Warren v. Slater et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION and DISMISSAL ORDER: It is hereby ordered that the Clerk's Office shall file Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. IT is further ordered that the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice, under 28 USC 1915 e2B 20 15, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. And, neither liberal interpretation of Plaintiffs claims not further opportunity to amend would lead to a difference result. This case is CLOSED. Signed by Judge Clark Waddoups on 9/28/2015. (kpf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
RAYMOND EUGENE WARREN,
MEMORANDUM DECISION &
DISMISSAL ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:14-CV-199 CW
v.
District Judge Clark Waddoups
OFFICER SLATER et al.,
Defendants.
Plaintiff, Raymond Eugene Warren, a former inmate at Davis County Jail, filed a pro se
prisoner civil-rights complaint, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2015), proceeding in forma pauperis.
See 28 id. § 1915. His Amended Complaint is now before the Court for screening. See id. §
1915A.
SCREENING ANALYSIS
1. Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges claims against Davis County defendants Officers
Slater, Lucious, Harrod and Corporal Johnson. Plaintiff calls his claims “invasion of privacy”
and “unnecessary rigor.” His invasion-of-privacy claim stems from an incident in which he
alleges that--against county policy--Officer Slater had him strip naked so that he could change
his clothing and that Officer Slater looked at him before handing him his clothing. A video
camera was allegedly in the vicinity. His unnecessary-rigor claim stems from the other
defendants “lying” to him about the camera being a surveillance-only camera and joking that any
video of him might end up on YouTube.
2. Grounds for Sua Sponte Dismissal
In evaluating the propriety of dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, this Court takes all well-pleaded factual assertions as true and
regards them in a light most advantageous to the plaintiff. Ridge at Red Hawk L.L.C. v.
Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate when, viewing those
facts as true, the plaintiff has not posed a "plausible" right to relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir.
2008). "The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a 'complaint with enough factual matter (taken as
true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief." Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When a civil rights complaint contains "bare assertions," involving
"nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional . . . claim," the
Court considers those assertions "conclusory and not entitled to" an assumption of truth.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55). In other
words, "the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in
support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe
that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Red
Hawk, 493 F.3d at 1177 (italics in original).
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This Court must construe these pro se "'pleadings liberally,' applying a less stringent
standard than is applicable to pleadings filed by lawyers. Th[e] court, however, will not supply
additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a
plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted). In the Tenth Circuit, this means that if this Court can reasonably read the pleadings "to
state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's
failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and
sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Still, it is not "the proper function of the district court to
assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant." Id.; see also Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d
1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam)). Dismissing the complaint "without affording the plaintiff notice or an opportunity to
amend is proper only 'when it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts
alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile.'" Curley v.
Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 (additional
quotation marks omitted)).
3. Invalid Causes of Action
The invasion-of-privacy and unnecessary-rigor incidents that Plaintiff describes fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. There is simply no federal constitutional
prohibition against a jail officer asking prisoner to strip naked so that the prisoner may change
his clothing or looking at the prisoner when he is naked or having a camera on in the vicinity.
See Banks v. Katzenmeyer, No. 13-cv-02599-KLM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26256, at *63 (D.
Colo. Mar. 4. 2015) (“Here, Plaintiff simply alleges that a female guard viewed him showering
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once and using the toilet once. This does not constitute a constitutional violation.”); Hodge v.
Topeka Corr. Facility, No. 12-3228-SAC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163975, at *5 n.3 (D. Kan.
Nov. 16, 2012) (“[T]he right to privacy is clearly subject to reasonable limitations in the prison
context, and security cameras are an accepted part of the prison environment. Thus, a bald
reference to privacy in a prison . . . without more is insufficient.”); ( Thompson v. Wyandotte
County Detention, 869 F. Supp. 893, 895 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding female inmate’s “limited
rights to privacy were not violated by the irregular and isolated occasions when she was
allegedly viewed in the nude” (emphasis omitted)).
There is also no federal constitutional prohibition against casual lying ( Plaintiff does not
suggest Defendants were under oath) or joking. See Williams v. Levansailor, No. 98-4006, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 16857, at *2 (10th Cir. July 21, 1998) (concluding that racially derogatory
joke told by jail guard “is deplorable and unprofessional . . . [but] does not . . . constitute a
violation of plaintiff’s [constitutional] rights”) (citing Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th
Cir. 1979) (stating verbal abuse alone is not actionable under § 1983)).
Not only are these claims invalid nonstarters but they border on frivolous. Further, it is
irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry here whether the officers were violating county policy by
doing any of the things alleged.
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office shall file Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with
prejudice, under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2015), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. And, neither liberal interpretation of Plaintiff's claims nor further
opportunity to amend would lead to a different result. This case is CLOSED.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________
CLARK WADDOUPS
United States District Judge
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