Leonard et al v. White Horse Development et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER-granting in part and denying in part 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Garletts' Motion to Dismiss 8 is denied as to Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, and granted with respect to Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief. Signed by Judge David Sam on 2/1/16. (jmr)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
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CURTIS LEONARD, ET AL..,
)
Plaintiffs,
)
vs.
Case No.
2:15-cv-00728 DS
)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
)
WHITE HORSE DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, LLC, ET AL.,
Defendants.
)
)
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I. INTRODUCTION
This litigation arises out of Plaintiffs’ endeavors to have a vacation home built for
them in Moab Utah. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendants Garlett Construction,
Inc., and Chuck Garlett (collectively “Garletts”) move to dismiss Claims Two and Seven
of the Complaint directed against them for failure to state a claim for relief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint must plead
sufficient facts, that when taken as true, provide “plausible grounds” that “discovery will
reveal evidence” to support plaintiff’s allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a “complaint with enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that he or she is entitled to relief. Id. “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. The
allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just
speculatively) has a claim for relief. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th
Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claim Two - Slander of Title/Wrongful Lien
Garletts contend that “[p]ursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-103(3) a Construction
Lien cannot be a wrongful lien and [Plaintiffs’] Second Claim for Relief fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” Mem. Supp. at 2.1
Plaintiffs respond that a lien claimant cannot evade the Wrongful Lien Act by
asserting that the lien is provided by statute and, therefore, it cannot be wrongful.2
Although, Plaintiffs’ opposition memorandum is not entirely responsive to Garletts’
position, which is not that their lien is provided by statute and, therefore, not wrongful, but
rather that the Wrongful Lien Act expressly does not apply to their lien based on the
language of § 38-9-103(3), the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ Second Claim sufficiently
states a claim for relief for purposes of the present motion . See Bay Harbor Farm, LC,
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-103(3) provides: “This chapter [Wrongful Lien Act] does
not apply to a person entitled to a preconstruction or construction lien under Section 38-1a301 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1a, Preconstruction and Construction
Liens.” The Complaint alleges that Garletts performed construction work on the project
property. Section 38-1a-301 (Preconstruction and Construction Liens) provides that “...a
person who provides preconstruction service or construction work on or for a project
property has a lien on the project property for the reasonable value of the ... service or ...
work ... as provided in this chapter.”
1
Plaintiffs rely on Total Restoration, Inc. V. Merritt, 338 P.3d 836, 841 (Utah App.
2014), and Bay Harbor Farm, LC, 329 P.3d 46, 48 (Utah App. 2014), to argue that a lien
claimant cannot escape the Wrongful Lien Act merely by alleging that the lien is authorized
by statute
2
2
329 P.3d at 48 (“if a lien claimant has no plausible claim to the property that is the subject
of the lien, a court may declare the lien wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act even if it
purports to be one falling into the category of statutorily authorized lines”). See also Hutter
v. Dig-It, Inc., 219 P.3d 918, 929-931 (Utah 2009)(discussing Wrongful Lien Act provision
that specifically exempted mechanic’s liens from its operation). Because the Complaint
alleges that Plaintiffs at all times paid the amounts due, that Garletts submitted lien
releases, and that the lien was improperly filed, Compl. ¶¶ 52-54, the Court concludes
that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient under the applicable standard of review to survive
the present motion. Garletts’ motion as to Claim Two, therefore, is denied.
B. Claim Seven - Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Garletts next urge that Plaintiffs’ Seventh Claim, for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, which is essentially based on Garletts recording a construction lien against
Plaintiffs’ vacation home, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
Court agrees.
To prevail on their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
the plaintiff[s] must show the following:
If the actor unintentionally causes emotional
distress to another, he is subject to liability to the
other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the
actor (a) should have realized that his conduct
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the
distress, ... and (b) from facts known to him,
should have realized that the distress, if it were
caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
[It has previously been held] that it is not enough for a plaintiff to merely
allege emotional distress. Instead, [they] must prove that distress by means
of severe physical or mental manifestations.
3
Carlton v. Brown, 323 P. 3d 571, 585 (Utah 2014)(citations and footnotes omitted).
A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be supported by either
mental or physical illness, but must be such that “‘a reasonable [person], normally
constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the
circumstances of the case’”. Id. at n.43 (quoting Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858
P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 1993)). Contrary to Garletts’ characterization of Plaintiffs’ failed effort
to paint “a monstrous, atrocious and heinous act”, Reply at 4, allegations of outrageous
conduct are not required. See Anderson Dev. Co. V. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 339 (Utah
2005) (“Unlike a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress does not require proof of outrageous conduct.”).
Case authority supports dismissal of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim
where the claimant “failed to allege that the distress he claimed to have suffered
manifested itself through severe mental or physical symptoms.” Carlton, 323 P. 3d at 585.
And relevant here is the holding of the Utah Supreme Court that “allegations of abusive
litigation, without more, cannot support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.”
Anderson Dev. Co. , 116 P.3d at 340. It is difficult to view plaintiffs’ claim of emotional
distress as any more egregious than the abusive litigation discussed in Anderson Dev. Co.
Because Plaintiffs’ have failed to allege that the distress suffered manifested itself
through severe mental or physical symptoms, Garletts’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Seventh
Claim as to them is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Garletts’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #8) is denied as to
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Plaintiffs’ Second Claim for Relief, and granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ Seventh Claim
for Relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 1st day of February, 2016
BY THE COURT:
DAVID SAM
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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