Prime Insurance v. Princess Tours et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER-granting 16 Motion to Dismiss Party. All causes of action against Chamberlin are Dismissed without Prejudice. Chanberlin & Reinheimer Ins Inc - Mark Agency terminated. Signed by Judge Robert J. Shelby on 3/17/2015. (las)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

PRIME INSURANCE COMPANY,
MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff /Counter-Defendant,
v.

Case No. 2:14-cv-458
PRINCESS TOURS, INC.,
Defendant /Counter-Claimant,

Judge Robert J. Shelby

CHAMBERLIN & REINHEIMER INS.,
INC.—MARK AGENCY,
Defendant.
This is an insurance coverage dispute. Defendant Chamberlin & Reinheimer Ins., Inc.—
Mark Agency moves to dismiss, alleging Plaintiff Prime Insurance Company has failed to state a
claim against Chamberlin upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the
court grants the motion.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an insurance coverage dispute relating to a March 17, 2014 bus
accident in Stafford County, Virginia. Prime issued a commercial auto insurance policy to
Princess Tours, Inc., with the policy period running from July 15, 2013 through July 15, 2014.
Chamberlin assisted in negotiating and obtaining the policy. Prime sued both Princess Tours and
Chamberlin, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Policy does not provide coverage for
damages arising out of the March 17 accident. In the alternative, Prime argues that any coverage
should be limited to $10,000. Beyond the allegation that Chamberlin assisted in negotiating and

obtaining the policy, Prime makes no factual allegations with respect to Chamberlin. In its
answer and counterclaim, Princess Tours likewise makes no factual allegations with respect to
Chamberlin and asserts no cause of action arising from Chamberlin’s involvement in the
transaction that procured the policy at issue.
ANALYSIS
Chamberlin moves to dismiss all claims against it on the grounds that Prime has failed to
allege sufficient facts to state an actionable claim for relief. Prime opposes the motion on
grounds that, although “admittedly speculative,”1 dismissing Chamberlin from the lawsuit may
lead to future unnecessary litigation.
I. Legal Standard
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “state a claim upon which relief
can be granted,” meaning the complaint must allege “enough factual matter, taken as true, to
make his ‘claim to relief ... plausible on its face.’”2 The court “accept[s] all well-pleaded facts as
true and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,”3 but the court will not accept
as true “legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.”4
II. Prime’s Allegations Against Chamberlin
Prime’s Complaint makes only two allegations and one prayer for relief that implicate
Chamberlin to any degree. First, Prime alleges “Chamberlin assisted Princess in negotiating and

1

Mem. in Opp. to Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 21), at 6.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
3
Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 633 F.3d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 2011).
4
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2

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obtaining the Policy.”5 Second, Prime asserts “[a]n actual dispute and controversy has arisen
between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding whether there is coverage available under the Policy
for the March 17, 2014 accident.”6 Lastly, Prime requests a declaration that “[a]s coverage is
precluded, Defendants have no right of recovery against Plaintiff for any claims or actions
arising out of the March 17, 2014 accident.”7 The court accepts as true Prime’s factual allegation
that Chamberlin was involved in negotiating and obtaining the Policy for Princess Tours. The
remaining allegations are legal conclusions not entitled to “an assumption of truth.”8
By itself, Chamberlin’s involvement in negotiating and obtaining the Policy for Princess
Tours does not support a plausible claim for relief. And Prime’s Complaint is devoid of any
further factual allegation that plausibly implicates Chamberlin in the coverage dispute between
Prime and Princess Tours. Prime urges the court to “liberally construe[]” the declaratory
judgment act in order to “avoid inconsistent, piecemeal litigation.”9 But even giving the act a
liberal construction would not absolve Prime of its obligation to adequately plead a claim against
Chamberlin. In the end, the court finds that Prime has failed to state an actionable claim for
relief against Chamberlin.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court GRANTS Chamberlin’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 16) and
all causes of action against Chamberlin are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Prime’s
claims against Princess Tours remain operative.

5

Complaint (Dkt. 2, exh. 1), at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 29.
7
Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶ 1(f).
8
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
9
Mem. in Opp. to Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 21), at 4.
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SO ORDERED this 17th day of March, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

________________________________________
ROBERT J. SHELBY
United States District Judge

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