Hargrave v. Neiburh et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS: granting 19 Motion to Dismiss. It is ordered that Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. This action is CLOSED. Signed by Judge David Nuffer on 09/24/2018. (kpf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
DONALD WAYNE HARGRAVE JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Case No. 2:16-cv-1063-DN

DANIEL NEIBURH,
Defendant.

Chief Judge David Nuffer

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss1 is at issue here. Plaintiff responded to the motion.2
Defendant replied to the response.3 Defendant then filed a proposed order based on his Motion to
Dismiss.4 Finally, Plaintiff filed objections to the proposed order.5 Having considered these
filings and being fully advised, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth facts
demonstrating a plausible claim for relief.”6 While a court will “presume[] the truth of all wellpleaded facts in the complaint,” it “need not consider conclusory allegations” in determining
whether a claim for relief is plausible.7 When a plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, the defendant
is entitled to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).8

1

(Doc. No. 19.)
(Doc. No. 22.)
3
(Doc. No. 23.)
4
(Doc. No. 25.)
5
(Doc. Nos. 28 & 29.)
6
Defeudis v. Wolfenden, No. 2:13-CV-429-CW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79069, at *2 (D. Utah June 6, 2014) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
7
Defeudis, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79069, at *5-6 (citations omitted).
8
See Kartiganer v. Juab County, No. 2:10-CV-842-CW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73422, at *4-5 (D. Utah Apr. 6,
2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims with prejudice as “time barred by the statute of limitations”).
2

Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleadings are “’liberally construed’” and held to a
“’less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”9 But “’a pro se plaintiff
requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury,’” and must
therefore “’provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which
relief can be granted.’”10 A court thus will not “’assume the role of advocate for a pro se
lititgant’” by “’supply[ing] additional facts” or “construct[ing] a legal theory for plaintiff that
assumes facts that have not been pleaded.’”11
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was his shift leader at Northern Utah Correctional Center
in 2010, when Defendant withheld documents from Plaintiff that would have been key to
Plaintiff getting a job. Plaintiff alleges that his failure to get a job then caused revocation of his
parole and a return to prison.12 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff filed this federal civil-rights
action on November 2, 2016.
“Utah’s four-year residual statute of limitations . . . governs suits brought under
[§] 1983.”13 And “[a]ctions under § 1983 normally accrue on the date of the [alleged]
constitutional violation,”14 as § 1983 claims “accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know of the injury that is the basis of the action.”15 The Court notes that “[a] plaintiff need not

9

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).
Rudolph v. Hanson, No. 2:14-cv-883-CW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113125, at *1 (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)).
11
Id. (quoting Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989)).
12
Other allegations about mental-health treatment and the length of Plaintiff’s incarceration within his sentence term
are not affirmatively linked to Defendant, so are not further considered here.
13
Fratus v. Deland, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995).
14
Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 2012).
15
Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 482 (10th Cir. 1994).
10

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know the full extent of his injuries before the statute of limitations begins to run,”16 and “it is not
necessary that a claimant know all of the evidence ultimately relied on for the cause of action to
accrue.”17
Thus, in applying the four-year statute of limitations to the facts of this case, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s claim here against Defendant is barred as untimely. Plaintiff’s claim
arises from a single allegation: Defendant’s withholding of documentation that would have
allowed to Plaintiff to set his path toward employment. Though the Court is unable to pinpoint
an exact date that this occurred, the year was definitely 2010. The statute of limitations therefore
expired sometime by the end of 2014. This action was not filed until almost two years later--on
November 2, 2016.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant is barred by the applicable four-year statute of
limitations. As a result, regardless of whether Plaintiff can otherwise state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, his claim against Defendant fails.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.18 This action is
CLOSED.
DATED this 24th day of September, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________________
CHIEF JUDGE DAVID NUFFER
United States District Court

16

Industrial Constructors Corp. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 969 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Romero
v. Lander, 461 F. App’x 661, 669 (2012) (section 1983 case).
17
Baker v. Bd. of Regents of State of Kan., 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).
18
(Doc. No. 19.)

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