Hansen v. Police Department of Salt Lake City
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER adopting in part 33 Report and Recommendation; granting in part and denying in part 24 Salt Lake City's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Jill N. Parrish on 9/29/2017. (blh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
LARRY HANSEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF SALT
LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Case No. 2:15-cv-00722-JNP-PMW
Defendant.
Judge Jill N. Parrish
Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation1 moved to dismiss plaintiff Larry Hansen’s second
amended complaint. [Docket 24]. Magistrate Judge Warner issued a Report and
Recommendation that this court grant the motion and dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
[Docket 33]. Mr. Hansen objected in part to the Report and Recommendation, but conceded that
several of his causes of action should be dismissed with prejudice. [Docket 34]. He
acknowledged that his first and second claims for gross negligence should be dismissed. He also
agreed that his third claim should be dismissed in part, but argued that the portion of this claim
that alleged a cause of action for violations of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution
should not be dismissed. Thus, the counts that remain in dispute in this case are the third claim
under Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, the fourth claim under Article 1, Section 11
of the Utah Constitution, and the Fifth claim for denial of his right to “access to the courts” under
the United States Constitution.
In the caption to his second amended complaint, Mr. Hansen named the defendant as
“The Police Department of Salt Lake City Corporation.” The court liberally construes the
complaint to allege claims against the proper defendant, the Salt Lake City Corporation.
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Because Mr. Hansen filed an objection, the court “must determine de novo” whether his
objections have merit. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any
part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”); see also United
States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e hold that a
party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and
specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review.”).
I.
OBJECTION TO DISMISSAL OF THE FIFTH CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF
MR. HANSEN’S RIGHT TO “ACCESS TO THE COURTS”
The United States Constitution guarantees access to the courts.2 Christopher v. Harbury,
536 U.S. 403, 414–15 (2002). A cause of action to vindicate this constitutional right may fit into
one of two categories. A forward-looking claim challenges government actions that effectively
bar a plaintiff from litigating a cause of action at the present time. Id. at 413. A forward-looking
claim seeks the removal of this impediment so that the plaintiff may pursue a remedy in the
courts. For example, prisoners may seek the use of a law library or plaintiffs may request the
waiver of filing fees that unreasonably impede access to a court of law. Id. A backward-looking
claim, on the other hand seeks damages caused by government actions that prevented a plaintiff
from litigating a cause of action that can no longer be pursued no matter what the government
does in the future. Id. at 413–14.
Mr. Hansen asserts a backward-looking access to the courts claim. He alleges that the Salt
Lake City Police Department failed to properly investigate his assault and identify his assailant.
The precise source of this right is somewhat hazy. At different times, the Supreme Court
has cited the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause,
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause,
or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as the foundation for the right to access to the
courts. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002).
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The department’s substandard investigation, he argues, prevented him from suing his attacker.
Because the statute of limitations has now run on his claim against this unknown individual, Mr.
Hansen is now prevented from ever asserting a tort claim in the courts. He contends, therefore,
that Salt Lake City violated his constitutional right to access to the courts and that the city should
now be held liable for the damages that he would have recovered in a lawsuit against his
assailant.
Judge Warner recommends that Mr. Hansen’s access to the courts claim be dismissed
because he does not have a constitutional right to the arrest or criminal prosecution of another
person. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (“[T]he benefit
that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not
trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive’
manifestations.”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks
a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). Mr. Hansen
objects, arguing that the cases cited in the Report and Recommendation are distinguishable and
do not address an access to the courts claim. This court determines that it is not necessary to
resolve the specific objection raised by Mr. Hansen. Upon reviewing Mr. Hansen’s access to the
court claim, the court determines that dismissal of this claim is required for an independent
reason: The constitutional right to access to the courts does not require a police department to
allocate some constitutional minimum amount of its resources to identify the perpetrator of a
crime so that the victim can sue the perpetrator.
The circuit courts that have recognized a backward-looking access to the courts claim
have only done so in cases where “obstructive actions by state actors” has prevented an
individual from pursuing a civil claim. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 174 (6th Cir.
