Property Solutions International v. Yardi Systems

Filing 890

ORDER on Motions in Limine - reserves ruling on 669 Motion in Limine; finding as moot 670 Motion in Limine; denying 671 Motion in Limine; granting in part and denying in part 672 Motion in Limine; denying 673 Motion in Limine; denying 674 Motion in Limine; denying 677 Motion in Limine; denying 678 Motion in Limine; finding as moot 681 Motion in Limine; denying 684 Motion in Limine; granting 690 Motion in Limine; granting 693 Motion in Limine; finding as moot 698 Motion in Limine; granting in part and denying in part 699 Motion in Limine; granting 708 Motion in Limine; granting 847 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge Clark Waddoups on 9/3/2019. (jwt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

ENTRATA, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Case No. 2:15-cv-00102

Plaintiff,

Judge Clark Waddoups
v.
YARDI SYSTEMS, INC., a
California corporation,
Defendant.

Before the court are a total of sixteen Motions In Limine. The court heard oral argument
on these motions on August 30, 2019, and ruled from the bench. This written order is meant to
provide additional guidance for the parties at trial.
Entrata’s Motion in Limine # 1 (ECF No. 690)
Entrata argues that the court “should exclude any argument and evidence about the
supposed [procompetitive] benefits of the SIPP under Rules 402 and 403” of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Yardi’s expert submitted an expert report on procompetitive effects. The court
struck that report in its entirety. The court GRANTS Entrata’s Motion In Limine #1, (ECF No.
690). If Yardi attempts to introduce other evidence of SIPP’s procompetitive effects by witnesses
other than Yardi’s expert, the court will rule on the admissibility of that evidence at trial.
Entrata’s Motion in Limine # 2 (ECF No. 693)
Entrata argues that “this Court should exclude evidence of conduct and statements by
Entrata involving” a June 15, 2015, settlement meeting under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. (ECF No. 696 at 4.) Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in relevant
part that “conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about [a disputed]
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claim” are not admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 408(a)(2). But “[t]he court may admit this evidence for
another purpose, such as . . . negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” Fed. R. Evid. 408(b).
Yardi argues that evidence of the parties’ divorce “is admissible to explain Yardi’s
actions and rebut Entrata’s incorrect accusations.” (ECF No. 737 at 9.) But a 2006 amendment to
Rule 408 provides: “[t]he amendment prohibits the use of statements made in settlement
negotiations when offered to impeach by prior inconsistent statement or through contradiction.
Such broad impeachment would tend to swallow the exclusionary rule and would impair the
public policy of promoting settlements.”
As the court provided at oral argument, it GRANTS Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 2,
(ECF No. 693). The court holds that evidence of conduct and statements made during the June
15, 2015, settlement meeting are excluded under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As
stated at oral argument, the 2006 amendment prohibits the evidence that Yardi seeks to admit.
Entrata’s Motion in Limine # 3 (ECF No. 698)
Entrata argues that “[t]he Court should exclude any evidence or argument that Yardi was
excused from performing its obligations under the parties’ 2006 Non-Disclosure Agreement . . .
.” (ECF No. 698 at 4.) Entrata’s argument relates to Entrata’s contract claim against Yardi for
Breach of Express Contract. The court granted Yardi’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of
Entrata’s claim. (See ECF No. 837 at 10.) Entrata Motion In Limine # 3 is therefore DENIED as
MOOT.
Entrata’s Motion in Limine # 4 (ECF No. 699)
Entrata argues that this court “should exclude any evidence and argument regarding
Entrata’s or any other vendors’ products, customers, or sales beyond the conventional

