Robert D. Geringer v. D. Ray Strong

Filing 36

MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Motion of Defendant D. Ray Strong, in his capacity as Liquidating Trustee of the Liquidating Trust for the Consolidated Legacy Debtors, the Liquidating Trust for Castle Arch Opport unity Partners I, LLC, and the Liquidating Trust for Castle Arch Opportunity Partners II, LLC, to Change Venue to the United States District Court for the District of Utah 19 is hereby GRANTED. ( MD JS-6. Case Terminated ) Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk) [Transferred from California Central on 5/10/2016.]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

Present: The Honorable

Date

‘O’

May 9, 2016

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk

Laura Elias
Court Reporter / Recorder

N/A
Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Kerry Fowler

Bryan McGarry
Milo Marsdem

Proceedings:

I.

MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE TO THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(Dkt. 19, filed March 22, 2016)

INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 2015, plaintiff Robert D. Geringer (“Geringer” or “plaintiff”)
filed the instant action against defendant D. Ray Strong (“Trustee,” “defendant,” or
“defendant-Trustee”), in his capacity as Liquidating Trustee of the Liquidating Trust for
the Consolidated Legacy Debtors, the Liquidating Trust for Castle Arch Opportunity
Partners I, LLC, and the Liquidating Trust for Castle Arch Opportunity Partners II, LLC.
Dkt. 1 (“Declaratory Relief Complaint”).
On March 22, 2016, defendant-Trustee filed the instant motion to change venue to
the District of Utah. Dkt. 19 (“Motion”). On April 18, 2016, plaintiff filed an opposition
to the instant motion. Dkt. 29 (“Opp’n”). On April 25, 2016, defendant-Trustee filed a
reply. On May 6, 2016, plaintiff filed a request for leave to file a sur-reply.1 Dkt 35
1

Generally, pursuant to Local Rule 7-10, no party shall file a response to a reply
absent prior written order of the Court. However, a district court may grant leave to file a
surreply “where a valid reason for such additional briefing exists . . . .” Hill v. England,
No. CVF05869RECTAG, 2005 WL 3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005). Among
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 1 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

(“Sur-Reply”). On May 9, 2016, the Court provided the parties with a tentative order and
held oral argument on the instant motion. Having carefully considered the parties’
arguments, the Court finds and concludes as follows.
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

General

Castle Arch Real Estate Investment Company, LLC (“CAREIC”) was organized as
a California limited liability company in April 2004, and commenced its business in
December 2005. Geringer Decl. at ¶ 3. Its business model is to acquire real property,
obtain zoning and other entitlements for its real property, and to develop and/or resell its
property for a profit. Id. Plaintiff Robert D. Geringer was the President of CAREIC and
a member of its Board of Directors from its inception in 2004 until his resignation in July
2009. Geringer Compl. at ¶ 23. As President, Geringer had power and authority over the
business, affairs, and property of the Company. Id.
Defendant D. Ray Strong brings the instant motion as the (i) postconfirmation
estate representative of CAREIC, CAOP Managers, LLC, Castle Arch Kingman, LLC,
Castle Arch Smyrna, LLC, Castle Arch Secured Development Fund, LLC, Castle Arch
Star Valley, LLC and Castle Arch Opportunity Partners I, LLC (collectively, the

other “valid reasons,” the district courts have recognized that a sur-reply may be an
appropriate vehicle to submit new authorities or evidence that were unavailable at the
time an opposition was filed. St John v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 8:10ML02151 JVS
FMOX, 2013 WL 5775072, at *1-*2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2013) (striking a declaration as
violative of Local Rule 7-10 where the “additional authority” attached was not new and
had been available at the time the opposition was filed). Because plaintiff’s sur-reply
cites evidence obtained after the filing of plaintiff’s opposition, plaintiff’s request for
leave to file a sur-reply is hereby GRANTED.
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 2 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

