Preston v. Providence Hall Charter School

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting #10 Motion to Dismiss Second and Third Causes of Action without prejudice. Plaintiff is given leave to file an amended complaint no later than 12/21/15. Signed by Judge Jill N. Parrish on 12/7/15 (alt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

ERIN PRESTON,
Case No. 2:15-cv-589-JNP-BCW
Plaintiff,
v.
PROVIDENCE HALL CHARTER
SCHOOL,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND
AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
Judge Jill N. Parrish

Before the court is Defendant Providence Hall Charter School’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second and Third Causes of Action. (Docket 10).
BACKGROUND
This case presents a variety of claims arising from the August 2014 termination of Erin
Preston as superintendent of Providence Hall Charter School (“Providence Hall”). In her second
and third causes of action, Ms. Preston alleges that Providence Hall Charter School breached
contractual duties and violated her constitutional rights by not providing her due process before
terminating her employment. Providence Hall moves to dismiss the second and third causes of
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

ANALYSIS
I. Legal Standard
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To do so, a plaintiff must plead both a viable
legal theory and “enough factual matter, taken as true, to make [the] ‘claim to relief . . . plausible
on its face.” Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but
the complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,” and ultimately must “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
II. The Second and Third Causes of Action Are Inadequately Pleaded
Ms. Preston’s second and third causes of action share a common element that is at the
core of the Providence Hall’s argument for dismissal: whether there was a contract between Ms.
Preston and Providence Hall that afforded her a reasonable expectation of continued employment
and a contractual right to due process prior to termination. The parties agree that Utah law
governs the issue of whether a contract existed. In Utah, “[a]n employment relationship for an
indefinite term gives rise to a presumption that the employment relationship is at will.”
Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2014 UT 55, ¶ 11, 345 P.3d 523. Nonetheless, an employee “may
overcome this presumption by showing that the parties created an implied-in-fact contract,

modifying the employee’s at-will status.” Id. (quoting Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d
331, 333 (Utah 1992)). In determining whether an implied-in-fact contract exists, “[r]elevant
evidence of the parties’ intent may include announced personnel policies, employment manuals,
the course of conduct between the parties, and relevant oral representations.” Id. ¶ 12.
Ultimately, “[t]he existence of such an agreement is a question of fact which turns on the
objective manifestations of the parties’ intent and is primarily a jury question.” Id. (quoting
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991)).
In her response to Providence Hall’s motion, Ms. Preston relied heavily on provisions
contained in the Providence Hall Charter, which were not included in her complaint. At oral
argument Ms. Preston’s counsel suggested that other evidence not alleged in the complaint
would also support her claims. Counsel for Ms. Preston essentially conceded that the complaint
as pleaded was deficient and stated a willingness to amend the complaint to incorporate the
missing factual allegations.
Upon reviewing the complaint, the court agrees. Ms. Preston has failed to incorporate
sufficient factual allegations to plausibly allege the existence of a contract, whether express or
implied-in-fact, that would give rise to a reasonable expectation of continued employment. The
complaint includes only one vague allegation of alleged oral representations that Ms. Preston
would have a permanent position. (See Docket 1, Exhibit #1 First Amended Complaint ¶ 9).
Likewise, the complaint cites only the portion of the Providence Hall Charter guaranteeing due
process before an employee could be terminated. (See id. ¶ 84). But these two allegations alone
are insufficient to overcome the presumption under Utah law that Ms. Preston’s employment was
at will.

In the briefing and at oral argument, Ms. Preston identified additional facts that could
have been included in the complaint. Had those facts been incorporated into the complaint, the
court would have no difficulty finding a plausible claim that survives a motion to dismiss. For
this reason, the court grants Ms. Preston leave to amend the complaint to incorporate sufficient
factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief on the second and third causes of action.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Preston has inadequately pleaded her second and third causes of action. Accordingly,
the court GRANTS Providence Hall’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second and Third Causes of
Action. The dismissal is without prejudice. Ms. Preston is given leave to file an amended
complaint no later than December 21, 2015.

Dated this 7th

day of December, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

___________________________________
JILL N. PARRISH, Judge
United States District Court