Hyland v. Dixie State University et al
Filing
47
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER granting 41 Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. Dixie State University terminated. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 8/3/2015. (blh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS
DALLAS HYLAND,
Plaintiff,
v.
DIXIE STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Case No. 2:15-CV-36 TS
Defendants.
District Judge Ted Stewart
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Dixie State University’s (“DSU”) Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. 1 For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court
will grant Defendant’s Motion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Dallas Hyland brings claims against DSU and five of its officials for First and
Fourteenth Amendment violations as well as for state-law defamation. Plaintiff’s claims arise
out of his suspension from DSU after he was accused of sexually harassing another student and
intimidating a faculty member. 2 Plaintiff alleges that the accusations were baseless and that
Defendants retaliated against him for investigating two DSU officials for misuse of funds, and
investigating another for mistreatment of veterans, and wrongly prohibited him from coming on
campus. 3
DSU seeks judgment on Plaintiff’s pleadings by asserting governmental immunity.
1
Docket No. 41.
2
Docket No. 2, at 8.
3
Id. at 7.
1
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is treated as a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” 4 The same standard is used when evaluating 12(b)(6) and 12(c)
motions. 5
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded factual allegations, as distinguished from
conclusory allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as
the nonmoving party. 6 Plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” 7 which requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully
harmed-me accusation.” 8 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” 9
“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that
the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally
sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” 10 As the Court in Iqbal stated,
4
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir.
5
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002).
6
GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir.
7
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
8
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
9
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original).
2000).
1997).
10
Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).
2
only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
. . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to
relief. 11
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff fails to state plausible claims for relief against DSU because DSU is protected
under the Eleventh Amendment from the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and protected under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act (“UGIA”) against the state-law defamation claim. 12
The Tenth Circuit and this Court have held that Utah state universities are arms of the
State of Utah and entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 13 DSU is a Utah state university
and is granted Eleventh Amendment immunity. Under such immunity, DSU is immune from
claims arising under § 1983. 14 Further, for the same reason, DSU is not a person under § 1983.
Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim that DSU violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants and the Court must engage in a factual analysis to
determine whether DSU is an arm of the State. However, Plaintiff fails to adequately address
11
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
12
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-101 (West 2015).
13
Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 574–75 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted); Erbacher v. Albrecht, No. 1:11-CV-96-RJS, 2013 WL 3049289, at *6 (D. Utah June
17, 2013); Pharm. & Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v. Univ. of Utah, 801 F. Supp. 508, 512 (D. Utah
1990) (“[T]his court . . . adopts the view of a majority of other courts that have treated state
universities as arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.”) (citations omitted).
14
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979); Cleveland v. Martin, 590 F. App’x 723,
730 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
3
those cases where the Tenth Circuit and this Court have upheld Eleventh Amendment immunity
for state universities.
The GAIU immunizes DSU from Plaintiff’s state-law defamation claim. To determine
whether the GAIU applies to DSU, the Court considers “(1) whether the activity undertaken is a
governmental function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the particular
activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver.” 15
In this case, the GAIU applies because DSU is an arm of the State of Utah and its
operation as a university is a governmental function. The GAIU does not waive immunity for
defamation claims. 16 Thus, DSU is immune from state-law defamation claims.
Plaintiff argues that DSU waived its governmental immunity by appearing and answering
the Complaint. DSU’s appearing and answering the Complaint do not constitute waiver of
immunity. 17 The Tenth Circuit has stated, “A state’s waiver is subject to a stringent test: Utah’s
consent to suit against it in court must be express and unequivocal.” 18
In this case, DSU has not expressly and unequivocally waived immunity. While DSU
appeared, answered the Complaint, and consented to the Court’s jurisdiction, it preserved its
immunity defenses under the GIAU and Eleventh Amendment. 19 Thus, DSU is not barred from
asserting these defenses.
15
Peck v. State, 191 P.3d 4, 7 (Utah 2008).
16
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-201(4)(b) (West 2015).
17
V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir. 1997).
18
Id. (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)).
19
Docket No. 29, at 2, 15.
4
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant Defendant DSU’s Motion and
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against DSU.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No.
41) is GRANTED.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
Ted Stewart
United States District Judge
5
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