Hansen et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 52 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings: Plaintiffs' claims against Cenlar FSB are dismissed. Signed by Judge David Nuffer on 3/31/17 (alt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
RICK D. HANSEN and CONNIE B.
HANSEN, individual citizens of Utah,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING CENLAR, FSB’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS

v.
Case No. 2:16-CV-744-DN
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, CHASE
BANK, JPMORGAN, JPMORGAN CHASE
& CO., CENLAR, FSB, EQUIFAX, INC.,
EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS,
INC., INNOVIS DATA SOLUTIONS, INC.,
TRANSUNION, LLC, and JOHN DOES
1 - 25,

District Judge David Nuffer

Defendants.

This case involves claims for damages arising from alleged incomplete or inaccurate
reporting of a government taking of real property owned by Plaintiffs Rick D. Hansen and
Connie B. Hansen (the “Hansens”) which had negative effects on the Hansens’ credit rating. 1
The Hansens assert six claims against Defendant CENLAR, FSB (“CENLAR”): (1) violations of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”); 2 (2) violations of the FCRA; 3 (3) violation of the Fair
and Accurate Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACTA”); 4 (4) violations of the Consumer Credit
Reporting Reform Act of 1996 (“CCRRA”); 5 (5) failure to reasonably investigate after multiple

1

Complaint, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

2

Id. ¶¶ 96-103.

3

Id. ¶¶ 104-112.

4

Id. ¶¶ 113-119.

5

Id. ¶¶ 120-126.

contacts; 6 and (6) defamation of credit. 7 CENLAR seeks judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that the Hansens’ claims fail as a
matter of law, are time barred, or are preempted. 8
Because the Hansens’ claims against CENLAR 9 fail as a matter of law and are time
barred, CENLAR’s Motion 10 is GRANTED.

Contents
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................. 5
No private right of action exists for alleged violations of Section 1681s-2(a) ......................... 7
The Hansens’ allegations are insufficient to state a claim against CENLAR for violation of
Section 1681s-2(b) .............................................................................................................. 8
The Hansens’ claim for defamation of credit against CENLAR fails as a matter of law ....... 11
Alternatively, the Hansens’ claims against CENLAR are time barred by the FCRA’s statute
of limitations ..................................................................................................................... 13
ORDER ......................................................................................................................................... 15

BACKGROUND
The Hansens were owners of certain real property in Spanish Fork, Utah (the “Property”)
where they had lived and Mr. Hansen conducted a cement curbing business for more than two
decades. 11 On December 20, 2013, the Hansens transferred ownership of the Property to the
cities of Spanish Fork and Springville as a result of an eminent domain taking for the expansion
of the Spanish Fork/Springville Municipal Airport. 12 The Hansens were paid the Property’s fair

6

Id. ¶¶ 127-136.

7

Id. ¶¶ 137-147.

8

CENLAR, FSB’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“CENLAR’s Motion”), docket no. 52, filed Oct. 5, 2016.

9

Complaint ¶¶ 96-147, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

10

Docket no. 52, filed Oct. 5, 2016.

11

Complaint at 2, 7, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

12

Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 35-36, 53-54.

2

market value for the taking. 13 However, the payment was insufficient to cover the existing debt
owed on the Property. 14
Prior to the taking, by letters dated July 22, 2013, the Hansens notified the Property’s lien
holders, Chase Bank and CENLAR, of the government’s intent to exercise eminent domain on
the Property. 15 This spurred a series of communications over a period of several months between
the Hansens and Chase Bank and CENLAR regarding the debts owed on the Property. 16 Despite
being repeatedly informed that the transaction was a government taking, Chase Bank and
CENLAR treated the Hansens’ notice as a request for a short sale. 17 A “short sale” is a sale for
less than value, which is treated in the industry as a foreclosure. 18
The taking resulted in Chase Bank and CENLAR settling the debts for an amount that
was less than full payment. 19 When the Hansens later attempted to obtain a replacement
property, they discovered that their credit rating had dropped as a result of information Chase
Bank and CENLAR furnished to the major credit reporting agencies concerning the debts. 20
Chase Bank and CENLAR had furnished information that the Hansens were delinquent in their
payments on the debts from October 2013 through December 2013, and that the Property was
sold for less than value. 21

13

Id. at 3.

14

Id.

15

Id. ¶ 4.

16

Id. ¶¶ 5-64.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 5-6.

19

Id. at 5, ¶¶ 20, 24, 41, 47, 50-51.

20

Id. at 6.

