USA ex rel Amber Hall

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment ; denying 30 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner on 4/28/2017. (las)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL.
AMBER HALL,
Plaintiff/Relator,
v.
LEARNKEY, INC.; JEFF CORUCCINI;
DAVID CLEMONS; AND BRIAN
TREMELLING,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Case No. 2:14-cv-379-PMW
Chief Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to have Chief United States
Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner conduct all proceedings in this case, including trial, entry of
final judgment, and all post-judgment proceedings. 1 Before the court are two motions: (1)
Relator Amber Hall’s (“Hall”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 2 and (2) a Cross-Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants LearnKey, Inc., Jeff Coruccini, David
Clemons, and Brian Tremelling (collectively “LearnKey”). 3
On April 25, 2017, the court heard oral argument on the motions. 4 At the hearing, Hall
was represented by Brett D. Ekins. 5 LearnKey was represented by David L. Elmont. 6 At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court took the motions under advisement. 7 Now being fully
advised, the court renders the following Memorandum Decision and Order.

1

Dkt. No. 21.
Dkt. No. 30.
3
Dkt. No. 39.
4
Dkt. No. 53.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
2

BACKGROUND
The First Amended Complaint is a declined qui tam action brought by Hall, a former
employee of LearnKey, who alleges that LearnKey violated the False Claims Act (“FCA”) by
seeking funding from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”) for nonqualifying educational courses. 8 In the First Amended Complaint, Hall claims she worked for
LearnKey between February 24, 2014, and March 3, 2014, and that she is “an original source”
with “independent knowledge” of LearnKey’s FCA violations. 9
LearnKey provides video training courses to disabled veterans who qualify for benefits
under the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment program, authorized by Congress under
Title 38, United States Code, Chapter 31 (“Chapter 31”). 10 Under Chapter 31, LearnKey submits
invoices to the VA for the payment of costs and expenses associated with LearnKey’s courses. 11
On September 1, 2011, LearnKey was approved by the VA to be a provider of “Online ExpertComputer Applications” under Chapter 31. 12
LearnKey does not enroll veterans in its courses. 13 Under the umbrella of Chapter 31, the
Secretary of the VA is tasked with formulating an “individualized written plan of vocational
rehabilitation” for eligible veterans. 38 U.S.C. § 3107(a). Accordingly, the VA works directly
with an eligible veteran to select which LearnKey courses will meet the veteran’s particular
needs. 14

8

Dkt. No. 15.
Id. at ¶¶ 1, 10.
10
Dkt. No. 17 at ¶ 11.
11
See Dkt. No. 31, Ekins Dec. at ¶¶ 6–7; Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 3.
12
Dkt. No. 31, Ex. H. Hall’s Exhibit H was received by the court without objection during oral argument
on April 25, 2017.
13
Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 3. Hall does not dispute this fact. See Dkt. Nos. 30, 43, 44,
51.
14
Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 3.
9

2

Unlike a traditional school course, LearnKey’s courses do not involve live in-class
instruction and do not require the course to begin on a specified date. LearnKey’s Veteran
Services Course Catalog itemizes courses offered by LearnKey. 15 Generally, LearnKey’s
courses involve online video instruction and allow a student to choose when to begin the
course. 16 Once the student begins the course, LearnKey requires that the course be completed by
a particular date and provides the student with performance milestones. 17 If the student “falls
behind in the course schedule and the delay is not promptly corrected, disciplinary action is taken
which includes the discontinuance of VA stipend payments to the student and ultimately
prevents the student from receiving credit for the course.” 18
Some of LearnKey’s courses prepare students to take tests administered by professional
or trade organizations for certification. 19 Once the student completes LearnKey’s course,
LearnKey arranges for the student to take the test for certification with the professional or trade
organization. 20 Conversely, where a particular field lacks a professional certification, LearnKey
provides the student with a certificate demonstrating the skills they mastered during LearnKey’s
course. 21
The parties dispute how LearnKey’s employees are compensated. LearnKey claims that
it “does not pay commissions based on the sales of its courses, nor does it invoice commissions
to the VA.” 22 LearnKey contends that any incentive-based pay is factored into LearnKey’s

15

Dkt. No. 31, Exs. D and E.
See id.
17
Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 2.
18
Id. at 4 (citing Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 2).
19
Dkt. No. 52, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 2.
20
Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.
21
Id.
22
Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 3.
16

