Whittle v. Colvin

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER on Administrative Appeal. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 1/6/2016. (blh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CIRCELI WHITTLE,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,

Case No. 2:15-CV-379 TS

Defendant.

District Judge Ted Stewart

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Circeli Whittle’s appeal from the
decision of the Social Security Administration denying her application for disability insurance
benefits. Having considered the arguments of the parties, reviewed the record and relevant case
law, and being otherwise fully informed, the Court will affirm the administrative ruling.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s review of the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is limited to
determining whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. 1 “Substantial evidence ‘means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” 2 The ALJ is required to
consider all of the evidence, although he or she is not required to discuss all of the evidence. 3 If
supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings are conclusive and must be

1

Rutledge v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 2000).

2

Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
3

Id.

1

affirmed. 4 The Court should evaluate the record as a whole, including the evidence before the
ALJ that detracts from the weight of the ALJ’s decision. 5 However, the reviewing court should
not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 6
II. BACKGROUND
A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging

disability beginning on May 8, 2011. 7 The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on May 8, 2013. 8 The ALJ
issued a decision on August 16, 2013, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. 9 The Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March 24, 2015, 10 making the ALJ’s decision
the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review. 11
B.

MEDICAL HISTORY
On June 19, 2012, Plaintiff was seen by William Drenguis, M.D., complaining of back

pain, ulcers, and anemia. 12 Plaintiff reported to Dr. Drenguis that she was able to take care of
her daily personal needs and was able to take care of her pet cats. 13 Plaintiff stated that she did
4

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.

5

Shepherd v. Apfel, 184 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999).

6

Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 2000).

7

R. at 170–71.

8

Id. at 37–68.

9

Id. at 21–31.

10

Id. at 1–7.

11

20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a).

12

R. at 311.

13

Id. at 312.
2

her own shopping, cooking, and housekeeping, and enjoyed watching television and playing with
her cats. 14 Plaintiff stated she was able to walk approximately two blocks before stopping
because of fatigue and back pain, could sit for at least an hour, and could stand for about 15
minutes. 15
Upon examination, Plaintiff could walk from the waiting room to the exam room without
difficulty. 16 She could also take off and put on her shoes and get on and off the examination
table without assistance. 17 Plaintiff had a normal gait. 18 Plaintiff’s range of motion was limited
by lumbar pain and she had shooting pain in her left leg. 19
Dr. Drenguis diagnosed lumbar disk disease with symptoms consistent with a left L5
radiculopathy, duodenal ulcers, and a history of anemia. 20 Dr. Drenguis opined that Plaintiff
could stand and walk for a total of four hours in an eight-hour day, could sit for six hours, could
lift twenty pounds occasionally and lift ten pounds frequently, and could occasionally climb,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. 21
Plaintiff saw John T. Lloyd, Ph.D., on June 21, 2012. 22 Plaintiff stated that she had been
depressed for most of her life, but had not received much treatment. 23 Plaintiff stated that she
14

Id. at 312.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 313.

19

Id. at 313–314.

20

Id. at 314.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 316.

23

Id.
3

was isolated, did not go out, had suicidal thoughts and sleep problems, had memory problems,
and described herself as moody and irritable. 24
Dr. Lloyd noted that Plaintiff was appropriately dressed and groomed. 25 He stated that
Plaintiff was candid, and her speech was soft-spoken and abundant. 26 During the evaluation,
Plaintiff was cooperative, had good eye contact, and had no conversational difficulties. 27
Plaintiff had good recall and her attention and concentration were adequate. 28 Describing her
activities of daily living, Plaintiff stated that she took care of her cats, made meals, watched
television, took naps, and worked on the computer. 29
Dr. Lloyd diagnosed Plaintiff with dysthymic disorder, mood disorder due to chronic pain
and anemia, anxiety disorder, and assessed a GAF score of 60, reflecting moderate difficulties. 30
Plaintiff’s prognosis was guarded, as her depression was volatile and probably would be a lifelong issue. 31 However, Dr. Lloyd believed that as Plaintiff’s physical symptoms improved so
would her psychological symptoms. 32 Dr. Lloyd believed that Plaintiff could manage both
simple and complex occupations, but because of her depression and anxiety she may have
difficulty in occupations requiring her to have contact with other people. 33
24

Id.