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multifamily property management marketplace in the United States, such as vendors’ total sales,
revenue, and unit counts.” (ECF No. 702 at 4.) Entrata largely seeks to exclude business press
releases related to the success of Entrata Core. (See ECF No. 702 at 6.) Entrata specifically seeks
exclusion of other companies’ “10-K filings” that Yardi seeks to admit to support its argument of
competition. (See ECF No. 702 at 8.) Entrata argues that these exhibits are overbroad because
they are not specific to Entrata’s conventional multifamily business, and argues that “Entrata’s
success—or lack thereof—in launching Entrata Core beyond the relevant market has no bearing
on whether ‘competition is effective’ or has been harmed in the relevant markets for this case . . .
.” (ECF No. 702 at 6.)
Yardi argues that “[t]he documents that Entrata is seeking to exclude speak to Entrata’s
success in growing Entrata Core in the multifamily space, which includes conventional
multifamily.” (ECF No. 741 at 8.) Yardi further argues that the exhibits it seeks to introduce are
relevant—even if they are overbroad. (See ECF No. 741 at 7.)
As the court provided at oral argument, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 4, (ECF No. 699). As a general matter, the court will sustain an
objection and will not allow evidence that goes to the question of Entrata’s overall success as a
company that is not confined carefully to the relevant market at issue in this case. With respect to
any specific exhibit, the court will expect a careful foundation to be laid, and if it possible from
that foundation to tease out relevant evidence that goes to Entrata’s success in the relevant
market, the court will admit that evidence. If the evidence as presented in the document or
testimony would be so confusing that there is no way for the jury to sort out what its relevance
would be with respect to the relevant market, the court will sustain an objection. Regarding the
10-K filings and statements about competition, the court will require careful foundation to be

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laid before the court will allow the evidence about competition to be admitted. The court will
require foundation as to the knowledge of the witness to testify about the content of the
document and relevance to an issue to be decided by the jury.
Entrata’s Motion in Limine # 6 (ECF No. 708)
Entrata argues that “[t]his Court should exclude any evidence or argument related to
Yardi’s intellectual property allegations, which are the basis of its California case.” (ECF No.
708 at 4.) Yardi responds that “Entrata’s misconduct is central to the issues in this litigation.”
(ECF No. 748 at 5.) In Reply, Entrata argues that “Yardi’s [intellectual property] allegations
would require an all-consuming side-trial.” (ECF No. 827 at 6.)
As provided at oral argument, the court GRANTS Entrata’s Motion # 6, (ECF No. 708).
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a “court may exclude relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” The court finds that introducing evidence of the
California allegations would require a trial within a trial. The probative value of this evidence is
outweighed by the undue delay that would result from Entrata having to rebut Yardi’s proposed
evidence. The court excludes evidence related to the California case. The allegations made in the
California case remain simply allegations, not proven facts. The allegations will best be resolved
in the California case where they are still pending.
Further, the court is persuaded by Entrata’s argument that Yardi previously sought to
restrict discovery related to the California case based on the argument that it was not relevant to
this case. Additionally, Yardi’s Answer did not raise any of the California issues as a defense to

