Hays v. Roseman University of Health Sciences et al
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM DECISION granting 7 Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Complaint 2 is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Dee Benson on 12/9/14. (jlw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
ALAN K. HAYS, an Individual,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
ROSEMAN UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH
SCIENCES, an educational corporation
with a presence in Utah; RAJAN
RADHAKRISHNAN, an Individual; and
DOES I-X,
Case No. 2:14-cv-00198-DB-DB
District Judge Dee Benson
Defendants.
This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Roseman
University of Heath Sciences (“Roseman”) and Rajan Radhakrishnan. (Dkt. No. 7). Defendants’
motion seeks dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and/or 12(f),
or in the alternative to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages as a remedy in his First
through Fourth Causes of Action. The court held a hearing on the motion on November 18, 2014.
At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by Dale H. Boam. Defendants were represented by
James Barrett. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the motion under advisement.
Since then, the court has further considered the memoranda and other materials submitted by the
parties, the oral arguments of counsel, as well as the law and facts relating to the motion. Now
being fully advised, the court renders the following Memorandum Decision and Order.
BACKGROUND
Roseman is a private university with campuses in Henderson, Nevada and South Jordan,
Utah. (Compl. ¶12). Plaintiff was a pharmacy student at Roseman until August 2014 when he
graduated with a degree in pharmacy. (Compl. ¶2, Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. A). On
approximately March 19, 2012, Plaintiff approached the Dean of the Utah campus, Dr. Larry
Fannin, to request an additional hour for each test as an accommodation for Attention Deficit
Disorder. (Comp. ¶¶ 15-16). Dr. Fanning referred Plaintiff to the head of student services, Tim
Ryan. (Id. ¶ 17). Mr. Ryan stated that Plaintiff needed to submit a doctor’s diagnosis of his
condition in order to request an accommodation. (Id.). Plaintiff submitted documentation related
to his condition from a therapist, and Roseman responded with a request for documentation from
a physician. (Id. ¶¶ 17-20). Plaintiff then went to his primary care physician who wrote a
recommendation that Plaintiff take a leave of absence from school, and referred Plaintiff to a
specialist to be reevaluated for a possible learning disability. (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiff later obtained a
new note from his doctor stating that he had improved enough to continue in the program, but
that he would require an extra hour to take tests as an accommodation. (Id. ¶ 32). On
approximately April 11, 2012, Plaintiff was granted his requested accommodation. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33,
Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 5).
When Plaintiff returned to school in August 2012, he was allowed an additional hour to
take each test. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-33). Following each exam, Roseman professors provided students
an opportunity to challenge exam questions. (Id. ¶ 33). Students are also able to challenge exam
questions through a formal appeals process. (Id. ¶ 35). In September 2012, Plaintiff complained
to Dr. Fannin that he, as an accommodated student, was unable to participate in the post-exam
review sessions because he was still taking his tests during that time period. (Id. ¶ 34). Plaintiff
also complained of this conflict to Dr. Rajan Radhakrishnan, the Dean of the Roseman School of
Pharmacy, in October 2012. (Id. ¶ 37). Although Plaintiff used the formal appeal process to
2
challenge questions, he believed the process to be inferior to the post-exam reviews due to a lack
of dialogue and delays in processing appeals. (Id. ¶¶ 38-42). On approximately December 4,
2012, following Plaintiff’s complaint, Roseman executed a Resolution Agreement with the
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) regarding this policy. (Id. ¶ 44). At that time, Roseman
voluntarily agreed to provide all accommodations requested by Plaintiff and to revise its policies
to ensure compliance. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 4).
On December 14, 2012, Plaintiff was placed on Academic Probation due to the number
of tests he had failed. (Compl. ¶ 43). On approximately December 28, 2012, Plaintiff was
informed that his sister had committed suicide. (Id. ¶ 45). On or about January 7, 2013, Plaintiff
told Dr. Radhakrishnan about his family situation and requested leave to return home to be with
his family for a few days. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 49). Dr. Radhakrishnan replied that Roseman policy does
not allow a student on probation to request leave. (Id. ¶ 46). Plaintiff disputes this statement of
policy and claims that Roseman policy allows the Dean to grant compassionate leave to a student
at the Dean’s discretion, regardless of probation status. (Id. ¶ 47). Plaintiff was denied the
requested leave and was informed that any tests missed due to his absence would be graded as a
fail. (Id. ¶ 48). Roseman students may fail six tests maximum before they are dismissed from the
university. (Id.). Plaintiff missed his sister’s funeral and after-funeral memorial service. (Id. ¶
51). Plaintiff felt that the denial of his leave was in retaliation for his complaint to the OCR and
that Dr. Radhakrishnan intended to cause severe emotional distress in order to drive him from the
program. (Id.).
On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action alleging violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Intentional
3
Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees on his ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims and compensatory and punitive damages on his Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim. (Id. ¶¶ 64, 73, 85, 94, 103-104).