21

Id. at 5-6.

3

Beginning on January 8, 2014, the Hansens sent letters to Chase Bank and CENLAR
demanding that the information furnished to the major credit reporting agencies be corrected to
reflect a government taking. 22 In response, CENLAR issued letters on January 16, 2014,
January 22, 2014, and February 11, 2014, recanting use of the term “short sale,” and
acknowledging that the transaction was a government taking and that the debt was “paid in
full.” 23 CENLAR’s letters were publicly noticed and shared with the major credit reporting
agencies. 24 However, CENLAR later informed the Hansens, by letters dated May 20, 2014, and
May 29, 2014, that it had furnished information to the major credit reporting agencies that the
debt was “settled for less than the full amount … due to eminent domain of the [Property].” 25
Chase Bank initially responded to the Hansens’ demands by indicating that it “sent an
electronic notification to the major credit agencies (Equifax, Experian, Innovis and TransUnion)
requesting that they suppress the delinquent payments reporting on [the Hansens’] account for
October 2013, November 2013, and December 2013.” 26 Chase Bank also notified the Hansens
that it asked the “four major credit agencies (Equifax, Experian, Innovis and TransUnion) to
show that [the Hansens had] paid off (or settled) the account for less than the full balance as of
December 27, 2013.” 27 However, Chase Bank later informed that Hansens that it “requested that
the credit reporting agencies report the loan as paid in full for less than the full balance – settled.
The credit bureaus do not report the narrative ‘Short Sale.’” 28 Chase Bank continues to

22

Id. at 7, ¶¶ 65, 68, 72.

23

Id. at 7, ¶¶ 70, 76.

24

Id.

25

Id. ¶¶ 79-80.

26

Id. ¶ 67.

27

Id. ¶ 85.

28

Id. ¶ 88.

4

characterize the debt as settled for “less than the full balance,” without reference to a government
taking or the exercise of eminent domain. 29
Despite the drop in their credit rating, the Hansens purchased a replacement property. 30
However, they received a higher interest rate which increased their monthly mortgage payments
by approximately $400. 31 The authorized limits on the Hansens’ personal and business credit
cards also suffered reductions which impacted the Mr. Hansen’s ability to conduct his cement
curbing business and secure future contracts. 32
DISCUSSION
CENLAR seeks judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 33 A motion for judgment on the pleadings is evaluated by the same standard as
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 34 Under this standard, a defendant
is entitled to judgment on the pleadings when the complaint, standing alone, is legally
insufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted. 35 When considering the motion, the
thrust of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint is presumed, but conclusory allegations need not
be considered. 36 Nor are the complaint’s legal conclusions and opinions accepted, whether or not
they are couched as facts. 37

29

Id. ¶¶ 92, 94.

30

Id. at 6.

31

Id. at 6-7.

32

Id. at 7.

33

CENLAR’s Motion, docket no. 52, filed Oct. 5, 2016.

34

Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2013).

35

Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999).

36

Cory v. Allstate Ins., 583 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 2009).

37

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Brown v.
Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 1995).

5

The United States Supreme Court has held that satisfying the basic pleading requirements
of the federal rules “demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” 38 “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” 39 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 40 Moreover, “naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement” are insufficient to state a claim that will survive a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. 41
“The allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not
just speculatively) has a claim for relief.” 42 “This requirement of plausibility serves not only to
weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable prospect
of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim against them.” 43
The Hansens’ Complaint asserts six claims against CENLAR. 44 The predicate for
CENLAR’s liability on the six claims is alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-2(a)
and 1681s-2(b). The Hansens generally allege that CENLAR willfully or negligently furnished
incomplete or inaccurate information to the major credit reporting agencies concerning the
Hansens’ debt on the Property. 45 The Hansens also allege that CENLAR willfully or negligently
failed to investigate and correct the information it furnished after being repeatedly notified by the

38

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 862 (2009).

39

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

40

Id.

41

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

42

Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008).

43

Id. at 1248.

44

Complaint ¶¶ 96-147, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

45

Id.