4

this case. This provides further support for the court’s conclusion that the evidence from the
California case should be excluded at trial.
Entrata’s Motion in Limine # 8 (ECF No. 847)
Entrata seeks to preclude Yardi under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(e) and 37(c)
from arguing at trial that Yardi refused to deal with Entrata to protect copyrights in its standard
interface specifications (APIs) and standalone databases. (See ECF No. 850 at 7.) Federal Rule
26(e) provides, in relevant part:
A party who . . . has responded to an interrogatory . . . must supplement or
correct its disclosure or response . . . in a timely manner if the party learns that in
some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if
the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to
the other parties during the discovery process or in writing . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) provides, in relevant part:
If a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the
party is not allowed to use that information . . . to supply evidence on a motion, at
a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
Entrata argues that “Yardi failed to assert or disclose its new copyright theory in
discovery, summary judgment briefing, or elsewhere in this case.” (ECF No. 850 at 4.) Entrata
argues that “Yardi’s response to Entrata’s interrogatories” “omit[ted] any mention of
copyrights.” (ECF No. 850 at 5.) On this point, Yardi responds that “[n]one of Entrata’s 58
interrogatories asks Yardi to identify the specific IP rights Yardi invoked for its SolidFX
Defense.” (ECF No. 873 at 7.)
The court rejects Yardi’s argument and finds that Yardi was required to include its
copyright defense in response to Entrata’s interrogatories. Interrogatory # 33 provided:
“[d]escribe with specificity every occasion on which You told any PM Vendor that it could not
participate in SIPP or otherwise Integrate its software or services with Your software . . .
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describing the form of each such communication, describing your reasons for not allowing the
PM vendor to Integrate its software or services with Your software . . . .” (ECF No. 871-2 at 7
(bold added).) Similarly, Interrogatory # 11 provided: “[i]dentify all facts relating to the creation,
development, and implementation of the Yardi Standard Interface Program, including Yardi’s
decision to bar third-party vendors from joining the Standard Interface Program . . . .” (ECF No.
871-1 at 28 (bold added).) These interrogatories required Yardi to describe its reasons for not
allowing Entrata to integrate its products with Yardi’s products. If Yardi’s protection of its
copyrights in its standard interface specifications and Voyager databases was its reason, it should
have responded to Entrata’s interrogatories accordingly. It did not. Rule 37(c)(1) bars Yardi from
using that information at trial.
Yardi also argues that it “raised its SolidFX Defense at the Outset of the Case.” (ECF No.
873 at 6.) In support, Yardi points to its counsel’s oral argument from a November 16, 2016
hearing on Yardi’s Motion to Dismiss. (See ECF No. 873 at 6 (citing (ECF No. 81 at 18–19).)
The court rejects this argument. This brief reference to SolidFX was not sufficient to put Entrata
on notice of Yardi’s copyright defense. Further, after Yardi’s Motion to Dismiss was denied, it
filed its Answer. Yardi’s Answer did not include its copyright defense.
Additionally, it is clear that the discovery that has been completed did not focus on
SolidFX as a defense. If it had been disclosed, the discovery that would have been taken would
have been different, and more complete—involving many issues that Yardi now asserts.
Allowing Yardi to argue that it is entitled to the presumption it argues for under SolidFX without
giving Entrata the ability to engage in full discovery on that issue would severely prejudice
Entrata. For all of these reasons, Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 8, (ECF No. 847) is GRANTED.

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Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 1 (ECF No. 669)
Yardi “moves the Court to preclude any evidence or references to pretrial discovery
conduct, disputes, or sanctions, pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.” (ECF No. 669 at 2.)
Entrata responds that “it does not intend to introduce the Court’s Orders regarding
Yardi’s discovery misconduct or resulting sanctions.” (ECF No. 774 at 4.) But Entrata argues
that Yardi’s “repeated bad faith efforts to conceal evidence of its unlawful actions are highly
relevant to the anticompetitive nature of its actions in the marketplace, the legitimacy . . . of its
proffered ‘business’ justifications, and its specific intent to monopolize the relevant markets . . .
.” (ECF No. 774 at 4.) Entrata seeks admission of the following categories of evidence:
•

Evidence related to Anant Yardi’s directive to copy-in-house counsel on documents to
avoid discovery;

•

“Yardi’s privilege claims as to nearly 9,000 documents that it later acknowledged were
discoverable;”

•

“the timing and circumstances of Yardi’s yCRM data productions and Yardi’s
misrepresentations, especially under oath about that data; and”

•

“[t]he substance of previously withheld or redacted documents and Yardi’s testimony
related to them.” Here, Entrata seeks to admit evidence that Mr. Bustany, Yardi’s inhouse-counsel, instructed Yardi employees to “discard older revisions” of the Sunset
Notice and seeks to admit evidence of Mr. Bustany’s conflicting deposition testimony.

(ECF No. 774 at 13–14.)
In reply, Yardi argues that (I) “[r]ules 402 and 403 foreclose Entrata’s attempts to parade
privilege assertions before the jury,” (II) “the history of Yardi’s production of yCRM data is

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irrelevant and prejudicial,” and (III) “evidence of Yardi’s privilege assertions and alleged
discovery misconduct are inadmissible.” (ECF No. 800 at 5; 9; & 11.)
The court has carefully considered the parties’ arguments. As stated at oral argument, the
court will not make a final ruling on Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 1, (ECF No. 669). The court
will rule on the admissibility of specific items of evidence at the time they are offered at trial. As
provided at oral argument, however, the court provides the following guidance:
•

With respect to Mr. Yardi’s directions as to counsel and whether those were followed up
with a particular course in terms of how discovery was carried out, the court is inclined to
allow that evidence to be received, depending on how the question is asked and whether
adequate foundation has been laid for the witness’s knowledge;

