Garcia et al v. Unique Auto Body et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 16 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second and Third Causes of Action. Signed by Judge Ted Stewart on 11/8/2016. (eat)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
AQUILES GARCIA and SALVADOR
GARCIA,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’
SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF
ACTION

Plaintiffs,
v.
UNIQUE AUTO BODY, INC., UNIQUE
AUTO BODY SOUTH JORDAN, INC.,
and JEREMY WELLER,

Case No. 2:16-CV-848 TS

Defendants.

District Judge Ted Stewart

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second and
Third Causes of Action Against All Defendants. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will
grant Defendants’ Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Aquiles Garcia and Salvador Garcia began working for Unique Auto Body in 2009 and
2010, respectively. Plaintiffs were paid at an hourly rate and were consistently required to work
55 hours per week and occasionally more than 60 hours per week. Defendants never paid
Plaintiffs time-and-a-half for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a work week. Plaintiffs did
not have a written employment contract with Defendants.
In 2013, one of Unique’s employees, Anselmo, verbally abused, screamed at, and swore
at both Plaintiffs, taunting them to fight him. Plaintiffs reported this to Weller, but he took no
action to punish Anselmo or prevent future workplace violence. In 2014, Anselmo struck
Plaintiff Aquiles Garcia in the face at work. In 2015, Anselmo and another employee
approached Aquiles from both sides and punched him in the face and body several times,

1

resulting in bruises, soreness, and swelling. Both the 2014 and 2015 attacks were in Defendant
Weller’s presence, and he did not take any action to punish the attackers or prevent future
workplace violence. As a consequence, Plaintiff Aquiles alleges that he suffered emotional
distress, including fear and apprehension of another attack.
Aquiles Garcia and Salvador Garcia filed a complaint against Unique Auto Body, Inc.
and Jeremy Weller for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED), and breach of contract in the Third District Court of Utah on April
13, 2016, and served Defendants on July 11, 2016. Defendants removed the case to this Court
on August 1, 2016. After receiving additional information from Defendants regarding the proper
corporate entities to sue, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on August 8, 2016, adding
Defendant Unique Auto Body South Jordan, Inc.
On August 26, 2016, Defendants filed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the Second and
Third Causes of Action. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion on September 23,
2016. On October 10, 2016, Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the court “must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint.” 1 Plaintiffs must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 2
Facial plausibility involves “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”
and requires “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

1

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

2

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
2

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 3 The court must view reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, and a Motion to Dismiss “may be granted only if it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts entitling her to relief under
her theory of recovery.” 4 However, a court is not required to accept conclusory allegations as
true. 5
III. DISCUSSION
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint asserted an IIED claim against all Defendants. However,
Plaintiffs have now clarified that only Plaintiff Aquiles Garcia is asserting an IIED claim, and
that claim is only against Defendant Weller.
To state a claim for IIED, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant “intentionally engaged in
some conduct toward the plaintiff (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b)
where any reasonable person would have known that such would result.” 6 In addition,
Defendant’s actions must be “of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in
that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.” 7
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly declined to extend IIED liability to bystanders. 8
In Cabaness v. Thomas, an employee filed a claim for IIED against a supervisor who “failed to

3

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

4

Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002).

5

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

6

Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486, 499 (Utah 2010) (citations omitted).

7

Id.

8

Id.
3

curb” a subordinate’s misconduct. 9 The subordinate disregarded safety procedures and regularly
insulted and demeaned the employee. 10 The employee sought mental health treatment for
depression related to a “hostile work environment.” 11 The court held that the supervisor was not
liable for “fail[ing] to curb” the subordinate’s behavior. 12 The court reasoned that they were
presented with no “case law supporting the position that the failure to prevent another from
inflicting emotional anguish gives rise to a valid claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.” 13 While the court acknowledged that other jurisdictions have expanded IIED to
include a failure to prevent harm, it explicitly declined to extend the rule. 14
Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that Defendant affirmatively acted in regards
to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew that Unique’s employees had threatened
him with physical harm and physically attacked him twice. Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant Weller took no action to discipline or prevent other employees from future violent
acts toward Plaintiff. Discounting the conclusory allegations, Plaintiff essentially alleges that
Defendant Weller was a bystander who should have disciplined or prevented other employees
from engaging in violent acts. This is not sufficient to sustain an IIED claim under Utah law.
Further, a defendant’s behavior must be outrageous and intolerable to sustain an IIED
claim. “To be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be

9

Id.