“Debtors”), and (ii) Liquidating Trustee of the Consolidated Legacy Debtors Liquidating
Trust and the Castle Arch Opportunity Partners I, LLC Liquidating Trust (together, the
“Trusts”), appointed in such capacities in the bankruptcy case styled as In re Castle Arch
Real Estate Investment Company, LLC, et al., Case No. 11-35082 (the “Bankruptcy
Case”), filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah.2 To date,
defendant-Trustee has commenced over 36 lawsuits in the Utah courts arising out of the
CAREIC Bankruptcy Case. Trustee Dec. at ¶ 7.
In his motion, defendant-Trustee argues that “[t]his case is a small slice of a much
larger and more comprehensive action that has been underway in federal court in Utah for
more than a year.” Motion at 1. Indeed, defendant-Trustee is the plaintiff in two actions
pending in the District of Utah: Strong v. Cochran, et al., Civil No. 2:14-cv-788–TC-EJF
(D. Utah) (the “Insider Action”), filed on October 30, 2014; and Strong v. Geringer, Civil
No. 2:15-cv-00837 (D. Utah) (the “Geringer Action”), filed on November 24, 2015
(nearly three weeks after the filing of the instant action). The Geringer Action and the
Insider Action (collectively, the “Utah Actions”) arise out of alleged fraudulent conduct

2

By way of background: On October 17, 2011, a court-appointed receiver filed a
voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for CAREIC in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Utah. On May 3, 2012, the Trustee was appointed the Chapter
11 Trustee for CAREIC. Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 215. In that capacity, the Trustee
managed, either directly or indirectly, each of the other Debtors. See id; Geringer Compl.
at ¶ 13; Insider Compl. at ¶12. On February 8, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court substantively
consolidated most of the Debtors. See Bankruptcy Case Dkt. Nos. 590 and 591. On June
7, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Confirming the Chapter 11 Trustee’s
First Amended Plan of Liquidation, dated February 25, 2013, which, among other things,
assigned to the Trusts all claims and causes of action held by creditors of, or investors in
the Debtors, against the Insiders, including Geringer. Geringer Compl. at ¶ 16; Insider
Compl. at ¶ 15.
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 3 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

and breaches of fiduciary duty committed by Robert D. Geringer, the plaintiff in this
action, and five other officers and directors of CAREIC (the “Insiders”).
B.

The 2014 Insider Action (filed in Utah by Trustee on October 30, 2014)

Defendant-Trustee asserts that in January 2013 he first sent a letter to Geringer
(and each of the other CAREIC Insiders) notifying them that he planned to assert claims
against them for “errors, misstatements, misleading statements, acts, omissions,
negligence, and breaches of duty [that they] had committed” in their respective capacities
at CAREIC. See Trustee Decl., Ex. 4. The letter further stated that the Trustee would file
a complaint against Geringer at an appropriate time and invited “discuss[ing] the
possibility of settling the Trustee’s claims” before then. Id. By October 2013––a year
before the complaint against the Insiders would ultimately be filed––the Trustee had
prepared a single complaint naming both the “Insiders” and Geringer as defendants.
Accordingly, on October 12, 2013, the Trustee emailed a copy of the draft Complaint to
both the Insiders and Geringer, further inviting them to execute tolling agreements so that
the parties could continue to explore settlement. See Trustee Decl., Ex. 5.
The Trustee first began direct settlement discussions with Geringer on June 17,
2014. See Trustee Decl. at ¶ 12. After that time, Geringer requested––according to the
Trustee––that the Trustee refrain from naming Geringer as a defendant in the Insider
Action and refrain from filing the already-prepared complaint against him while the
parties explored further settlement discussions, including mediation. Id. at ¶ 14.
Ultimately, on October 30, 2014, the Trustee filed an action in the District of Utah
against only the Insiders, alleging that they breached their fiduciary duties in a number of
ways.3 Geringer, however, was not named as a defendant in the 2014 Insider Action.4

3

The defendants named in the Insider Complaint were CAREIC’s CEO, CFO, Sr.
Vice President of Business Development, Chairman of the Board of Directors, and
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 4 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

The Trustee avers, however, that although Geringer was not named as a defendant in the
2014 Insider Action, this was only because settlement discussions with him remained
ongoing at the time and he requested not to be named while such discussions continued.
C.

