule 16 have afforded wide discretion to district courts’ applications of
that rule.” DeMarco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124911, at *4-5 (alteration in original) (quotations,
citations, and footnotes omitted). “When applied, the good cause standard requires the . . . party
to show that it has been diligent in attempting to meet the deadlines, which means it must
provide an adequate explanation for any delay.” Id. at *5 (quotations and citation omitted).
Given the rough similarity between the rule 16(b) good cause standard and the undue delay
analysis under rule 15, the court will consider them together. Specifically, the court will focus on
whether Plaintiff has provided an adequate explanation for the delay in bringing her motion.
The deadline for bringing motions to amend pleadings in this case was September 30,
2013. 3 Plaintiff’s motion was not filed until April 24, 2014, nearly seven months after that
3
See docket no. 18.
3
deadline and one day before expiration of the fact discovery deadline. 4 In her motion, Plaintiff
asserts that she is not seeking to add new claims or new parties. Instead, Plaintiff contends that
she is merely seeking to clarify some of her claims, including dismissing a substantive due
process claim against Kelly Davis (“Davis”) contained in her original complaint. However, as
noted by West Valley City and Davis (collectively, “Defendants”) in their response to Plaintiff’s
motion, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint actually seeks to assert a new substantive and
procedural due process claim against West Valley City. In her reply memorandum, Plaintiff
contends that, until she conducted some discovery and more legal research, she did not determine
that her due process claim against Davis was not viable or that she had an allegedly viable due
process claim against West Valley City.
As an initial matter, the court notes that, with respect to dismissal of Plaintiff’s due
process claim against Davis, there is no need for Plaintiff to amend her complaint to accomplish
that goal. She can simply file a motion to voluntarily dismiss that claim.
Turning to whether there was undue delay, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to
provide an adequate explanation for the delay in bringing her motion to amend her complaint.
The court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that she did not determine that she had a
viable due process claim against West Valley City until after she conducted discovery and more
legal research. In the court’s view, all of the facts supporting Plaintiff’s proposed due process
claim against West Valley City were available to her at the time her original complaint was filed.
See Gates Learjet Corp., 823 F.2d at 387 (providing that “courts have denied leave to amend
where the moving party was aware of the facts on which the amendment was based for some
4
See docket no. 22.
4
time prior to the filing of the motion to amend”). Plaintiff has failed to provide a sufficient
explanation for why she did not include that claim in her original complaint or seek leave to
include that claim before the deadline for filing motions to amend pleadings. As for the other
clarifications that Plaintiff seeks to make to her claims, Plaintiff has failed to offer any
explanation why they were not included in her original complaint or why she did not seek to
make those clarifications by way of a timely motion to amend her complaint.
II. Prejudice
“The . . . most important . . . factor in deciding a motion to amend the pleadings, is
whether the amendment would prejudice the nonmoving party.” Minter, 451 F.3d at 1207.
Courts typically find prejudice only when the amendment unfairly
affects the defendants in terms of preparing their defense to the
amendment. Most often, this occurs when the amended claims
arise out of a subject matter different from what was set forth in
the complaint and raise significant new factual issues.
Id. at 1208 (quotations and citation omitted).
For the following two reasons, the court concludes that Defendants will be unduly
prejudiced if Plaintiff is provided with leave to amend to amend her complaint at this late date.
First, the fact discovery deadline has expired. The court concludes that allowing Plaintiff to
assert a new claim against West Valley City after the close of discovery would be clearly
prejudicial to Defendants because they would not have an opportunity to conduct discovery on
that claim. While the court could reopen discovery for that purpose, it is unwilling to do so at
this late stage of the case.
Second, as noted by Defendants, they have made strategic decisions and conducted
discovery based on the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s original complaint. Indeed, Defendants have
5
invested significant time and resources in preparing a timely motion for summary judgment on
the claims in Plaintiff’s original complaint. That motion has been filed and is in the process of
being briefed. Allowing Plaintiff to assert a new claim against West Valley City at this stage of
the case would result in a waste of the time and resources Defendants have invested in preparing
that motion.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint 5 is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 16th day of July, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
PAUL M. WARNER
United States Magistrate Judge
5
See docket no. 23.
6
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