Norton v. State of Utah et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION denying 7 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 9 Motion for TRO/Preliminary Injunction; denying 13 Motion for questioning constitutionality; denying 16 Motion for change of relief; denying 17 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff a copy of the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a form complaint for Plaintiff to use should he choose to file an amended complaint. Signed by Judge Clark Waddoups on 9/28/2015. (kpf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
LONNIE NORTON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER & MEMORANDUM DECISION
v.
STATE OF UTAH et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:14-CV-874-CW
District Judge Clark Waddoups
Plaintiff, inmate Lonnie Norton, filed this pro se civil rights suit, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983
(2015), in forma pauperis, see 28 id. § 1915. The Court now screens his Complaint and orders
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to cure deficiencies before further pursuing his claims.
Deficiencies in Complaint
Complaint:
(a) improperly names "State of Utah" as a defendant, though there is no showing that it
has waived its governmental immunity (see below).
(b) improperly names Judges Kouris, Lubeck, and Barlow as defendants, without
considering judicial immunity, as further explained below.
(c) improperly names prosecutors, Sim Gill, Josh Player, and Patricia Cassell as
defendants, without considering prosecutorial immunity, as further explained below.
(d) possibly alleges claims that concern the constitutionality of his conviction and/or
validity of his imprisonment, which should be brought in a habeas-corpus petition,
not a civil-rights complaint.
(e) alleges claims that are possibly invalidated by the rule in Heck (see below).
(f) has claims appearing to be based on conditions of current confinement; however, the
complaint was apparently not submitted using the legal help Plaintiff is entitled to by
his institution under the Constitution. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996)
(requiring prisoners be given "'adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law' . . . to ensure that inmates . . . have a reasonably adequate
opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or
conditions of confinement") (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)
(emphasis added)).
Instructions to Plaintiff
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "(1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the
relief sought." Rule 8's requirements mean to guarantee "that defendants enjoy fair notice of
what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest." TV Commc'ns Network,
Inc. v ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991).
Pro se litigants are not excused from complying with these minimal pleading demands.
"This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts
surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine
whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the Court "to assume the role of advocate for
a pro se litigant." Id. Thus, the Court cannot "supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal
theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded." Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d
1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff should consider the following points before refiling his complaint. First, the
revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by
reference, any portion of the original complaint. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612
(10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supersedes original).
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Second, the complaint must clearly state what each defendant--typically, a named
government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d
1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is
essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear
exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, No. 08-2222, slip op. at 4
(10th Cir. July 20, 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma,
519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Third, Plaintiff cannot name an individual as a defendant based solely on his or her
supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
supervisory status alone does not support § 1983 liability).
Fourth, "denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of
constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983."
Gallagher v. Shelton, No. 09-3113, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25787, at *11 (10th Cir. Nov. 24,
2009).
Fifth, as to claims that have been made against the State, generally, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents "suits against a state unless it has waived its immunity or consented to suit,
or if Congress has validly abrogated the state's immunity." Ray v. McGill, No. CIV-06-0334-HE,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51632, at *8 (W.D. Okla. July 26, 2006) (unpublished) (citing Lujan v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 F.3d 1511, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995); Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrs., 846
F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff asserts no basis for determining that the State has
waived its immunity or that it has been abrogated by Congress. Because any claims against the
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State appear to be precluded by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court believes it has no
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider them. See id. at *9.
Sixth, it is well settled that judges "are absolutely immune from suit unless they act in
'clear absence of all jurisdiction,' meaning that even erroneous or malicious acts are not proper
bases for § 1983 claims." Segler v. Felfam Ltd. P'ship, No. 08-1466, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
10152, at *4 (10th Cir. May 11, 2009) (unpublished) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
356-57 (1978)). Regarding the claims at issue here, Judges Kouris, Lubeck, and Barlow very
well may have been acting in a judicial capacity in presiding over this case, so the judges’
actions would be entitled to absolute immunity. See Doran v. Sanchez, No. 08-2042, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 17987, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 2008) (unpublished).
Seventh, a prosecutor acting within the scope of his duties enjoys absolute immunity
from suit under § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976). The prosecutor’s acts,
as alleged by Plaintiff, appear to relate to advocacy before the court. This defendant therefore
may be entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from this lawsuit.