Continuing Settlement Discussions with Geringer through November
2015

The Trustee and Geringer ultimately agreed to mediation before the Honorable
Randall J. Newsome (retired). Id. at ¶ 17. The various mediation sessions took place in
San Francisco and focused on the Trustee’s claims against Geringer. Id. at ¶ 5. As a
result of a May 2015 mediation session, the parties signed a “Memorandum of
Understanding” (“MOU”). See Trustee Decl., Ex. 9. Geringer signed the MOU in
California, and the Trustee signed it in Utah. Id. at ¶ 18.
Under the MOU, Geringer would agree to buy certain real property located in
Smyrna, Tennessee (the “Smyrna Property”) at a significant premium to the current
market price, and the Trustee would release all claims against Geringer. See generally
Bankruptcy Case Dkt. 1103 (Trustee’s motion for Bankruptcy Court approval to sell
Smyrna Property to Geringer). According to the Trustee, the MOU contemplated that the
parties would enter a definitive settlement agreement, which would be presented to the
Bankruptcy Court for approval––that is, the MOU was explicitly made contingent upon

Managing Director of Business Development.
4

Although Geringer is not named as a defendant in the 2014 Insider Action, he
features prominently in the Insider Complaint. Indeed, the first 30 pages of the Insider
Complaint are devoted specifically to the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty Geringer
committed as “President” and the CAREIC Executive responsible for real estate
purchases and development activity.
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 5 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

“the approval of the bankruptcy court, and the Trustee’s ability to terminate the current
purchase contract.” MOU at ¶ 10.
The parties subsequently prepared and executed definitive sale and settlement
documents, and then presented them to the Bankruptcy Court for approval. Ultimately,
however, the Bankruptcy Court did not approve the sale to Geringer. See Bankruptcy
Case Dkt. Nos. 1126 (Bankruptcy Court continuing without date Trustee’s Motion to sell
Smyrna Property to Geringer), 1130 (order continuing hearings on Trustee’s motion to
sell Smyrna Property to Geringer), and 1148 (order denying Trustee’s motion to
reconsider). The Trustee states that after it became clear that the Bankruptcy Court
would not approve the sale and settlement with Geringer, the parties scheduled another
mediation session with Judge Newsome to take place on November 4, 2015, in order to
explore other potential settlement options.
D.

The 2015 California Declaratory Judgment Action (filed in California
by Geringer on November 6, 2015)

According to the Trustee, Geringer knew the Trustee’s filing of a complaint against
him in Utah was imminent, and on November 6, 2015—two days after the parties’ last
formal mediation session—Geringer filed the instant action in the Central District of
California. The Trustee further avers that Geringer then “held it,” without serving, while
the end stages of the parties’ settlement discussions continued. On November 23, 2015,
counsel for the Trustee extended a final settlement offer to Geringer, stating that the offer
would have to be accepted that day or the Geringer Complaint would be filed in Utah and
served. Trustee Decl. ¶ 22. In response, Geringer’s counsel served the complaint in the
instant action (“Declaratory Action” or “The California Declaratory Judgment Action”),
which (1) asserts two claims and seeks damages related to the Trustee’s alleged breach of
the May 2015 MOU, and (2) seeks declaratory judgment that (i) all of “the Trustee’s
claims are time-barred,” Dec. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-59; (ii) all of “the Trustee’s claims are
released,” id. at ¶¶ 60-66; as well as (iii) a judgment that “the Trustee is estopped
[because of the MOU] from asserting claims” against Geringer, id. at ¶¶ 67-73.
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 6 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

E.

Date

‘O’

May 9, 2016

The 2015 Utah Geringer Action (filed in Utah by Trustee on November
23, 2015)