•

Regarding Yardi’s privilege claims as to nearly 9,000 documents that it later
acknowledged were discoverable, the court remains open to allowing that testimony, but
will require that there be a proffer as to what the testimony will be and who the witnesses
are that will be called to support it;

•

With respect to the yCRM data, the court enters a separate order on Entrata’s Motion for
Spoilation of Evidence, (ECF No. 718). That order provides that Entrata may introduce
evidence of Yardi’s failure to preserve yCRM data. If there is sufficient evidence that
Yardi acted with an intent to deprive Entrata of that data, the court will include a special
interrogatory in the final jury instructions that will allow the jury to decide Yardi’s intent.

•

Regarding the substance of Mr. Bustany’s email directing Yardi employees to “discard”
revisions of the Sunset Notice, the court is inclined to allow that evidence to be received,
depending on how the question is asked and whether adequate foundation has been laid

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for the witness’s knowledge. The court is also inclined to allow evidence of Mr.
Bustany’s inconsistent deposition testimony to be received.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 2 (ECF No. 670)
Yardi’s moves the court to “exclude any argument by Entrata that Yardi’s intellectual
property justifications for the alleged refusal to deal were a mere ‘pretext’ . . . .” (ECF No. 670 at
2.) As explained above, the court granted Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 8. That ruling precludes
Yardi from raising protection of its copyrights as defense against Entrata’s refusal to deal claims.
Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 2 is therefore MOOT.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 3 (ECF No. 671)
As Yardi points out in its Reply, “Yardi’s requested relief regarding specialty properties
is unopposed.” (ECF No. 802 at 4.) This portion of Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 3 is therefore
MOOT.
At oral argument, Yardi made clear that it is largely concerned that Entrata will ask Dr.
Rausser a question about “the later-produced yCRM data . . .” (See ECF No. 802 at 5.) Entrata
represented at oral argument that it would not ask Dr. Rausser about why he did not analyze the
later produed yCRM data. As the court explained at oral argument, to the extent Dr. Rausser is
asked a question on that topic, he should simply respond that he is not offering an opinion on that
data.
Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 3, (ECF No. 671) is DENIED.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 4 (ECF No. 672)
Yardi argues that the court “should exclude any references to counterclaims brought
against Yardi in a 2011 lawsuit that Yardi filed against RealPage . . . .” (ECF No. 672 at 2.)
Yardi argues that “the mere fact that RealPage brought [antitrust] counterclaims against Yardi in

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another lawsuit does not make any fact in this case more probable and has no consequence to this
case.” (ECF No. 672 at 3.)
In response, Entrata argues that evidence related to RealPage’s counterclaims “goes to
key issues at the heart of this litigation,” including “Yardi’s pretextual business justifications for
cutting off Entrata,” “Entrata’s market definitions,” and “Yardi’s dominant position as a
monopolist.” (ECF No. 777 at 5.) Regarding Yardi’s pretextual business justifications, Entrata
argues that Yardi allowed RealPage to join its Standard Interface even after Yardi had accused
RealPage of stealing its intellectual property. (See ECF No. 777 at 6.) Regarding market
definition, Entrata argues that Yardi’s reliance on RealPage’s 2016 10-K filing to attack Dr.
Kearl’s market definition is undercut by the fact that RealPage “defined the market for its own
antitrust counterclaims identically to what Dr. Kearl calls the Core Property Management
Systems market . . . .” (ECF No. 777 at 8.)
As provided at oral argument, the court GRANTS Yardi’s Motion in part and DENIES in
part. The court will not allow this case to become a trial about whether the allegations made by
RealPage were accurate or not accurate. The allegations were resolved by settlement, not trial.
They remain allegations, not proven facts. The court will not allow reference to the RealPage
counterclaims and the allegations made in those counterclaims—with two caveats. First, if Yardi
takes the position at trial that it has never done business with a company that it has previously
accused of stealing its intellectual property, then Entrata would be allowed to ask questions on
cross-examination about whether Yardi allowed RealPage to join the SIPP. Second, if Yardi
makes factual representations about the RealPage litigation that are inaccurate, Entrata will be
allowed to ask questions to rebut those representations. More specifically, if Yardi relies on
RealPage’s 10-K filing to attack Entrata’s market definition, the court will allow Entrata to

