Doe v. Brigham Young University

Filing 222

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT - denying 213 Motion to Alter Judgment. See Memorandum Decision for details. Signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins on 4/7/20. (jrj)

FILED
2020 APR 7 AM 11:41
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
JOHN OIRYA,

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

Case No. 2:16-CV-01121-BSJ
District Judge Bruce S. Jenkins

This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff John Oirya’s “Motion for Relief from
Summary Judgment.” 1 Mr. Oirya contends the court’s January 9, 2020 Judgment 2 in favor of
Brigham Young University (“BYU”) should be altered because BYU’s counsel “improperly and
inaccurately represented the Court’s true ruling.” 3 Neither party requested oral argument and
the court finds it can decide the matter on the basis of the written submissions. The court has
carefully considered the parties’ arguments, applicable law, and the relevant facts. Now, being
fully advised, the court will deny Mr. Oirya’s Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment.
I.

SUMMARY OF THE ORDER UNDERLYING JUDGMENT
The court begins with a short summary of its January 9, 2020 Order that led to the

judgment Mr. Oirya now challenges. 4 In short, the court’s January 9 Order granted BYU
summary judgment because Mr. Oirya did not dispute two of BYU’s asserted bases for

ECF No. 213
ECF No. 201.
3
ECF No. 213 at 3.
4
ECF No. 200.
1
2

dismissing him: First, he never received money from the Kenyan government despite earlier
making representations to BYU that he had; and second, he plagiarized material for one of his
courses. The court found these two reasons sufficient to justify Mr. Oirya’s dismissal from
BYU. Also, the court found that–to the extent it needed to consider BYU’s third basis for
dismissal, sexual misconduct–BYU adequately investigated those allegations before dismissing
Mr. Oirya. In addition to these findings, the court noted Mr. Oirya offered no evidence that
BYU’s actions were motivated by gender bias; a failure fatal to his Title IX claims. Finally, the
court noted several independent reasons Mr. Oirya’s state-law claims failed. For example, his
defamation claim failed because: he had no evidence BYU said anything untrue about him;
BYU’s statements were privileged; the statute of limitations barred the claim; and the court
afforded preclusive effect to the District of Alabama’s order, which found Mr. Oirya’s legal
harm was caused by his own misstatements, rather than any statement from BYU. Mr. Oirya
now seeks to challenge the judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60.
II.

ANALYSIS
First, Mr. Oirya asks the court to alter its judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b)

allows a party to seek relief from judgment for enumerated reasons, including, fraud, newly
discovered evidence, and other reasons that undermine the validity of the judgment. Rule 60(b)
relief “is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Zurich N. Am. v.
Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2005). Second, Mr. Oirya also cites Rule
59(e), which allows a party to request the court alter or amend its judgment. “A Rule 59(e)
motion to alter or amend the judgment should be granted only ‘to correct manifest errors of law
or to present newly discovered evidence.’” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir.
2

1997). On the other hand, Rule 59 “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise
arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
Nelson at 929. When considering Mr. Oirya’s arguments, the court is mindful of the Tenth
Circuit’s admonition that “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to
a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 5 In construing Mr. Oirya’s filings, the court must overlook
“plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor
syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements” but the court
must simultaneously refrain from acting as Mr.Oirya’s advocate. Id.
a. Mr. Oirya offers no adequate basis to relieve him from judgment
Mr. Oirya provides no proper basis for the court to alter its judgment under Rule 59(e) or
60(b). In short, the court decided the case based on the issues raised and briefed by the parties–
while Mr. Oirya was represented by counsel–granting summary judgment in favor of BYU on all
of Mr. Oirya’s then-pending claims. As discussed in detail below, Mr. Oirya does not persuade
the court to alter its judgment or otherwise provide him relief.
1. The issues raised and decided at the summary-judgment stage disposed of
all of Mr. Oirya’s claims
Mr. Oirya first raises a procedural objection, suggesting there are over three hundred
outstanding legal issues that must be resolved. He seems to believe the Rules of Civil Procedure
required BYU to address each and every numbered paragraph in his complaint to obtain
While Hall indicates leniency is afforded to “pleadings” subsequent Tenth Circuit cases suggest
this leniency is properly afforded motions as well. See, e.g., Dalton v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 66 F. App'x 824, 825 (10th Cir. 2003) (considering whether district court properly applied
more lenient standards to two motions).
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3