6

Hansens of their dispute. 46 The Hansens seek damages for CENLAR’s alleged willful or
negligent noncompliance under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o. 47
The Hansens’ claims against CENLAR 48 fail as a matter of law and are time barred.
No private right of action exists for alleged violations of Section 1681s-2(a)
In asserting their claims against CENLAR, the Hansens make repeated reference to and
allegations concerning the obligations the FCRA imposes on furnishers of information to credit
reporting agencies under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). 49 Section 1681s-2(a) pertains to the duty of
furnishers to provide accurate information to credit reporting agencies. 50 Among the obligations
imposed by Section 1681s-2(a) are:
•

a furnisher may not furnish information to a credit reporting agency that it
knows or has reasonable cause to believe is inaccurate; 51

•

a furnisher must promptly correct and update the information it furnishes to
credit reporting agencies; 52

•

a furnisher may not furnish information to a credit reporting agency without
notice that the information is disputed by the consumer; 53

•

a furnisher must provide timely written notice to the consumer when it
furnishes negative information to a credit reporting agency; 54 and

46

Id.

47

Id. ¶¶ 101-102, 110-111, 135-136, 145-146.

48

Id. ¶¶ 96-147.

49

Id.

50

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a).

51

Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1).

52

Id. § 1681s-2(a)(2).

53

Id. § 1681s-2(a)(3).

54

Id. § 1681s-2(a)(7).

7

•

a furnisher must comply with certain investigative procedures concerning the
accuracy of the information it furnishes when a consumer raises a dispute
directly with the furnisher. 55

The Tenth Circuit has held that “while [the] FCRA allows federal agencies and state
officials to enforce the[] obligations [of Section 1681s-2(a)], it does not allow consumers … a
private right of action to do so.” 56 Therefore, even assuming the Hansens’ allegations
demonstrate that the obligations of Section 1681s-2(a) apply to CENLAR, and that CENLAR
failed to comply with them, any claim that CENLAR violated Section 1681s-2(a) fails as a
matter of law.
Therefore, insofar as the Hansens’ claims against CENLAR 57 are predicated on violations
of Section 1681s-2(a), the claims fail as a matter of law.
The Hansens’ allegations are insufficient to state a claim against CENLAR
for violation of Section 1681s-2(b)
In asserting their claims against CENLAR, the Hansens also make repeated reference to
and allegations concerning the duties the FCRA imposes on furnishers of information to credit
reporting agencies under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). 58 Section 1681s-2(b) pertains the duties of
furnishers to comply with certain investigative procedures after receiving notice from a credit
reporting agency that a consumer disputes the completeness or accuracy of furnished
information. 59 Among the duties imposed by Section 1681s-2(b) are:

55

Id. § 1681s-2(a)(8).

56
Brunson v. Provident Funding Associates, 608 Fed. App’x 602, 611 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Sanders v. Mountain
Am. Fed. Credit Union, 689 F.3d 1138, 1147 (10th Cir. 2012)); see also Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs.,
Inc., 316 Fed. App’x 744, 751 (10th Cir. 2009); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c), (d).
57

Complaint ¶¶ 96-147, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

58

Id.

59

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).

8

•

a furnisher must timely conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed
information; 60

•

a furnisher must review all relevant information provided by a consumer
reporting agency; 61

•

a furnisher must report the results of its investigation to the consumer
reporting agency that provided the furnisher notice of the consumer’s
dispute; 62

•

if the investigation reveals that the furnished information was incomplete or
inaccurate, a furnisher must report the results to all credit reporting agencies
to which the information was furnished; 63 and

•

if the information disputed by the consumer is incomplete, inaccurate, or
cannot be verified, a furnisher must promptly modify, delete, or permanently
block the reporting of the information. 64

“The investigation an information furnisher undertakes must be a reasonable one.” 65
Unlike Section 1681s-2(a), a private right of action exists against furnishers of
information to credit reporting agencies for violations of Section 1681s-2(b). 66 However, the
Tenth Circuit has held that “[t]he furnisher’s duty to investigate [under Section 1681-2(b)] arises
only after a [credit reporting agency] notifies the furnisher of a dispute and, conversely, does not
arise when notice is provided directly from a consumer.” 67 “Thus, a consumer cannot recover

60

Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A), (b)(2).

61

Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(B).

62

Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(C).

63

Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D).

64

Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E).

65

Maiteki v. Marten Transp. Ltd., 828 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).

66

Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1147.

67
Willis v. Capital One Corp., 611 Fed. App’x 500, 502 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1147; Pinson, 316 Fed. App’x at 751.

