Taren v. Reaves et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FORSUMMARY JUDGMENT - the court HERBY GRANTS Defendants Motion forSummary Judgment 60 . See Order for details. Signed by Judge Clark Waddoups on 5/16/19. (jmr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
MICHAEL THOMAS TAREN,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVE REAVES; MARK ACKER;
OGDEN CITY; OGDEN CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT; OGDEN CITY
ANIMAL SERVICES; and DOES 1-10,
Case No. 2:15-cv-333
Judge Clark Waddoups
Defendants.
Before the court is the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 60) filed by defendants
Steve Reaves, Mark Acker, Ogden City, Ogden City Police Department, and Ogden City Animal
Services (“Defendants”). Plaintiff Michael Taren (“Mr. Taren”) failed to respond to Defendants’
motion. Having reviewed the motion and the pleadings in this action, the court now enters this
order GRANTING Defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
On September 23, 2014, Mr. Taren was parked on the side of a street in Ogden, Utah.
(ECF No. 38, at ¶ 17, Amend. Compl.) His dog, Annie, was with him in the car. Id. Defendant
Officer Reaves approached Mr. Taren’s vehicle, and Mr. Taren drove away, and then abandoned
his car on foot, leaving Annie inside. Id. at ¶ 18. Officer Reaves, or another officer of defendant
Ogden City Police Department, impounded Annie. Id. Annie was thereafter placed in the
custody of the Weber County Animal Shelter. (ECF No. 60-1, at ¶¶ 3–6.) Mr. Taren was
arrested the next day and remained in jail throughout the events that gave rise to his complaint.
(ECF No. 38, at ¶¶ 20 & 24, Amend. Compl.) Thereafter, “sometimes before September 30,
2014,” an acquaintance of Mr. Taren, Mr. Reyna, attempted to retrieve Annie, but Weber County
Animal Shelter would not release her to him. Id. at ¶ 25. Annie was euthanized on September
30, 2014. Id. at ¶ 33. By Amended Complaint filed on August 4, 2017, Mr. Taren alleges that
Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by seizing and
destroying Annie without notice and asks this court to grant him declaratory judgment affirming
that Defendants had a constitutional duty to warn him before Annie was euthanized. Id. at ¶¶
40–63. Defendants move for summary judgment on each of these claims. Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment was filed and mailed to Mr. Taren on January 15, 2019. Mr. Taren has
not responded to the motion.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(A). A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of
showing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). “Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter.” Id. The
court must “view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sea Harvest Seafood Co., 251
F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2001).
Mr. Taren is proceeding pro se. While the court therefore interprets the allegations in the
complaint liberally, “even pro se litigants must do more than make mere conclusory statements
regarding constitutional claims.” Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing
2
United States v. Fisher, 38 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir.1994)). And although the court will not
require from Mr. Taren the formality expected of parties proceeding with the representation of
counsel, he “nevertheless must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”
Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). One of these such rules
is that “‘once a properly supported summary judgment motion is made, the opposing party may
not rest on the allegations contained in his complaint, but must respond with specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried.’” Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d
516, 519 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. 1979)).
Mr. Taren did not respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and although the Court
views the allegations of Mr. Taren’s Amended Complaint as true, in determining if summary
judgment is proper, Mr. Taren’s Amended Complaint cannot refute Defendants’ arguments.
A. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Taren’s first and second
causes of action because Mr. Taren abandoned Annie and because Defendants did
not have custody of Annie and were not responsible for her euthanasia.
Mr. Taren’s first and second causes of action allege that Defendants violated 42 USC §
1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments through four actions: 1) impounding Annie; 2)
euthanizing Annie; 3) not providing him notice that Annie would be euthanized; and 4) refusing
to release Annie to his authorized representative. The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no State shall “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The court
reads Mr. Taren’s pleadings to allege that the first two actions of Defendants violated the Fourth
Amendment and the second two violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
3
1. Defendants did not violate Mr. Taren’s Fourth Amendment rights.
It is uncontested that Defendants took Annie and put her in the custody of the Weber
County Animal Shelter. (ECF No. 38, at ¶ 18, Amend. Compl.; ECF No. 60-1, at ¶¶ 3–6.) This
clearly constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Mayfield v. Bethards, 826 F.3d
1252, 1256 (10th Cir. 2016) (“‘A “seizure” of property occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” (quoting United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). The Tenth Circuit has specifically recognized that “it is
unlawful to seize a dog absent a warrant or circumstances justifying an exception to the warrant
requirement.” Id. However, the Tenth Circuit has also recognized that “[w]hen individuals
voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit any expectation of privacy in it that they might have
had. Therefore, a warrantless search or seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted). Here, it is uncontested that Defendants only seized Annie because Mr. Taren had
abandoned her inside of his car as he fled from the police. (ECF No. 38, at ¶ 18, Amend.
Compl.) Thus, an “exception to the warrant requirement” existed, and it was not unreasonable,
and therefore not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, for Defendants to seize Annie.
Turning to Mr. Taren’s claim that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by
euthanizing Annie, the court finds that Defendants were not responsible for Annie’s death. In his
Amended Complaint, Mr. Taren’s alleges that Defendants impounded Annie with “Ogden
Animal Services” and that “Animal Services killed Annie.” (ECF No. 38, at ¶¶ 18 and 33,
Amend. Compl.) However, Defendants allege that, pursuant to Ogden City Ordinance 13-29(B), 1 they placed Annie in the custody of Weber County Animal Shelter, and that Weber
1
Ogden City Ordinance § 13-2-9(B) states that “[t]he animal services coordinator shall place all animals
which he/she takes into custody in the Weber County Animal Shelter. Weber County ordinances and regulations
4
County Animal Shelter was responsible for Annie’s euthanasia. 2 (ECF No. 60-1, at ¶¶ 3–6.)