3

tuition costs and, therefore, LearnKey does not directly charge the VA for employee incentives. 23
Hall, however, argues that LearnKey’s invoices demonstrate that LearnKey routinely billed the
VA for employee commissions in violation of Chapter 31 regulations. 24 For example, Hall relies
on a LearnKey invoice for Mr. Steven Boyd (“Boyd Invoice”) wherein LearnKey charged the
VA $675 for “[m]oney towards incentives, in house lunches, misc expenses, etc. A+ Cert 2012
Crs-OL.” 25
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In evaluating a motion for summary
judgment, the court reviews the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and draws all
reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 573 (10th Cir.
2015). “In considering the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment, the court treats
each motion separately, drawing all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is
under consideration.” Morden v. XL Specialty Ins., No. 2:14-cv-0224, 2016 WL 1337252, at *3
(D. Utah Apr. 5, 2016) (citing Mascon v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 743 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir.
2014)). “[T]he plain language of [Rule 56(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

23

Id.
Dkt. No. 31, Exs. F and G.
25
Id. at Ex. F.
24

4

DISCUSSION
The FCA imposes civil liability on “any person who . . . knowingly presents, or causes to
be presented, a false or fraudulent claim [to the government] for payment or approval.” 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). The FCA permits qui tam actions, which allow an individual plaintiff to
sue on behalf of the government. Once a qui tam action is filed, the government may intervene
and take over the plaintiff’s case. Id. § 3730(b). If the government declines to intervene, the
plaintiff or “relator” may proceed while sharing any recovery with the government. Id. §
3730(c)(3). In this case, on August 3, 2015, the government declined to intervene; therefore,
Hall is proceeding as a relator under the FCA. 26
Under Chapter 31, the Secretary of the VA is responsible for formulating an
“individualized written plan of vocational rehabilitation” for eligible disabled veterans. 38
U.S.C. § 3107(a). There are six types of courses that qualify for Chapter 31 funding. Relevant
here, LearnKey argues that its courses qualify as “school course[s]” pursuant to 38 C.F.R. §
21.122. 27
Section 21.122(a) broadly defines a “school course” to include “public or private school,
secondary school, vocational school, correspondence school, business school, junior college,
teacher’s college, college, normal school, professional school, university, scientific or technical
institution, or other institution furnishing education for adults.” Furthermore, a “school course”
generally
consists of a number of areas of subject matter which are organized into learning
units for the purpose of attaining a specific educational or vocational objective.
Organized instruction in the units comprising the course is offered within a given
period of time and credit toward graduation or certification is generally given.
38 C.F.R. § 21.122(b).
26
27

Dkt. No. 6.
Dkt. No. 38 at 8.

5

Importantly, it is not enough for the course to meet the regulatory definition of “school
course.” The VA is tasked with determining whether a course meets the requirements of Chapter
31 and the VA must approve the course for Chapter 31 funding. See id. § 21.292(a) & (b). To
determine whether a course meets the requirements of Chapter 31, the VA may rely on a number
of resources, including: state approval agencies, the Department of Labor, or nationally
recognized accrediting associations. See id. § 21.292(c)(1). 28 In addition to VA approval, any
tuition charged to the VA “may not exceed that charged to similarly circumstanced nonveteran
students” and if “the contractor has more than one standard charge for the same service, the
charge to [the] VA must be the lowest price that is offered or published for the entire course,
semester, quarter, or term.” 48 C.F.R. § 831.7001-1.
Hall argues that LearnKey violated the FCA in two ways. First, Hall claims that
LearnKey’s courses do not qualify for Chapter 31 funding because LearnKey’s courses are not
offered in a “given period of time” and some of LearnKey’s courses do not offer credit toward
“graduation or certification.” 29 Therefore, according to Hall, every time LearnKey submits an
invoice for reimbursement to the VA, LearnKey is violating the FCA. Second, Hall argues that
LearnKey violated the FCA by submitting invoices to the VA for employee commissions which
are not entitled to Chapter 31 funding. 30
In response, LearnKey argues that Hall fails to offer any evidence demonstrating that
LearnKey knowingly engaged in fraudulent activity. 31 LearnKey further argues that any dispute

28

At oral argument, without legal or factual support, Hall’s counsel speculated that the VA does not
review individual courses. Rather, the VA relies on independent contractors, like LearnKey, to police
Chapter 31 eligibility. Hall’s premise that the VA carte blanche reimburses courses under Chapter 31 is
inconsistent with VA regulations and lacks factual support.
29
Dkt. No. 30 at 5; Dkt. No. 51 at 2.
30
Dkt. No. 30 at 7.
31
Dkt. No. 38 at 2.