10

Id. at 493.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 499.

13

Id.

14

Id.
4

more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair.” 15 Defendant Weller was a bystander, and therefore
his conduct does not reach the level of outrageousness required to support an IIED claim in
Utah. 16
B. Breach of Contract
Both Plaintiffs bring claims under the FLSA for unpaid overtime. Plaintiffs also assert a
common law breach of contract claim for those same overtime wages. Plaintiffs’ breach of
contract claim will be dismissed because the claims under the FLSA and under breach of
contract are based on the same factual allegations. 17 In Stephenson v. All Resort Coach, Inc., this
Court held that where the same factual allegations made up common law claims and an FLSA
claim, the FLSA claim preempted the common law claims. In that case, an employee filed a
claim for unpaid tips under the FLSA and under common law claims for conversion, unjust
enrichment, and quantum meruit. The court held that because the “same allegations ma[de] up a
portion of” the FLSA claim, the common law claims were preempted. In addition, both the First
and the Fourth Circuits have held that “Congress prescribed exclusive remedies in the FLSA for
violations of its mandates.” 18

15

Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 207 (Utah
2001) (citations omitted).
16

In Cabaness, although the Utah Supreme Court did not directly analyze the
outrageousness of the supervisor’s behavior, it did affirm the district court’s
determination that the supervisor’s conduct could not sustain an IIED claim. In its
decision, the district court concluded that the supervisor’s behavior was not sufficiently
outrageous as a matter of law. Cabaness v. Thomas, No. 040700494, 2007 WL 7262293
(Utah Dist. Ct. Jan. 11, 2007). The same is true here.
17

Stephenson v. All Resort Coach, Inc., No. 2:12–CV–1097 TS, 2013 WL 4519781, at *9
(D. Utah Aug. 26, 2013) (Stewart, J.); accord. Johnston v. Davis Sec., 217 F.Supp.2d
1224, 1226–27 (D. Utah 2013) (Kimball, J.).
18

Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 194 (4th Cir. 2007); see Roman v. Maietta
Constr., Inc., 147 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 1998).
5

Plaintiffs contend that their common law claims are not preempted because courts in
other jurisdictions have found circumstances where the FLSA did not preempt common law
claims. However, in each of these cases, other circumstances allowed for a separate cause of
action for the common law claim, including the breadth of available remedies or the presence of
a written contract. 19 No such circumstances apply here. Indeed, the only difference in the claims
is the statute of limitations; the FLSA permits recovery for only two or three years, and Utah
common law for breach of contract allows recovery for four years. Therefore, because the same
factual allegations make up the FLSA claim and the breach of contract claim, the breach of
contract claim is preempted by the FLSA claim and will be dismissed. 20

19

Plaintiff cites multiple cases to support the contention that the FLSA does not preempt
the common law claim in this case. None of these cases, however, stand strictly for that
proposition. Abdulina v. Eberl’s Temp. Services, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1205 (D.
Colo. 2015) (“[Plaintiff] fails to allege facts which establish a right to such payment in a
contract independent of the FLSA.”); Mickle v. Wellman Prod., LLC, No. 08-CV-0297CVE-PJC, 2008 WL 3925266, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 20, 2008) (“If a plaintiff's common
law claims are merely duplicative of the remedies provided by the FLSA, the common
law claims are preempted.”); see also Hammond v. Lowe’s Home Centers, 316 F. Supp.
2d 975, 979 (D. Kan. 2004) (“In other words, an employer may establish contractual
rights to overtime or other payments that exceed the FLSA’s mandate, and an employer
may be held liable for breach of contract if a plaintiff establishes a right to such a
payment in a contract independent of the FLSA.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
20

Defendant also argues that the breach of contract claim fails because there was no
consideration. Since the FLSA claims preempt Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, the
Court need not decide whether the oral employment contract included consideration.
6

IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second and Third Causes of
Action (Docket No. 16) is GRANTED.
DATED this 8th day of November, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

Ted Stewart
United States District Judge

7