Stevens v. Vernal City et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM DECISION and Order - GRANTING 11 Motion to Dismiss and ; GRANTING 14 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; DENYING 22 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct. The remaining Motions 27 , 28 , 32 , 39 are subsequently Moot and are DENIED. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 4/21/2015. (jds)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
DALE STEVENS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
v.
VERNAL CITY, et al.,

Case No. 2:14-CV-801 TS

Defendants.

District Judge Ted Stewart

This matter is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Vernal City,
Judge Ray Richards, Michael D. Harrington, Vance Norton, Sonja Norton, Ted Mumford, Keith
Campbell, and N.J. Taylor (“Vernal City Defendants”) and Jennifer Escalera, Nannette Rolfe,
and Bart Mortensen (“State Defendants”). Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the Motions.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dale Stevens alleges violations of his constitutional rights and state law claims
arising out of a traffic stop and citation for driving on a denied license. On April 1, 2014, police
officer N.J. Taylor stopped Plaintiff and issued Plaintiff a ticket for driving on a denied license.
After the April 1, 2014 stop, Plaintiff sought to dismiss the citation before Judge Ray Richards.
Plaintiff brings suit against Officer N.J. Taylor, Vernal City, and Judge Ray Richards for
“excessive prejudice Malicious [sic] prosecution, and malicious abuse of process of the
Plaintiff.” 1 Additionally, Plaintiff brings suit against Vernal City Defendants and the State
1

Docket No. 2 Ex. A, ¶ 11.
1

Defendants as “[e]mployees officers, officials, and agents of Vernal City” under a number of
theories, including “malicious abuse of process, negligence, and gross negligence under the
[l]aws of the State of Utah, as well as under the Federal Constitutional Amendments and Federal
Civil Rights statutes,” 2 presumably for their involvement in processing Plaintiff’s traffic citation.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his “First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth” Amendment
rights. 3 Plaintiff also alleges Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded factual allegations, as distinguished from
conclusory allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as
the nonmoving party. 4 Plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” 5 which requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully
harmed-me accusation.” 6 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” 7

2

Docket No. 2 Ex. A, ¶ 14.

3

Id. ¶ 10.

4

GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir.

5

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).

6

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

7

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original).

1997).

2

“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that
the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally
sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” 8 As the Court in Iqbal stated,
only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
. . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to
relief. 9
In considering a motion to dismiss, a district court not only considers the complaint, “but
also the attached exhibits,” 10 and “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and
matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” 11 The Court “may consider documents
referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do
not dispute the documents’ authenticity.” 12
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against them on a number of different grounds.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees that the claims against Defendants must be
dismissed.

8

Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).

9

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

10

Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d
1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2011).
11

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (citing 5B
WRIGHT & MILLER § 1357 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2007)).
12

Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002).

3

A.

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Plaintiff alleges Judge Ray Richards’s failure to dismiss the ticket was done in violation

of the “First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.” 13 Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges Judge Richards acted with
“excessive prejudice Malicious [sic] prosecution, and malicious abuse of process. . . .” 14
Defendants argue that claims against Judge Ray Richards are overcome by absolute judicial
immunity.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for
money damages. 15 Judicial immunity is overcome in only two circumstances. First, a judge is
not protected by immunity for “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial
capacity.” 16 Second, judicial immunity will not attach when a judge acts in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction, even if the action is judicial in nature. 17
The judicial action for which Plaintiff seeks relief is Judge Richards’s failure to dismiss
Plaintiff’s traffic ticket. 18 Dismissal of traffic citations falls within the scope of judicial action
and Judge Richards acted within his judicial capacity when he exercised his discretion. 19
Though Plaintiff alleges that Judge Richards “did not have jurisdiction,” Plaintiff’s Complaint

13

Docket No. 2 Ex. A, ¶ 10.

14

Id. ¶ 11.

15

Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991).

16

Id. at 11.

17

Id. at 12.

18

Docket No. 2 Ex. A, at p. 5.

19

See generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 1-4-703 (West 1997).

4

fails to provide any support that Judge Richards acted beyond his jurisdiction. 20 Plaintiff further
alleges Judge Richards acted with “excessive prejudice Malicious [sic] prosecution, and
malicious abuse of process. . . .” 21 However, no evidence is proffered to support that contention.
Regardless, judges are immune from claims so long as they originate from judicial actions, even
if the plaintiff alleges the decision is “erroneous, malicious, or in excess of their judicial
authority.” 22 Thus, even if Judge Richards acted maliciously, he is still shielded by judicial
immunity. Accordingly, the Court finds that Judge Richards is entitled to absolute judicial
immunity and all claims against him are dismissed with prejudice.
B.