6

over Chapter 31 course eligibility is within the sole jurisdiction of the Secretary of the VA. 32
Moreover, even if the court reaches the merits of Hall’s claims, LearnKey argues that its courses
qualify as “school course[s]” and are eligible for Chapter 31 funding. 33
At the outset, the court will address LearnKey’s argument that the court lacks jurisdiction
over this case pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 511. Under § 511, “[t]he Secretary [of the VA] shall
decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law that
affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survivors of
veterans.” (emphasis added). LearnKey exhausted much of its argument claiming that § 511
prohibits the court from reviewing whether the Secretary of the VA improperly approved
LearnKey’s courses for Chapter 31 funding. LearnKey’s argument misses the mark. This is not
a case about the Secretary’s decision to approve LearnKey’s courses for funding. This is a case
about whether LearnKey knowingly submitted a false claim to the VA to receive reimbursement
under Chapter 31. Section 511 does not impose a jurisdictional bar where the court is not in the
position of reviewing the VA’s Chapter 31 eligibility determinations, individual or otherwise.
Turning to the merits of Hall’s FCA claims, for the reasons that follow, LearnKey’s
Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted and Hall’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is denied. Accepting the evidence proffered by Hall as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in her favor, the court finds that Hall is not entitled to relief under the FCA. 34 Hall
offers no evidence demonstrating that LearnKey misrepresented its course offerings to the VA.
LearnKey’s Veteran Services Course Catalog accurately describes its course offerings as online
courses and the VA routinely approved LearnKey’s courses for Chapter 31 funding. Similarly,

32

Id.
Id. at 8.
34
Viewing Hall’s claims in a deferential light, the court finds that Hall’s FCA claims fail as a matter of
law. Accordingly, the court will not separately address Hall’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
33

7

aside from bare speculation, Hall offers no evidence that LearnKey’s invoices contained false
statements in order to obtain compensation for employee commissions. Furthermore, even if the
court were look past these deficiencies, Hall fails to offer any evidence satisfying the materiality
and scienter requirements of the FCA. Hall may disagree with the VA’s approval of LearnKey
courses, but Hall’s misgivings do not amount to a claim under the FCA.
I. False or Fraudulent Claim
A defendant’s “presentation of a false or fraudulent claim to the government is a central
element in every [FCA] case.” United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of
Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 727 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). To establish a false or fraudulent
claim, a relator may rely on “either a legally or factually false request for payment.” United
States ex rel. Thomas v. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., 820 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir.
2016) (quoting United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1168
(10th Cir. 2010)). In the context of compliance with a regulatory mandate, a false claim may be
express or implied. “Express false certification occurs when a government contractor falsely
certifies compliance with a particular statute, regulation, or contract term and compliance is a
prerequisite to payment.” United States v. The Boeing Co., 825 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016)
(citing Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1168). Conversely, implied false certification “occurs when a
government contractor [does not] expressly certify compliance, but knowingly and falsely
implies that it is entitled to payment when it submits a claim.” Id. Implied false certification
includes “half-truths” or “representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting
critical qualifying information.” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989,
2000 (2016).

8

The evidence before the court does not demonstrate that LearnKey submitted a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval by the VA. The VA’s approval of LearnKey’s courses
was not contingent on falsely supplied information or half-truths proffered by LearnKey.
Indeed, if LearnKey was presenting its courses in a false light to obtain approval for Chapter 31
funding, Hall may have a cognizable FCA claim. However, LearnKey’s Veteran Services
Course Catalog does not misrepresent the Chapter 31 deficiencies outlined by Hall. LearnKey’s
course catalog specifies that LearnKey’s courses are online and the number of hours in which a
student can expect to complete the course. For example, LearnKey’s CompTIA A+ Certification
specifies that the course includes: “approximately 25 hours of instructive video, interactive labs,
pre-tests/posttests, adaptive test prep program, online student workbook, and two 800 series
exam vouchers . . . .” 35 LearnKey further specifies that it will take the student “162 clock hours
or 8 weeks” to complete 36 and that the purpose of its CompTIA classes is to prepare a student to
take tests for certification administered by a third party. 37 Moreover, the VA routinely enrolled
eligible veterans in LearnKey’s courses. 38
Hall may believe that LearnKey’s courses are not “school course[s]” entitled to Chapter
31 funding. However, Hall’s remonstration is with the VA. The evidence before the court
shows that the VA knew what it was funding and, as such, there is no evidence that LearnKey
submitted a false claim for payment under Chapter 31.
Hall’s commission theory suffers from the same fatal flaw. Hall does not offer any
evidence showing that LearnKey submitted false claims for employee commissions to the VA.
LearnKey’s invoices do not hide the ball. The Boyd Invoice relied on by Hall includes a line