On November 23, 2015, one day after being served with Geringer’s California
Declaratory Judgment Action, the Trustee filed an action in the District of Utah against
Geringer (the “Geringer Action”). The Geringer Action covers the same period of time
as the 2014 Insider Action and makes the very same factual allegations against Geringer
as those that are made against the Insiders in the Insider Complaint.5 Accordingly,
shortly after filing the 2015 Geringer Complaint, the Trustee moved to have it reassigned
to Judge Tena Campbell, who was overseeing the 2014 Insider Action. Insider Case Dkt.
58. On March 3, 2016, Judge Campbell granted the reassignment motion. See Insider
Case Dkt. 67; Geringer Case Dkt. 22.
Judge Campbell is now overseeing both the 2014 Insider Case and the 2015
Geringer Case. In the 2014 Insider Case, Judge Campbell granted a motion to compel
arbitration of all the Trustee’s claims asserted in that action. See Insider Case Dkt 55. In
the 2015 Geringer case, the Trustee has filed a motion seeking to have that case
submitted to arbitration, along with the 2014 Insider Case. Geringer Case Dkt. 58. The
parties appear not to have agreed on a panel of arbitrators in the Insider Case.
Accordingly, the Trustee argues that the “time to transfer this case to the Utah federal
district court is now.” Motion at 12.

5

See Geringer Compl. ¶¶ 30-127 (breaches related to CAREIC real estate
projects); ¶¶ 129-132 (breaches related to lack of board oversight); ¶¶ 174-219 (fraud in
the sale of CAREIC securities). The Geringer Complaint also alleges the same causes of
action as the Insider Complaint. See id. Claim 1 (breach of fiduciary duty), Claims 2
through 4 (securities fraud), Claims 5 and 6 (common law fraud), Claim 7 (civil
conspiracy), Claim 8 (state RICO), Claims 9 through 16 (fraudulent and preferential
transfers).
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 7 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

III.

Date

‘O’

May 9, 2016

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Transfer of Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“Section 1404(a)”)

“For [1] the convenience of parties and [2] witnesses, [and] [3] in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have
consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
In analyzing the “interests of justice,” a number of factors are relevant, including
the following: (1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and
executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff’s
choice of forum, (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts
relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the
costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel
attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of
proof. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1988); Jones v. GNC
Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). Other factors that may be
considered are: the enforceability of the judgment; the relative court congestion in the
two forums; and which forum would better serve judicial economy. 17 Moore’s Federal
Practice § 111.13[1][c] (3d ed. 1997). However, “[s]ubstantial weight is accorded to the
plaintiff’s choice of forum, and a court should not order a transfer unless the
‘convenience’ and ‘justice’ factors set forth above weigh heavily in favor of venue
elsewhere.” Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96379, *3-4 (C.D.
Cal. 2006).
The party seeking to transfer venue bears the burden of showing that convenience
and justice require transfer. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d
270, 278-279 (9th Cir. 1979); Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d
834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience
to warrant upsetting the plaintiff’s choice of forum.”). The decision to transfer lies within
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 8 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d
635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988).
IV.

DISCUSSION

As set for above, in the instant motion defendant-Trustee argues that this case is “a
small slice of a set of more comprehensive actions that have been underway in Utah for
more than a year,” such that transferring this case to the District of Utah, pursuant to
Section 1404(a), will be efficient and convenient for the courts, the witnesses, and the
parties. Reply at 3. The Supreme Court has explained that Section 1404(a) “is intended
to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to [a]
‘. . . case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’ ” Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29
(quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, (1964)). “The statute permits a
‘flexible and individualized analysis’ and affords district courts the opportunity to look
beyond a narrow or rigid set of considerations in their determinations.” Research
Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29).
In ruling on a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1404(a), the Court may
consider the following four factors: (1) the interests of justice; (2) the plaintiff’s choice of
forum; (3) the convenience of the witnesses; and (4) the convenience of the parties. Los
Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 499 (C.D.
Cal. 1981). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that transfer of the instant
case to the District of Utah is appropriate.
A.

Interests of Justice (Judicial Economy and Avoiding Multiplicity of
Litigation)

