Stommel v. LNV Corporation

Filing 88

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDERgranting 75 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b); denying 80 Motion Suggestion of Mootness re 75 . Signed by Judge Dale A. Kimball on 4/27/2015. (jds)

______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

CHRISTINA STOMMEL,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
Case No. 2:13CV821DAK
LNV CORPORATION,
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Defendant.

This matter is before the court on Defendant LNV Corporation’s Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification of Final Judgment and Suggestion of Mootness. On January 30, 2015, this court
entered a Memorandum Decision and Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Plaintiff did not move for
summary judgment on her promissory estoppel claim and Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim was denied, the January 30, 2015,
Memorandum Decision and Order did not rule on all the claims pending before the court. The
court erroneously entered a Judgment in a Civil Case that same day. On February 18, 2015,
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. On March 4, 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
entered an Order noting that this court had not entered a final order or judgment resolving all
claims against all parties. Plaintiff did not oppose LNV’s Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of
Final Judgment but did oppose Defendant’s Suggestion of Mootness on April 13, 2015. The
time for Defendant to reply with respect to the Suggestion of Mootness has passed. Therefore,

the court considers the motions fully briefed. Now being fully advised, the court renders the
following Memorandum Decision and Order.
DISCUSSION
In a case involving multiple claims and counterclaims, Rule 54(b) allows a court to
“direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). An analysis of whether Rule 54(b)
certification is appropriate requires the court: (1) to determine that the order to be certified is a
final judgment; and (2) to find there is no just reason to delay appellate review of the order until
the conclusion of the entire case. Id. at 7-8; see also Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. Bruner, 259
F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001); McKibben v. Chubb, 840 F.2d 1525, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988).
“In making these determinations, the district court should act as a ‘dispatcher’ weighing
Rule 54(b)’s policy of preventing piecemeal appeals against the inequities that could result from
delaying an appeal.” Stockman’s Water Co., LLC v. Vaca Partners, L.P., 425 F.3d 1263, 1265
(10th Cir. 2005). The court should consider “‘whether the claims under review [are] separable
from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already
determined [are] such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than
once even if there were subsequent appeals.’” Id. (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec.
Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980)).
Although Plaintiff does not oppose the Rule 54(b) certification, the court has serious
concerns over whether the policy considerations underlying Rule 54(b) would be met by allowing
a Rule 54(b) certification in this case. The separability requirement must be satisfied in order for
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the judgment to be considered “final.” Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Durango Air Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d
1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 259 F.3d at 1243. “[The
judgment] must be a ‘judgment’ in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for
relief, and it must be ‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim
entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 466 U.S. at 7 (quoting
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)); see also Old Republic Ins., 283
F.3d at 1225.
In this case, Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim is a separate claim even though it is
based on the same facts and seeks the same legal relief that her declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief claims seek. Therefore, although there is significant overlap between the claims
in this case, the first element of Rule 54(b) certification is met.
The court must next consider whether there should be any just reason for delay of entry of
final judgment in light of the strong policy against piecemeal appeals. See Curtis-Wright, 466
U.S. at 8. To aid in this inquiry, the Supreme Court directed district courts to exercise discretion
“in the interest of sound judicial administration” to determine when each final decision in a
multiple claims action is ready for appeal. Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 U.S. at 437).
The court should consider “whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that no
appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were
subsequent appeals.” Id.
The court finds no just reason for delay because there is no need for Plaintiff to pursue a
separate final judgment on her promissory estoppel claim. Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim
seeks the same legal relief based on the same facts as the claims that have a final adjudication.
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Therefore, there is little practical chance that piecemeal appeals would occur. In fact, Defendant
seeks to appeal the court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s promissory
estoppel claim along with the court’s granting of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief claims. The court concludes that the claims are so interconnected
that judicial economy would be served by the issues being considered together and reviewed at
this stage of the litigation. Therefore, the court finds no just reason for delay. Accordingly, the
court grants Defendant’s motion for Rule 54(b) certification.
Defendant further seeks a ruling from the court that Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim
is moot. The court agrees that Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim does not afford her any
additional relief and, in a technical sense, could be considered moot at this point because she has
all the relief she can obtain. However, the claim cannot be considered moot while Defendant
seeks to appeal the court’s denial of summary judgment on the claim. The claim provides
Plaintiff with a separate basis for obtaining the relief that the court granted Plaintiff on the other
two claims and it is unnecessary for the court to declare the claim moot while such
interconnected matters are pending on appeal. Therefore, Defendant’s suggestion of mootness is
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant LNV Corporation’s Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification is GRANTED and its Suggestion of Mootness is DENIED.
DATED this 27th day of April, 2015.

DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
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