9

under [Section] 1681s-2(b) if they do not initiate the process for recovery by notifying a [credit
reporting agency] of the dispute.” 68
The Hansens fail to allege that they ever initiated the investigative procedures of
Section 1681s-2(b) by providing notice to a credit reporting agency of their dispute regarding the
completeness or accuracy of the information CENLAR furnished. 69 Rather, the Hansens allege
only that they raised their dispute directly with Chase Bank and CENLAR, and through the
office of Senator Orrin Hatch. 70
The closest the Hansens come to alleging that they initiated the investigative procedures
of Section 1681s-2(b) is found in following allegation:
Either the [credit reporting agency] was not provided, with a [consumer dispute
verification form], containing sufficient detail to explain that this was a “taking”
and not a foreclosure type action, in which case the furnisher of information is to
blame for causing the negative credit report, or the furnisher did provide direct
information clearly classifying the transaction as a government taking based on
eminent domain and the [credit reporting agency] mischaracterized the transaction
as carrying a negative impact. The results were the same as neither the [credit
reporting agency] nor the furnisher satisfy the reasonable obligation test. 71
However, this allegation is generalized, conclusory, and argumentative. The allegation is found
in the Hansens’ claim against Chase Bank and CENLAR for failure to reasonably investigate
after multiple contacts. 72 But the allegation does not refer to CENLAR as the relevant furnisher
of information. 73 Nor does the allegation identify the relevant credit reporting agency. 74 The

68

Willis, 611 Fed. App’x at 502 (internal quotations omitted); see also Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1147; Pinson, 316 Fed.
App’x at 751.
69

15 U.S.C. § 1681i; see also Wright, 805 F.3d at 1241-42.

70

Complaint at 7, ¶¶ 65, 68, 72, 75, 82-83, 86, 89-90, 93, 98-99, 107, 118, 140, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

71

Id. at 130.

72

Id. at ¶¶ 127-136.

73

Id. at ¶ 130.

74

Id.

10

allegation also acknowledges that the credit reporting agency may not have been provided with a
consumer dispute verification form. 75
Moreover, the Hansens do not allege, even on information and belief, that CENLAR ever
received relevant information from a credit reporting agency concerning the Hansens’ dispute. 76
“A ‘reasonable’ investigation [by a furnisher] is one that a reasonably prudent person would
undertake under the circumstances.” 77 And “[h]ow thorough an investigation must be to be
‘reasonable’ turns on what relevant information was provided to a furnisher by the [credit
reporting agency] giving notice of a dispute.” 78
In the absence of allegations that the Hansens initiated the investigative procedures of
Section 1681s-2(b), and that CENLAR received relevant information concerning the Hansens’
dispute from a credit reporting agency to guide its investigation, any claim that CENLAR
violated Section 1681s-2(b) fails as a matter of law. Therefore, each of the Hansens’ claims
against CENLAR 79 fail as a matter of law.
The Hansens’ claim for defamation of credit against CENLAR
fails as a matter of law
CENLAR seeks dismissal of the Hansens’ claim for defamation of credit on the ground
that the claim is preempted by the FCRA. 80 This argument is based on the mistaken assumption
that the claim is predicated on state common law, and not the provisions of the FRCA. 81

75

Id. at ¶ 130.

76

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).

77

Maiteki, 828 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotations omitted).

78

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

79

Complaint ¶¶ 96-147, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

80

CENLAR’s Motion at 2-3, 9-10, docket no. 52, filed Oct. 5, 2016; CENLAR, FSB’s Reply in Support of Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (“CENLAR’s Reply”) at 3, 7, docket no. 62, filed Nov. 16, 2016.
81

CENLAR’s Motion at 2-3, 9-10, docket no. 52, filed Oct. 5, 2016; CENLAR’s Reply at 3, 7, docket no. 62, filed
Nov. 16, 2016.

11

CENLAR’s mistaken assumption is understandable because the claim is titled “Defamation of
Credit” 82 without reference to the FCRA and its allegations do not expressly refer to the FCRA
section CENLAR is alleged to have violated. 83 The claim’s allegations 84 also track the elements
of a Utah common law claim for defamation:
A prima facie case for defamation must demonstrate that (1) the defendant
published the statements in print or orally; (2) the statements were false; (3) the
statements were not subject to privilege; (4) the statements were published with
the requisite degree of fault; and (5) the statements resulted in damages. 85
Specifically, the claim alleges that CENLAR communicated and made public statements that
were inaccurate and false concerning the Hansens’ debt on the Property. 86 And that these
communications and public statements are not subject to privilege, are malicious in nature, and
have harmed the Hansens’ reputation and caused lost profits to Mr. Hansen’s business. 87
However, the claim’s allegations 88 also track the obligations and duties of furnishers of
information to credit reporting agencies under the FCRA, specifically Section 1681s-2(a) and
Section 1681s-2(b). 89 And the claim asserts the Hansens are entitled to damages for CENLAR’s
alleged willful or negligent noncompliance with the FCRA under Section 1681n and
Section 1681o. 90 Moreover, the Hansens’ argument in response to CENLAR’s Motion makes

82

Complaint at 38, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

83

Id. ¶¶ 137-147.