CLAIMS AGAINST N.J. TAYLOR
Plaintiff alleges that Officer N.J. Taylor’s actions violated his “First, Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth” Amendment rights when Officer Taylor “stopped [Plaintiff] and gave [Plaintiff] a
ticket for driving on a denied license,” without probable cause. 23 However, beside his
allegations that Officer Taylor stopped and issued a citation, Plaintiff pleads no facts. Though it
is possible that Officer Taylor wrongfully stopped and issued a citation to Plaintiff, Plaintiff
provides no supporting facts to push his claims against Officer Taylor from possible to plausible.
Plaintiff provides only conclusory allegations and legal conclusions that the stop was conducted
without sufficient cause. This is insufficient. Because Plaintiff makes allegations only in the
form of legal conclusions without providing facts to support his claim, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against Officer N.J. Taylor.
20

Docket No. 2 Ex. A.

21

Id. ¶ 11.

22

Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1473 (10th Cir. 1990).

23

Docket No. 2 Ex. A, ¶ 9.
5

C.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants—

Michael D. Harrington, Mr. & Mrs. Vance Norton, Vernal City Council, Keith Campbell
Nannette Rolfe, Bart Mortensen, and Jennifer Escalera—for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Furthermore, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims arising from
the alleged violation of various federal criminal statutes.
In the present matter, Plaintiff’s claims against Vernal City Defendants and State
Defendants consist of naming them in the caption without any factual allegations to state a
“plausible” claim. For instance, Plaintiff only mentioned Defendant Rolfe to identify her as the
“head of deportment [sic] of Public safety for the State of Utah.” 24 Plaintiff lists a number of
other Defendants in the caption without pleading any facts articulating how they violated his
rights under the Constitution, state, or federal law. Plaintiff makes no effort to ascribe any
conduct to them which could be considered a plausible claim. The Court finds no facts that
permit it “to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” and therefore dismisses all
claims against Vernal City Defendants and State Defendants. 25
Furthermore, the alleged violation of federal criminal statutes cannot form the basis of
civil liability. 26 Plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42, 1001, 2383, and 2384 are
dismissed because Plaintiff “cannot recover civil damages for an alleged violation of a criminal
statute.” 27
24

Docket No. 2 Ex. A, at p. 6.

25

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

26

See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–65 (1986).

27

Shaw v. Neece, 727 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir. 1984).
6

D.

STATE LAW CLAIMS
In addition to his other claims, Plaintiff asserts certain state law claims against

Defendants, including “intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution,
malicious abuse of process, negligence, and gross negligence.” 28 Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
A plaintiff may not normally bring suit against a government employee for injuries “that
result[ ] from the exercise of a governmental function.” 29 A “governmental function” is defined
as “each activity, undertaking, or operation of a governmental entity.” 30 The Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah (GIAU) provides a number of limited exceptions to this general
prohibition. 31 Pursuant to GIAU, governmental immunity is waived for “any injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of
employment.” 32 However, governmental immunity is not waived under subsection (4) when
“the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel,
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil
rights.” 33
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of what he considered a wrongful traffic stop and subsequent
prosecution. Because issuing and processing traffic citations qualify as “activit[ies],
28

Docket No. 2 Ex. A, ¶ 14.

29

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-201(1).

30

Id. § 63G-7-102(4)(a).

31

Id. § 63G-7-202(3)(c)(i)-(v).

32

Id. § 63G-7-301(4).

33

Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(b).

7

undertaking[s], or operation[s] of a governmental entity,” they are governmental functions that
are presumptively attached with governmental immunity. 34 Vernal City Defendants are cloaked
with governmental immunity unless “some other part of the Act specifically waives the
immunity.” 35
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligent and grossly negligent. 36 Though GIAU
withdraws governmental immunity from “negligent act[s] or omission[s]” of government
employees, Plaintiff provides insufficient allegations that the claims against Defendants stemmed
from anything other than the type of conduct immunized by GAIU. 37 Furthermore, Subsection
(4) rejects waiver of governmental immunity when the injury arises out of “malicious
prosecution, . . . abuse of process, . . . infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights.” 38
Defendants are therefore shielded by GAIU from Plaintiff’s claims arising from such injuries.
Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants are shielded from state law claims by the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.

34

Id. § 63G-7-102(4)(a).

35

Ledfors v. Emery County School Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Utah 1993).

36

Docket No. 2 Ex. A, at p. 7.

37

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4).

38

Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(b).

8

IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 11 and 14) are
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Docket No. 22) is DENIED. Plaintiff
requested adding as Defendants: Dawn Searle, Daren B. Goff, Linda St. John, Dustin B. Pead,
Cecilia Lesmes, and Heather S. White, to this lawsuit without alleging any facts or causes of
action as against these individuals. It is further
ORDERED that remaining Motions (Docket No. 27, 28, 32, and 39) are subsequently
moot and are DENIED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case forthwith.
DATED this 21th day of April, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

Ted Stewart
United States District Judge

9