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introduce evidence of the RealPage’s counterclaim, and RealPage’s market definition in those
counterclaims.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 5 (ECF No. 673)
Yardi moves the court “to preclude Entrata . . . from offering evidence of or referencing
any supposed data security issues not located within interfaces.” (ECF No. 673 at 2.) More
specifically, Yardi argues that “any security issues concerning” Yardi’s Voyager Software are
irrelevant. (ECF No. 673 at 2.)
In response, Entrata argues Yardi put data security at issue in this case when it “told
customers . . . that it barred them from Entrata’s custom interface to enhance data security.”
(ECF No. 778 at 4.) Entrata seeks to introduce evidence that Yardi’s representations to customers
that “using Voyager with Yardi’s own standard interfaces” was more secure than “Entrata’s
custom interface” were false. (See ECF No. 778 at 4.) Entrata’s argues that Voyager’s security
vulnerabilities are relevant because those vulnerabilities are not completely distinct from Yardi’s
standard interface. (See ECF No. 778 at 7–8.)
In reply, Yardi argues that “[t]he alleged fact that certain supposed underlying
vulnerabilities in Voyager itself apply equally to Entrata’s custom interface and Yardi’s standard
interfaces does not bear on whether, for example, quarantining a portion of the Entrata custom
interface was a reasonable way to address a specific security vulnerability that existed in
Entrata’s custom interface.” (ECF No. 803 at 8.)
As explained at oral argument, the court DENIES Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 5, (ECF
No. 673). If Yardi introduces evidence that it cutoff Entrata’s custom interface because of data
security concerns, the court will allow Entrata to cross-examine Yardi’s witnesses about

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Voyager’s security vulnerabilities. This evidence is relevant to Yardi’s motivation to cutoff
Entrata.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 6 (ECF No. 674)
Yardi moves the court “to exclude any references to or evidence of the size or the
financial condition of Yardi . . . .” (ECF No. 676 at 2.) Entrata responds that “Yardi’s overall size
and financial condition, including its revenues and profitability, are highly relevant to” Yardi’s
willingness and ability to forsake short-term profits. (ECF No. 779 at 6–7.)
As explained at oral argument, the court DENIES Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 6, (ECF
No. 674). Yardi’s overall strength and profitability is a relevant issue in the case. Yardi’s
profitability in other markets is relevant to its ability forgo short term profits in the relevant
market. Entrata is entitled to put on evidence as to Yardi’s ability, because of its overall strength
and profitability, to forgo short term profits and its willingness to do so. If the presentation of
evidence goes beyond that limited issue, the court will sustain an objection.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 7 (ECF No. 677)
Yardi moves the court to exclude evidence or references to any prior judicial rulings or
attorney arguments with respect to any expert in this case. (See ECF No. 677 at 2.) More
specifically, Yardi seeks to prevent Entrata from “attack[ing] the general credibility and
reputation of” Yardi’s expert—Dr. Rausser. (See ECF No. 677 at 2.)
Entrata “opposes Yardi’s effort to shield Dr. Rausser from examination about [his]
serious prior misconduct.” (ECF No. 767 at 5.) Entrata argues that “Dr. Rausser’s prior
misconduct is admissible and he should confront cross examination on it . . . .” (ECF No. 767 at
11.)

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As explained at oral argument, the court DENIES Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 7, (ECF
No. 677). Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b)(1) provides that “extrinsic evidence is not admissible
to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s
character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired
into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . the witness.”
The court will allow Entrata, under Rule 608(b), to cross examine Dr. Rausser fully about his
prior acts. If Yardi believes that any of Entrata’s questions go beyond the scope of what that rule
allows, Yardi can object and the court will rule at that time.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 8 (ECF No. 678)
Yardi “moves the Court to exclude evidence of or reference to whether Yardi permits the
use of custom interfaces with respect to commercial property and asset management companies .
. . or any other non-conventional multifamily customer . . . .” (ECF No. 680 at 2.) Yardi argues
that “[t]he relevant inquiry is . . . Yardi’s conduct within the confines of the alleged markets for
managers of conventional multifamily properties, not commercial.” (ECF No. 680 at 2–3.)
Entrata responds that “Yardi’s different treatment of custom interfaces for multifamily
and non-multifamily customers is probative of pretext and specific intent.” (ECF No. 780 at 5.)
Entrata intends to “introduce evidence of Yardi’s . . . elimination of custom interfaces for only its
multifamily customers to show that Yardi’s claim that its conduct was justified because of data
security and data integrity concerns is merely pretext for its ‘anticompetitive motivation.’” (ECF
No. 780 at 5 (citation omitted).)
In Reply, Yardi argues that “the differences between custom interfaces for nonmultifamily customers and multifamily customers disposes of Entrata’s relevance claims.” (ECF
No. 805 at 5.) Yardi argues that “the custom interface for a commercial customer” is necessarily