25

Id. at 317.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 318.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 319.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.
4

In July 2012, Michael L. Brown, Ph.D., a state agency psychologist, reviewed the
evidence and assessed Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity. 34 Dr. Brown opined that
Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to carry out detailed instructions, maintain
attention and concentration for extended periods, and get along with coworkers or peers without
distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. 35 He found that Plaintiff was markedly
limited in her ability to interact appropriately with the general public. 36 Otherwise, he found no
significant limitations. 37 Dr. Brown concluded that Plaintiff could work in the proximity of
coworkers, but not collaboratively, could accept instructions from supervisors, but could not
work in jobs requiring interaction with the general public. 38
On November 16, 2012, John F. Robinson, Ph.D., a state agency psychologist, reviewed
Plaintiff’s record and conducted a mental residual functional capacity assessment. 39 Dr.
Robinson stated that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to understand and remember
detailed instructions, carry out detailed instructions, and maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods. 40 Dr. Robinson found that Plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability to

34

Id. at 80–82.

35

Id. at 80–81.

36

Id. at 81.

37

Id. at 80–82.

38

Id. at 82.

39

Id. at 97–98.

40

Id.

5

interact appropriately with the general public. 41 Dr. Robinson concluded that Plaintiff could
sustain concentration on simple repetitive and semi-complex tasks. 42
Plaintiff began treatment with Joseph Cress, M.D., on November 29, 2012. Plaintiff
presented with suicidal ideation with no plan. 43 She reported excessive worry, loss of
motivation, and lack of interest. 44 Plaintiff stated she had a history of depression that was
exacerbated by her health and financial issues. 45 Dr. Cress noted that Plaintiff was appropriately
dressed and groomed. 46 She was calm and cooperative. 47 Her eye contact was good, her speech
was normal, and a rapport was easily established. 48 While her mood was depressed, her affect
was appropriate. 49 Dr. Cress noted that there were no problems with Plaintiff’s thought process
or content, Plaintiff was alert and oriented, her attention and concentration were adequate, and
her memory was intact. 50 Plaintiff’s judgment, insight, and impulse control appeared adequate. 51
Dr. Cress diagnosed depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and assessed a GAF score of 60. 52

41

Id. at 98.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 462.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 463.

6

Plaintiff’s treatment goals were to focus on surviving, eliminating suicidal ideation, decreasing
worry and fear, and improving motivation. 53
Plaintiff saw psychiatric nurse practitioner Margaret M. Depew on December 15, 2012. 54
Plaintiff presented with mild emotional distress. 55 Plaintiff stated that she had been depressed
much of her life, and that stress and anxiety made it worse. 56 Ms. Depew noted that Plaintiff was
calm, cooperative, and in good behavioral control. 57 Plaintiff was well groomed and well
nourished. 58 She was able to sit calmly during the interview and was able to answer questions
fully. 59 Ms. Depew found that Plaintiff was alert and oriented and had appropriate recall and
attention. 60 Plaintiff had good insight into her mental illness, and her judgment and intelligence
were within normal limits. 61 Ms. Depew diagnosed major depression and rule out bipolar II
disorder, and assigned a GAF score of 55. 62 Ms. Depew created a treatment plan that included
medication and counseling. 63

53

Id.

54

Id. at 459–61.

55

Id. at 459.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 460.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 461.

63

Id.

7

Plaintiff saw Ms. Depew again on January 18, 2013. Plaintiff stated she was feeling
okay, but was weak and tired. 64 Ms. Depew noted that Plaintiff was alert, oriented, calm, and
cooperative. 65 Plaintiff had good behavior control, normal eye contact, and had a normal rate
and rhythm of speech. 66 Ms. Depew altered Plaintiff’s medication and continued counseling. 67
Plaintiff saw Dr. Cress on January 25, 2013. 68 Plaintiff reported that she was unable to
function in employment. 69 Dr. Cress noted mild progress in Plaintiff’s treatment and continued
counseling. 70 A visit with Dr. Cress on February 7, 2013, was similar. 71
On February 8, 2013, Plaintiff reported to Ms. Depew that she was feeling okay, but was
gaining weight possibly because of her medications. 72 Ms. Depew noted that Plaintiff was alert,
oriented, calm, and cooperative. 73 She had good behavioral control, normal eye contact, and her
speech was normal. 74 However, her mood and affect were depressed. 75 Ms. Depew continued
Plaintiff on medication without change and continued counseling. 76

64

Id. at 458.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 457.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 456.