35

Dkt. No. 31, Ex. D at 22.
Id.
37
See id. at 17–18.
38
Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 3.
36

9

item charging the VA for “[m]oney towards incentives.” 39 Aside from pure guesswork, Hall
offers no evidence that “money towards incentives” is really a facade for money intended for
employee commission. Ostensibly, if LearnKey wished to deceive the VA into improperly
paying commissions, LearnKey surely would not have itemized its charges to the VA and would
not have included a line item that, in Hall’s words, “sounds a lot like commission.” 40 Similarly,
without supporting evidence, Hall assumes that the VA is too busy to thoroughly review
LearnKey’s invoices and, therefore, may have overlooked LearnKey’s blatant commission
itemization. This is not enough to create liability under the FCA. Facts, not theories and
speculation, create FCA liability.
There is no evidence of a falsehood, misrepresentation, or half-truth attributable to
LearnKey that caused the VA to unlawfully compensate LearnKey under Chapter 31.
Accordingly, Hall’s FCA claims fail as a matter of law. While these deficiencies standing alone
are sufficient to grant LearnKey’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, the court will examine
the remaining deficits in Hall’s FCA claim.
II. Knowledge and Materiality
Assuming arguendo that LearnKey misrepresented the substance of its courses in order to
obtain Chapter 31 funding, Hall fails to satisfy the FCA’s rigorous scienter and materiality
requirements. The FCA is not an “‘all-purpose antifraud statute’ or a vehicle for punishing
garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory violations.” Universal Health Servs., 136 S.
Ct. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672
(2008)). To violate the FCA, “the submitted claim must be both knowingly and materially
false.” Boeing, 825 F.3d at 1148 (citations omitted). Hall does not attempt to establish that
39
40

Dkt. No. 31 at Ex. F.
Dkt. No. 43 at 7.

10

LearnKey acted knowingly or that LearnKey’s alleged falsehoods were material to the VA’s
obligation to pay.
A. Knowledge
It is not enough for a relator to show the defendant submitted a false claim. The FCA
requires that the defendant act “knowingly.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). The FCA defines
knowingly to mean that the defendant: “(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity of the information.” Id. § 3729(b)(1). To ameliorate concerns of “fair notice
and open-ended liability” the Supreme Court emphasized that the FCA’s scienter requirement
should be strictly enforced. Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 2002. Therefore, to survive a
motion for summary judgment, a relator must proffer facts demonstrating that the defendant
acted knowingly within the meaning of the FCA. Boeing, 825 F.3d at 1148.
For instance, in United States v. The Boeing Company, the relators argued that Boeing
violated the FCA by certifying that an aircraft sold to the government complied with Federal
Aviation Administration (“FAA”) regulations where certain parts incorporated in the aircraft
were noncompliant. Id. at 1140. The relators argued that the FCA’s knowledge requirement was
satisfied because the parts incorporated were so “clearly” in violation of FAA regulations that
“anyone at Boeing” knew that incorporating the parts would violate FAA regulations. Id. at
1149. Additionally, the relators offered expert testimony demonstrating that the parts used by
Boeing were noncompliant with FAA regulations. Id. at 1150. Affirming the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Boeing, the Tenth Circuit found that the expert evidence
was inconclusive because the FAA disagreed with the expert’s interpretation of FAA regulations.
See id. at 1150–51. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that even if Boeing’s aircraft did not

