Casey v. State of Utah Third Judicial District Court et al
Filing
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ORDER & MEMORANDUM DECISION denying 14 Motion to Appoint Counsel; however, if, after the case develops further, it appears that counsel may be needed or of specific help, the Court will ask an attorney to appear pro bono on Plainti ff's behalf. denying 15 Motion for Service of Process (Prisoner); denying 19 Motion for Default Judgment. Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Amended Complaints deficiencies noted in this order. The Clerk's Office shall mail P laintiff a copy of the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a form complaint and habeas petition for Plaintiff to use should he choose to file an amended complaint or a habeas-corpus petition. If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice. Signed by Judge Jill N. Parrish on 6/23/16. (jlw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
MICHAEL SHAWN CASEY,
Plaintiff,
ORDER & MEMORANDUM DECISION
v.
Case No. 2:15-CV-891-JNP
STATE OF UTAH et al.,
Defendants.
District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Plaintiff, inmate Michael Shawn Casey, filed this pro se civil rights suit, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, in forma pauperis, see 28 id. § 1915. The Court now screens his Amended Complaint
and orders Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint to cure deficiencies before further
pursuing his claims.
A. Deficiencies in Amended Complaint
Amended Complaint:
(a) is not on the form required by the Court.
(b) improperly names Dean H. Becker and Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association as
defendants, without considering that public defenders are not considered to be state
actors subject to suit under § 1983.
(c) improperly names "State of Utah" as a defendant, though there is no showing that it
has waived its governmental immunity (see below).
(d) appears, for some issues, to be filed past the applicable statute of limitation (see
below).
(e) possibly alleges claims that concern the constitutionality of his conviction and/or
validity of his imprisonment, which should be brought in a habeas-corpus petition,
not a civil-rights complaint.
(f) alleges claims that are possibly invalidated by the rule in Heck (see below).
(g) has claims appearing to be based on conditions of current confinement; however, the
complaint was apparently not submitted using the legal help Plaintiff is entitled to by
his institution under the Constitution. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996)
(requiring prisoners be given "'adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law' . . . to ensure that inmates . . . have a reasonably adequate
opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or
conditions of confinement") (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)
(emphasis added)).
B. Instructions to Plaintiff
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "(1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the
relief sought." Rule 8's requirements mean to guarantee "that defendants enjoy fair notice of
what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest." TV Commc'ns Network,
Inc. v ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991).
Pro se litigants are not excused from complying with these minimal pleading demands.
"This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts
surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine
whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the Court "to assume the role of advocate for
a pro se litigant." Id. Thus, the Court cannot "supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal
theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded." Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d
1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff should consider the following points before refiling his complaint. First, the
revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by
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reference, any portion of the original complaint. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612
(10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supersedes original).
Second, the complaint must clearly state what each defendant--typically, a named
government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d
1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is
essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear
exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, No. 08-2222, slip op. at 4
(10th Cir. July 20, 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma,
519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Third, Plaintiff cannot name an individual as a defendant based solely on his or her
supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
supervisory status alone does not support § 1983 liability).
Fourth, "denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of
constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983."
Gallagher v. Shelton, No. 09-3113, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25787, at *11 (10th Cir. Nov. 24,
2009).
• Immunity
Fifth, as to claims that have been made against the State, generally, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents "suits against a state unless it has waived its immunity or consented to suit,
or if Congress has validly abrogated the state's immunity." Ray v. McGill, No. CIV-06-0334-HE,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51632, at *8 (W.D. Okla. July 26, 2006) (unpublished) (citing Lujan v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 F.3d 1511, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995); Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrs., 846
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F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff asserts no basis for determining that the State has
waived its immunity or that it has been abrogated by Congress. Because any claims against the
State appear to be precluded by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court believes it has no
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider them. See id. at *9.
• Statute of Limitations
Sixth, "Utah's four-year residual statute of limitations . . . governs suits brought under
section 1983.” Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff's claims accrued
when "'facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.'” Id. at 675 (citation
omitted. Some of the circumstances underlying these claims appear to have occurred more than
four years before this case was filed.
• Heck
Finally, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims appear to involve some allegations that
if true may invalidate his conviction and/or sentencing. "In Heck, the Supreme Court explained
that a § 1983 action that would impugn the validity of a plaintiff's underlying conviction cannot
be maintained unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal or impaired by collateral
proceedings." Nichols v. Baer, No. 08-4158, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4302, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar.
5, 2009) (unpublished) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Heck prevents
litigants "from using a § 1983 action, with its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their
conviction or sentence without complying with the more stringent exhaustion requirements for
habeas actions." Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Heck clarifies that "civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments." 512 U.S. at 486.
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Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in a way that may attack
Petitioner's very imprisonment. Heck requires that, when a plaintiff requests damages in a §
1983 suit, this Court must decide whether judgment in the plaintiff's favor would unavoidably
imply that the conviction or sentence is invalid. Id. at 487. Here, it appears it may regarding
some claims. If this Court were to conclude that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated in
a prejudicial manner, it would be stating that Plaintiff's conviction and/or sentence were not
valid. Thus, the involved claims "must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. This has apparently not happened and
may result in dismissal of such claims.
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
The Court now addresses Plaintiff's motion for the Court to request pro bono counsel to
represent him. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel. See Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d
613, 616 (10th Cir. 1995); Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397, 399 (10th Cir. 1987).
However, the Court may in its discretion appoint counsel for indigent plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C.S.
§ 1915(e)(1) (2016); Carper, 54 F.3d at 617; Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir.
1991). "The burden is upon the applicant to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to
his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel." McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838
(10th Cir. 1985).
When deciding whether to appoint counsel, the district court should consider a variety of
factors, "including 'the merits of the litigant's claims, the nature of the factual issues raised in the
claims, the litigant's ability to present his claims, and the complexity of the legal issues raised by
the claims.'" Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Williams, 926
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F.2d at 996); accord McCarthy, 753 F.2d at 838-39. Considering the above factors, the Court
concludes here that, at this time, Plaintiff's claims may not be colorable, the issues in this case
are not complex, and Plaintiff is not at this time too incapacitated or unable to adequately
function in pursuing this matter. Thus, the Court denies for now Plaintiff's motion for appointed
counsel.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Amended Complaint’s deficiencies
noted above.
(2) The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff a copy of the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a
form complaint and habeas petition for Plaintiff to use should he choose to file an
amended complaint or a habeas-corpus petition.
(3) If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's
instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice.
(4) Plaintiff’s motion for service of process is DENIED. (See Docket Entry # 15.)
There is no valid complaint on file to serve. Moreover, the Court will screen and
order service of process on prisoner complaints without prompting. So, no
motions of this kind are ever needed.
(5) Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is DENIED. (See Docket Entry # 19.)
(6) Plaintiff's motion for appointed counsel is DENIED, (see Docket Entry # 14);
however, if, after the case develops further, it appears that counsel may be needed
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or of specific help, the Court will ask an attorney to appear pro bono on Plaintiff's
behalf.
DATED this 23rd day of June, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
JUDGE JILL N. PARRISH
United States District Court
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