Finally, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims appear to involve some allegations that
if true may invalidate his conviction and/or sentencing. "In Heck, the Supreme Court explained
that a § 1983 action that would impugn the validity of a plaintiff's underlying conviction cannot
be maintained unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal or impaired by collateral
proceedings." Nichols v. Baer, No. 08-4158, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4302, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar.
5, 2009) (unpublished) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Heck prevents
litigants "from using a § 1983 action, with its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their
conviction or sentence without complying with the more stringent exhaustion requirements for
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habeas actions." Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Heck clarifies that "civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments." 512 U.S. at 486.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in a way that may attack
Petitioner's very imprisonment. Heck requires that, when a plaintiff requests damages in a §
1983 suit, this Court must decide whether judgment in the plaintiff's favor would unavoidably
imply that the conviction or sentence is invalid. Id. at 487. Here, it appears it may regarding
some claims. If this Court were to conclude that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated in
a prejudicial manner, it would be stating that Plaintiff's conviction and/or sentence were not
valid. Thus, the involved claims "must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. This has apparently not happened and
may result in dismissal of such claims.
Preliminary Injunctive Relief
The Court evaluates Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiff appears
to merely be trying to expedite the relief he seeks in his complaint. This type of injunction is
disfavored by the law. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (10th Cir.
1991).
Further, Plaintiff has not specified adequate facts showing each of the four elements
necessary to obtain a preliminary injunctive order:
"(1) a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2)
irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; (3) proof that the
threatened harm outweighs any damage the injunction may cause
to the party opposing it; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, will
not be adverse to the public interest."
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Brown v. Callahan, 979 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (D. Kan. 1997) (quoting Kan. Health Care Ass'n v.
Kan. Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1542 (10th Cir. 1994)).
Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy to be granted only
when the right to relief is "clear and unequivocal." SCFC ILC, Inc., 936 F.2d at 1098. The
Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff's pleadings and motions for injunctive relief and concludes
Plaintiff's claims do not rise to such an elevated level that an emergency injunction is warranted.
In sum, Plaintiff has not met the heightened pleading standard required in moving for an
emergency injunction.
Because Plaintiff requests that this Court intervene in state criminal proceedings in his
motions for preliminary injunctive relief, a related ground for denying this relief may be the
Younger abstention doctrine. See Housley v. Williams, No. 92-6110, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
5592, at *8 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 1993) (unpublished); Cen v. Castro, No. C 02-2094 PJH (PR),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9314, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2002). After all, "[t]he rule of exhaustion
in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of federal-state comity," as defined in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973). The
abstention analysis has three parts: "First, is there a pending state judicial proceeding; 'second,
do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity
in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.'" Oltremari ex rel. McDaniel v. Kan.
Social & Rehab. Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1356 (D. Kan. 1994) (quoting Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, (1982)).
Applying the analysis here, the Court first determines based on the information in the
complaint that there is apparently a pending state judicial proceeding. Second, although this is a
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federal civil-rights case, "'[t]he importance of the state interest may be demonstrated by the fact
that the noncriminal proceedings bear a close relationship to proceedings criminal in nature.'"
Oltremari ex rel. McDaniel, 871 F. Supp. at 1356 (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457
U.S. at 432). Considering that Petitioner actually attacks--both here and in state court--ongoing
criminal proceedings, the Court concludes the issues in this noncriminal civil-rights case clearly
are integral to "proceedings criminal in nature," and, consequently, involve an important state
interest. Id. Finally, Petitioner has an adequate chance to raise any of his federal constitutional
challenges in state court. The Court is persuaded by this analysis to avoid intervening in
Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Complaint’s deficiencies noted above.
(2) The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff a copy of the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a form
complaint for Plaintiff to use should he choose to file an amended complaint.
(3) If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's
instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice.
(4) Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunctive relief are DENIED. (See Docket Entry
#s 7, 9, & 17.) Any conditions-of-confinement claims raised solely in the motions for
preliminary injunctive relief are inappropriately raised in that manner and should be
instead be brought in a separate civil-rights complaint.
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(5) Plaintiff’s motion questioning the constitutionality of Utah law is DENIED. (See
Docket Entry # 13.) This issue appears to be more properly raised in Plaintiff’s criminal
case.
(6) Plaintiff’s motion for change of relief is DENIED. (See Docket Entry # 16.) Plaintiff
may adjust his request for relief in his amended complaint, if he wishes.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
CLARK WADDOUPS
United States District Judge
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