Thomas v. Mitsubishi Motors

Filing 90

MEMORANDUM DECISION denying 84 Motion for Protective Order and the order staying the depositions 88 is vacated. The depositions shall proceed as scheduled. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner on 4/24/14. (jlw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

THOMAS J. THOMAS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
MITSUBISHI MOTORS
CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI
MOTORS NORTH AMERICA, INC;
and MITSUBISHI MOTOR SALES OF
AMERICA, INC;

Case No. 2:12cv1215

District Judge Dee Benson

Defendants.

Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner by District Judge Dee
Benson pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).1 Before the court is Thomas J. Thomas’s
(“Plaintiff”) motion for a protective order.2 The court has carefully reviewed the memoranda
submitted by the parties. Pursuant to civil rule 7-1(f) of the United States District Court for the
District of Utah Rules of Practice, the court elects to determine the motion on the basis of the
written memoranda and finds that oral argument would not be helpful or necessary. See
DUCivR 7-1(f).

1

See docket no. 33.

2

See docket no. 84.

Plaintiff moves this court for a protective order staying the depositions of his damages
experts until Judge Benson has ruled on Mitsubishi Motors Corporation; Mitsubishi Motors
North America, Inc.; and Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”)
pending motion to bifurcate the trial into two phases: liability and damages.3 Defendants suggest
that the same jury could be impaneled for both phases. Plaintiff indicates that he intends to
partially oppose Defendants’ motion to bifurcate on the basis that the interests of judicial
economy would be best served if the trial on damages is scheduled several months after the
liability trial. Plaintiff argues that this proposed schedule would allow the parties to conduct
expert discovery on damages only if necessary. Plaintiff contends that allowing the depositions
of his damage experts to go forward would needlessly subject him to the undue burden and
expense of taking potentially irrelevant depositions should the jury find in favor of Defendants.
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause for a
protective order. This court agrees. Under rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]
party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be
presented at trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A). However, “[t]he court may, for good cause,
issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “[T]he party seeking the protective order must
show good cause by demonstrating a particular need for protection. Broad allegations of harm,
unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.”
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 137 F.R.D. 372, 389 (D. Utah June 14, 1991) (quotations and citation
omitted).

3

See docket no. 76.
2

Plaintiff purports to have demonstrated good cause by alleging that he would suffer
undue burden and/or expense if required to move forward on the depositions of his damage
experts prior to a ruling on Defendant’s motion to bifurcate. The court is not persuaded by this
argument. It is speculative at best that Judge Benson would separate the liability and damages
phases of the trial by several months. Plaintiff’s proposal would not promote the prompt
resolution of the case, nor would it satisfy judicial economy considerations. In the event that
Defendants are found liable, Plaintiff’s proposed bifurcation schedule would result in increased
cost, inconvenience, and delay by requiring the court to impanel a second jury months after the
liability trial.
Based on the foregoing, this court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated good
cause for postponing the depositions of the parties’ respective damage experts.4 As such,
Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order is DENIED, and the order staying the depositions5 is
hereby vacated. The depositions shall proceed as scheduled.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 24th day of April, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

PAUL M. WARNER
United States Magistrate Judge

4

The court notes that, as stated by Defendants, Plaintiff seeks to postpone the depositions
of his expert witnesses only; he does not move to postpone the depositions of both parties’
damage experts.
5

See docket no. 88.
3