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2013). The Tenth Circuit, for example, has suggested that where law enforcement officers
threatened to revoke a potential plaintiff’s probation if he filed a civil rights action based upon
his arrest, such conduct may violate the right of access to the courts. McKay v. Hammock, 730
F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit has held that that planting evidence to
conceal an unlawful killing committed by police officers unconstitutionally deprived the
deceased’s family members of an opportunity to vindicate the killing through judicial redress.
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit has also held
that “if state officials wrongfully and intentionally conceal information crucial to a person’s
ability to obtain redress through the courts, and do so for the purpose of frustrating that right, and
that concealment and the delay engendered by it substantially reduce the likelihood of one’s
obtaining the relief to which one is otherwise entitled, they may have committed a constitutional
violation.” Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1989); accord Flagg, 715 F.3d at 173
(“In backward-looking [access to the courts] claims, . . . the government is accused of barring the
courthouse door by concealing or destroying evidence so that the plaintiff is unable to ever
obtain an adequate remedy on the underlying claim.”); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 328
(7th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen police officers conceal or obscure important facts about a crime from
its victims rendering hollow the right to seek redress, constitutional rights are undoubtedly
abridged.”).
Mr. Hansen’s claim is qualitatively different from the claims made in the cases that have
recognized a backward-looking access to the courts cause of action. He does not allege that Salt
Lake City actively obstructed his civil suit against his unknown assailant or that the city
destroyed or concealed evidence. Mr. Hansen’s claim is that the city did not try hard enough to
assist his civil litigation efforts against an unknown third party. But, “[t]he constitutional right of
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access to the civil courts plainly does not encompass a right to receive assistance in gaining
access to the civil courts.” Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1116 (3d Cir. 1990).
Because the Constitution does not impose a duty on government entities to actively assist
the civil litigation efforts of crime victims, Mr. Hansen’s federal access to the courts claim fails
as a matter of law. This fundamental legal impediment makes amendment of this claim futile.
Therefore, Mr. Hansen’s fifth cause of action for violations of his right to access to the courts is
dismissed with prejudice.
II.
OBJECTIONS TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE THIRD CLAIM UNDER ARTICLE
1, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH CLAIM
UNDER ARTICLE 1, SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Judge Warner also recommended that Mr. Hansen’s claims under the Utah Constitution
be dismissed because lawsuits based upon injuries proximately caused by assault and battery or
the violation of civil rights are barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. UTAH CODE
§ 63G-7-201(4)(b). Mr. Hansen objected, arguing that “the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
does not apply to claims alleging state constitutional violations.” Jensen ex rel. Jensen v.
Cunningham, 250 P.3d 465, 479 (Utah 2011).
The court need not reach the merits of Mr. Hansen’s objection because the court
dismisses without prejudice his state constitutional claims for an independent reason. As noted
above, all of Mr. Hansen’s federal claims have been dismissed. “When all federal claims have
been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any
remaining state claims.” Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156
(10th Cir. 1998). Because the only remaining claims arise under the Utah Constitution, and
because Mr. Hansen acknowledges that his state constitutional claims raise several novel
questions of state law, the court dismisses his constitutional claims under Article 1, Section 7 and
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Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution without prejudice. Mr. Hansen may refile his
claims in state court if he wishes to pursue them.
CONCLUSION
The court ORDERS as follows:
(1) The Report and Recommendation [Docket 33] is ADOPTED IN PART. The court
adopts the portions of the Report and Recommendation that recommend the dismissal
with prejudice of the first and second claims for gross negligence and the portion of
the third claim that seeks to vindicate Mr. Hansen’s right “to substantive and
procedural due process of law, and the equal protection thereof” under the United
States Constitution.
(2) Salt Lake City’s motion to dismiss with prejudice [Docket 24] is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. The court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the first
and second claims for gross negligence, the portion of the third claim that seeks to
vindicate Mr. Hansen’s right “to substantive and procedural due process of law, and
the equal protection thereof” under the United States Constitution, and the fifth claim
under the federal constitutional guarantee of “access to the courts.” The court
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the portion of the third claim that seeks
redress under Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth claim,
which seeks redress under Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
SO ORDERED September 29, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
______________________________________
JILL N. PARRISH
United States District Judge
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