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, asserting: (1) the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims because Plaintiff has graduated
and those claims are moot; (2) Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are improper
against Dr. Radhakrishnan and the unnamed Does as individuals; (3) punitive damages are not an
authorized remedy for Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; and (4) Plaintiff has failed
to state an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim upon which relief can be granted.
DISCUSSION
ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act are moot (Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 7), as Plaintiff has
graduated and “there is no current dispute presented that is ‘definite, concrete, and amenable to
specific relief.’” Rhodes v. Southern Nazerene University, 554 Fed. Appx. 685, 690 (10th Cir.
2014) (quoting Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1024 (10th Cir. 2011)).
The parties also agree that Plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages under the
ADA, (Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 7-8); See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1); Rhodes, 554 Fed.
Appx. at 690, nor has he requested any. However, Plaintiff claims that he requested
compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act in his complaint and that such relief would
be appropriate. This court finds that Plaintiff did not make a request for compensatory relief
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in his complaint. Instead, he states: “in the absence
4
of the injunction requested herein, [Plaintiff] will continue to be injured, damaged, and aggrieved
by Defendants’ discrimination.” (Compl. ¶¶ 64, 94). Further, the court finds that allowing
Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to request compensatory damages would be futile under these
circumstances. See Rhodes, 554 Fed. Appx.at 690. As such, Plaintiff’s First through Fourth
Causes of Action are DISMISSED without leave to amend.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff’s remaining claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Dr.
Radhakrishnan’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for “compassionate leave” to attend his sister’s
funeral. (Compl. ¶¶ 97-98). To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
Utah, “a plaintiff must plead facts that demonstrate that the defendant
‘intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose
of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have
known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.’”
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ¶ 56, 70 P.3d 17, 30 (emphasis
in original) (quoting Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ¶
27, 21 P.3d 198). On a motion to dismiss, “’[i]t is for the court to determine, in the first instance,
whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery.’” Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, 30, 232 P.3d 486, 499 (quoting Gygi v.
Storch, 28 Utah 2d 399, 503 P.2d 449, 450 (1972)). Severe conduct is required to establish a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress—the conduct must “evoke outrage or
5
revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair.” Id. At 500 (quoting Franco, 21
P.3d at 207). Further, such conduct must be “outrageous and intolerable in that [it] offend[s]
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.” Franco, 21 P.3d at 207
(quoting Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (1961) (abrogated on other
grounds)). Finally, “[a]n act is not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortious, injurious,
or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal.” Id.
In this case, even accepting all of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and affidavit
as true, Dr. Radhakrishnan’s conduct consisted of denying Plaintiff leave when he was given the
express discretion to do so. Plaintiff has not alleged any insults or threats made by Dr.
Radhakrishnan, other than his reiteration of school policy that missed exams count as failed
exams. Although this precise issue has not been raised previously under Utah law, other
jurisdictions have consistently found that the denial of leave to attend a funeral is insufficient to
constitute outrageous behavior to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
See, e.g., Barham v. Kmart Corp.,2010 WL 3650684 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (holding that an
employee who was denied leave to attend a funeral and then disciplined for attending did not
establish “extreme and outrageous” conduct in support of an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim); Lange v. Showbiz Pizza Time, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Kan. 1998)
(employee who was denied leave and terminated while making funeral arrangements for his
mother failed to establish claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Chime v. PNC
Bank Corp., 1998 WL 51285 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (employee who was denied leave to attend a
funeral while other employees were granted paid leave to be with family during Spring Break did
not establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Although Dr.
6
Radhakrishnan’s conduct may have been less-than-compassionate, it was not so egregious as to
evoke outrage or revulsion or offend generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
Rather, Dr. Radhakrishnan acted within his discretion as a school administrator to grant or deny
leave.
Further, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Dr. Radhakrishan acted with the purpose of
inflicting emotional distress. With respect to the intent element of an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, “[i]t is not enough to establish a claim that defendant intentionally
acted in a way that causes distress” but rather the plaintiff must establish that defendant acted
“for the purpose of inflicting emotional distress.” Franco, 21 P.3d at 207 (quoting Samms, 358
P.2d at 346 (abrogated on other grounds)). Although Plaintiff here undoubtedly suffered
emotional distress resulting from the suicide of his sister, he has failed to allege any facts that Dr.
Radhakrishnan denied his leave with the purpose of causing additional distress. His conclusory
allegations that Dr. Radhakrishnan denied him leave in retaliation for his OCR complaint or his
previous advocacy related to his disability are devoid of factual support.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is reserved for “atrocious”
behavior. Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791, 831 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d on
other grounds, 483 U.S. 327 (1897). Allowing an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim to move forward under these circumstances would effectively remove discretion from
school administrators in effectuating school policies. Such an expansion would offend the
principal espoused by the Utah Supreme Court that “rigorous scrutiny [must be] applied to
attempts to expand the reach of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Cabaness, 232 P.3d
7
at 499 (quoting Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, 147 P.3d 383). As such, Plaintiff’s claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED this 9th day of December, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
Dee Benson
United States District Judge
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?