11

comply with FAA regulations, “there are simply no facts in the record supporting the relators’
contention that Boeing knew about the nonconformities when submitting the claims for
payment.” Id. at 1149 (emphasis in original). The court held, “relators’ naked assertions, devoid
of any evidence of scienter” could not survive summary judgment. Id.
Like Boeing, Hall’s naked assertions, devoid of any evidence of scienter, cannot survive
summary judgment. Hall offers no argument, let alone evidence, demonstrating LearnKey acted
knowingly. Indeed, it appears that Hall believes that the knowledge element is simply a given
under the FCA. Searching the factual record for any evidence of scienter, the court recognizes
that the undisputed facts weigh in favor of LearnKey. As described above, only VA approved
courses are entitled to Chapter 31 funding. The substance of LearnKey’s courses was accurately
outlined in LearnKey’s Veteran Services Course Catalog and the VA routinely approved and
enrolled veterans in LearnKey’s courses. 41 Therefore, assuming LearnKey’s courses were
noncompliant and that a false record or certification was submitted to the VA, there is no
evidence demonstrating that LearnKey acted knowingly.
B. Materiality
Although the text of § 3729(a)(1)(A) does not expressly require the false statement to be
material to the government’s obligation to pay, the Supreme Court held that “misrepresentation
about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the
[g]overnment’s payment decision in order to be actionable under the [FCA].” Universal Health
Servs, 136 S. Ct. at 1996 (interpreting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)). The FCA defines materiality
to include facts that have “a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the
payment or receipt of money or property.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). “The materiality standard is
demanding.” Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 2003. A misrepresentation is not material
41

Dkt. No. 31, Ex. H; Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 3.

12

“merely because the [g]overnment designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory,
or contractual requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is it sufficient for a finding of
materiality that the [g]overnment would have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the
defendant’s noncompliance.” Id. Similarly, materiality cannot be established where the
regulatory violation is “minor or insubstantial.” Id. (citation omitted).
In Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States, relators brought an FCA action
against a healthcare provider, claiming that the provider violated Medicaid regulations by
misrepresenting the qualifications of its staff. Id. at 1997. The Supreme Court clarified the
application of the materiality requirement in the context of regulatory compliance. The Court
found that it is not enough for the relator to demonstrate that the government “would be entitled
to refuse payment were it aware of the [regulatory] violation.” Id. at 2004. In the context of
materiality, the government’s “decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of
payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive.” Id. at 2003. A plaintiff can demonstrate
materiality by showing “that the defendant knows that the [g]overnment consistently refuses to
pay claims . . . based on noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirement.” Id. Equally, “if the [g]overnment pays a particular claim in full despite its actual
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those
requirements are not material.” Id.
With this backdrop in mind, assuming arguendo that LearnKey’s courses are Chapter 31
noncompliant and that LearnKey knowingly submitted false invoices to the VA, Hall fails to
demonstrate that LearnKey’s misrepresentations were material to the VA’s decision to pay. As
described above, there is no evidence establishing that the VA’s approval of LearnKey’s courses
was based on falsehoods or misrepresentation. The VA routinely approved LearnKey’s courses

13

for Chapter 31 funding and enrolled students in LearnKey’s courses. 42 The VA paid LearnKey
for invoices that itemized expenses for “[m]oney towards incentives.” 43 Accordingly, the VA’s
complacency is very strong evidence that the minor regulatory violations alleged by Hall were
not material to the VA’s decision to reimburse LearnKey under Chapter 31. See Universal
Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 2003.
As a final note, Hall repeatedly implies that the purpose of her lawsuit is to protect
veterans from being taken advantage of by educational providers like LearnKey. 44 There is no
evidence before the court that veterans complained about LearnKey’s course offerings or that
disabled veterans failed to receive any benefit from LearnKey’s online courses. Hall merely
bolsters her policy argument with speculation in attempt to persuade the court. The court is not
swayed. Hall was a LearnKey employee for one week. 45 Hall then filed a lawsuit claiming that
a hyper-technical reading of the VA’s regulations entitled her to financial reward. This is not the
purpose of the FCA and Hall unquestionably fails to persuade the court of her self-proclaimed
noble cause.

42

Id.
Id. at Ex. F; Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A, Tremelling Dec. at ¶ 3.
44
See Dkt. No. 43 (stating that LearnKey’s online course structure “hurts disabled veterans, who are in
danger of being preyed on by unscrupulous institutions because of their disability, and need protection in
the form of course requirements designed to make sure a course is useful and helpful”).
45
Dkt. No. 15 at ¶ 1.
43

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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Hall’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 46 is DENIED and
LearnKey’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 47 is GRANTED. The First Amended
Complaint only seeks recovery under the FCA. Therefore, this Memorandum Decision and
Order disposes of all claims against LearnKey. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to
close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 28th day of April, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

Paul M. Warner
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

46
47

Dkt. No. 30.
Dkt. No. 39.

15