72

Id. at 455.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

8

On February 22, 2013, Plaintiff reported that she was doing better on her current
medication, but was still gaining weight. 77 Ms. Depew adjusted Plaintiff’s medication and
continued her counseling. 78
Plaintiff saw Dr. Cress on February 28, 2013. 79 Dr. Cress noted some progress and
continued treatment. 80 Dr. Cress’ treatment notes from Plaintiff’s visits in April and May 2013
are similar. 81
Plaintiff saw Ms. Depew on March 29, 2013. 82 Plaintiff stated that she was feeling better
on her new medication and that she was losing weight. 83 Ms. Depew noted good mood
stability. 84 Plaintiff’s medication was increased and her counseling was continued. 85
On April 4, 2013, Dr. Cress completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do
Work-Related Activities. 86 On that form, Dr. Cress stated that Plaintiff had marked restrictions
in her ability to understand and remember simple instructions, understand and remember
complex instructions, carry out complex instructions, and the ability to make judgments on
complex work-related decisions. 87 Dr. Cress stated that Plaintiff had severe memory

77

Id. at 454.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 453.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 447–51.

82

Id. at 452.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id. at 415–17.

87

Id. at 415.

9

impairment, including short-term, recall, and long-term. 88 Dr. Cress further stated that Plaintiff
had marked restrictions in her ability to interact appropriately with the public and to respond
appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. 89 Dr. Cress
stated that Plaintiff had extreme restrictions in her ability to interact appropriately with
supervisors and co-workers. 90 Dr. Cress believed that Plaintiff had a limited ability to handle
stress because of pain and depression. 91 He further opined that Plaintiff could not focus, attend,
or concentrate, and could not sustain output over a modest period of time. 92 Finally, Dr. Cress
stated that Plaintiff had limited energy, both physical and mental, due to extreme anxiety and
depression. 93
In November 2013, Dr. Cress completed a Medical Opinion Questionnaire. 94 On that
form, Dr. Cress indicated that Plaintiff’s ability to perform the following activities was either
poor or nonexistent:
•

maintain socially appropriate behavior

•

adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness

•

remember work-like procedures

•

maintain attention for a two hour segment

•

maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances

•

sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision
88

Id.

89

Id. at 416.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 465–67.

10

•

work in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly distracted

•

complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically
based symptoms

•

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods

•

accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors

•

get along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting
behavior extremes

•

respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting

•

deal with normal work stress

•

understand and remember detailed instructions

•

carry out detailed instructions

•

set realistic goals or make plans independently of others

•

deal with stress of semiskilled and skilled work 95
In a letter submitted with the Medical Opinion Questionnaire, Dr. Cress stated:
Ms. Whittle was under my psychological care from November 2012 until
September 2013. At that time, she became homeless and left the area. During
that time interval I saw her between one and two times a month. She has the
diagnoses of major depression and bipolar II. Symptoms include suicidal
thoughts with a plan, significant sleep disturbance, and significantly decreased
appetite. She experienced ongoing fatigue, lethargy, and anhedonia. She felt
hopeless and helpless and had no motivation to do anything. During the time I
saw her, she was often in a melancholic state. She reported that she tried to work
but was unable to sustain any level of productivity. She has been on a host of
antidepressant medications including Prozac, Celexa, Effexor, and Lexapro.
None of the medications appeared to alleviate her significant depressive
symptoms. In addition to her psychological symptoms, she also has a history of
anemia, lower back pain, and dumping syndrome. We have been able to work
through suicidal episodes through intense psychotherapy and “no suicide
contracts.” 96

95

Id. at 466–67.

96

Id. at 468.

11

C.