84

Id. ¶¶ 138-144.

85

Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 21, 212 P.3d 535 (internal quotations and punctuation omitted).

86

Complaint ¶¶ 138-141, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

87

Id. ¶¶ 142-144.

88

Id. ¶¶ 138-144.

89

Supra at 7-10.

90

Complaint ¶¶ 145-146, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

12

clear that the claim is predicated on the existence of a private right of action against furnishers of
information to credit reporting agencies under Section 1681s-2(b), not Utah common law. 91
Therefore, because the Hansens’ defamation of credit claim 92 is an FCRA claim
predicated on Section 1681s-2(b), CENLAR’s preemption argument 93 lacks merit.
Nevertheless, because the Hansens fail to allege that they ever initiated the investigative
procedures of Section 1681s-2(b), and fail to allege that CENLAR received relevant information
concerning the Hansens’ dispute from a credit reporting agency to guide its investigation, any
claim that CENLAR violated Section 1681s-2(b) fails as a matter of law. 94 Therefore, the
Hansens’ defamation of credit claim against CENLAR 95 fails as a matter of law.
Alternatively, the Hansens’ claims against CENLAR are time barred
by the FCRA’s statute of limitations
As an alternative basis for the dismissal of the Hansens’ claims against CENLAR, the
FCRA provides:
An action to enforce any liability created under [the FCRA] may be brought …
not later than the earlier of--(1) 2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff
of the violation that is the basis for such liability; or (2) 5 years after the date on
which the violation that is the basis for such liability occurs. 96

91

Response to Defendant CENLAR, FSB’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 3-4, 18-19, docket no. 57, filed
Oct. 18, 2016. The Hansens similarly argue that their claim for defamation of credit is predicated on a private right
of action under Section 1681s-2(b), and not Utah common law, in their Response to Defendants JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A.; Chase Bank; JPMorgan; and JPMorgan Chase & Co. Motion to Dismiss at 3, docket no. 56, filed
Oct. 18, 2016.
92

Complaint ¶¶ 137-147, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

93

CENLAR’s Motion at 2-3, 9-10, docket no. 52, filed Oct. 5, 2016; CENLAR’s Reply at 3, 7, docket no. 62, filed
Nov. 16, 2016.
94

Supra at 8-11.

95

Complaint ¶¶ 137-147, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

96

15 U.S.C. § 1681p.

13

The Hansens first discovered CENLAR’s alleged violations of the FCRA on or before
January 8, 2014. 97 On that date, the Hansens sent a letter through counsel to CENLAR
demanding that the information CENLAR furnished to the major credit reporting agencies be
corrected to reflect a government taking of the Property. 98 In response, CENLAR issued letters
to the Hansens and their counsel on January 16, 2014, January 22, 2014, and February 11, 2014,
purporting to correct the information it had furnished to the major credit reporting agencies. 99
However, CENLAR later informed the Hansens, by letters dated May 20, 2014, and
May 29, 2014, that it had furnished information to the major credit reporting agencies that the
debt was “settled for less than the full amount … due to eminent domain of the [Property].” 100
Therefore, the latest date on which the Hansens discovered that CENLAR’s alleged
violations of the FCRA were ongoing was upon their receipt of CENLAR’s May 29, 2014
letter. 101 The Hansens did not file their Complaint until June 29, 2016, more than two years later.
Under the plain language of the FCRA’s limitation of actions, 102 the Hansens claims against
CENLAR are time barred because they were not filed within two years after the date the Hansens
discovered CENLAR’s alleged violations of the FCRA. Therefore, CENLAR is entitled to
judgment on the pleadings on each of the Hansens’ claims. 103

97

Complaint at ¶ 65, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 7, ¶¶ 70, 76.

100

Id. ¶¶ 79-80.

101

Id. ¶ 80.

102

15 U.S.C. § 1681p.

103

Complaint at ¶¶ 96-147, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016

14

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CENLAR’s Motion 104 is GRANTED. Consequently, the
Hansens’ claims against CENLAR 105 are DISMISSED.
Signed March 31, 2017.
BY THE COURT

________________________________________
District Judge David Nuffer

104

Docket no. 52, filed Oct. 5, 2016.

105

Complaint ¶¶ 96-147, docket no. 2, filed June 29, 2016.

15