Cunningham v. Colvin

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision in this case is REVERSED AND REMANDED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner on 02/05/2015. (tls)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
TERESA CUNNINGHAM,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:14-cv-332-PMW

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner

Before the court is Teresa Cunningham’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the Commissioner’s final
decision determining that Plaintiff was not entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
under Title II of the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, see id. §§ 1381-1383f. After careful
consideration of the written briefs and the complete record, the court has determined that oral
argument is not necessary in this case.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges disability due to various physical and mental impairments. In December
2010, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning on July 15, 2010. 1
Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. 2 On July 15, 2011,

1

See docket no. 8, Administrative Record (“Tr.

2

See Tr. 81-84.

”) 155-68.

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), 3 and that hearing was
held on September 13, 2012. 4 On September 24, 2012, the ALJ issued a written decision
denying Plaintiff’s claim for DIB and SSI. 5 On March 19, 2014, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, 6 making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision for
purposes of judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981,
416.1481.
On May 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed her complaint in this case. 7 The Commissioner filed her
answer and the administrative record on July 10, 2014. 8 On July 18, 2014, both parties
consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in the case, including
entry of final judgment, with appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 9
Consequently, this case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Warner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
and rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

3

See Tr. 106-07.

4

See Tr. 53-80.

5

See Tr. 26-52.

6

See Tr. 8-12.

7

See docket no. 3.

8

See docket nos. 7-8.

9

See docket nos. 14.

10

See id.
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Plaintiff filed her opening brief on September 5, 2014. 11 The Commissioner filed her
answer brief on September 23, 2014. 12 Plaintiff filed her reply brief on October 21, 2014. 13
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court “review[s] the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal
standards were applied.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations and
citation omitted). The Commissioner’s findings, “if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (quotations and citation omitted).
“In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, [this court may] neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute
[its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Madrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quotations and citation omitted). “The failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide
this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been
followed [are] grounds for reversal.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quotations and citation omitted).
A five-step evaluation process has been established for determining whether a claimant is
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Williams v.
Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing the five-step process). If a

11

See docket no. 17.

12

See docket no. 18.

13

See docket no. 19.
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determination can be made at any one of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, the
subsequent steps need not be analyzed. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
Step one determines whether the claimant is presently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. If [the claimant] is, disability benefits
are denied. If [the claimant] is not, the decision maker must
proceed to step two: determining whether the claimant has a
medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. . . . If
the claimant is unable to show that his impairments would have
more than a minimal effect on his ability to do basic work
activities, he is not eligible for disability benefits. If, on the other
hand, the claimant presents medical evidence and makes the de
minimis showing of medical severity, the decision maker proceeds
to step three.
Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51 (quotations and citations omitted); see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(ii).
“Step three determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed
impairments that . . . are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity . . . . If the
impairment is listed and thus conclusively presumed to be disabling, the claimant is entitled to
benefits. If not, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step . . . .” Williams, 844 F.2d at 751
(quotations and citations omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). At
the fourth step, the claimant must show that the impairment prevents performance of his “past
relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). “If the claimant is able to
perform his previous work, he is not disabled.” Williams, 844 F.2d at 751. If, however, the
claimant is not able to perform his previous work, he “has met his burden of proof, establishing a
prima facie case of disability.” Id.
At this point, “[t]he evaluation process . . . proceeds to the fifth and final step.” Id. At
this step, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner, and the decision maker must determine
“whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] . . . to perform other work
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in the national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.” Id.; see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If it is determined that the claimant “can make an
adjustment to other work,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), he is not disabled.
If, on the other hand, it is determined that the claimant “cannot make an adjustment to other
work,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), he is disabled and entitled to benefits.
ANALYSIS
In support of her claim that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, Plaintiff
presents several arguments. Among other things, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his
evaluation of the opinions of Dr. David Grygla (“Dr. Grygla”) and Dr. Joseph Nelson (“Dr.
Nelson”). That argument is dispositive of Plaintiff’s appeal because it mandates reversal.
Accordingly, the court will address only that argument here and “will not reach the remaining
issues raised by [Plaintiff] because they may be affected by the ALJ’s treatment of this case on
remand.” Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Gilbert v. Astrue,
231 Fed. App’x 778, 785 (10th Cir. 2007) (“In light of the remand of this case, we do not reach
the remainder of [the plaintiff’s] claims on appeal . . . .”).
In deciding how much weight to give a treating source
opinion, an ALJ must first determine whether the opinion qualifies
for controlling weight. To make this determination, the ALJ . . .
must first consider whether the opinion is well[ ]supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
If the answer to this question is “no,” then the inquiry at this stage
is complete. If the ALJ finds that the opinion is well[ ]supported,
he must then confirm that the opinion is consistent with other
substantial evidence in the record. If the opinion is deficient in
either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight.
Even if a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to
controlling weight, treating source medical opinions are still
entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors
provided in [20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927]. Those factors
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are: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency
of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind of
examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the
physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4)
consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5)
whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which
an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s
attention which tend to support or contradict the opinion.
Under the regulations, the agency rulings, and [Tenth
Circuit] case law, an ALJ must give good reasons . . . for the
weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion . . . that are
sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical
opinion and the reason for that weight. If the ALJ rejects the
opinion completely, he must then give specific, legitimate reasons
for doing so.
Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted)
(sixth alteration in original); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).
In this case, the ALJ’s decision includes extensive summaries of the opinions of Dr.
Grygla and Dr. Nelson. However, as conceded by the Commissioner, the ALJ did not include
any analysis of the weight he was according to those opinions. The Commissioner argues,
however, that the ALJ’s failure in that regard does not constitute reversible error for various
reasons.
The court disagrees and concludes that the Commissioner’s arguments are nothing more
than an attempt to provide post hoc rationalization for the ALJ’s treatment of the opinions of Dr.
Grygla and Dr. Nelson. Such post hoc arguments are improper. See, e.g., Haga v. Astrue, 482
F.3d 1205, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2007); Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005).
As noted above, “an ALJ must give good reasons . . . for the weight assigned to a treating
physician’s opinion . . . that are sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers
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the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reason for that
weight.” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119 (quotations and citations omitted) (first alteration in
original). The ALJ failed to do so with the opinions of Dr. Grygla and Dr. Nelson. The court
concludes that the ALJ’s failure in that regard constitutes reversible error.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the
opinions of Dr. Grygla and Dr. Nelson. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Commissioner’s decision in this case is REVERSED AND REMANDED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 5th day of February, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

PAUL M. WARNER
United States Magistrate Judge

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