HEARING TESTIMONY
At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert. Plaintiff

testified that she suffered from lower back pain and anemia. 97 Plaintiff explained that her back
pain radiated down her left side and that her anemia made her dizzy. 98 Plaintiff further testified
that she suffered from ulcers, which sometimes left her in severe pain. 99 Plaintiff stated that she
could make simple meals, do some chores, and go grocery shopping. 100 Plaintiff also stated that
she suffers from stress and anxiety. 101 She went on to testify that she suffers from panic attacks
and can have as many as two or three a day. 102 Plaintiff stated that she could only walk from one
room to the next before needing a break, could stand for 15 minutes at a time, and could sit for
up to 45 minutes or an hour before needing to stretch. 103
The ALJ asked the vocational expert to assume a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s
age, education, and work experience who could do sedentary work within the following
restrictions: no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional crouching, kneeling, crawling,
and climbing ramps and stairs; avoid concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures, excessive
vibration, poorly ventilated areas, moving machinery, and unprotected heights; occasional
interaction with coworkers; and no interaction with the general public. 104 The vocational expert

97

Id. at 48–49.

98

Id. at 49.

99

Id. at 52.

100

Id. at 53–54.

101

Id. at 55.

102

Id. at 56.

103

Id. at 57–58.

104

Id. at 64.

12

testified that such an individual could perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a data entry clerk
and transcriptionist. 105
D.

THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process in deciding Plaintiff’s

claim. At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since May 8, 2011, the alleged onset date. 106 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
suffered from the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, ulcers,
anemia, affective disorder, and anxiety disorder. 107 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed
impairment. 108 At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant
work and, therefore, was not disabled. 109
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises the following issues in her brief: (1) the ALJ failed to provide specific and
legitimate reasons for discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating specialist; and (2) the ALJ
erred by failing to consider Plaintiff’s work history in his credibility analysis.

105

Id. at 65.

106

Id. at 23.

107

Id. at 23–24.

108

Id. at 24–25.

109

Id. at 31.

13

A.

TREATING PHYSICIAN
Plaintiff first takes issue with the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Cress’s opinion. An ALJ must

review every medical opinion. 110 In reviewing the opinions of treating sources, the ALJ must
engage in a sequential analysis. 111 First, the ALJ must consider whether the opinion is wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques. 112 If the ALJ finds that
the opinion is well-supported, then he must confirm that the opinion is consistent with other
substantial evidence in the record. 113 If these conditions are not met, the treating physician’s
opinion is not entitled to controlling weight. 114
This does not end the analysis, however. Even if a physician’s opinion is not entitled to
controlling weight, that opinion must still be evaluated using certain factors. 115 Those factors
include:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2)
the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, including the treatment
provided and the kind of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to
which the physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency
between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is
a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors
brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to support or contradict the opinion. 116

110

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

111

Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003).

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 1301 (quoting Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001)).

14

After considering these factors, the ALJ must give good reasons for the weight he ultimately
assigns the opinion. 117 If the ALJ rejects the opinion completely, he must give specific,
legitimate reasons for doing so. 118
Plaintiff began treatment with Dr. Cress in late November 2012. On April 4, 2013, Dr.
Cress completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities. 119 On
that form, Dr. Cress stated that Plaintiff had marked restrictions in a number of areas, including
her ability to understand and remember simple instructions, understand and remember complex
instructions, carry out complex instructions, and the ability to make judgments on complex
work-related decisions. 120 Dr. Cress stated that Plaintiff had severe memory impairment,
including short-term, recall, and long-term. 121 Dr. Cress further stated that Plaintiff had marked
restrictions in her ability to interact appropriately with the public and to respond appropriately to
usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. 122 Dr. Cress stated that Plaintiff
had extreme restrictions in her ability to interact appropriately with supervisors and coworkers. 123 Dr. Cress believed that Plaintiff had a limited ability to handle stress because of pain
and depression. 124 He further opined that Plaintiff could not focus, attend, or concentrate, and

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

R. at 415–17.

120

Id. at 415.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 416.

123

Id.

124

Id.
15

could not sustain output over a modest period of time. 125 Finally, Dr. Cress stated that Plaintiff
had limited energy, both physical and mental, due to extreme anxiety and depression. 126
In November 2013, Dr. Cress completed a Medical Opinion Questionnaire. 127 On that
form, Dr. Cress indicated that Plaintiff’s ability to perform the following activities was either
poor or nonexistent:
•

maintain socially appropriate behavior

•

adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness

•

remember work-like procedures

•

maintain attention for a two hour segment

•

maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances

•

sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision

•

work in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly distracted

•

complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically
based symptoms

•

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods

•

accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors

•

get along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting
behavior extremes

•

respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting

•

deal with normal work stress

•

understand and remember detailed instructions

•

carry out detailed instructions

•

set realistic goals or make plans independently of others

•

deal with stress of semiskilled and skilled work 128
125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id. at 465–67.

