Reid et al v. LVNV Funding et al
Filing
98
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 86 Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees. The court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $106,804.00, which includes 332.2 attorney hours at $320.00 per hour and $500 in paralegal fees. Signed by Judge Dale A. Kimball on 8/29/2016. (eat)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
ALEXIS REID and TAYLOR REID,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
vs.
Case No. 2:14CV471DAK
LVNV FUNDING LLC; et al.,
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Defendants.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Alexis Reid’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees.
The motion is fully briefed. The court concludes that a hearing would not significantly aid in its
determination of the motion. Accordingly, the court issues the following Memorandum Decision
and Order based on the memoranda submitted by the parties and the law and facts relevant to the
motion.
Plaintiff seeks attorney fees as the prevailing party in this Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”) case. The FDCPA provides that “in the case of any successful action to enforce
the foregoing liability, [the defendant is liable for] the costs of the action, together with a
reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). In this case,
Plaintiff reached a settlement with Defendants, in which Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees, and Defendants do not dispute that the FDCPA mandates an award of attorney’s
fees.
In awarding attorney fees under the FDCPA, a court applies the lodestar amount pursuant
to Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Assocs.,
LLC, 616 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 2010). The lodestar “is the ‘number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 433).
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate of $320 is a reasonable
hourly rate for a consumer litigation attorney of similar experience in the Salt Lake legal market.
Therefore, the issue before the court is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation.
Plaintiff is seeking compensation for 382.4 attorney hours and $500 for paralegal
assistance. Defendants, however, contend that Plaintiff should receive one-third of her requested
fees. There are six factors in determining a reasonable fee: (1) “a reasonable fee is a fee that is
sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights
case”; (2) “the lodestar method yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve this
objective”; (3) “enhancement may be awarded in rare and exceptional circumstances”; (4) “an
enhancement may not be awarded based on a fact that is subsumed in the lodestar calculation”;
(5) “the burden of proving the enhancement . . . must be borne by the fee applicant”; and (6) “a
fee applicant seeking an enhancement must produce specific evidence that supports the award.”
Purdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552-53 (2010).
First, Defendants argue that Reid’s requested award should be decreased because she
achieved only limited success in this case. However, the court ruled in her favor on all of her
2
substantive claims. Although the court dismissed her husband’s claims, the court allowed Reid
to pursue most of his damages as household damages. Therefore, the case was not “cut in half”
as Defendants suggest. In actuality, Reid’s ability to recover damages was only slightly limited
and the discovery regarding Taylor Reid’s damages remained relevant to the case. Taylor Reid’s
claims were not based on different facts or legal theories. Rather, the two Plaintiffs had highly
interconnected claims. Hence the court’s decision allowing Alexis to seek Taylor’s damages as
her own at trial. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, [her] attorney should recover a
fully compensatory fee.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). Because Plaintiff
obtained excellent results, the court finds no basis for reducing her requested fee.
Next, Defendants argue the Plaintiff’s requested fee should be reduced because the case
did not involve complex issues. Defendants claims that counsel cannot appeal to a case’s
complexity in order to justify an exorbitant fee. However, Plaintiff’s counsel merely cites the
number of issues raised by Defendants and their vigorous defense to demonstrate that she was
required to respond to these defenses. Plaintiff is not claiming that the subject matter of the work
was difficult. Plaintiff is claiming that when Defendants raised issues, Plaintiff was required to
respond and she is entitled to fees for such work. Had Plaintiff not responded, she would not
have been successful. Defendant cannot choose to engage in aggressive litigation and then claim
it was not necessary. The court finds no basis for reducing Plaintiff’s requested fees on work her
counsel was required to undertake in response to Defendant’s litigation strategy.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel seeks fees unrelated to Plaintiff’s
FDCPA claims and claimed inflated hours for the work expended. For example, Defendants take
3
issue with counsel spending 19.5 hours drafting the Complaint, 52.55 hours preparing for four
depositions, and 5.2 hours speaking with a contract attorney retained to draft a response to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In support of their assertions, Defendants submit a
Declaration from Scott Daniels, a well-respected Salt Lake litigator and former state court judge.
Mr. Daniels provides the specific amount of time he deems required in contrast to the amount of
time Plaintiff stated her counsel expended to complete certain tasks. However, the court
recognizes that Plaintiff obtained a successful result based on the work expended and the court is
hesitant to second-guess the amount of time required to obtain a successful result, especially with
respect to motion practice.
Nonetheless, the court agrees that the time for drafting, finalizing, and filing the
Complaint should be reduced from 19.5 hours to 10.0 hours, the time for work on the motion for
judgment on the pleadings should be reduced from 27.5 hours to 20.0 hours, the time spent for
depositions should be reduced from 61.8 hours to 50 hours, the time expended on the expert
testimony motion in limine should be reduced from 29.4 hours to 20.0 hours, and the time
expended on preparation for the hearing on cross motions for summary judgment should be
reduced from 20 hours to 8 hours. Based on these deductions, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s
counsel’s time of 382.40 hours should be reduced by 50.2 hours, or 332.2 hours.
Based on the above analysis, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees.
The court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
$106,804, which includes 332.2 attorney hours at $320.00 per hour and $500 in paralegal fees.
4
DATED this 29th day of August, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?