summary judgment. This belief is contrary to the express language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(a), which states: “A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each
claim or defense–or the part of each claim or defense–on which summary judgment is sought.”
As indicated, summary judgment is addressed on a claim-by-claim basis. Rule 56 does not
require a movant to challenge each numbered paragraph in a complaint on an individualized
basis. Instead, the Rule allows for argument on each legal claim, which is comprised of the
various factual allegations in a complaint. BYU sought summary judgment on all of Mr. Oirya’s
legal claims that were pending at the time BYU filed its motion. After briefing from BYU and
Mr. Oirya (while still represented by counsel), the court granted summary judgment in favor of
BYU on all of Mr. Oirya’s claims.
Also, Mr. Oirya suggests BYU did not seek summary judgment on his eighth cause of
action, which alleged violations of immigration law stemming from BYU’s management of his
records in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (“SEVIS”). The court agrees
that this was not raised at summary judgment. Unfortunately for Mr. Oirya, this circumstance
does not avail him because the court previously dismissed this count–with prejudice–based on an
earlier motion BYU filed. 6 Accordingly, BYU had no need to address Mr. Oirya’s immigration
claim at the summary-judgment stage because that claim had already been dismissed. Thus,
nothing remained for trial following summary judgment because all claims had been terminated.
2. Mr. Oirya identifies no new evidence and no fraud or misconduct
perpetrated by BYU
Mr. Oirya brings Rule 60 challenges under subsections 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3), which he
addresses together. The court will address them in the same manner. To obtain relief under Rule
6

See ECF No. 93.
4

60(b)(2), Mr. Oirya must show (1) newly discovered evidence exists; (2) he was diligent in
discovering the new evidence; (3) the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (4) the newly discovered evidence is material; and (5) that further proceedings (i.e.
a new trial) with the newly discovered evidence would probably produce a different result.
Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2005). 7 Next, to prevail
under Rule 60(b)(3), Mr. Oirya must provide “clear and convincing proof” of fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct that substantially interfered with his ability to prepare for trial.
Zurich at 1290.
Mr. Oirya first claims that, until oral argument on December 4, 2019, BYU did not
identify the individuals interviewed during its investigation. 8 Mr. Oirya’s suggestion is mistaken
as revealed by the portion of the hearing transcript he cites. A review of the December 4
Hearing transcript reveals BYU cited to the record while discussing the identities of the
witnesses it interviewed. The portion of the record BYU cited contains its discovery responses
identifying the witnesses at issue and providing further citations to the notes of interview for
each witness, which BYU previously provided to Mr. Oirya in response to his discovery
requests. 9 Thus, Mr. Oirya identifies no new evidence, and no attempt on BYU’s part to
misrepresent these witnesses’ identities.
Mr. Oirya next argues BYU “unlawfully withheld” three witness statements that
exonerate him of any wrongdoing related to the sexual harassment complaint against him.
Similarly, Rule 59(e) allows the court to modify its judgment where a party presents newly
discovered evidence. Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997). While Mr.
Oirya does not separately address Rule59(e), the court considers it nonetheless given Mr. Oirya’s
pro se status.
8
ECF No. 210 at 9–10 (citing Dec 4, 2019, Mot. Hr’g 73:3–18, 81:6–14).
9
ECF No. 190, Ex. 18 at 12–15.
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Again, this argument raises no new evidence because BYU identified these witnesses in its
response to Mr. Oirya’s interrogatory number four. BYU attached its response to interrogatory
number four to its motion for summary judgment. 10 Moreover, all three witness statements
submitted by Mr. Oirya bear a Bates stamp indicating they were part of BYU’s discovery
production. Accordingly, this is not new evidence because it was produced to Mr. Oirya during
discovery. Mr. Oirya may believe BYU had an affirmative duty to raise these matters in its
summary-judgment briefing. Any such belief is mistaken. It was incumbent on Mr. Oirya, via
his counsel, to alert the court to evidence purportedly creating a genuine dispute of material fact
at the summary judgment stage. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Thus, responsibility for any
omission of these statements from the summary-judgment proceedings lies with Mr. Oirya. It
does not constitute fraud on the part of BYU. Accordingly, this issue provides no basis for the
court to grant Mr. Oirya relief from judgment.
Third, Mr. Oirya argues BYU recanted evidence it presented during summary judgment
because BYU’s motion indicated it interviewed eleven fact witnesses during its investigation,
while the draft order BYU prepared, and the court’s Order, indicated BYU interviewed “at least
five fact witnesses.” 11 This argument raises no new evidence because the parties each addressed
this issue during summary judgment. Further, BYU did not commit fraud but rather changed the
language in the proposed order to “at least five witnesses” because Mr. Oirya’s Opposition
conceded BYU had interviewed at least that many witnesses during its investigation. 12 Also, the
court notes that the language “at least five witnesses” is entirely consistent with a scenario in