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different from the custom interface for a multifamily customer because “every Yardi client has a
different database and because the custom interface is unique to that database.” (ECF No. 805 at
6.) More specifically, Yardi argues that it does not store personal information for commercial
clients, but does for multifamily customers.
As provided at oral argument, the court DENIES Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 8, (ECF No.
678). The court will allow Entrata to introduce evidence that Yardi continued to allow custom
interfaces for non-multifamily customers because this evidence is relevant to Yardi’s motivation
to cut off Entrata. To the extent that Yardi has valid reasons for cutting off customer interface for
only Entrata, and not commercial customers, Yardi may present evidence to the factfinder to
justify its decision.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 9 (ECF No. 681)
Yardi moved the court to exclude testimony by Dr. Kearl relating to damages for
Entrata’s remaining tort claim for false advertising. (See ECF No. 683 at 2.) Entrata subsequently
notified the court that Dr. Kearl “will not offer any opinion on damages associated with Entrata’s
second claim for false advertising . . . .” (ECF No. 838 at 2.) Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 9, (ECF
No. 681) is therefore MOOT.
Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 10 (ECF No. 684)
Yardi moves the court to exclude “testimony by Dr. Kearl relating to the purported
irrationality of Yardi’s conduct . . . .” (ECF No. 686 at 2.) Yardi argues that Dr. Kearl’s proposed
testimony “is an impermissible legal opinion . . . .” (ECF No. 686 at 2.) In response, Entrata
argues that “Dr. Kearl’s testimony on the economic rationality of Yardi’s conduct is well within
his expertise as an economist.” (ECF No. 782 at 4.)

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As the court provided at oral argument, the court DENIES Yardi’s Motion In Limine #
10, (ECF No. 684). Dr. Kearl is an economist. Economists regularly consider rationality from an
anticompetitive point of view as part of their analyses. The court will not preclude him from
expressing that opinion as an economist. To the extent that he has not given adequate notices of
opinions in his report, Yardi is free to challenge Dr. Kearl as going beyond what was provided in
his report. But to be clear, the court will not allow Dr. Kearl to express his views about what the
believes the law is.
Conclusion
As explained above, the court orders as follows:
I.

The court GRANTS Entrata’s Motion In Limine #1, (ECF No. 690).

II.

The court GRANTS Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 2, (ECF No. 693).

III.

The court DENIES as MOOT Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 3, (ECF No. 698).

IV.

The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 4,
(ECF No. 699).

V.

The court GRANTS Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 6, (ECF No. 708).

VI.

The court GRANTS Entrata’s Motion In Limine # 8, (ECF No. 847).

VII.

The court reserves ruling on Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 1, (ECF No. 669).

VIII.

The court DENIES as MOOT Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 2, (ECF No. 670).

IX.

The court DENIES Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 3, (ECF No. 671).

X.

The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 4, (ECF
No. 672).

XI.

The court DENIES Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 5, (ECF No. 673).

XII.

The court DENIES Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 6, (ECF No. 674).

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XIII.

The court DENIES Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 7, (ECF No. 677).

XIV. The court DENIES Yardi’s Motion in Limine # 8, (ECF No. 678).
XV.

The court DENIES as MOOT Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 9, (ECF No. 681).

XVI. The court DENIES Yardi’s Motion In Limine # 10, (ECF No. 684).

DATED this 3rd day of September, 2019

BY THE COURT:

____________________________________
Clark Waddoups
United States District Court Judge

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