Because Mr. Taren has not responded to Defendants’ motion or refuted these assertions, the
court treats them as uncontested. See Otteson, 622 F.2d at 519. Defendants did not euthanize
Annie and had no control over the entity that did euthanize her. They are not therefore
responsible for her death and cannot be found to have violated Mr. Taren’s constitutional rights.
Even if Defendants had been responsible for Annie’s euthanasia, such action was not a
violation of Mr. Taren’s constitutional rights. As recognized by the Tenth Circuit, “[k]illing a
dog meaningfully and permanently interferes with the owner’s possessory interest. It therefore
constitutes a violation of the owner’s Fourth Amendment rights absent a warrant or some
exception to the warrant requirement.” Mayfield, 826 F.3d at 1256. Again, because Mr. Taren
abandoned Annie, it was not unreasonable under, or a violation of, the Fourth Amendment for
Defendants to euthanize her. See Jones, 707 F.2d at 1172. While the court is sympathetic to the
emotional pain that Mr. Taren suffered as a result of Annie’s death, he simply does not have a
claim against Defendants. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Taren’s claims
that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
2. Defendants did not violate Mr. Taren’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Mr. Taren’s allegations that Defendants violated his rights by not providing notice that
Annie would be euthanized and by refusing to release Annie to his authorized representative
appear to be allegations that Defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Like Mr. Taren’s claims under the Fourth Amendment, these allegations fail
pertaining to the shelter shall apply.” That ordinance further requires that an animal be placed in custody if it is
“abandoned, neglected or distressed [such that its] health or safety may be threatened should the animal not be readily
placed into protective custody.” When Annie was abandoned in Mr. Taren’s car, her “health or safety [was]
threatened,” and Defendants were therefore required to place her in the custody of the Weber County Animal Shelter.
2
Weber County Ordinance § 6-5-4(1) states that “an animal impounded shall be held for a minimum of five
business days before further disposition.”
5
because Defendants were not responsible for Annie’s euthanasia or for any notification or
procedural requirements that prefaced it.
Under Ogden City Ordinance § 13-2-9(B), Defendants turned Annie over to the Weber
County Animal Shelter, and it was the Weber County Animal Shelter, who is not a party to this
action, who held and ultimately euthanized Annie. Defendants are not responsible for Weber
County Animal Shelter’s failure to notify Mr. Taren of Annie’s potential euthanasia. 3
Mr. Taren next argues that that his rights to due process were violated because defendant
Ogden City Animal Services refused to release Annie to his authorized representative, Mr.
Reyna. However, as is discussed above, defendant Ogden City Animal Services did not have
custody of Annie—Weber County Animal Shelter did. Thus, Defendants are not responsible for
Weber County Animal Shelter’s failure to release Annie to Mr. Reyna.
Finally, Mr. Taren argues that the reason he was not notified of the risk that Annie could
be euthanized, and that Annie was not released to Mr. Reyna, was because on September 23,
2014, defendant Mark Acker wrote on Annie’s Kennel card “If some[]one comes to claim this
dog contact Mark Acker im[m]ediately”; (2) “Please DO NOT release dog without contacting
Ogden Animal”; and (3) “if anyone calls or comes in, get all identification information possible,
just standard procedure.” (ECF No. 38, at ¶ 30, Amend. Compl. (emphasis and edits added by
Mr. Taren).) This note does not prohibit Annie from being released—it merely states that
defendant Mark Acker or defendant Ogden City Animal Services should be contacted before she
was released. This request was reasonable, given that it was made before Mr. Taren was arrested
3
The court recognizes that Weber County Ordinance § 6-5-4(1)(a) only requires that “[r]easonable effort
shall be made to notify the owner of any animal wearing a license or other identification,” and that Annie “did not
have any identifying collar or chip.” (ECF No. 38, at ¶ 26, Amend. Compl.) As such the court questions whether
Weber County Animal Shelter was even required, under its ordinance, to notify Mr. Taren that Annie was in its custody
and that she could be euthanized.
6
and was therefore written with the goal of finding him. Moreover, this note supports
Defendants’ assertions that Weber County Animal Shelter had custody of Annie, as it shows that
on September 23, 2014, the day Annie was seized by Defendants, defendant Ogden City Animal
Services no longer had control over her. Id. Thus, this note does not make Defendants
responsible for Weber County Animal Shelter’s failure to notify Mr. Taren of Annie’s euthanasia
or its failure to release Annie to Mr. Reyna. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary
judgment on Mr. Taren’s claims that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
B. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Taren’s claim for declaratory
judgment.
Mr. Taren’s final cause of action is for declaratory judgment and seeks a declaration that
Defendants had a duty under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to warn Mr. Taren “that
there was a chance that Defendants may euthanize Annie . . . before Defendants killed her.”
(ECF No. 38, at ¶ 63, Amend. Compl.) As discussed above, Defendants did not kill Annie, and
they were not responsible for her death. They did not therefore have a duty to warn Mr. Taren of
the possibility that she could be euthanized. Indeed, Defendants had no control over whether
Weber County Animal Shelter would euthanize Annie. Defendants are therefore entitled to
summary judgment on Mr. Taren’s request for declaratory judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court HERBY GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 60).
DATED this 16th day of May, 2019.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________
Clark Waddoups
United States District Judge
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?