Rohwedder v. State of Utah

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION and Order denying 19 Motion for Service of Process (Prisoner). ; denying 21 Motion for Service of Process (Prisoner). Plaintiff shall have THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date of this order to cure the deficiencies noted in this order. If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to the instructions here this action will be dismissed without further notice. Signed by Judge Dee Benson on 3/4/15. (jlw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
BILLY L. ROHWEDDER,
ORDER & MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:13-CV-710-DB

STATE OF UTAH,

District Judge Dee Benson

Defendant.

Plaintiff, inmate Billy L. Rohwedder, filed this pro se civil rights suit, see 42 U.S.C.S. §
1983 (2014), in forma pauperis, see 28 id. § 1915. The Court now screens the Amended
Complaint and orders Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint to cure deficiencies before
further pursuing his claims.
Deficiencies in Amended Complaint
Amended Complaint:
(a) improperly names State of Utah as a defendant, though there is no showing it has
waived its immunity from suit (see below).
(b) alleges claims that are possibly invalidated by the rule in Heck (see below).
(c) is not on a Court-approved form.
(d) was apparently not prepared with the help of Utah State Prison contract attorneys.
Instructions to Plaintiff
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "(1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the

relief sought." Rule 8's requirements mean to guarantee "that defendants enjoy fair notice of
what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest." TV Commc'ns Network,
Inc. v ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991).
Pro se litigants are not excused from complying with these minimal pleading demands.
"This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts
surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine
whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the Court "to assume the role of advocate for
a pro se litigant." Id. Thus, the Court cannot "supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal
theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded." Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d
1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff should consider the following points before refiling his complaint. First, the
revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by
reference, any portion of the original complaint. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612
(10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supercedes original).
Second, the complaint must clearly state what each defendant--typically, a named
government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d
1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is
essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear
exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, No. 08-2222, slip op. at 4
(10th Cir. July 20, 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma,
519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)).

Third, Plaintiff cannot name an individual as a defendant based solely on his or her
supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
supervisory status alone does not support § 1983 liability).
Fourth, "denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of
constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983."
Gallagher v. Shelton, No. 09-3113, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25787, at *11 (10th Cir. Nov. 24,
2009).
Fifth, as to claims that have been made against the State, generally, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents "suits against a state unless it has waived its immunity or consented to suit,
or if Congress has validly abrogated the state's immunity." Ray v. McGill, No. CIV-06-0334-HE,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51632, at *8 (W.D. Okla. July 26, 2006) (unpublished) (citing Lujan v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 F.3d 1511, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995); Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrs., 846
F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff asserts no basis for determining that the State has
waived its immunity or that it has been abrogated by Congress. Because any claims against the
State appear to be precluded by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court believes it has no
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider them. See id. at *9.
Finally, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims appear to involve some allegations that
if true may invalidate his conviction and/or sentencing. "In Heck, the Supreme Court explained
that a § 1983 action that would impugn the validity of a plaintiff's underlying conviction cannot
be maintained unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal or impaired by collateral
proceedings." Nichols v. Baer, No. 08-4158, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4302, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar.
5, 2009) (unpublished) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Heck prevents

litigants "from using a § 1983 action, with its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their
conviction or sentence without complying with the more stringent exhaustion requirements for
habeas actions." Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Heck clarifies that "civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments." 512 U.S. at 486.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated his constitutional rights in a way that may attack
Petitioner's very imprisonment. Heck requires that, when a plaintiff requests damages in a §
1983 suit, this Court must decide whether judgment in the plaintiff's favor would unavoidably
imply that the conviction or sentence is invalid. Id. at 487. Here, it appears it may--regarding
some claims. If this Court were to conclude that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated in
a prejudicial manner, it would be stating that Plaintiff's conviction and/or sentence were not
valid. Thus, the involved claims "must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. To the Court’s knowledge, this has not
happened and may result in dismissal of such claims.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff shall have THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date of this order to cure the
deficiencies noted above.
(2) The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff a copy of the Pro Se Litigant Guide.
(3) If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to the instructions
here this action will be dismissed without further notice.
And, (4) Plaintiff’s motions for service of process are DENIED. (See Docket Entry #s
19 & 21.) First, the Amended Complaint has been deemed deficient, and, therefore, not worthy
of service. And, second, the Court is already required by statute to screen prisoner complaints,
see 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2014), and order service of process if warranted, see id. § 1915(d). No
further prompting by Plaintiff is necessary.
DATED this 4th day of March, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

DEE BENSON
United States District Judge