16

The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Cress’ opinion. In reviewing Dr. Cress’ opinion, the
ALJ stated that there was “no objective support in the record for [his] drastic opinion, either in
the treatment notes of Ms. Depew . . . or in Dr. Cress’ treatment notes.” 129 The ALJ went on to
evaluate Dr. Cress’ treatment notes and found that the objective findings contained therein were
“not consistent with Dr. Cress’ opined severity of the claimant’s limitations.” 130
As set forth above, the ALJ must first determine whether the opinion is well-supported
and consistent with other substantial evidence. Here, the ALJ found that Dr. Cress’ opinion was
not supported and was inconsistent with the medical record. This conclusion is supported by
substantial evidence. While Dr. Cress stated that Plaintiff had extreme limitations in a number of
areas, that opinion is not supported by the evidence, including Dr. Cress’ own treatment notes.
Therefore, the ALJ was not required to give Dr. Cress’ opinion controlling weight.
Even if not given controlling weight, the ALJ must evaluate the opinion using the abovelisted factors and must provide good reasons for the weight ultimately given to that opinion.
Though the ALJ did not discuss all of these factors, it is clear that the ALJ evaluated Dr. Cress’
opinion using these factors. In so doing, the ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons for giving
little weight to that opinion. Specifically, the ALJ found that Dr. Cress’ opinion was not
supported by objective evidence, was not supported by the treatment notes of Dr. Cress and Ms.
Depew, and was not consistent with the other evidence in the record. These are all good reasons,
supported by substantial evidence, allowing the ALJ to give Dr. Cress’ opinion little weight.
Therefore, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Cress’ opinion.
128

Id. at 466–67.

129

Id. at 30.

130

Id. at 31.

17

B.

PLAINTIFF’S CREDIBILITY
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred in his credibility determination. Social Security

Ruling 96-7p sets out relevant factors an ALJ should consider in determining credibility. These
include:
(1) the individual’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and
intensity of the individual’s pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate
and aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects
of any medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other
symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has
received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures other than
treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g.,
lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping
on a board); and (7) any other factors concerning the individual’s functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 131
In determining credibility, the ALJ must consider the entire case record. 132 However, the
Tenth Circuit “does not require a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence . . . [s]o
long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in evaluating the claimant’s
credibility . . . .” 133 An ALJ’s “[c]redibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the
finder of fact, and [the reviewing court] will not upset such determinations when supported by
substantial evidence.” 134
The ALJ found “that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

131

SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3 (July 2, 1996).

132

Id.

133

Qualls, 206 F.3d at 1372.

134

Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted).

18

entirely credible.” 135 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider her work history in
making his credibility determination. 136
Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not specifically mention her work history in his
credibility analysis. However, her prior work was clearly in the record and was discussed by the
ALJ in his determination that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. The ALJ
specifically stated that he had considered all of the evidence. 137
Moreover, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s credibility determination.
As set forth above, the objective medical evidence does not support a finding that Plaintiff’s
symptoms were as disabling as Plaintiff asserted. Further, the evidence concerning Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living provide support for the ALJ’s credibility determination. This evidence
showed that Plaintiff was able to live on her own, take care of her household, care for her cats,
shop on her own, and otherwise take care of her daily needs. As the ALJ correctly noted,
Plaintiff’s “wide range of activities suggest that her limitations are not as significant as
alleged.” 138 Thus, while Plaintiff does have an exemplary work history, that history was just one
of many factors the ALJ could take into account in determining Plaintiff’s credibility. Therefore,
reversal is not required on this ground.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having made a thorough review of the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ’s
evaluation and ruling is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner’s
135

R. at 26.

136

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5.

137

R. at 21.

138

Id. at 26.

19

findings must be affirmed. Further, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal
standard in determining that Plaintiff is not disabled.
For the reasons just stated, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the decision below. The Clerk of
the Court is directed to close this case forthwith.
DATED this 6th day of January, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

Ted Stewart
United States District Judge

20