Domai v. Tuttle

Filing 6

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION dismissing case with prejudice. Signed by Judge Tena Campbell on 8/24/17 (alt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

CENTRAL DIVISION

GUY M. DOMAI,
Plaintiff,

v.

STEVE TUTTLE,

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
DECISION

Case No. 2:17-cv-00446-TC

Judge Tena Campbell

Defendant.

Guy M. Domai brings this action against Steve Tuttle in his capacity as the
Senior Vice President at American Express. Mr. Domai is proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis.
When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis the court “shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-ii).

Yet

“[d]ismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where
it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it

would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of
Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999).
When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint the Court “presumes all of
plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir.
1991).

And when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes his

pleadings liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard. Id. But the “broad
reading of the plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve [him] of the burden of
alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id.
Here, Mr. Domai asserts that he worked for American Express from 2008
through May 20, 2011. Mr. Domai alleges that he was fired after requesting leave
under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Mr. Domai seeks lost wages and
benefits totalling $1 million, attorney fees totalling $350,000, and liquidated
damages totalling $100,000.
Actions for violating the FMLA “may be brought . . . no later than 2 years
after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which the
action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). In the case of a “willful violation,”
the statute of limitations is three years. Id. at § 2617(c)(2).
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Here, Mr. Domai alleges that he stopped working for American Express in
May 20, 2011—the last date on which the statute of limitations could begin to
run. But Mr. Domai did not file the complaint until June 28, 2017, well beyond
the two- or even three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, Mr. Domai’s
complaint is time-barred. No amendment could cure this defect.
Because Mr. Domai’s complaint is time-barred, the court DISMISSES this
case with prejudice.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

TENA CAMPBELL
U.S. District Court Judge

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