See ECF No. 190, Ex. 18 at 15.
ECF No. 200 at 9.
12
See ECF No. 194 at 6–7.
10
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which BYU interviewed eleven witnesses. BYU’s amended language more carefully reflects the
parties’ agreed view of the facts. Accordingly, the court does not find these circumstances
constitute fraud on BYU’s part.
Finally, Mr. Oirya suggests the court improperly took judicial notice of facts found by the
U.S. District Court for the District of Alabama. This argument fails for two reasons. First, while
BYU filed a notice of supplemental authority shortly after the District of Alabama issued its
order, 13 Mr. Oirya never opposed BYU’s request for this court to afford preclusive effect to the
District of Alabama’s decision. In fact, Mr. Oirya did not file any response to the notice of
supplemental authority. Likewise, he did not address the matter in his Opposition to BYU’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, which he filed over three weeks after BYU filed its notice. Mr.
Oirya may not ignore an issue on summary judgment and then hope to raise it subsequently in a
motion for relief from judgment. Second, even assuming this court acted improperly by
affording preclusive effect to the Alabama order, that order provides only one of four alternative
bases justifying dismissal of Mr. Oirya’s defamation claim. The court also granted BYU
summary judgment on this issue because the undisputed facts did not reveal any untrue statement
from BYU; BYU’s statements were privileged; and the claims were barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. Thus, even setting the District of Alabama’s proceedings aside, three
sufficient bases remain justifying dismissal of Mr. Oirya’s defamation claim.

13

ECF No. 191.
7

III.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court finds no reason to set aside or modify its judgment. 14

At the summary-judgment stage, Mr. Oirya did not offer evidence to dispute any material facts.
Instead, Mr. Oirya offered explanations for his misconduct that did not impact the legal analysis.
For example, he claimed he was not sufficiently warned that copying material from Wikipedia
constitutes plagiarism. While this assertion may make Mr. Oirya feel less blameworthy, it does
not diminish BYU’s justification for his dismissal. Critically, Mr. Oirya did not deny that he
copied from Wikipedia. Similarly, Mr. Oirya attempts to blame his uncle, Fred Odhiambo, for
Mr. Oirya’s untrue claim that he received financial aid from the Kenyan government. While Mr.
Oirya may have grounds to be upset with his uncle, any miscommunication between them did
not relieve Mr. Oirya of his responsibility to prove he had adequate financial support. Nor does
it relieve him of fault for making inaccurate representations to BYU regarding that support.
Similarly his uncle is without authority to absolve Mr. Oirya of his legal obligations or the
consequences of his statements to BYU. 15 Finally, Mr. Oirya was unable to dispute BYU’s
evidence showing it conducted an adequate investigation of the sexual harassment allegations
against Mr. Oirya and that BYU’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. It is
undisputed that BYU interviewed multiple witnesses, including Mr. Oirya. Further, BYU

14

Mr. Oirya cites the catchall provision found at Rule 60(b)(6), but he makes no discernable
argument for relief from judgment under this provision. “Parties moving for relief under Rule
60(b) cannot simply throw in subsection (6) without any new arguments and expect to obtain a
new trial.” Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1293 (10th Cir. 2005).
15
Further, despite BYU’s efforts to reach Mr. Odhiambo, he was never deposed. Accordingly,
even assuming Mr. Odhiambo could somehow provide a legal excuse for Mr. Oirya’s
misstatement, the record contains no testimony from Mr. Odhiambo.
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allowed Mr. Oirya multiple opportunities to address the allegations against him in writing and to
meet with BYU’s administrators to discuss the charges.
Mr. Oirya understandably prefers the investigation had not resulted in his dismissal.
While the court understands Mr. Oirya’s preference, he offers no sufficient legal basis upon
which the court could grant him relief from judgment. Mr. Oirya is not entitled to the relief he
seeks here because he offers no new evidence and no description of any fraud or similar
wrongdoing on BYU’s part. Accordingly, the court’s January 9, 2020 Judgment will stand.
IV.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Oirya’s Motion to Alter Judgment is hereby DENIED. (ECF

No. 213).
Dated this 7th day of April 2020.
BY THE COURT

______________________________
Bruce S. Jenkins
United States Senior District Judge

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