Woods v. Department of Education
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION terminating 4 Motion to Appoint Counsel; terminating 5 Motion for Service of Process. This case is HEREBY DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Judge Robert J. Shelby on 07/29/2013. (tls)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
TERRYETT WOODS,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
v.
Case No. 2:12-cv-1046-RJS
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
Judge Robert J. Shelby
Before the court are pro se Plaintiff Terryett Woods’ Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt.
No. 4) and Motion for Service of Process (Dkt. No. 5). Woods moves for counsel and service of
process for her Complaint (Dkt. No. 3) against the U.S. Department of Education. Woods asserts
civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. She alleges that the Department of
Education engaged in fraud and forgery by deducting money from her social security checks from
2005 to 2012 to cover payments due under higher education loans for schooling Woods contends
that she did not receive.
Woods represents that she did not attend Barclay College in St. Louis and completed only
one semester at Marysville College in St. Louis, the schools where the educational loans accrued.
Woods argues that the Department of Education fraudulently deducted approximately $100,000
from her social security checks. Woods notes that she wrote a letter to Barclay College
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expressing her intention to stop attending after one semester. Woods asserts that the school
engaged in forgery by receiving checks from federal student loan programs, including Pell
Grants, and depositing them into the school’s account using Woods’ social security numbers and
student identification number without her permission. Woods attaches to her Complaint various
student loan ledgers and social security records. She seeks a full refund from the Department of
Education.
I. Legal Analysis
Before the court considers Plaintiffs’ motions for service of process and appointment of
counsel it must ensure that jurisdiction is proper. Woods is proceeding in forma pauperis.
Under the in forma pauperis statute the court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Woods brings her complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,
using a standard civil rights complaint form. The federal government however has not consented
to be sued under either section. Consequently Woods’ claims against the Department of
Education fail as a matter of law.
The United States and its agencies may be sued only where Congress has waived
sovereign immunity. “Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government
and its agencies from suit.” Id. Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. See, e.g., Beals v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 460 F. App’x 773, 775
(10th Cir. 2012) (noting this lack of waiver and the general jurisdictional defect that Ҥ 1983
appli[es] only to actions by state and local entities, not by the federal government”) (citing Dry v.
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United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir.2000)). “Therefore, the only proper defendants in a
Section 1983 claim are those who represent [the state] in some capacity, whether they act in
accordance with their authority or misuse it.” Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 492 (10th Cir.
1995). Because Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for federal agencies under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the court is without jurisdiction over Woods’ claims against the
Department of Education.
As Woods is proceeding pro se the court must liberally construe her Complaint. See, e.g.,
Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). Alternatively Woods could
be attempting to bring her claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Bivens creates a cause of action against federal actors analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983’s
cause of action against state actors. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675–76 (2009) (Bivens “is
the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . [42 U.S.C. 1983]”). But
“Bivens claims cannot be asserted directly against the United States, federal officials in their
official capacities . . . or federal agencies.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1099 (10th
Cir. 2009). Here Woods names only a federal agency. She names no individual agents or
officers of the Department of Education acting in their individual capacities. Therefore any
implied claims under Bivens also fail under Woods’ Complaint as drafted.
II. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above the court must dismiss this case. In dismissing the case the
court passes no judgment on the merits of Woods’ complaints. It is entirely possible that Woods
may have viable claims to assert against parties not immune from suit, but her present Complaint
names as Defendant an agency of the United States not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § §
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1983 and 1985. This case is HEREBY DISMISSED without prejudice. Woods’ motions (Dkt
Nos. 4 and 5) are TERMINATED. The clerk of court is directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED this 29th day of July, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
______________________________
ROBERT J. SHELBY
United States District Judge
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