As noted above, factors that may be relevant to the “interests of justice” include:
(1) the location where relevant agreements (if any) were negotiated and executed, (2) the
state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4)
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 9 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

the respective parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s
cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two
forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling
non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof. Stewart Org., 487
U.S. at 29–30. Other factors that may be considered are: the enforceability of the
judgment; the relative court congestion in the two forums; and which forum would better
serve judicial economy. 17 Moore’s Federal Practice § 111.13[1][c] (3d ed.1997).
One additional factor that is frequently mentioned in determining the interests of
justice––and that the Court focuses on here––“is the desire to avoid multiplicity of
litigation resulting from a single transaction or event.” 15 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. §
3854 (4th ed.). The Supreme Court has suggested that much weight should be given to
this efficiency consideration:
To permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the
same issues are simultaneously pending in different District
Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and money that
s 1404(a) was designed to prevent. Moreover, such a situation
is conducive to a race of diligence among litigants for a trial in
the District Court each prefers.
Cont’l Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960). Indeed, the Supreme Court
has recognized that “the purpose of [Section 1404(a)] is to prevent the waste ‘of time,
energy and money’ and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary
inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 623. Accordingly, some courts
have found that while many factors may be considered in determining the interests of
justice, “concerns over judicial efficiency are paramount. . . .” Hawkins v. Gerber
Products Co., 924 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1214 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
Accordingly, in an effort to facilitate judicial economy and avoid multiplicity of
litigation, “many courts have transferred to a forum in which other actions arising from
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 10 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

the same transaction or event, or which were otherwise related, were pending.” 15 Fed.
Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3854, n.5 (4th ed.) (collecting cases). Here, as defendant-Trustee
notes, the similarity between the 2014 Insider Action and the 2015 Geringer Action, both
of which are currently before Judge Campbell in Utah, cannot reasonably be disputed.
The 2014 Insider Complaint covers the same time period and makes essentially the same
factual allegations as the 2015 Geringer Complaint. The two complaints also assert
largely the same claims, with the 2014 Action asserting these claims against the Insiders,
and the 2015 Action asserting them only against Geringer.6 Accordingly, shortly after

6

Specifically, the Insider Complaint first alleges that CAREIC engaged in a
number of highly speculative real estate projects and that in pursuing those projects
CAREIC management breached their fiduciary duties by (a) wasting corporate assets on
projects they knew were infeasible and for which they did not have sufficient funding, (b)
relying on irrational sales assumptions that contradicted known data, and (c) engaging in
co-mingled and self-dealing transactions that were not disclosed to investors. See Insider
Compl. at ¶¶ 39-133. The Insider Complaint further alleges that the CAREIC Board
breached its fiduciary duty by failing to supervise and oversee the actions of
management. As a result, CAREIC management was allegedly able to pursue speculative
and infeasible projects, co-mingle and misuse investor money, solicit investors by means
of false and misleading offering materials, and illegally employ unlicensed broker
dealers. Id. at ¶¶ 134-37. The Insider Complaint also alleges that management raised
money by means of offering documents that were false and materially misleading. Id. at
¶¶ 198-243. Based upon these allegations, the Insider Complaint asserts a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty (claim 1), three securities fraud claims (claims 2 through 4), two
common law fraud claims (claims 5 and 6), a civil conspiracy claim (claim 7), a state
RICO claim (claim 8), and a variety of other claims, including fraudulent and preferential
transfer claims (claims 9 through 18). The Geringer complaint details essentially the
same allegations. See Geringer Compl. at ¶¶ 30-127 (breaches related to CAREIC real
estate projects); id. at ¶¶ 129-132 (breaches related to lack of board oversight); id. at ¶¶
174-219 (fraud in the sale of CAREIC securities). It also asserts the same set of claims.
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 11 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

filing the 2015 Geringer Action in the District of Utah, the Trustee moved to have the
case reassigned to Judge Campbell so that she could preside over both of the Utah
Actions. See Insider Case Dkt. 58. On March 3, 2016, Judge Campbell granted the
reassignment motion, see Insider Case Dkt. 67, Utah Geringer Case Dkt. 22, and she is
now overseeing both the 2014 Insider Case and the 2015 Geringer Case.
The question here, therefore, is whether judicial economy weighs in favor of
transferring the instant action to the District of Utah. The Court concludes that it does.
In the instant action, Geringer asserts five claims against the Trustee, three of which are
claims for declaratory relief. Specifically, Geringer seeks entry of declaratory judgment
that (1) “any and all potential claims that the Trustee could bring against Mr. Geringer
related to CAREIC” are “time-barred” (Decl. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-59) and (2) “released” (id.
at ¶¶ 60-66), and further that (3) “the Trustee is estopped [because of the May 2015
MOU] from asserting [any such claims]” against Geringer (id. at ¶¶ 67-73). As the
Trustee rightly notes, each of these affirmative claims for declaratory relief are potential
affirmative defenses to the Trustee’s claims in the Geringer Action pending in the District
of Utah. And while Geringer also pleads two additional claims in the instant case for
breach of the MOU, see id. at ¶¶ 24-40, these breach of contract claims may also be
counterclaims in the Geringer Action.
Indeed, despite his arguments to the contrary in his opposition here, Geringer
appears fully to have recognized the relatedness of the 2015 Geringer Action and the
instant action in a January 2016 motion filed in the District of Utah. In that motion,
Geringer requested that the Geringer Action be dismissed or transferred to this Court
because the Geringer Action “involve[ed] precisely the same dispute pending in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California.” See Declaration of

