LHC-3 v. Remar Investments

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM DECISION and Order denying 4 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Jill N. Parrish on 1/26/17. (jlw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
LHC-3, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability
Company,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2:16-cv-01046-JNP

REMAR INVESTMENTS, LP, a California
Limited Partnership

District Court Judge Jill N. Parrish

Defendant.

Before the court is Plaintiff LHC3’s Motion to Stay, filed December 23, 2016. (Docket
No. 4). Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion on January 9, 2017. (Docket
No. 18). Plaintiff filed a reply to that memorandum on January 18, 2017. (Docket No. 23).
Plaintiff asks this court to issue an order staying arbitration proceedings currently pending in
California. Plaintiff argues that a stay of the arbitration is necessary “to protect LHC3 from the
Arbitrator’s unlawful exercise of jurisdiction over LHC3’s claims.” (Docket No. 4, at 5).
The court concludes that Plaintiff’s request must be denied for several reasons. First, it
appears that Plaintiff has misfiled a motion for preliminary injunction as a motion to stay. These
are distinct motions with separate standards that are not to be confused. 1 More importantly,
Plaintiff has failed to point to a proper source of authority that would allow this court to issue an
injunction staying the arbitration—whether the purported authority arises under Fed. R. Civ. P.

1

A motion to stay invokes “the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its
docket[,]” see Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S. Ct. 163 (1936) (emphasis added), not the docket of
another tribunal. A motion for injunction, by contrast, requests “[a] court order commanding or preventing an
action” by a party. See Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

65 or some applicable state law, Plaintiff does not say. 2 Finally, Plaintiff has not articulated an
appropriate standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction or made any specific arguments
applying the facts of this case to that standard. This deficiency alone precludes the court from
granting Plaintiff’s Motion. See Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d
1276, 1281 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the
movant’s right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” (quoting Wilderness Workshop v. U.S.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Docket No. 4) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 26th day of January, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

_______________________________
The Honorable Jill N. Parrish
District Court Judge

2

Plaintiff briefly references application of the arbitration law of this forum, (Docket No. 4, at 8), but does not
explain how Utah arbitration law could possibly allow the injunction of an arbitration proceeding under California
law. Plaintiff also cites to several cases from other circuits and districts for the proposition that federal courts “have
implied power to enjoin arbitrations as concomitant to the power to compel arbitrations under § 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act.” (Docket No. 4, at 8) (citing, inter alia, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio
Artists, 412 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). From the court’s reading, none of the cited cases held that
federal courts have implied authority to issue injunctions staying arbitrations under the Federal Arbitration Act—
they only held that any authority to enjoin arbitration proceedings was not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Societe Generale de Surveillance , S.A. v. Raytheon European Mgmt. & Sys. Co.,
643 F.2d 863, 867–68 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that authority derived from Massachusetts state law to enjoin an
arbitration underway in Massachusetts was not inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act). To the extent the court
has any authority to stay the proceedings at issue, that authority does not arise from the Federal Arbitration Act.

2