See id. Claim 1 (breach of fiduciary duty), Claims 2 through 4 (securities fraud), Claims
5 and 6 (common law fraud), Claim 7 (civil conspiracy), Claim 8 (state RICO), Claims 9
through 16 (fraudulent and preferential transfers).
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 12 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

Nathan S. Seim at Ex. A (Strong v. Geringer, Civil No. 2:15-cv-00837 (D. Utah), Dkt.
11) (“Utah Brief”), at 1 (emphasis added). Geringer further stated at the time––and the
Court agrees––that “[t]here can be no question that issues raised in the Central District of
California are not only substantially similar to the issues raised by the Trustee’s claims
[in the 2015 Utah Action], they are, in fact, identical.” Id. at 13 (emphasis added). More
specifically, Geringer explained the overlap as follows:
In the Central District of California, Mr. Geringer seeks
damages for the Trustee’s breach of the [MOU] and a
declaratory judgment from the court that any purported claims
brought by the Trustee against Mr. Geringer are barred as a
matter of contract and by the applicable statutes of limitations.
In the [2015 Geringer Action in Utah District Court], the
Trustee purports to bring the exact claims against Mr. Geringer
that Mr. Geringer asserts are barred.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
Allowing the California Declaratory Judgment Action and the Geringer Action to
proceed independently in different forums, despite the substantial overlap of issues
between the two actions, presents a significant possibility of inconsistent results. Of
course, “centralizing the adjudication of [these] similar cases will . . . avoid the
possibility of [any such] inconsistent judgments.” Hawkins, 924 F.Supp. 2d at 1214; c.f.
Cardoza v. T-Mobile USA Inc., No. 08-5120 SC, 2009 WL 723843, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 18, 2009) (finding that despite claims not being identical, the existence of pending
litigation in another forum involving several similar elements weighed heavily in favor of
transfer because consolidation still would be possible despite the differences between the
claims); SoccerSpecific.com v. World Class Coaching, Inc., No. CIV. 08-6109-TC, 2008
WL 4960232, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 18, 2008) (finding that once one of several closely
related claims was required to be transferred, judicial economy, among other
considerations, strongly favored the transfer of the remaining claims).
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 13 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

As Geringer himself argued in the 2015 Geringer Action, “because some of the
issues in California are the flip-side of all of the issues raised [in the Geringer Action], if
the Trustee’s claims [in the Geringer Action] against Mr. Geringer are allowed to proceed
to judgment, and the litigation in the Central District of California likewise proceeds, it is
entirely possible that the result would be two conflicting judgments.” Id. at 12-13.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that in order to avoid such a possibility, the instant case
should be heard in the same forum. Given the number of potentially related cases
pending in the District of Utah, the Court concludes that the Geringer Action should be
transferred to the District of Utah, where it can proceed simultaneously with its related
cases. C.f. eNom, Inc. v. Philbrick, No. C08-1288RSL, 2008 WL 4933976, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 17, 2008) (“[T]ransferring this action will likely result in consolidation of the
two cases, so the issues will be tried efficiency, expeditiously, and in a cost-effective
manner.”). The interests of judicial economy and the need to mitigate against the
possibility of inconsistent judgments weighs in favor of a transfer.
B.

Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

“The general rule is that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is afforded substantial
weight” in determining whether or not transfer is appropriate under section 1404(a).
Williams v. Bowman, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001). However, a
plaintiff’s choice of forum “is not the final word,” and indeed if plaintiff’s suit is
“anticipatory,” then “plaintiff’s chosen forum will be accorded little deference.” Royal
Queentex Enterprises v. Sara Lee Corp., No. C-99-4787 MJJ, 2000 WL 246599, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2000). Indeed, “[t]he principle disfavoring anticipatory lawsuits is
especially strong where, as here, the first-filed suit is one for a declaratory judgment. ‘[A]
proper factor to consider in dismissing a declaratory judgment is whether the suit was
filed in anticipation of another and therefore was being used for the purpose of
forum-shopping.’ ” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc. v. Beachbody, LLC, No. 1:11-CV-00024-TC, 2011 WL 1899390, at *3 (D.
Utah May 19, 2011) (“[I]mproper anticipatory filings, ‘by necessity, often take the form
of declaratory judgments’”) (citation omitted).
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 14 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

As one court in the District of Utah explained, “a declaratory suit is immediately
suspect as an improper anticipatory filing because a declaratory action, generally
speaking, is essentially the prosecution of an affirmative defense.” ICON, 2011 WL
1899390, at *3 (citation omitted). Geringer’s complaint in the instant action pleads as
affirmative claims for declaratory judgment what effectively are his affirmative defenses
in the Geringer Action (i.e., defenses premised upon statutes of limitation, releases, and
equitable estoppel). See Decl. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-73. Furthermore, it appears clear from
the record that defendant-Trustee held off on filing the 2015 Geringer Action due to a
good faith desire to continue settlement discussions. For example, on January 18, 2013,
the Trustee informed Geringer that he planned to assert claims against him but would
refrain from filing a complaint to pursue settlement discussions. On October 12, 2013,
before the parties continued their settlement discussions, the Trustee went so far as to
provide Geringer with a copy of a draft complaint listing him as a defendant. See id.
Thereafter, the Trustee repeatedly refrained from filing suit against Geringer—sometimes
at Geringer’s request—while the parties continued their attempt to settle the matter.
Under such circumstances, “[w]here a party is prepared to pursue a lawsuit, but first
desires to attempt settlement discussions, that party should not be deprived of the
first-filed rule’s benefit simply because its adversary used the resulting delay in filing to
proceed with the mirror image of the anticipated suit. Otherwise, potential plaintiffs
would be discouraged from first attempting to resolve their claims without resorting to
litigation.” Ontel Products, Inc. v. Project Strategies Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1144, 1150
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). Because the Court finds that plaintiff’s filing of the instant suit on
November 6, 2015 was anticipatory in nature and occurred only two days after the
parties’ final mediation session began, the Court affords little weight to the fact that
plaintiff was the first to file.
3.

Convenience of the Witnesses and Parties

“One of the most important factors in determining whether to grant a motion
to transfer venue is the convenience of the witnesses.” Royal Queentex, 2000 WL
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 15 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

246599, at *6; see also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 89 F.R.D. at 501 (“The
convenience of witnesses is said to be the most important factor in passing on a transfer
motion.”). Defendant-Trustee argues that “[i]f this Court does not transfer the
Declaratory Judgment Action to the District of Utah, where the Insider Action and the
Geringer Action are pending, the Trustee will be forced to litigate Geringer’s affirmative
defenses here in California,” while “the merits of the Trustee’s underlying claims in the
Geringer Action . . . remain in Utah to be litigated and tried there.” Motion at 16.
According to defendant, such an arrangement “makes little sense,” id. at 16, and does not
best serve the interests of the parties and witnesses in each action. More specifically, the
Trustee contends that because the factual allegations and the causes of action in the
Insider Action and the Geringer Action overlap almost entirely, discovery in these cases
will also significantly overlap as well. The Trustee avers that he has identified over 30
potential witnesses in the Insider Action, most of whom will be required in the Geringer
Action as well. Motion at 17. Accordingly, the Trustee argues that because these
witnesses are located across the country, it makes little sense to have them sit for
depositions in the Insider Action, the Geringer Action, and again in the instant action.
Plaintiff contends, however, that the instant action is primarily one for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of
the Trustee’s alleged breach of the May 2015 MOU. Although the complaint also
includes requests for declaratory judgment that the Trustee’s potential claims against
Geringer are barred by the MOU and the applicable statutes of limitation, plaintiff argues
that these claims for declaratory relief do not require delving into the merits of the
Trustee’s claims that are currently pending in Utah. Plaintiff avers that the “30 witnesses
that the Trustee has identified for those cases will not have information relating to the
parties’ [MOU], the tolling agreement and its amendments, or the negotiations leading
thereto,” such that the Trustee has failed to identify any witnesses who would be required
to testify in this case––i.e., witnesses “who would have information relevant to the
parties’ negotiations, the [MOU], the tolling agreement, or the Trustee’s breach.” Opp’n
at 18.
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 16 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

Ultimately, however, plaintiff’s argument misses the mark. In his reply,
defendant-Trustee persuasively argues that at least some of the major issues to be litigated
in this case will necessarily require discovery and testimony that will overlap with the
discovery and testimony of the two Utah actions. For example, the claim in the instant
action for declaratory relief regarding the running of the statutes of limitation implicates
the very same statute of limitations issues as those to be addressed in the Utah Actions:
namely, determining when the Trustee’s many claims against Geringer accrued. Reply at
13 (arguing that in this case, under the discovery rule, the Trustee’s claims do not accrue
until the investors discovered or reasonably should have discovered the underlying
alleged fraud). As defendant-Trustee rightly argues, “to the extent Geringer takes his
statute of limitation pleading seriously in this case, he will have to conduct discovery of
investors to establish when they discovered or reasonably should have discovered the
fraud,” irrespective of the particulars of the Tolling Agreement. Id. at 14. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the factor regarding the convenience of the witnesses weighs in favor
of transferring to the District of Utah, where the Insider Action is already nearly 20
months along.7 As to the relative convenience of each forum to the parties themselves,
the Court finds this factor to be largely neutral. While Geringer is a California resident
and both his office and many of the documents pertinent to this action are located in this

7

On May 6, 2016, plaintiff filed a sur-reply arguing that the Trustee’s May 4,
2016 deposition testimony provides additional evidence in support of plaintiff’s
contention that consideration of the witnesses’ convenience does not bode in favor of a
transfer. The additional arguments made in plaintiff’s sur-reply do not inform a different
result here, as they demonstrate only that the Trustee concedes that the potential
witnesses in the Insider Action have no knowledge regarding the May 2015 MOU or the
Tolling Agreement between the Trustee and Geringer. Any such admission does not
speak to whether these witnesses might have knowledge relevant to plaintiff’s claims for
declaratory relief––namely, his claims seeking declaratory judgment that the Trustee’s
claims must be time-barred, perhaps irrespective of the MOU or the Tolling Agreement
(i.e., based simply on the discovery rule and the date of accrual of these claims).
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 17 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:15-cv-08696-CAS(GJSx)

May 9, 2016

Title

ROBERT D. GERINGER v. D. RAY STRONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF THE LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR THE
CONSOLIDATED LEGACY DEBTORS, THE LIQUIDATING TRUST
FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS I, LLC, AND THE
LIQUIDATING TRUST FOR CASTLE ARCH OPPORTUNITY
PARTNERS II, LLC

district, Geringer is already actively involved in his own defense in the Utah Geringer
Action. Furthermore, despite Geringer’s attempt to argue that the documents pertinent to
the May 2015 MOU are largely located or based in California, this again ignores that the
scope of the instant action is much broader than the Trustee’s alleged breach of the MOU.
In sum, the Court finds that in order to avoid potential for inconsistent judgments,
serve the interests of justice, and facilitate both judicial economy and the convenience of
the witnesses in this action, transfer of this case to the District of Utah, where it likely
will be litigated alongside the Insider Action and the Geringer Action, is appropriate
under Section 1404(a).
V.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, defendant-Trustee’s motion to change venue to
the United States District Court for the District of Utah is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer

CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

:

10

CMJ

Page 18 of 18